Judgment :- 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.12.2003 passed by the first appellate court in A.S.No.39 of 2003 in reversing the judgment and decree dated 31.03.2003 passed by the trial court made in O.S.No.373 of 1998 in dismissing the suit. 2. The appellant herein was the second defendant; the first respondent was the plaintiff and the respondents 2 and 3 were the defendants 1 and 3 before the trial court. The second defendant/appellant remained exparte before the trial court. 3. The case of the plaintiff as stated in the plaint are as follows:- The plaintiff had occupied the suit property several years back, ie., in or about 1970 and had been living there, after putting up construction of a house for dwelling purpose. Some times later, the plaintiff applied for electricity connection and paying house tax for the same. The electricity service connection was obtained. For the occupation of the land, the revenue authorities had granted 'B' memo receipts. Later, Thiruporur Town Panchayat gave water supply connection. The plaintiff put up pakka construction after getting the plan approved. The plaintiff is living in the suit property for nearly three decades. Patta had been granted to the plaintiff for the suit property as early as 1995 and a notice under Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Act 3/1905 was also given in 1970s. The patta for the suit property under Natham Survey is 470. Without violation of any rule, the plaintiff is living there in the suit property for more than 30 years doing all acts of ownership and on the strength and support of the defendants and other revenue authorities and therefore, to contend otherwise, amounts to "Promissory Estoppel" and also "Estoppel by conduct" on the part of the defendants. While that being so, now the first defendant had sent a communication dated 01.12.1998 and received by the plaintiff on 04.12.1998 stating that the patta granted already had been cancelled and directed the authorities/defendant No.3 to take further action. They have no right to take away those rights given to the plaintiff with their full knowledge. Based on the promise and other impetus given by the defendants and other revenue and other authorities, a huge sum of Rs.3,00,000/- had been invested by the plaintiff for the suit property. They have no right to take away those rights given to the plaintiff with their full knowledge. Based on the promise and other impetus given by the defendants and other revenue and other authorities, a huge sum of Rs.3,00,000/- had been invested by the plaintiff for the suit property. One Mahalakshmi, W/o. Mohan had trespassed into the BDO complex and had put up a hotel and running her business there, which is also of the same survey number in the suit property. It is more than four cents. No action was taken and she continues to be there doing her business and this attitude of the defendants is partisan and has bad motives. No ground for eviction is stated in the notice by the first defendant. The cause of action for the suit arose. The plaintiff therefore, filed suit for declaration that the notice cancelling the patta in favour of the plaintiff for the suit property dated 29.09.1998 is void, inoperative and not binding on her and for permanent injunction. 4. The case of the first defendant as stated in the written statement are as follows:- The suit is not maintainable. The obtaining of electricity service connection will not clothe the plaintiff with any title to the suit property. The issue of 'B' memo receipts would only prove that penalty has been imposed for wrongful possession. In law, the serving of notice under the Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act tantamount to eviction as per the decision of the Hon'ble High Court. Hence, the suit for injunction does not lie. Therefore, the plaintiff's possession, even if true, is that of a trespasser only. Under such circumstances, the suit for injunction as against the State, who is the real owner of the suit property, is not maintainable. The suit land S.No.110/C8 measuring 0.0342 sq.metre is classified as 'Village Site'. It is abutting the Panchayat Union Office, Thiruporur. The plaintiff's husband Dorairaj was working as Record Clerk in Panchayat Union Office at Thiruporur. During that time only, he had encroached on the suit site. Then, he created an agreement in favour of his wife in or about 1982 in order to obtain service connection etc., In 1995, the plaintiff has obtained house site patta from the Special Tahsildar (Natham Survey) Thiruporur. The said grant of patta is against rules. Hence, the patta was duly cancelled, by order dated 29.09.1998, after observing all formalities. Then, he created an agreement in favour of his wife in or about 1982 in order to obtain service connection etc., In 1995, the plaintiff has obtained house site patta from the Special Tahsildar (Natham Survey) Thiruporur. The said grant of patta is against rules. Hence, the patta was duly cancelled, by order dated 29.09.1998, after observing all formalities. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The suit does not satisfy the requirements of Section 80 CPC. The suit without statutory notice is bad in law. The suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The plaintiff without filing an appeal against the order of cancellation of patta to the appropriate authority and without exhausting her remedies, has no locus standi to file the suit before this Court. There is no question of estoppel by conduct or otherwise. Notice dated 01.12.1998 is valid. No permission was obtained by the plaintiff from the State before putting up any construction. The plaintiff cannot find fault with the defendants and cannot try to take advantage of her wrongs. The plaintiff has no cause of action to sue. Hence, the suit may be dismissed with exemplary costs under Section 35-A CPC. 5. The trial court after framing necessary issues entered trial. After appraising the evidence adduced on either side, the trial court had come to the conclusion of dismissing the suit without costs. The aggrieved plaintiff had filed an appeal before the first appellate court in A.S.No.39 of 2003 against the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. The first appellate court had heard the arguments advanced on either side and had come to the conclusion of reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court and thus, decreed the suit. 6. Aggrieved second defendant has preferred the second appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court. 7. On admission, this Court had formulated the following substantial questions of law for consideration in the second appeal:- 1. Whether the lower appellate court is correct in coming to the conclusion that the non-issuance of Section 80 notice will not vitiate the suit ? 2. Whether the lower appellate court is correct in coming to the conclusion that the issuance of B-Memo receipt and the non-production of the same will prove the possession of the suit property by the first respondent ? 8. Heard Mr. 2. Whether the lower appellate court is correct in coming to the conclusion that the issuance of B-Memo receipt and the non-production of the same will prove the possession of the suit property by the first respondent ? 8. Heard Mr. S. Parthasarathy, learned counsel for the appellant/second defendant and Mr.T.Murugamanickam, learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff and Mr.M.Venugopal, learned Additional Government Pleader (C.S) for the respondents 2 and 3 / defendants 1 and 3. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit in his argument that the first appellate court failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence without any proper perception. He would further submit that mere issuance of 'B' memo was considered by the first appellate court for the plaintiff found in possession of the suit property for a long period. He would further submit that the plaintiff did not produce any acceptable evidence to prove her long possession over the property and yet, the first appellate court had found that the plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. He would further submit in his arguments that the suit was filed against the Government seeking relief and the non-issuance of notice to be issued under Section 80 CPC was material and in the absence of such issuance of notice under Section 80 CPC would disentitle the plaintiff to get reliefs. He would further submit that the first appellate court did not consider that the plaintiff did not approach the appellate forum and exhaust the remedy, but directly approached the Civil Court. He would also submit that the alleged 'B' memo receipts issued to the plaintiff were not produced before the trial court and yet, the plaintiff was found in possession of the suit property by the first appellate court. He would further submit that the first appellate court ought to have dismissed the suit and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, since no notice was issued under Section 80 CPC. He would further submit that the plaintiff did not plead that the suit property was gramanatham. He would also submit that the patta granted to the plaintiff was cancelled by the Sub-Collector and therefore, the plaintiff did not prove her lawful possession and the possession of her predecessor in title in respect of the suit property. He would further submit that the plaintiff did not plead that the suit property was gramanatham. He would also submit that the patta granted to the plaintiff was cancelled by the Sub-Collector and therefore, the plaintiff did not prove her lawful possession and the possession of her predecessor in title in respect of the suit property. He would further submit that the reference as to the judgment reported in 1998 -3 - LW 603 (Thillaivanam, A.K. and another vs. District Collector, Chengai Anna District and 3 others) and the reliance placed over it are not applicable to the present facts of the case. He would also submit that the case that the notice issued under Section 231 of the Panchayats Act was not valid, is not also sustainable. He would further submit that the suit being filed against the Government, the foremost requirement is issuance of Section 80 CPC notice and since no such notice has been issued, it ought to have been dismissed. He would, therefore, request the Court to interfere and set aside the judgment passed by the first appellate court and thereby, restore the findings reached by the trial court. 10. The learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff would submit in his arguments that the appellant/first defendant remained absent before the trial court and did not file any objections to the pleadings submitted by the plaintiff. He would further submit in his arguments that when the second defendant did not file any written statement, the averments made in the plaint filed by the first respondent / plaintiff are deemed to have been admitted. He would further submit that the suit was erroneously dismissed by the trial court, but it was correctly interfered and set aside by the first appellate court. He would further submit that the second defendant, even though not represented before the trial court, entered appearance in the first appellate court through counsel and put forth its contentions. He would further submit that the second defendant did not opt for filing written statement with the permission of the Court even at the appellate stage nor disputed the pleadings filed by the plaintiff in the appeal. He would further submit that the second defendant did not opt for filing written statement with the permission of the Court even at the appellate stage nor disputed the pleadings filed by the plaintiff in the appeal. He would further submit that the evidence produced before the trial court and the pleadings of both parties were alone considered in the first appeal and the first appellate court had come to the conclusion of decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants 1 and 3, who were the main contestants of the suit as well as in the first appeal, did not prefer any appeal, but the second defendant, who did not file any pleadings nor adduced any evidence, had come forward with this present appeal. He would further submit that the appeal filed by the second defendant is not sustainable. He would further submit that the first appellate court had detailedly discussed the evidence and had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property by virtue of the grant of patta, which was subsequently cancelled by the Sub-Collector, without giving notice to the plaintiff. He would also submit that the issuance of 'B' memo has been rightly admitted by the Government and therefore, there is no necessity to produce those 'B' memos to prove the admitted facts. He would also submit that the classification of land was admittedly 'gramanatham land' and therefore, there cannot be any ownership for the Government so as to exercise its proprietary right over the occupants of such property. He would further submit in his arguments that there are number of judgments of this Court reported in AIR 1959 (2) MLJ 513 (S.Rangaraja Iyengar ..vs.. Achi Kannu Ammal);1998 III LW 603 (Thillaivanam, A.K. and another ..vs.. District Collector, Chengai Anna District and 3 others); 2002 (3) CTC 221 (Krishnamurthy Gounder ..vs.. Government of Tamil Nadu);and 2004 (3) CTC 270 (The Executive Officer, Kadathur Town Panchayat ..vs.. V.Swaminathan); for the principle that the gramanatham lands never vested with the Government nor with Town Panchayat; and the Panchayat or Government had no jurisdiction to pass resolution cancelling the pattas or evicting the persons, who are in the occupation of gramanatham land. Government of Tamil Nadu);and 2004 (3) CTC 270 (The Executive Officer, Kadathur Town Panchayat ..vs.. V.Swaminathan); for the principle that the gramanatham lands never vested with the Government nor with Town Panchayat; and the Panchayat or Government had no jurisdiction to pass resolution cancelling the pattas or evicting the persons, who are in the occupation of gramanatham land. He would further submit in his arguments that the land in question is being a gramanatham land, to which the Government or the appellant / second defendant are not the owners, the plaintiff has no obligation to issue notice under Section 80 CPC. He would also submit that the suit was revolving upon the quasi-judicial proceedings and there is no necessity to issue 80 CPC notice for questioning those proceedings incidentally towards the relief sought for by the plaintiff. He would cite a judgment of this Court reported in 1993 (2) LW 537 (Tholappa Iyengar etc., ..vs.. Executive Officer, Sri Kallalagar Devasthanam etc., & 7 others) in support of his argument. He would rely upon the aforesaid judgment of this Court and further argued that the defendants 1 and 3 ought to have raised the plea, but they remained silent without filing any separate appeal or cross appeal in this appeal and the first defendant, who is not a Government Department, cannot raise such a question in this regard. He would also submit that the stand taken by the first appellate court that Section 80 CPC notice is not necessary and the said finding need not be interfered and therefore, the appeal preferred by the second defendant may be dismissed and the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court may be confirmed. 11. The learned Additional Government Pleader (C.S) would submit in his argument that he did not prefer any appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court, however he is entitled to agitate his case in this appeal. He would further submit that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/second defendant is adopted by the respondents 2 and 3 / defendants 1 and 3 and he has no serious objection in allowing the appeal. 12. I have given anxious thoughts to the arguments advanced on either side. 13. He would further submit that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/second defendant is adopted by the respondents 2 and 3 / defendants 1 and 3 and he has no serious objection in allowing the appeal. 12. I have given anxious thoughts to the arguments advanced on either side. 13. The suit was originally filed by the plaintiff for permanent injunction against the defendants in any way interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The claim of the plaintiff was that she had occupied the suit property several years back, ie., in or about 1970 and had been living there, after putting up construction of a house for dwelling purpose. Some times later, the plaintiff applied for electricity connection and paying house tax for the same. The electricity service connection was obtained. For the occupation of the land, the revenue authorities had granted 'B' memo receipts. Later, Thiruporur Town Panchayat gave water supply connection. The plaintiff put up pakka construction after getting the plan approved. The plaintiff is living in the suit property for nearly three decades. Patta had been granted to the plaintiff for the suit property as early as 1995 and a notice under Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Act 3/1905 was also given in 1970s. The patta for the suit property under Natham Survey is 470. She was in possession of the suit property for more than three decades. The said suit property being gramanatham land, the plaintiff was given patta recognising her possession and enjoyment of the suit property. It is also the case of plaintiff that she put up thatched house at the suit property and she was in possession and enjoyment of the same. While that being so, the first defendant had sent a communication dated 01.12.1998 stating that the patta granted already had been cancelled and directed the authorities/defendant No.3 to take further action. They have no right to take away those rights given to the plaintiff with their full knowledge. Hence, the suit for declaration and for consequential injunction. 14. However, the defendants 1 and 3 filed a written statement objecting the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff in the suit property and it was also submitted that the patta issued to the plaintiff was cancelled on 29.09.1998. Hence, the suit for declaration and for consequential injunction. 14. However, the defendants 1 and 3 filed a written statement objecting the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff in the suit property and it was also submitted that the patta issued to the plaintiff was cancelled on 29.09.1998. It is also categorically stated in the written statement that the property was classified as gramanatham and the patta granted to the plaintiff in the year 1995 was cancelled in the year 1998 as aforesaid. The evidence adduced by the defendants 2 and 3 through DW.1 would go to show that the suit property was comprised in S.No.110/C1 and it was classified as gramanatham. Even DW.1 had admitted in his cross examination that it was still classified as gramanatham as on the date of his cross examination. Exs.B1 and B2 would also go to show that the suit property was classified as gramanatham. Therefore, the principles laid down by this Court in various judgments right from 1959 onwards would be binding upon the trial court as well as the first appellate court. 15. In the judgment reported in AIR 1959 (2) MLJ 513 cited supra, it has been categorically laid down as follows:- " It is contended that in relation to buildings, specific provision is made under Section 18 of Act XXVI of 1948 and that, consequently, unless a house-site can be brought within the ambit of Section 18, such house-site should be held to be property as to which title gets transferred to the Government under Section 3(b). Section 18 deals, in my opinion, with buildings wherever they may be situate, whether in the gramanatham or in ryoti lands or pannai lands or waste lands. Section 18 has no particular application to buildings or house-sites in a gramanatham. A building in a gramanatham (or village habitation) is protected from transfer of title to the Government both under Section 18(1) of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 and under the Madras Land Encroachment Act (III of 1905). The title to a house site in a gramanatham is protected from transfer to Government by the operation of Madras Act III of 1905. The title to a house site in a gramanatham is protected from transfer to Government by the operation of Madras Act III of 1905. It is not necessary that in order that the policy underlying Madras Act XXVI of 1948 be completely given effect to, house-sites belonging to private individuals (that is persons other than the land holder) in a gramanatham, should be transferred to the Government. It is not part of the policy of the Act to transfer to the Government, land in which the proprietor had no interest at any time. Further, transfer of title of such house-sites to the Government would be virtually without payment of compensation, because there would be no means of determining the part of the total compensation payable for the estate as a whole, which should be regarded as compensation paid for a few cents of house-sites in a hamlet of the village. Therefore, if there is any ambiguity in the Act, in relation to transfer of title as to a house site, such ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the owner, because no legislation should be held to be expropriatory in character, if such an inference could possibly be avoided. I hold that Section 3(b) of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 does not have the effect of transferring to the Government title to a house site within a gramanatham belonging to a person other than the land holder when the estate in which the house site is situate is taken over under a notification issued under the Act." 16. Subsequently, in the judgment reported in 1998 (III) LW 603 cited supra, it has been held as follows:- "27. Thus it is obvious, the admitted classification of the land being a gramanatham, the land was never vested with the respondents nor they could take action under the Land Encroachment Act or any other enactment. The petitioners state they have exclusive right, title, possession, since 1954 onwards. The respondents have no right to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land and their action in giving a complaint for alleged offence under Section 420 of the IPC is total misconception." 17. In yet another judgment reported in 2002 (3) CTC 221 cited supra, it has been held as follows:- "11. ..... The respondents have no right to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land and their action in giving a complaint for alleged offence under Section 420 of the IPC is total misconception." 17. In yet another judgment reported in 2002 (3) CTC 221 cited supra, it has been held as follows:- "11. ..... When the appellant has been in exclusive possession of the property and their predecessors in title were also in enjoyment of the land without interference by any person, the appellant has acquired a valid right to the land by their exclusive possession. The village natham is a land which never vested with the respondents and they have no right over it. Admittedly when the land has been classified as village natham, it is obvious that no portion of the land vests with the respondents under Section 2 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1905." 18. In the judgment reported in 2004 (3) CTC 270 cited supra, the first Bench of this Court had categorically explained about the nature of gramanatham lands and what is the proprietary right of the Government over the said land. The relevant passage would run as follows:- "12. Further, 'Grama Natham' is defined in the Law Lexicon as "ground set apart on which the house of village may be built". Similarly, Natham land is described in Tamil Lexicon published under the authority of University of Madras to the effect that it is a residential portion of a village; or portion of a village inhabited by the non-Brahmins; or land reserved as house sites; etc. 13. In the light of the above and in view of the fact that the admitted classification of the land being a 'Grama Natham', it is obvious that the land was never vested with the Government or the Town Panchayat. Inasmuch as the petitioners and their ancestors were in exclusive possession of the lands in question for the past 40 years, the impugned order of the third respondent in cancelling the pattas with a view to evict them, summarily at the instance of the resolution passed by the Panchayat, is not sustainable. Further, such a summary eviction is not permissible in law when the disputed question of title is involved for adjudication as laid down by the Apex Court in number of decisions." 19. Further, such a summary eviction is not permissible in law when the disputed question of title is involved for adjudication as laid down by the Apex Court in number of decisions." 19. When one of the judgments reported in 1998 III LW 603 was cited before the trial court, it had referred to the principles laid down in the said judgment, but it has simply stated that it does not add strength to the case of the plaintiff. The trial court did not say in what way the said principle laid down by this Court does not add strength to the plaintiff is not explained in the said judgment. However, it has been referred that the plaintiff did not plead that the Government has no right to cancel the patta and therefore, the right claimed by the plaintiff was not valid and thus, the plaintiff was not entitled to the suit property. The trial court did not see the evidence properly. The patta was cancelled on 29.09.1998 and then only the suit was filed on 09.12.1998. Therefore, the finding reached by the trial court was without application of mind and without any proper perspective of the evidence adduced by the parties. The first appellate court has rightly come to the conclusion that the finding of the trial court was sheerly not in accordance with the evidence. 20. However, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant/second defendant that the plaintiff did not comply with the provisions of Section 80 CPC. The said question was not raised by the defendants 1 and 3, who are the Government Departments, by filing any separate appeal or cross appeal in this appeal. The respondents 2 and 3 had simply supported the case of the appellant. By virtue of the aforesaid pearls rolling judgments detailed above, it is very clear that the Government has no proprietary right over the suit property, since it being a gramanatham land. When the Government as well as the appellant/second defendant are expected to act in accordance with law had come forward to interfere with the plaintiff's right in the property without resorting to legal process. The ultimate process taken by the Government was to cancel the patta. In the said circumstances, there is no necessity for issuing any notice under Section 80 CPC, which do not warrant any circumstance as contemplated in Section 80 CPC. The ultimate process taken by the Government was to cancel the patta. In the said circumstances, there is no necessity for issuing any notice under Section 80 CPC, which do not warrant any circumstance as contemplated in Section 80 CPC. The first appellate court was right in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff established her right to the suit property and the defendants had no right in the property, and therefore, the interference caused by the defendants was not purported to be done by such public officer in his official capacity. Therefore, the requirement of issuance of Section 80 CPC notice is not necessary in this case. The first appellate court had rightly come to the conclusion that the issuance of Section 80 CPC notice was not necessary, which is quite acceptable. 21. Therefore, I find no reasons to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court. The questions of law framed by this Court in this appeal are also not decided in favour of the appellant, but in favour of the first respondent/plaintiff. 22. For the foregoing discussions, I am of the considered view that the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court are not liable to be disturbed and accordingly, they are confirmed. The Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed and thereby, the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court are confirmed. No order as to costs.