Judgment : MADAN B. LOKUR, J. 1. This writ appeal has been filed by ten appellants who are owners and occupiers of shops in a building which is identifiable as “Margadarshi Building”. The shops bear No.6-1-1062/5 to 11 on the first floor; No.6-1-1062/12 to 17 on the second floor; No.6-1-1062/10/B and No.6-1-1062/2/A (on the terrace) on Raj Bhavan Road, Lakdikapool, Hyderabad. Margadarshi Building is situated on the road from Sant Nirankari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel. For convenience, the appellants are referred to as the shop owners. 2. For reasons that will be clear a little later, it is important to note that M/s Margadarshi Chit Fund Private Limited (appellant No.9) is the owner and occupier of shop No.6-1-1062/17 and shop No.6-1-1062/10/B. 3. The shop owners are aggrieved by a judgment and order dated 12.10.2011 passed by a learned Single Judge dismissing their writ petition bearing No.14345 of 2011. In our opinion, the shop owners have not made out any case for interference with the judgment and order under appeal and consequently, their appeal is required to be dismissed. The facts: 4. Some time in 2002, the respondents that is the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC), the Assistant City Planner and the Special Deputy Collector (LA) prepared a road development plan, inter alia, for the area that we are concerned with. The plan was approved and preliminary steps were taken for acquisition of land through negotiations for the road development project. 5. Apparently pursuant to that plan, by a letter dated 1.2.2003, the Assistant City Planner informed the father of appellant No.3 that there is a proposal to widen the road from Sant Nirankari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel to 100 feet and that his shop will be affected upto a depth of 10 feet. His cooperation was sought in the matter of handing over possession of the affected area in the road widening project in public interest. It is not clear from the record what follow-up action was taken on this proposal. 6. Be that as it may, on 22.11.2006, a proposal was initiated by the respondents to acquire properties for the road widening project. The proposal included premises bearing No.6-1-1062/5 to 11 in Margadarshi Building to an extent of 282.81 square yards, the break being 143.56 square yards + 139.25 square yards. 6. Be that as it may, on 22.11.2006, a proposal was initiated by the respondents to acquire properties for the road widening project. The proposal included premises bearing No.6-1-1062/5 to 11 in Margadarshi Building to an extent of 282.81 square yards, the break being 143.56 square yards + 139.25 square yards. It has been explained to us by the learned Advocate General that the shops on the first floor bearing No.6-1-1062/5 to 11 have an area of 143.56 square yards and the shops above them (though not specifically mentioned) have an area of 139.25 square yards. 7. On 10.1.2007, the Assistant City Planner informed appellant No.9 that it is proposed to widen the existing road from Sant Nirankari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel to 100 feet to ensure free flow of traffic. It was also mentioned that in the road widening program, premises bearing No.6-1-1062/5 to 11 would be affected upto a depth of 20 feet admeasuring 191.11 square yards. Appellant No.9 was requested to extend cooperation by consenting to hand over advance possession of the affected area in public interest. It may be noticed at this stage that while the proposal made on 1.2.2003 to the father of appellant No.3 indicated that the affected portion would be up to a depth of 10 feet, the proposal made on 10.1.2007 indicated that the portion affected would be up to a depth of 20 feet. 8. Pursuant to the intention of the respondents to acquire land for road widening, a draft notification under Section 4 and a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’) was prepared on 15.2.2007. The drafts were approved by the Collector, Hyderabad District and on 26.2.2007, a notification under Section 4 of the Act and a declaration under Section 6 of the Act both read with Section 17 thereof were published in the daily newspapers. 9. At this stage, it is important to note that in the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, the premises sought to be acquired was described as bearing No.6-1-1062/5 to 11 having an area of 139.25 square yards. We are told that inadvertently, the remaining portion of 143.56 square yards was described as belonging to premises No.6-1-1063/1 to 4. We may note that it is nobody’s case that the area of 143.56 square yards belongs to premises No.6-1-1063/1 to 4. We are told that inadvertently, the remaining portion of 143.56 square yards was described as belonging to premises No.6-1-1063/1 to 4. We may note that it is nobody’s case that the area of 143.56 square yards belongs to premises No.6-1-1063/1 to 4. In any event, the notification did cover the entire area of 139.25 square yards plus 143.56 square yards = 282.81 square yards in Margadarshi Building (apart from other areas that we are not concerned with). 10. Feeling aggrieved by the publication of the notification acquiring the land of the shop owners, while dispensing with their opportunity of filing objections under Section 5A of the Act, they filed Writ Petition No.5789 of 2007 in this Court. That writ petition was filed by the owners of premises bearing No.6-1-1062/5 to 11 on the first floor as well as by the owners of premises bearing No.6-1-1062/12 to 17 on the second floor. As mentioned above, M/s Margadarshi Chit Fund Private Limited (appellant No.9) is the owner and occupier of shop No.6-1-1062/17 and shop No.6-1-1062/10/B. For reasons that are not clear, M/s Margadarshi Chit Fund Private Limited did not file a writ petition in respect of shop No.6-1-1062/10/B. It seems to us that the misdescription of the premises sought to be acquired did not mislead any of the shop owners, other than perhaps, the owner of shop No.6-1-1062/2/A (on the terrace) who was not a party to that writ petition. 11. Writ Petition No.5789 of 2007 was disposed of by a learned Single Judge by an order dated 26.3.2007 holding that there was no urgency in acquiring the shops. Therefore, the writ petitioners should be given a hearing in accordance with Section 5A of the Act and only thereafter, a decision should be taken for acquisition. 12. On 13.4.2007, the respondents invited objections from all the parties concerned and an enquiry was fixed for 22.5.2007. It is interesting to note that of the ten shop owners who are before us, nine of them filed objections to the acquisition process. It is not clear exactly who the objectors were. 13. From the record before us, it appears that the main objection of the shop owners to the acquisition was that land up to a depth of 10 feet only should be acquired from their side of the road and the remaining 10 feet ought to be acquired from across the road. 13. From the record before us, it appears that the main objection of the shop owners to the acquisition was that land up to a depth of 10 feet only should be acquired from their side of the road and the remaining 10 feet ought to be acquired from across the road. In this manner, it was submitted that the respondents would have their total of 20 feet for the road widening project. 14. The objections filed by the shop owners were heard on 22.5.2007 and by a decision taken on 26.11.2007, the Special Deputy Collector (LA) rejected the objections. 15. Thereafter a declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued followed by a declaration for making an Award under the provisions of the Act. Eventually, on 19.12.2009 the Award was published by the respondents. 16. On 11.3.2011, the Assistant City Planner wrote to the concerned Executive Engineer attaching sketch plans of the affected properties and requested him to prepare a structural evaluation. While this process was going on, by a letter dated 28.4.2011, all the shop owners (except the owner of shop No.6-1-1062/15) requested the respondents that land up to a depth of 10 feet be taken from their side of the road for which they would not even claim compensation, except to the extent of the building/structure as per the municipal rules. 17. Since the representation dated 28.4.2011 was not considered by the respondents, the shop owners (including the owner of premises bearing No.6-1-1062/15) preferred a writ petition in this Court challenging the acquisition. The prayer made in the writ petition, significantly, was for a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in threatening to demolish their shops without passing any final orders on their representation dated 28.4.2011 as illegal and arbitrary. No relief was claimed with regard to acquisition process as such. 18. The respondents contested the writ petition and some time in early August, 2011 they filed an additional counter affidavit in which it was disclosed that the shop owners had earlier filed a writ petition (being W.P.No.5789 of 2007) and that they had also filed objections under Section 5A of the Act and participated in the enquiry. 19. 18. The respondents contested the writ petition and some time in early August, 2011 they filed an additional counter affidavit in which it was disclosed that the shop owners had earlier filed a writ petition (being W.P.No.5789 of 2007) and that they had also filed objections under Section 5A of the Act and participated in the enquiry. 19. During the final hearing of the case before the learned Single Judge, the shop owners filed a reply affidavit dated 15.8.2011 in which it was alleged for the first time that the notification issued by the respondents under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act pertained only to premises bearing No.6-1-1062/5 to 11 and that the other premises namely bearing No.6-1-1062/12 to 17 (second floor) and No. 6-1-1062/10/B and No. 6-1-1062/2/A on the terrace were left out of the acquisition process. No such plea was taken by the shop owners at any earlier point of time. 20. As mentioned above, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the shop owners. Judgment and order under appeal: 21. In the judgment and order under appeal, the learned Single Judge framed four issues for consideration. They are as follows: 1. Whether the respondents have discriminated against the petitioners in seeking to acquire their properties? 2. Whether the property bearing premises No.6-1-1062/12 to 17, No.6-1-1062/10/B and No.6-1-1062/2/A are covered by the acquisition? 3. Whether the petitioners had knowledge of the acquisition proposals in respect of their properties and they have acquiesced in raising objection for the first time by way of a reply affidavit in this writ petition? 4. Whether the acquisition proceedings are liable to be interfered with on the ground of hardship to the petitioners? 22. Insofar as the first issue is concerned, the contention advanced on behalf of the shop owners was that land from across the road could also have been acquired and, therefore, it is not as if the road widening process has to be completed only on the basis of acquisition of land of the writ petitioners up to a depth of 20 feet. The learned Single Judge was of the view, and in our opinion quite rightly, that it was not open to the shop owners to suggest alternative land for acquisition. 23. The learned Single Judge was of the view, and in our opinion quite rightly, that it was not open to the shop owners to suggest alternative land for acquisition. 23. In so far as issue Nos.2 and 3 are concerned, it was held that the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act covered the premises of the shop owners even though it may not have been accurately described. The shop owners, in fact, had knowledge that their property was sought to be acquired and they had participated in the acquisition process. It was held that the shop owners could not rely upon a typographical or inadvertent error to get out the acquisition process, particularly when such an objection was not taken at any point prior to the filing of the reply affidavit dated 15.8.2011. 24. The submissions made before the learned Single Judge have been reiterated before us by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the shop owners. Findings and conclusions: A. Acquisition of alternative land 25. As far as the issue of discrimination against the shop owners is concerned, the argument advanced is to the effect that the respondents could or should acquire land upto a depth of 10 feet from the shop owners and the remaining 10 feet could or should have been acquired from across the road. It is submitted that if this is done, the shops of the shop owners could be saved from demolition and, for the purposes of road widening, the respondents could achieve their objective through land acquired from across the road upto a depth of 10 feet. 26. At this stage, it is necessary to note that the shop owners have not denied the public purpose namely, widening of the road. For achieving the public purpose, whether property ‘A’ or property ‘B’ is to be acquired is a decision that the acquiring authority must take and the courts have very little or no say in the matter. Similarly, even the owner of a property has very little or no say in the matter. 27. A similar issue arose in Union of India v. K. Balaji Jaya Rama Rao (2007) 15 SCC 791. Similarly, even the owner of a property has very little or no say in the matter. 27. A similar issue arose in Union of India v. K. Balaji Jaya Rama Rao (2007) 15 SCC 791. In that case, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 19 as follows: “………….It is for the Government to decide whether this property is to be acquired or some other property is to be acquired. It is not open to an owner to say that some other property is more suitable. If that were to be permitted then every owner will say that some other property is better and that that property must be acquired instead of his own. So long as the property was required for a public purpose, the mere fact that some other property could have been acquired is not a ground on which the High Court can say that the reasoning for acquisition is not sufficient.” 28. That apart, even on merits, the respondents have actually considered this aspect of the matter. In their counter affidavit dated Nil June, 2011 filed before the learned Single Judge, the respondents stated that road widening from Sant Nirankari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel could be taken up in two stretches – the first stretch from Lakdikapool to Sant Nirankari Bhavan and the second stretch from Sant Nirankari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel. It is stated that the width of the existing road in the two stretches is not uniform and is between 60 and 70 feet. On taking up the road widening process, no uniform measure can be adopted because it would vary from point to point depending upon the actual width of the road at each point. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that an elaborate exercise was carried out on the feasibility of the road widening project keeping in view the volume of traffic, projections of future increase in traffic and the importance of the road attracting traffic from all corners of the city. The respondents have stated that the second stretch from Sant Nirankari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel (with which we are concerned) has a steeper gradient towards Dwaraka Hotel and as such all vehicles coming from Ayodhya Junction and from other corners of Panjagutta are likely to converge at Sant Nirankari Bhavan and proceed towards Dwaraka Hotel to take a left turn towards Telephone Bhavan. They have also stated that the area is likely to have traffic from all sides and due to the steep gradient of the area, vehicles are likely to gather speed on the left side of the road which would necessitate widening to 20 feet as against 10 feet claimed by the shop owners. When the road development plan was prepared, the GHMC took all these factors into consideration and it was then decided to widen the road to 100 feet with 20 feet widening proposal on the left side that is on the side of the shop owners. 29. The respondents have also stated in their counter affidavit that it is not correct that the land across the road has been ignored. Road widening is also taking place across the road and negotiations are also in process from other land owners, including Global Hospital to surrender some land for the purpose of road widening. 30. As regards future projections, it is stated by the respondents in their counter affidavit that a high quality mass transit facility for Hyderabad called the Metro Rail System under Hyderabad Metro Rail Limited is being planned and corridor No.1 thereof passes through the road under reference and the Metro Rail station is likely to be located on this road and that too would attract a heavy flow of traffic. It is averred that under these circumstances, the road widening is in public interest and is necessary. 31. The shop owners filed a reply affidavit to the said affidavit before the learned Single Judge on 28th June, 2011 in which they re-affirmed their view that land directly across the road could be taken up for acquisition. In fact, the shop owners have gone a step further and have stated in the reply affidavit that as per their calculation, even acquisition of their land up to a depth of 10 feet is not required and it would be sufficient if the respondents acquire land only up to a depth of 5.7 feet for completion of the road widening project. 32. Given these facts and considerations, it is hardly possible for us to substitute our view or the view of the shop owners for the view of the city planners. 32. Given these facts and considerations, it is hardly possible for us to substitute our view or the view of the shop owners for the view of the city planners. Neither we, nor the shop owners have any expertise in the subject, and unless the view of the city planners seems completely irrational, we do not think it appropriate to interfere in the matter. The public purpose is not in question, nor is the decision making process in question. That being so it is apt that we restrain ourselves from interfering in the subject matter. In any case, as has been held by the Supreme Court, it is hardly within our jurisdiction to decide which land is suitable for acquisition. It is essentially and eventually a decision that has to be taken by the respondents and in the absence of any mala fides having been alleged against them, we cannot sit in judgment over which actual parcel of land should be acquired by the respondents. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the shop owners in this regard must be rejected. B. Knowledge of the acquisition proceedings 33. As far as the issue whether property bearing No.6-1-1062/12 to 17, No.6-1-1062/10/B and No.6-1-1062/2/A are covered by the acquisition and whether the owners of these properties had knowledge of the acquisition that too must be answered against the shop owners. We propose to deal with these issues together since they are interlinked. 34. As far as the law on the subject is concerned, we have to keep in mind the observation of the Supreme Court in Kubic Darusz v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 568 that we ought not to put common sense in cold storage. Looking at the matter from this point of view, we cannot forget that all the shop owners are adjacent to each other and are located in the same building, which does not seem to be particularly large. Talk of acquisition for the purpose of road widening has been going on in the area from sometime in 2002. Correspondence has also been exchanged between some shop owners and the respondents. It is also on record that negotiations were going on between both parties so that the shop owners could amicably vacate the shops in question so that the road widening process could proceed. Correspondence has also been exchanged between some shop owners and the respondents. It is also on record that negotiations were going on between both parties so that the shop owners could amicably vacate the shops in question so that the road widening process could proceed. In these circumstances, it is difficult to accept that any shop owner was oblivious of the events relating to the acquisition process. 35. In this context, the Supreme Court in Swaran Lata v. State of Haryana (2010) 4 SCC 532 relied upon a Constitution Bench judgment in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 285 and observed: “7. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi while dealing with the issue, observed as under: (SCC p. 291, para 11) “11. … To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners.” 36. The Supreme Court noted in Swaran Lata (and that is also the situation in the present appeal) that the shop owners had not set up a case that they were unaware of the acquisition proceedings. In Swaran Lata, the Supreme Court noted that the only ground taken by the petitioners in the writ petition filed by them in the High Court was that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act have been published in the newspapers not having a wide circulation. The Supreme Court noted that even if that submission were to be accepted, it cannot be presumed that the petitioners therein were not aware of the acquisition proceedings for the reason that a very huge chunk of land belonging to a large number of tenure-holders had been notified for acquisition. The Supreme Court observed that the acquisition should have been the talk of the town. 37. Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, it is quite clear that no shop owner can truthfully deny knowledge of the acquisition proceedings. The Supreme Court observed that the acquisition should have been the talk of the town. 37. Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, it is quite clear that no shop owner can truthfully deny knowledge of the acquisition proceedings. The issue of acquisition of land for the purpose of road widening has been the subject matter of discussion from 2002 onwards; correspondence had been exchanged between some of the shop owners and the respondents; the number of shop owners is rather small; all the shop owners are more or less adjacent to each other and all of them are located in the same building; all of them will be affected by the acquisition process; neighbouring properties have already been acquired and demolished for the road widening project. Under these circumstances, it can be said that those of the shop owners who disclaim knowledge of the unfolding events, are really “fence sitters” adopting dilatory tactics to stall the implementation of the road widening process. 38. The view that we have taken is fortified by the fact that almost all the shop owners had earlier filed WP No.5789 of 2007 in this Court challenging the invocation of the urgency clause in the acquisition process. That being so they cannot now deny knowledge of the acquisition process. It is quite obvious that all of them were aware of the proposal to acquire their land for the road widening project. 39. For the first time in their reply affidavit attested on 15.8.2011 that the shop owners raised the plea that the owners of shop Nos.6-1-1062/12 to 17 and shop No.6-1-1062/2/A (Terrace) were not aware of the acquisition proceedings and that their premises had not been acquired by the respondents. On the other hand, it is these very persons who had filed Writ Petition No.5789 of 2007. It does not lie in their mouth to now say that they were not aware of the acquisition proceedings. 40. Additionally, of the shop owners before us, nine out of ten had filed objections under Section 5A of the Act and they were, in fact, given a hearing before the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to accept the plea that some of the shop owners were unaware of the acquisition proceedings. 41. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to accept the plea that some of the shop owners were unaware of the acquisition proceedings. 41. It is also important to note in this context that in the writ petition filed by the appellants, they did not disclose any of these facts, more particularly the fact of their having filed Writ Petition No.5789 of 2007 or the fact of their having filed objections under Section 5A of the Act or of the fact that they were given a hearing by the respondents on the objections filed by them. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge was rather charitable in entertaining the writ petition filed by the shop owners despite this material concealment of facts – in fact, the writ petition ought to have been rejected on the ground of concealment of material facts. 42. We may mention that the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act as well as the declaration under Section 6 of the Act do show an apparent mis-description of the premises numbers that we are concerned with. The shops which are the subject matter of objection bearing Nos.6-1-1062/12 to 17, No.6-1-1062/10/B and 6-1-1062/2/A are shown to be forming a part of premises No.6-1-1063/1 to 4. We have been told at the Bar that premises No.6-1-1063/1 to 4 has an area of 144.99 square yards, whereas the notification and declaration show the area to be 144.99 and 143.56 square yards. Factually, this is incorrect. The area of 143.56 square yards is actually part of premises bearing No.6-1-1062, but it has inadvertently been shown in premises bearing No.6-1-1063. 43. The misdescription in the notifications has occurred in the following manner: 44. We could have understood that the parties in the normal course of events could have been misled, but given the facts of the case, as are present before us and the history of the litigation, it is quite clear that the appellants before us could certainly not have been caught unawares or were confused whether their shops have been acquired or not. 45. We may also mention that in the Award dated 19.12.2009, the correction has been made and premises No.6-1-1062 has been shown as comprising of two parts, one having an area of 143.56 square yards and the other having an area of 139.25 square yards. 45. We may also mention that in the Award dated 19.12.2009, the correction has been made and premises No.6-1-1062 has been shown as comprising of two parts, one having an area of 143.56 square yards and the other having an area of 139.25 square yards. The correction having been made in the Award and that having not been challenged by any of the appellants, clearly shows that none of them has any doubt that their shops has been acquired by the respondents by issuing an appropriate notification under Section 4 of the Act and a declaration under Section 6 of the Act. 46. Finally, on the issue of prejudice having been caused to any of the shop owners, we may say that the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents has stated that all the shop owners would be treated equally and would entitled to compensation at appropriate rates and that there would be no differentiation. In our opinion this should satisfy the shop owners. Result: 47. In view of the above, we find no merit in the appeal warranting interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.