JUDGMENT Per: ADITYA KUMAR TRIVEDI, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to a judgment dated 5th April, 1990 passed by Sessions Judge, Purnea in Sessions Trial No.41 of 1987 whereby and where under sole appellant Sk. Ilias alias Ilwa has been found guilty for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for life. 2. Telltale of prosecution case begins with institution of First Information Report (Ext.-3) by Md. Ishaque (PW-5) wherein he had stated that on the same day when he along with his uncle Ainul, son of Sk. Himja Ali, had gone to market and had also visited toddy shop of Halim they had found appellant Md. Ilwa present since before. It has been alleged the appellant on seeing Md. Ainul, began to abuse him and had also threatened him of being taught a lesson then and there, for getting him disrobed of his lungi at Araria whereafter he also began to assault Ainul. But before it could have turned into a nasty event the situation was averted on the intervention of Sk. Halim the toddy shopkeeper who along with Md. Ajim and others had asked them to leave the place. According to the informant, they had proceeded from the toddy shop but no sooner they had covered a distance of 200 yards west therefrom and had reached on a road, the appellant, Ilwa having Chhura in his hand came running and pierced it in the left side of the chest of Md. Ainul as a result whereof he fell down and when the informant had tried to apprehend the appellant Ilwa, he too was inflicted Chhura blow leading to cut injuries in the fingers of his right hand. The informant had claimed while appellant Ilwa having caused injuries had fled away, Md. Ainul had met his instantaneous death at the spot. The motive for such occurrence in the fardbeyan of the informant is that in the previous month of Ramjan while his uncle Ainul (deceased) had gone to offer Alwida Namaz, the appellant Md. The informant had claimed while appellant Ilwa having caused injuries had fled away, Md. Ainul had met his instantaneous death at the spot. The motive for such occurrence in the fardbeyan of the informant is that in the previous month of Ramjan while his uncle Ainul (deceased) had gone to offer Alwida Namaz, the appellant Md. Ilwa had stolen away a wrist watch of a Maulwi and for that his body was searched by stripping of his clothes at the instance of deceased and during course thereof the aforesaid stolen wrist watch was recovered from his possession leading to his being severely reprimanded and thus the occurrence in question was committed by the appellant to avenge that humiliation suffered by him in the hands of the appellant. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid fardbeyan Jokihat P.S. Case No. 18 of 1986 was registered under Section 302 of the IPC whereupon the investigation commenced and the police after completing the same, had submitted a charge sheet which was followed by orders taking cognizance and commitment of the Court of Sessions whereafter completion of trial, he having been convicted by the impugned judgment has filed this appeal. 4. The defence case as is evident from mode of cross-examination as well as statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is one of innocence as well as complete denial of occurrence in the manner alleged but neither any defence witness was examined nor any document has been exhibited on his behalf. 5. While assailing the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court, it has been submitted Mr. Ashok Priyadarshi learned counsel on behalf of the appellant that the learned lower court should have considered that the prosecution case actually was suffering from inherent infirmities. In this regard, it has been submitted that save and except PW-5, the informant, none happens to be an eyewitness to the occurrence and as such when his evidence is both sketchy and shaky the trial court ought to have rejected it altogether. In this regard, it has been submitted that save and except PW-5, the informant, none happens to be an eyewitness to the occurrence and as such when his evidence is both sketchy and shaky the trial court ought to have rejected it altogether. It has also been submitted that the place of occurrence as flashed by the prosecution could not be established in the evidence of PW-5 then only eyewitness to the occurrence specially when the same happens to be near the village market located in village-Jokihat and thus in absence of any of the witness, other than PW-5 who being informant had claimed himself to be sole eyewitness of occurrence is actually suggestive of the fact that neither any occurrence took place at the place of occurrence as was suggested by the prosecution much less in the manner alleged by PW-5. 6. It has further been submitted that neither the toddy shopkeeper Sk. Halim nor the other person namely Ajim whose presence in shop was admitted in the fardbeyan of PW-5 was claimed by way of genesis to the occurrence has been examined on behalf of prosecution and thus the presence of appellant in the toddy shop since before arrival of informant along with deceased Ainul has not at all been established and prosecution case in absence of any independent corroboration cannot be believed. In this regard it has been also submitted that non-examination of the I.O. happens to be an additional ground in rejecting the prosecution version because of the fact that on account of non-examination of IO serious prejudice has been caused to the appellant due to his being an opportunity to cross-examine the IO on his objective finding relating to place of occurrence as well as with regard to fatal lapses committed during course of investigation. The cumulative effect of all such serious infirmities would therefore lead to the only conclusion that prosecution did not substantiate its case beyond all reasonable doubt. 7. Last but not the least, it has further been submitted by Mr. Priyadarshi, that when there is no evidence on record to show that the appellant was knowing since before with regard to arrival of informant along with deceased at the toddy shop of Md. 7. Last but not the least, it has further been submitted by Mr. Priyadarshi, that when there is no evidence on record to show that the appellant was knowing since before with regard to arrival of informant along with deceased at the toddy shop of Md. Ainul the prosecution cannot be said to have proven the motive much less the manner of occurrence inasmuch as whatever action was alleged, was not sufficient to show that the appellant had intended to commit murder of deceased and thus in the aforesaid background, the conviction recorded by the learned lower court under Section 302 of the IPC against the appellant is not at all justified. It has further been submitted that consequently the finding of the learned lower court laminating the occurrence under Section 302 IPC is itself full of gyre and based on surmises and conjecture. 8. On the other hand the learned Additional Public Prosecutor while supporting the finding recorded by the learned trial court has submitted that for the purpose of proving a case, the number of witness is not at all important rather it is the quality and the nature of evidence which alone counts as is the requirement of law laid down under Section 134 of the Evidence Act. Thus, it has been submitted that when the evidence of PW-5, informant is gone through it can be easily and safely found that he apart from having supported occurrence and withstood the test of cross-examination while reaffirming the prosecution case in its entirety. It has further been submitted that had the occurrence taken place at the toddy shop probably the plea of appellant of the occurrence being covered under Section 304 IPC could have been accepted but when the prosecution case is specific and consistent the appellant after covering 200 yards therefrom after chasing the deceased to such a long distance by itself is suggestive of the fact that after their departure of the informant and deceased from the toddy shop the appellant only with a view to take revenge had chased them and had caused unfatal blow on the deceased which would automatically rule out application of Section 300(4) of the IPC. Mr. Mishra, learned APP has summed up that in such a situation the judgment impugned does not suffer from any error so as to be interfered or modified by this Court. 9. Mr. Mishra, learned APP has summed up that in such a situation the judgment impugned does not suffer from any error so as to be interfered or modified by this Court. 9. It has to be noted that the prosecution had examined altogether 7 PWs out of whom PW-1 is Dr. Kapilleshwar Prasad Sah who had conducted postmortem over the dead body of deceased Md. Ainul, PW-2 Wajuddin, PW-3 Kalimuddin, P.W.-4 Najuddin and PW-6 Fida Hussan are all hearsay witness PW-5 Md. Ishaque is the informant and an eye witness to occurrence, and PW-7 Manki Soren is a formal witness who had exhibited the relevant documents on account of non-examination of Investigating Officer. Side by side the prosecution also exhibited Ext.-1 postmortem report, Ext.-2 Signature of PW-5 over fardbeyan and Ext.-3 the formal FIR. 10. Before coming to analyze the evidence having on the record, it looks better to refer the finding of the doctor which he recorded on the basis of conduction of the postmortem report at first count. “Sharp cut penetrating would 1” x ½” x 2” over front of chest by the left side of midline 1” above lower margin of sternum bone obliquely. On dissection of the chest, skin, muscle, bone (Sternum) pericardium and whole thickness of front wall of right ventricle were cut. The size of wound of heart was ¾” x 1/8” x whole thickness of heart muscle. Dark blood and blood clots were present in pericardial cavity. Time elapsed since death – within 24 hours. The cause of death was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of injury to the vital organ i.e. Heart. 11. During cross-examination of Doctor, PW-6 the defence could not divulge the aforesaid conclusive opinion and therefore finding of the doctor with regard to presence of ante mortem sharp cut penetrating wound over left side of chest over deceased Ainul is found to be fully proved which as noted above has been found by the doctor in the ordinary course of nature to be sufficient to cause death. 12. The aforesaid medical evidence is fully corroborated from the evidence of PW-5 the sole eyewitness. It is needless to say that he had given details of manner of occurrence, place of occurrence and the motive wherein he had stated that when he along with deceased had gone to the toddy shop of the Md. 12. The aforesaid medical evidence is fully corroborated from the evidence of PW-5 the sole eyewitness. It is needless to say that he had given details of manner of occurrence, place of occurrence and the motive wherein he had stated that when he along with deceased had gone to the toddy shop of the Md. Halim to take toddy which is in village–Dhankura and adjacent to village Jokihat, they had found the appellant / accused present since before who also attempted to assault deceased Md. Ainul but the same was arrested by the shopkeeper Md. Halim and others who had intervened into the matter and asked them to leave the place (Shop) and accordingly, they had gone away from there. He has also stated that when they just covered a distance of 200 yards, the appellant having knife in his hand, came running and pierced the same in left side of the chest of the deceased. He had also claimed that he too had sustained injury during course of his making unsuccessful attempt in apprehending the appellant. Then he had also disclosed that he became unconscious and could regain sense after sometime but by that time the appellant had already made his successful escape. He had also disclosed that he had inquired from deceased with regard to cause of quarrel. He had also stated that after leaving the deceased at the place of occurrence he had gone to P.S. which was only at a distance of 1/2 K.M. and got his fardbeyan recorded. During cross-examination, it is evident that defence could not extract anything from him so as to demolish his testimony as an eyewitness on any count. 13. It is well settled that the finding of conviction can be recorded on the basis of the evidence of solitary eyewitness. In fact apart from the provisions of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, the issue has also been set at rest by the Hon’ble Apex Court on several occasions and even recently in a decision reported in AIR 2012 SC 37 , (Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat & Anr.) it has been held as follows:- 10. The complainant Shri Bharat Rajendraprasad Trivedi (PW-1) is the sole eye-witness. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellants that being a sole and interested witness, his evidence cannot be relied upon without corroboration. The complainant Shri Bharat Rajendraprasad Trivedi (PW-1) is the sole eye-witness. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellants that being a sole and interested witness, his evidence cannot be relied upon without corroboration. The submissions advanced in this respect had been Shri Bharat Rajendraprasad Trivedi (PW-1) being a partner in the Firm would be beneficiary in the transaction of land involved herein in case one partner had been eliminated and other partner landed in jail. Such an argument is not acceptable for two reasons: (i) While appreciating the evidence of witness considering him as the interested witness, the court must bear in mind that the term ‘interested’ postulates that the witness must have some direct interest in having the accused somehow or the other convicted for some other reason. (Vide: Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 614 : (1995 AIR SCW 4540 : 1996 CriLJ 889); and Rakesh & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, JT 2011 (10) SC 525). (ii) This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the court will insists on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence as a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence. (See : Vadively Thevar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 ; Sunil Kumar v State Govt. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence. (See : Vadively Thevar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 ; Sunil Kumar v State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2003) 11 SCC 367 : ( AIR 2004 SC 552 : 2003 AIR SCW 6026); Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150 AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 100 : 2007 AIR SCW 1835); and Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West Benchal, AIR 2010 SC 3638 : (2010 AIR SCW 4470)). 14. Therefore, there happens to be no difficulty in accepting the evidence of solitary eyewitness subject to condition that the evidence must inspire both confidence and credibility. As observed earlier, the evidence of PW-5 fully corroborates the genesis as well as manner of occurrence specially when the defence could not even create any doubt in course of his cross-examination. Thus there happens to be no ambiguity over accepting the genuineness of prosecution version as put forward in evidence of PW-5. 15. It is significant to note that the version of PW-5 also has received corroboration to some extent from hearsay evidence of PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-6 who have supported the prosecution version on the point of either seeing the deceased lying on the road or seeing the appellant fleeing therefrom at the time of the occurrence when they, on an alarm raised by PW-5, Md. Ishauqe had reached the place of occurrence. Added to it the medical evidence of Dr. K.P. Sah PW-1 is also found to be consistent with the prosecution version of PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-6. 16. It is true that there is no explanation as with regard to non-examination of Halim the toddy shopkeeper as well as Ajim present in toddy shop at the time of genesis of occurrence but the same does not materially affect prosecution version because of the fact that the present prosecution has not been launched for any occurrence committed at the toddy shop rather the consistent evidence is that such occurrence had taken place 200 yards away from his toddy shop on the road for which the aforesaid two were never cited as witness. The non-examination of all the witnesses named in the FIR cannot be fatal as was also held by the Apex Court in a case of Nirpal Singh v. State of Haryana, (1977) 2 SCC 131 at para 16 wherein it has been observed, that:- “The real question for determination is not as to what is the effect of non-examination of certain witnesses as the question whether the witnesses examined in court on sworn testimony should be believed or not. Once the witnesses examined by the prosecution are believed by the court and the court comes to the conclusion that their evidence is trust-worthy, the non-examination of other witnesses will not affect the credibility of these witnesses. …… It is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witnesses after witnesses on the same point. In the instant case, once the evidence of the eyewitnesses is believed, there is an end of the matter. The aforesaid view has further found followed in subsequent case law (1) Satate of U.P. Vs. Hakim Singh (1980) 3 SCC 55 , Nandu Rastogi Vs. State of M.P. Vs. Dhar Kele (2004) 13 SCC 308 , Raj Narain Singh Vs. State of U.P. (2009) 10 SCC 362 . 17. There is however considerable force in the second leg of the submission of learned counsel for the appellant as with regard to the offence being not one under Section 302 IPC inasmuch as it is not in dispute that the appellant was not knowing since before as with regard to arrival of prosecution party at the toddy shop of Halim where he was sitting since before. The motive for occurrence had itself been disclosed by the prosecution wherein prestige of appellant was put at stake by the deceased inasmuch as he felt very much humiliated on account of his being disrobed at the instance of the deceased in presence of people in the mosque. There is also no disclosure by any of the PWs that during the intervening period appellant had anyway tried to track the deceased. Thus from the evidence it becomes clear that it was that very unfortunate moment when the appellant became furious, in other words became agitated, after seeing the deceased whom he had found responsible for his aforesaid insult in public and that happens to be reason behind which led to sudden provocation of the appellant in indulging in such a nefarious act. It is however significant that even in such anxious moment the appellant as alleged had caused a single blow on the deceased. Non-repetition of blow would therefore indicate the mental condition of the appellant that he had not at all intended at that very moment to commit murder of deceased. Such a momentous outburst and surroundings situation has been taken repeatedly into consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court in a series of cases while modifying the finding of the conviction and sentences from Section 302 IPC to 304 part II IPC. Even in a recent decision of Apex Court in the case of Ranjitham v. Basavaraj & Ors.) With State by Inspector of Police v. Swamikannu & Ors reported in AIR 2012 SC 1856 , it has been held as follows:- 20. In Hari Ram v. State of Haryana (1983) 1 SCC 193 , there was an altercation between the appellant and the deceased. The appellant had remarked that the deceased must be beaten to make him behave. He thereafter ran inside the house, brought out a jelly and thrust in into the chest of the deceased. This Court observed that in the heat of altercation between the deceased on one hand, and the appellant and his comrades on the other, the appellant seized a jelly and thrust it into the chest of the deceased. This was preceded by his remark that the deceased must be beaten to make him behave. Therefore, it does not appear, that there was any intention to kill the deceased. This Court, therefore, set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and in stead convicted him under Section 304 Part II of the IPC and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years. 21. In Jagtar Singh, v. State of Punjab Haryana (1983) 2 SCC 342 in a trivial quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like a knife and landed a blow in the chest of the deceased. This Court observed that the quarrel had taken place on the spur of the moment. There was exchange of abuses. 21. In Jagtar Singh, v. State of Punjab Haryana (1983) 2 SCC 342 in a trivial quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like a knife and landed a blow in the chest of the deceased. This Court observed that the quarrel had taken place on the spur of the moment. There was exchange of abuses. At that time, the appellant gave a blow with a knife which landed on the chest of the deceased and therefore, it was permissible to draw an inference that the appellant could be imputed with a knowledge that he was, likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death but since there was no premeditation, no intention could be imputed to him to cause death. This Court, therefore, convicted the appellant under Section 304, Part II of the IPC instead of Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years. 22. In Hem Raj v. The State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1990 SC 2252 the appellant the deceased had suddenly grappled with each other and the entire occurrence was over within a minute. During the course of the sudden quarrel, the appellant dealt a single stab which unfortunately landed on the chest of the deceased resulting in his death. This Court observed that as the totality of the established facts and circumstances show that the occurrence had happened most unexpectedly, in a sudden quarrel and without premeditation during the course of which the appellant caused a solitary injury to the deceased, he could not be imputed with the intention to cause death of the deceased, though knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which is likely to cause death could be imputed to him. This Court, therefore, set aside the conviction under Section 302 of the IPC and convict the appellant under Section 304 Part II, IPC and sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. 23. In V. Subramani ( AIR 2005 SC 1983 : 2005 AIR SCW 1311), there was some dispute over grazing of buffaloes. Thereafter, there was altercation between the accused and the deceased. The accused dealt a single blow with a wooden yoke on the deceased. 23. In V. Subramani ( AIR 2005 SC 1983 : 2005 AIR SCW 1311), there was some dispute over grazing of buffaloes. Thereafter, there was altercation between the accused and the deceased. The accused dealt a single blow with a wooden yoke on the deceased. Altering the conviction from Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part II of the IPC, this Court clarified that it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever death occurs on account of a single blow. Section 302 of the IPC is ruled out. The fact situation has to be considered in each case. Thus, the part of the body on which the blow was dealt, the nature of the injury and the type of the weapon used will not always be determinative as to whether an accused is guilty of murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The events which precede the incident will also have a bearing on the issue whether the act by which death was caused was done with an intention of causing death or knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without intention to cause death. It is the totality of circumstances which will decide the nature of the offence. 24. The deceased received a single stab injury. PW-15 Dr. Subramani, who did the post-mortem has described the said injury as a stab injury seen at the left chest, that is, junction of second rib bone and chest bone. On internal examination, he found that the injury had gone inside the left chest through the lungs into the heart. Undoubtedly, the injury was serious and on a vital part of the body, but it was caused by a penknife, which was in key bunch of the accused. A key bunch is carried by a person in routine course and a penknife is used for odd jobs, which a person may be required to do during the course of the day. It is not possible for us to say, in the facts of this case, that A2 had carried the penknife which was in his key bunch to stab the deceased. The background of this case also needs too be kept in mind. This case appears to have political overtones. The accused and the deceased belonged to different political parties. Admittedly, there was enmity between the two sides. The background of this case also needs too be kept in mind. This case appears to have political overtones. The accused and the deceased belonged to different political parties. Admittedly, there was enmity between the two sides. There had been an altercation between the deceased and PW-1 on the one hand and the accused on the other hand. PW-1 had, at the instance of the deceased, asked for donation from A2 and A2 is stated to have made some disparaging remarks. The situation in the village was tense. The accused had the gone to the rice mill of the deceased. There again, there was an altercation between the sides. The circumstances on record clearly indicate that A2 stabbed the deceased without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion. His case falls in Explanation 4 to Section 300 of the IPC. A2 knew that the act by which the death was caused was likely to cause death but it appears to us that he had not intention to cause death. In the light of the abovementioned judgments of this court, this in our opinion is a fit case where A2-Basavaraj should be convicted for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and should be sentenced for five years rigorous imprisonment under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. Needless to say that he must be given set off for the period already undergone by him ……”. 18. In the aforesaid background as well as taking into account the evidence on record, while confirming the finding of the trial court holding the appellant to be responsible for causing death of Md. Ainul, the same is only modified from the heading of murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder attracting application of provision of Explanation 4 of Section 300 IPC. This Court thus on the basis of materials on record while modifying the findings of the court below in this regard has also taken into consideration the submission of Mr. Ashok Priyarshi learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant had already undergone RI for 8 years before being granted bail by this Court on 30.06.1994. As such, the appellant is sentenced for the period already undergone by him. 19. With the aforesaid limited modification, this appeal is dismissed. The appellant however being on bail would now stand discharged of the liability of his bail bond. 20. As such, the appellant is sentenced for the period already undergone by him. 19. With the aforesaid limited modification, this appeal is dismissed. The appellant however being on bail would now stand discharged of the liability of his bail bond. 20. We would fail in our duty if we do not acknowledge the assistance rendered by Mr. Ashok Priyadarshi, learned counsel appearing as an amicus curiae in this appeal right from the inception which was received and registered as a jail appeal. Appeal allowed.