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2012 DIGILAW 1327 (BOM)

Chairman The Sangli Salary Earners Cooperative Societies v. Sameer Fulchand Shaha

2012-07-20

R.M.SAVANT

body2012
Judgment : 1. Rule, with the consent of the parties made, returnable forthwith and heard. 2. The above Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the order dated 20/2/2012 passed by the learned District Judge1, Sangli by which order the Appeal filed by the Respondent came to be allowed and the Petitioner herein, its agent, servants or any other person claiming through it were temporarily restrained from removing the sign board of “Chandan Steel Centre” admeasuring 30 ft. x 4 ft. which is displayed on the suit property without following the due process of law : 3. The facts in brief involved in the present Petition can be stated thus : The Petitioner Society has leased out ground floor premises admeasuring 2189.18 sq.ft. in the building owned by it in C.T.S. No.1104 at Sangli to the Respondent for carrying out business. The Petitioner society was constrained to issue notices dated 8/2/2010, 4/3/2010, 31/3/2010, 8/4/2010 for removal of 30 x 4 feet sign board in its name which has been affixed by the Respondent on the first floor balconies of the said building. Upon such notices being issued, the Respondent filed a Dispute in the Cooperative Court being AB No.220 of 2010 for permanent injunction. The Petitioner society raised a issue of maintainability of the said Dispute on the ground of jurisdiction in view of the provisions of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act. Therefore the Cooperative Court allowed the application of the Petitioner society and upheld the plea of jurisdiction viz. that the Cooperative Court would have no jurisdiction. 4. Upon this, the Respondent filed a suit being Regular Civil Suit No.174 of 2011 in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Sangli for permanent injunction in respect of removal of the said board. In the said suit the Respondent filed an application for temporary injunction which was numbered as Exhibit5. The said application for temporary injunction was replied to by the Petitioner society, and the sum and substance of the reply was that the said board has been put up unauthorizedly without permission of the Petitioner society. The said application (Exhibit 5) came to be rejected by the trial Court by order dated 18/1/2012. The said application for temporary injunction was replied to by the Petitioner society, and the sum and substance of the reply was that the said board has been put up unauthorizedly without permission of the Petitioner society. The said application (Exhibit 5) came to be rejected by the trial Court by order dated 18/1/2012. The substance of the order passed by the trial Court was that the suit of the nature filed by the Respondent could not have been filed without issuing the statutory notice under Section 164 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1961. The trial Court, as can be seen from the impugned order, however has not dealt with the issue as to whether the Respondent had any right to put up the said board at the site in question. 5. Aggrieved by the order dated 18/1/2012 the Respondent herein filed an Appeal being Misc. Civil Appeal No.18 of 2012. The main plank of the Appeal was that since the Petitioner society had consented to the board being put up, the notices issued were illegal, and that action was sought to be taken against the Respondent for removal of the board in view of the change in the management of the Petitioner society. The said appeal was heard by the learned District Judge1, Sangli. The Lower Appellate Court has laid emphasis on the aspect of the change in the management of the Petitioner society, and news appearing in the weekly paper “Nandadeep” to deduce there from that the earlier Board of Directors had given consent to the Respondent for displaying the board. The Lower Appellate Court laid emphasis on various news paper cuttings and election pamphlets issued by the persons who are now incharge of the management of the Petitioner society which, documents according to the Lower Appellate Court disclose that it is the manifesto of the persons who have come in power to remove the Respondent from the said premises. The impugned order also discloses that the Lower Appellate Court has arrived at a finding that the Plaintiff i.e. the Respondent has put up the said board after obtaining permission which permission is contained in the letter dated 11/2/2006. The Lower Appellate Court for the aforesaid reasons allowed the said Appeal and thereby injuncted the Petitioner, its agent, servants or any other person claiming through it from removing the said board in question. The Lower Appellate Court for the aforesaid reasons allowed the said Appeal and thereby injuncted the Petitioner, its agent, servants or any other person claiming through it from removing the said board in question. As indicated above, it is the said order which is challenged in the above Petition. 6. The facts as narrated above therefore disclose that whilst the trial Court refused to grant injunction on the ground that the suit filed by the Respondent against the Petitioner without issuing notice under Section 164 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act was not maintainable. The Lower Appellate Court thereafter has laid undue emphasis on the aspect of the change in the management of the Petitioner society, which in my view has no relevance to the aspect whether a prima facie case for grant of injunction has been made out by the Plaintiff. The question therefore posed is whether the Respondent Plaintiff has any right to put up the board in question at the site at which it is now existing i.e. on the front side of the balconies on the first floor of the building owned by the Petitioner. At this stage except the correspondence which comprises the letters dated 11/2/2006, no other material was admittedly placed on record by the Respondent Plaintiff in support of its case that it had obtained permission of the management of the Petitioner Society. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the Respondent Plaintiff Shri Kulkarni has produced the compilation of the said three letters all dated 11/2/2006 for perusal of this Court. The first letter dated 11/2/2006 is the letter of one Jitendra B Shinde, who has addressed the said letter on behalf of the Respondent to the Chairman of the Petitioner Society. The said letter, it seems, has been addressed immediately after the Respondent was granted lease of the said property. The said letter informs the Chairman of the Petitioner Society of the nature of the works which the Respondent intends to carry out in respect of which permission is sought. The said works are listed from alphabets (A) to (F) in the said letter. In so far as the present petition is concerned, the item at alphabet (F) is material. The said alphabet (F) contains the work of preparing board of about 40 feet to be placed on the front side of the structure. The said works are listed from alphabets (A) to (F) in the said letter. In so far as the present petition is concerned, the item at alphabet (F) is material. The said alphabet (F) contains the work of preparing board of about 40 feet to be placed on the front side of the structure. The second letter dated 11/2/2006 is the response given by the Architect of the Petitioner Society one Pramod R Pise. The said letter is addressed to the Chairman of the Petitionersociety. It refers to the permission sought by the Respondent vide its letter dated 11/2/2006. From the point of view of the present Petition Clause3 of the said letter is relevant wherein the Architect informs the Chairman of the Petitioner Society that there should be no objection to the repairing work being carried in terms of the letter dated 11/2/2006 of the Respondent. The last letter is also a letter dated 11/2/2006 addressed by the Chairman of the Petitioner Society to the Respondent. The said letter refers to the permission sought by the Respondent and the said letter states that the letter of the Architect of the Petitioner Society which is self explanatory is annexed to the said letter and the changes may be made accordingly. 8. A cumulative reading of all the aforesaid three letters, therefore, makes it clear that at the highest, the Petitioner Society had consented to the repair work or changes to be carried out in the leased out portion. There is no reference in the two letters either of the Architect of the Petitioner Society or the Chairman of the Petitioner Society that permission for putting up the said 40 feet wide board has been granted to the Respondent. At the highest the permission granted was only in respect of repairs/changes to be carried out in the leased out portion. It cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed that on the basis of the said correspondence that the Petitioner Society had consented to the huge board that is put up by the Respondent on the front side of the balconies of the first floor of the building owned by the Petitioner society. The Petitioner being a cooperative society has to function within the parameters of the law applicable viz. the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, and the Rules framed thereunder. The Petitioner being a cooperative society has to function within the parameters of the law applicable viz. the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, and the Rules framed thereunder. It is significant to note that the Respondent is not relying upon any decision of the Managing Committee of the Petitioner Society granting it permission to put up the board. There is even no document to show, except the said letter of the Chairman of the Petitioner Society dated 11/2/2006 that any decision was arrived at by the body corporate which the Petitioner Society is, to permit the Respondent to put up the sign board of the nature which it has put up. Hence at this stage the material on record does not disclose any permission in favour of the Respondent. No case was therefore made out by the Respondent for the grant of injunction. The Lower Appellate Court in spite of the same has directed the Petitioner Society to follow the due process of law. The grant of temporary injunction is a discretionary relief which discretion has to be exercised on well settled principles. That the board in question is necessary for business expediency is no ground to entrench upon the property of the Petitioner Society. The Respondent can very well put up the board on the front of its shop within the leased out portion. The Lower Appellate Court in my view has totally misdirected itself and has laid undue emphasis on factors which are not germane for consideration of an application for temporary injunction. The impugned order of the Lower Appellate Court is therefore required to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. Resultantly, the Appeal in question is required to be dismissed. The above Writ Petition is allowed. Rule is accordingly made absolute in the aforesaid terms with parties to bear their respective costs. However, at the request of the learned counsel for the Respondent, the status quo as on date would continue for a period of four weeks from date so as to enable the Respondent to approach the Apex Court.