Judgment :- N.K. BALAKRISHNAN, J: 1. This case has come before us on a reference made by a learned Single Judge of this Court. The learned Single Judge found it unable to accept the views expressed in the decisions in P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko (1967) KLT 799 and George v. State of Kerala (1968) KLT 219 regarding the test of ‘obscenity’ in Section 294(b) of I.P.C. According to the learned Single Judge the meaning given to the word ‘obscene’ in Section 292 IPC cannot be made applicable to Section 294 IPC. It was observed that a particular meaning given to a particular word for the purpose of a particular provision cannot be applied to another provision. 2. The aforesaid Crl.M.C. has been filed by the accused in C.C. No.148/2007 of Additional C.J.M. Court, Thiruvananthapuram. That case was taken cognizance on a private complaint filed by the 1st respondent herein alleging commission of offences punishable under section 294(b) and 504 IPC. 3. The petitioner contends that a reading of the complaint itself is sufficient to show that the petitioner has not committed the offences punishable under sections 294(b) and 504 of IPC. Hence she seeks to quash the proceedings C.C.148/2007 mentioned above. 4. Chapter XIV of the Indian Penal Code deals with offences affecting the public health, safety, convenience, decency and morals. Section 292, 293 and 294 come under that Chapter. Section 292 of IPC reads” “292. Sale, etc., of obscene book, etc.-(1) For the purposes of sub-section any other object, shall be deemed to be obscene if it is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect, or (where it comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of any one of its items is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt person, who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it. (2) whoever- (a) Sells, lets to hire, distributes, publicly exhibits or in any manner puts into circulation, or for purposes of sale, hire, distribution, public exhibition or circulation, makes, produces or has in his possession any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, drawing, painting representation or figure or any other obscene object whatsoever, or (b) import, exports or conveys any obscene object for any of the purposes aforesaid, or knowing or (c) having reason to believe that such object will be sold, let to hire, distributed or publicly exhibited or in any manner put into circulation, or (d) takes part in or receives profits from any business in the course of which he knows or has reason to believe that any such obscene objects are for any of the purposes aforesaid, made, produced, purchased, kept, imported, exported, conveyed, publicly exhibited or in any manner put into circulation, or (e) advertises or makes known by any means whatsoever that any person is engaged or is ready to engage in any act which is an offence under this section, or that any such obscene object can be procured from or through any person, or (f) offers or attempts to do any act which is an offence under this section, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, and, in the event of a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment or either description for a term which may extend to five years and also with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.” 5. it is argued that Sub Section (1) of Section 292 is clear on the point that the definition of the word ‘obscene’ is given only for the purpose of Sub Section 2 of Section 292 IPC and so the definition of the word ‘obscene’ obtained in Section 292(1) cannot have any application when the same word is to be interpreted in the context in which it is used in Section 294 IPC. The learned single Judge has observed that there is nothing in Section 294 IPC to hold that the meaning given to the word ‘obscene’ in Section 292 is applicable to any other provision in IPC. The learned single Judge has observed that there is nothing in Section 294 IPC to hold that the meaning given to the word ‘obscene’ in Section 292 is applicable to any other provision in IPC. It is true that it is not stated in Section 294 that the word ‘obscene’ used in that Section carries the same meaning as defined in Section 292(1). It is argued that if the legislature intended that the word ‘obscene’ as explained in Section 292(1) has the same meaning or application wherever that word ‘obscene’ occurs in other parts of IPC then it would not have been stated specifically that the said explanation or definition is applicable for the purpose of Sub Section 2 of Section 292. The argument is that the word ‘obscene’ occurring in Section 294 should have a different meaning than the meaning given to that word in Section 292. The expression ‘deemed to be obscene’ mentioned in Section 292(1) may tend to think that what is explained in Section 292(1) is not actually the definition of the word ‘obscene’ but a particular meaning is given to the word ‘obscene’ for the purpose of Section 292(2) Section 293 of IPC reads as follows: “293. Sale, etc., of obscene objects to young person.-Whoever sells, lets to hire, distributes, exhibits, or circulates to any person under the age of twenty years any such obscene object as is referred to in the last preceding section, or offers or attempts so to do, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, and, in the event of a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and also with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees.” 6. On going through Section 293, it is clear that a separate penal provision was made with regard to the sale, exhibition etc. of such obscene object to any person under the age of 20 years where as Section 292(1) deals with sale, exhibition etc. of such obscene object to any person. Therefore, in order to make the provision more stringent and grave in so far as it relates to the sale etc. of such obscene object to any person under the age of 20 years where as Section 292(1) deals with sale, exhibition etc. of such obscene object to any person. Therefore, in order to make the provision more stringent and grave in so far as it relates to the sale etc. of obscene objects to younger persons-aged less than 20 years, a separate penal provision, made applicable Section 293, was introduced. It is in that context, the word ‘obscene’ occurring in Section 292(1) is made applicable to Section 293 also. This has also been projected as a ground to contend that the meaning given to the word ‘obscene’ is not intended to be imported to Section 294 IPC, for, otherwise the legislature would not have made the meaning of the word ‘obscene’ applicable only to Section 292(2) and 293 of IPC. The fact that the meaning given to the word ‘obscene’ in Section 292(1) is not made specifically applicable to Section 294 would go a long way to hold that the meaning of the word obscene occurring in Section 292(1) can have no application when it is to be considered or construed in the context of Section 294 of IPC, is the other limb of the argument. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that when a particular word is defined in a particular statute unless the context otherwise warrants a different meaning, the word has to be given the same meaning, as otherwise, it would lead to a preposterous position where the same word is to carry different meaning, when applied to different sections in the same statute which the legislature could not have contemplated at all. According to the learned counsel, if the legislature intended that the word obscene should carry a different meaning than what is explained in Section 292(1) then it would have been so gatherable from Section 294 itself. According to the learned counsel, if the legislature intended that the word obscene should carry a different meaning than what is explained in Section 292(1) then it would have been so gatherable from Section 294 itself. In Blacks Law Dictionary (7th Edition), the meaning of the word obscene is given as; “Extremely offensive under contemporary community standards of morality and decency; grossly repugnant to the generally accepted notions of what is appropriate.” In Oxford Advanced Leaner’s Dictionary, the meaning of the word obscene is given as; “connected with sex in a way that most people find offensive:” In Collins Cobuild English Dictionary for advanced learners Dictionary, the word obscene is explained as; “If you describe something obscene, you mean it offends you because it relates to sex or violence in a way that you think is unpleasant and shocking” In legal context, books, pictures, or films which are judged obscene are illegal because they deal with sec or violence in a way that is offensive to the general public.” In Queen v. Hicklin 1868-3-Q.B. 360 at 371 the test of ‘obscenity’ was laid down in these words” “….the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charges as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences.” 8. The crucial question is whether the test of ‘obscenity’ laid down by Cockburn-J-in Hicklins case (The Queen v. Hicklin 1863-3-Q.B. 360 at 371) made applicable to section 292 IPC in some of the decisions is equally applicable to section 294(b) IPC as well. The learned Single Judge has observed that a reading of section 292 IPC would make it clear that a particular meaning is given to the word ‘obscene’ occurring in that section by legal fiction by employing the word “deemed to be obscene” but that cannot be imported to while “obscenity” occurring in section 294 IPC is to be considered. It has to be examined whether the test of obscenity propounded in Hicklin’s case cited supra, which was followed in some of the decision, while interpreting ‘obscenity’ used in Section 292 IPC, is equally applicable to ‘obscenity’ used in section 294 IPC. In Samuel Rath vs. UISA (1957) it was held: “that the test of ‘obscenity’ is the “substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires”. In Samuel Rath vs. UISA (1957) it was held: “that the test of ‘obscenity’ is the “substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires”. It was also observed that in order to be ‘obscene’ the matter must “tend to sexually impure thoughts”. That decision is also in tune with the ratio laid down in Hicklin’s case cited above. 9. In Ranjith D. Udeshi vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1965 SC 881 it was observed by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court: “An overall view of the obscene matter in setting of the whole work would, of course, be necessary, but the obscene matter must be considered by itself and separately to find out whether it is so gross and its obscenity so decided that it is likely to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to influences of this sort and into whose hands the book is likely to fall. In this connection the interests of our contemporary society and particularly the influence of the book etc. on it must not be overlooked. A number of considerations may here enter which it is not necessary to enumerate, but we must draw attention to one fact. Today our National and Regional Languages are strengthening themselves by new literary standards after a deadening period under the impact of English. Emulation by our writers of an obscene book under the aegis of this Court’s determination is likely to pervert our entire literature because obscenity pays and true art finds little popular support. Only an obscurement will deny the need for such caution. This consideration marches with all law and precedent on this subject and so considered we can only say that where obscenity and art are mixed, art must be so preponderating as to throw the obscenity into a shadow or the obscenity so trivial and insignificant that it can have no effect and may be overlooked. In other words, treating with sex in a manner offensive to public decency and morality (and these are the words of our Fundamental Law), judged by our National standards and considered likely to pander to lascivious, prurient or sexually precocious minds, must determine the result.” 10. In P.T. Chacko Vs. Nainan Chacko reported in 1967 KLT 799, it was considered whether the words uttered by the accused were obscene and whether the utterance caused annoyance to the public. In P.T. Chacko Vs. Nainan Chacko reported in 1967 KLT 799, it was considered whether the words uttered by the accused were obscene and whether the utterance caused annoyance to the public. In that case it was held thus: In The Queen V. Hicklin 1863-3-Q.B. 360 at 371 Cockburn C.J. laid down the test of ‘obscenity’ in these words: “….the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences”. This test has been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme Court has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 Sc 881 at 887. In Samuel Roth v. U.S.A. (1957) 354 U.S.476, Chief Justice Warren sand that the test of ‘obscenity’ is the “substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires”. Mr. Justice Harlan observed that in order to be ‘obscene’ the matter must “tend to sexually impure thoughts”. I do not think that the words uttered in this case have such a tendency. It may be that the words are defamatory of the complainant but I do not think that the words are ‘obscene’ and the utterance would constitute an offence punishable under S.294(b) IPC. 11. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this Court has followed the test laid down in Hicklin’s case and also the decisions in Samurl Rath and that of the apex Court in Ranjit D. Udeshi, decades back and that dictum was hitherto followed by all Courts and it was understood by all the courts that the test of obscenity was not differently defined or explained in Section 294 IPC than what was defined or explained in Section 292 of IPC. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that when similar word is seen defined or explained in the previous section it is not necessary for the legislature to again and again explain or state in the succeeding section that the definition or explanation of a particular word used in the previous section is applicable whenever and wherever that word is used in the succeeding provisions of the same statute. 12. In George v. State of Kerala 1968 KLT 219 another Single Judge of this Court followed the dictum laid down in Hicklin’s case. 12. In George v. State of Kerala 1968 KLT 219 another Single Judge of this Court followed the dictum laid down in Hicklin’s case. The word ‘obscenity’ was considered in George’s case to find whether the words used by the accused in that case attracted the offence under Section 294(b) IPC. The obscene word, stated to have been used by the accused in that case is seen quoted in paragraph 2 of the Judgment. It was held therein: “This court has held many a time basing on the dictum of Cockburn, C.J., in Queen v. Hicklin 1868-3 Q.B 360 and other leading decisions, that the test of obscenity is ‘whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity, is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences’. The words uttered must be capable of arousing sexually impure thoughts in the minds of the hearers.” Considering the facts of that case it was held that the words uttered by the accused in that case are not such as would tend to arouse sexually impure thoughts or deprave and corrupt the minds of the complainant therein. Therefore, this decision also, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, perforce strengthens the argument that the Courts have consistently and uniformly applied the test of ‘obscenity’ laid down in Hicklin’s case followed by the apex Court in Renjit D. Udeshi’s case, as the test applicable to decide whether the words used do attract the offence under section 294 (b) of IPC. 13. In Samaresh Bose vs. Amal. Mitra reported in AIR 1986 SC 967, it was held by the Supreme Court: “A vulgar writing is not necessarily obscene. Vulgarity arouses a feeling of disgust and revulsion and also boredom but does not have the effect of depraving, debasing and corrupting the morals of any reader of the novel, whereas obscenity has the tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences.” 14. This decision was rendered considering ‘obscenity’ occurring in Section 292 IPC. The concept of ‘obscenity’ would differ from country to country depending upon the standards and morals of contemporary society. There is difference between ‘vulgarity’ and ‘obscenity’. ‘Vulgarity’ arouse a feeling of disgust and revulsion. This decision was rendered considering ‘obscenity’ occurring in Section 292 IPC. The concept of ‘obscenity’ would differ from country to country depending upon the standards and morals of contemporary society. There is difference between ‘vulgarity’ and ‘obscenity’. ‘Vulgarity’ arouse a feeling of disgust and revulsion. That does not have the effect of depraving, debasing or corrupting the morals of the reader or viewed whereas ‘obscenity’ has the tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. While considering the allegation that the publication was ‘obscene’, it was observed by the apex Court, what kind of possible influence the book is likely to create in the minds of readers is to be examined and in that context it was held that the Court shall apply its judicial mind dispassionately to decide whether the publication in question can be said to be ‘obscene’ within the meaning of Section 292 IPC, by an objective assessment of the whole book. It is contended that since those observations were made while considering the meaning of ‘obscenity’ occurring in section 292 IPC, those observations cannot be made applicable to a case coming under section 294 IPC. 15. In Somnath v. State of Kerala-1989 (2) KLT 282, another Single Judge of this Court followed the test of obscenity laid down in Hicklin’s case. But that was a case where the test of obscenity was considered to find whether offence under section 292(a) was attracted. It was not a case dealt with under section 294 of IPC. The learned counsel for the petitioner would rely upon the decision of the apex Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1996) 4 SCC 17. That was a case where the appellant therein, was appointed on a Class IV post on Adhoc basis and while in service he was convicted in summery trial for offence under section 294 IPC and was ordered to pay Rs.20/- as fine. He paid that fine. When placed a foot to regularize his service, the factum of conviction was reported and thus his service was terminated on that ground alone. The matter reached the apex Court. He paid that fine. When placed a foot to regularize his service, the factum of conviction was reported and thus his service was terminated on that ground alone. The matter reached the apex Court. While considering the ingredients to prove the offence under section 294 IPC, it was observed by the apex Court: “In order to secure a conviction the provision requires two particulars to be proved by the prosecution, i.e., (i) the offender has done any obscene act in any public place or has sung, recited or uttered any obscene songs or words in or near any public place; and (ii) has so cause annoyance to others. If the act complained of is not obscene, or is not done in any public place, or the song recited or uttered is not obscene, or is not sung, recited or uttered in or near any public place, or that it causes no annoyance to others, the offence is not committed:. 16. It is argued that no ratio as such was laid down by the apex Court in Pawan Kumar’s case that the test of obscenity laid down in Hicklin’s case is equally applicable to decide whether the acts, words or songs used by the accused are ‘obscene’ as mentioned under section 294 IPC. It is pointed out that the issue involved in that case was whether the conviction of the appellant therein for offence under section 294 IPC, on its own, would involve moral turpitude depriving him of the opportunity to serve the State unless the facts and circumstances which led to the conviction, met the requirement of the policy decision of the Government. 17. The Courts have taken a consistent view interpreting obscene/obscenity to mean that the matter charged as ‘obscene’ should tend to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to immoral influence arousing lustful desire or must tend to sexually impure thoughts. It may be argued that precedent is authority only for what it actually decides and not for what may remotely or logically follow from it. What is binding is the ratio decidendi of the judgment. According to the respondents P.T. Chacko’s case and Chacko George’s case cited supra, were rendered by a Single Judge and hence the learned Single Judge, when passed the reference Order has expressed the inability to accept the views expressed in P.T. Chacko and Chacko George, cited supra. 18. What is binding is the ratio decidendi of the judgment. According to the respondents P.T. Chacko’s case and Chacko George’s case cited supra, were rendered by a Single Judge and hence the learned Single Judge, when passed the reference Order has expressed the inability to accept the views expressed in P.T. Chacko and Chacko George, cited supra. 18. It was held by the apex Court in Kattite Valappil Pathumma v. Taluk Land Board (1997) 4 SCC 114, thus: “Interpretation of the law is not a mere mental exercise. Things which have been adjudged long ago should be allowed to rest in peace. A decision rendered long ago can be overruled only if this Court comes to the conclusion that it is manifestly wrong or unfair and not merely on the ground that another interpretation is possible and the court may arrive at a different conclusion.” It cannot be said that the earlier decisions referred to above were based on a reasoning which was demonstrably wrong. Taking a different view from the law laid down in the earlier decisions, would have the effect of unsettling the law established for a number of years. 19. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even if it is accepted that the observation in regard to the meaning or interpretation of the word ‘obscenity’ occurring in section 292 of IPC is not made applicable to section 294 of IPC, still the Court has to construe the word ‘obscenity’ by reference to the meaning of that word given in various dictionaries which have been quoted earlier. The meaning of the word ‘obscene’ in Blacks Law Dictionary, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Collins Cobuild English Dictionary etc. would leave no doubt that the word’ ‘obscene’ is connected with sex and extremely offensive under contemporary community standards of morality and decency grossly repugnant to generally accepted notions of what is appropriate. The word ‘obscene’ mentioned in those dictionaries, also give the same meaning as was given by Cockburn, J. in Hincklin’s case cited supra. That also according to the learned counsel for the petitioner would perforce strengthen his contention that the word ‘obscene’ cannot have a different meaning that what is gatherable from section 292 of IPC. 20. The word ‘obscene’ mentioned in those dictionaries, also give the same meaning as was given by Cockburn, J. in Hincklin’s case cited supra. That also according to the learned counsel for the petitioner would perforce strengthen his contention that the word ‘obscene’ cannot have a different meaning that what is gatherable from section 292 of IPC. 20. In order to attract the offence under section 294(b) of IPC, the words sung, recited or uttered, in or near any place should have caused annoyance to others. There is nothing in section 294 to hold that the word ‘obscene’ should have a different meaning than that is made applicable to section 292 of IPC. 21. It is also argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the effect of ‘obscenity’, which may be depicted in the books, writings, paintings etc., would be more when compared to the utterance of the obscene words, the punishment prescribed for the offence under section 292 is graver than what is prescribed for the offence under section 294. The learned counsel, tries to distinguish stating that the obscene pictures, books etc., are affecting the visual sense. The person who views or sees would be more tempted to be affected by such impure thoughts and lustful desires. In section 293 the punishment prescribed is still more than the one prescribed for offence prescribed under section 292 since that provision pertains to the sale of such books etc., to a person under the age of 20 years. The intention behind is quite clear that young minds should not be fouled by such obscene pictures, books etc. 22. The learned counsel further submits that so far as section 294 is concerned, the utterance of such words, songs etc. would affect only the hearing sense i.e. it is to be heard by ear and not to be seen. When one sees obscene pictures or books the effect would be graver in contrast to the effect that may be created on a person who simply hears such words or songs. That appears to be the reason why the punishment prescribed under section 294 is less but that does not mean that there is any difference in the meaning to be given to the word ‘obscenity’ when it is dealt with in sections 292, 293 or 294. 23. That appears to be the reason why the punishment prescribed under section 294 is less but that does not mean that there is any difference in the meaning to be given to the word ‘obscenity’ when it is dealt with in sections 292, 293 or 294. 23. The upshot of the our discussion is that the word ‘obscene’ is not defined differently in these sections but the punishments were prescribed differently in other sections depending upon the effect of ‘obscenity’ that causes on the viewer or hearer as the case may be. It is not gatherable from the words used in these sections that the word ‘obscenity’ used in section 294 of IPC should have a different meaning than what is explained in sections 292 and 293 of IPC. All these sections come under the same chapter. That also would sufficiently indicate that the said word is to be understood as understood for the purpose of Section 292. 24. To attract an offence under section 294(b), the words uttered must be obscene and it must be to the annoyance of others and it must have been uttered in or near any public place. The concept of ‘obscenity’ would differ from country to country, state to state and even from region to region depending on the standards of morals and contemporary society. The words treated as obscene in Malabar area may not be obscene in other parts of Kerala; similarly the words used in other parts of Kerala may not be obscene in Malabar Area. Therefore, the learned Public Prosecutor submits that there are even regional variations in the meaning of such words. The learned Public Prosecutor would further submit that the tone and tenor of the words and the way it is expressed also may have relevance depending upon the context and circumstances. 25. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that reference to such words by itself cannot be considered ‘obscene’. The very same words may carry different meaning in different localities or regions. The two particular words alleged to have been used by the accused which are seen quote din the complaint, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, carry different meaning and at any rate it is not offensive to public morals and as such it cannot be said that utterance of those words would cause annoyance to the public. The two particular words alleged to have been used by the accused which are seen quote din the complaint, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, carry different meaning and at any rate it is not offensive to public morals and as such it cannot be said that utterance of those words would cause annoyance to the public. But the counter argument is that those words are likely to cause annoyance to the hearers. The people nearby must have been shocked to hear such sensuous words which were suggestive of lustful ideas and were impure, indecent, lewd and lascivious. Even if the offender by his act intends only to injuriously affect his victim, nonetheless, if the act is done in public and it is obscene and is bound to cause annoyance to others who happened to see or hear it besides the victim, the act of the accused will certainly attract the offence under Section 294(b). 26. Therefore, so far as the case on hand is concerned, whether the two words uttered were obscene, whether those words are/were likely to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences is a question of fact to be decided based on the evidence that may have to be adduced by reference to the meaning attributed to those words in that particular region/locality. The tone and tenor of those words and the meaning of those words, whether hearers are likely to suffer mental shock on hearing such words, whether those words are actually intended and used in that locality as obscene are questions of fact to be decided based on the evidence that may have to be adduced. Therefore, the request to quash the proceedings invoking the power under section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed. The reference is answered as follows: Test of obscenity laid down in Hicklin’s case (1868) 3 Q.B. 360 followed in P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko (1967) KLT 799 and George v. State of Kerala (1968) KLT 219while interpreting ‘obscenity’ used in Section 294(b) of IPC, having been followed for nearly four decades has to be accepted and followed as the correct law laid down on the point. We find no reason to differ from the views taken in P.T. Chacko and George referred to above. We find no reason to differ from the views taken in P.T. Chacko and George referred to above. In the light of what has been stated in the preceding paragraphs, this Criminal M.C. is dismissed giving liberty to the petitioner to raise all such contentions before the trial Court.