Judgment :- 1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner, who is an employee of the India Bank, challenging an Award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (for short CGIT) made in I.D.No.13 of 2007, dated 25.6.2008. By the impugned Award, the CGIT declined to grant any relief to the petitioner and upheld the punishment of compulsory retirement with all terminal benefits is legal and that the reference was rejected. 2. In the writ petition, notice of motion was ordered on 12.09.2009. Subsequently, the matter was admitted on 25.11.2010. On notice from this court, the second respondent management has filed a counter affidavit, dated 23.7.2011. 3. The case of the petitioner was that he joined the Bank in the year 1978 as a Sub staff and subsequently promoted to the Clerical cadre in the year 1990 and posted to work at the Chintadripet Branch at Chennai. While he was working as a Clerk / Shroff at the Chintadripet Branch, he was allocated work in the section relating to BPO/DDs. He was placed under suspension on 10.4.2001. It was followed by a charge memo, dated 24.10.2002. It was alleged that while he was serving in the branch, he had removed BPO No.004639 from the BPO book kept in the officer's table without his knowledge and had handed it over to one Ravindran, an Ex-employee of the Bank. When the non availability of the BPO was noticed by the Section Officer on 19.03.2001, he had enquired about the same with the petitioner and he pleaded ignorance. But, despite search made, it was not available. Hence it was marked as 'cancelled' in the BPO register. 4. Later it transpired that the said BPO was presented for clearing by the service branch, Canara Bank, Chennai favauring one New Sri Lakshmi Saw Mills, Bangalore for an amount of Rs.3,50,000/- with an endorsement on the reverse that "Payees Account credited" made by the Canara Bank, Yelahanka Satellite Town Branch. It was found that the signature in the BPO was forged and it was returned by the Chintadripet Branch as fraudulent pay order. A criminal case was also registered against the petitioner by the Central Crime Branch, Egmore on the same set of facts in Crime No.232 of 2001 under Sections 379 and 420 IPC. It was found that the signature in the BPO was forged and it was returned by the Chintadripet Branch as fraudulent pay order. A criminal case was also registered against the petitioner by the Central Crime Branch, Egmore on the same set of facts in Crime No.232 of 2001 under Sections 379 and 420 IPC. The criminal complaint, after investigation resulted in a charge sheet being filed and tried in C.C.No.8960 of 2002 by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore. Even while pendency of the criminal case, a departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner on 30.10.2002 and concluded on 19.6.2003. After conclusion of the enquiry proceedings, a defence statement was given by the defence representative of the petitioner. The Presenting Officer also gave a written brief. The Enquiry Officer gave his report, dated 03.11.2003 and found him guilty of charges. When the report was given, the petitioner gave a detailed comments on the enquiry report. Thereafter, he was served with the second show cause notice dated 18.05.2004 proposing to impose the punishment of compulsory retirement. The petitioner gave a reply on 7.7.2004. But the disciplinary authority confirmed the penalty of compulsory retirement vide his order dated 8.7.2004. 5. The petitioner filed an appeal before the General Manager, who is the appellate authority, on 18.8.2004, but the appeal was rejected without assigning any reason by order dated 17.2.2005. Thereafter, the petitioner had raised an industrial dispute under Section 2(A) before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Chennai. As the said officer after conciliation proceedings could not bring about settlement, he sent a failure report to the Government of India. The Government of India upon receipt of the failure report and on considering the other relevant materials, by an order dated 6.2.2007, had referred the following dispute for adjudication by the CGIT, i.e., the first respondent, which reads as follows: "Whether the action of the Management of the Indian Bank in awarding the punishment of Compulsory Retirement with superannuation benefits to Sri G.R.Samy is just and legal? If not, to what relief is the workman entitled?" 6. The said dispute was registered by the CGIT as I.D.No.13 of 2007 and notice was issued to both sides. The petitioner filed a claim statement dated 11.5.2007 and the second respondent filed a counter statement dated 23.6.2007. If not, to what relief is the workman entitled?" 6. The said dispute was registered by the CGIT as I.D.No.13 of 2007 and notice was issued to both sides. The petitioner filed a claim statement dated 11.5.2007 and the second respondent filed a counter statement dated 23.6.2007. Even before the order of reference was made by the Government, the petitioner was acquitted by the criminal court in C.C No.8960 of 2002 vide judgment dated 09.02.2004. The criminal court found that there was no evidence to show that the petitioner was responsible for stealing the BPO. Hence the case against him was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, in the criminal case, it was found that one Manilal, P.W.5, who was timber merchant at Bangalore had stated that he was in the shop on 26.3.2001 run by his brother. At that time, M/s.Nagaraj and Srinivasan came to the shop and gave the pay order. Those two persons were not enquired by the Investigating Officer during the course of the trial. This was also taken exception by the criminal court. But, however, before the Labour Court, the workman filed the judgment of the criminal court which was marked as Ex.W.1. On the side of the second respondent management, 28 documents were filed and marked as Exs,M.1 to M.28. The CGIT after referring to the enquiry proceedings found that the petitioner was the person who gave the BPO to one Nagaraj who in turn gave it t some party for the supply of timber. The police investigation had revealed these facts based upon his confession to the police. The confession was also spoken to by one Kannan, who is the sixth witness examined by the management. The confession statement was confirmed. 7. The labour court in paragraphs 8 and 9 held as follows: "8) ....the learned counsel for the Respondent argued that in this case, three witnesses viz., MW5 to MW7 were examined with regard to the confession statement given by the concerned employee. The concerned employee has not disputed the fact that the confession statement was obtained by coercion or undue influence and put any question regarding to them to these witness and, therefore, the allegation made by the employee in this dispute is only an afterthought and the findings given by the Enquiry Officer cannot be questioned by the petitioner on the ground that it is not admissible. 9.) I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent since the learned counsel for the petitioner questioned the reliance by the Enquiry Officer on the confessional statement given by the concerned employee, I am of the opinion that this Tribunal cannot question the reliance placed by the Enquiry Officer on the confessional statement given by the concerned employee because the Enquiry Officer after careful consideration has come to the conclusion that the confessional statement is a genuine one and he has voluntarily admitted the fact in question. Therefore, I am not inclined to accept that the findings of the Enquiry Officer is vitiated, as such, I find this point against the petitioner."(Emphasis added) With these findings, the CGIT had rejected the case of the petitioner. 8. The CGIT though referred to the judgment of acquittal by the criminal court marked as Ex.W.1, did not make any comment on the effect of acquittal. May be in the opinion of the CGIT, the departmental enquiry was preceded before the criminal court's judgment. 9. In the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent, in paragraphs 12 and 13 it was stated as follows: "12) ....the Tribunal was fully aware that the petitioner was found guilty only on the admission made by him in his letter of 05.4.2001 and the confession statement given to the Enquiry Officer and based on the ruling of the Supreme Court, the 1st respondent held that the Enquiry Officer was entitled to rely on the confession in reaching the conclusion about the guilt of the petitioner.... 13.) ..it is submitted that the two employees of the Bank who were present when the Petitioner was interrogated by the Police, were examined in the enquiry and they had testified to the effect that the petitioner had made a statement to the police admitting his involvement in the fraud. Therefore, the non-examination of the Investigation officer would not go in favour of the petitioner." 10. It must be noted that in the departmental enquiry, seven witnesses were examined. M.W.3 Padmavathy was examined as P.W.4 in the criminal case. M.W.1 K.N.Rajaram was examined as P.W.3. M.W.6 S.Kannan was examined as P.W.2. M.W.7 R.M.Subramaniam was examined as P.W.1 in the criminal trial. However, the said Munilal who is the timber merchant and Murugesan, the Investigating Officer were not examined in the departmental enquiry. M.W.3 Padmavathy was examined as P.W.4 in the criminal case. M.W.1 K.N.Rajaram was examined as P.W.3. M.W.6 S.Kannan was examined as P.W.2. M.W.7 R.M.Subramaniam was examined as P.W.1 in the criminal trial. However, the said Munilal who is the timber merchant and Murugesan, the Investigating Officer were not examined in the departmental enquiry. In the departmental enquiry, the workman had objected to marking of the documents made available in the criminal case without examining the Investigating Officer and the statements were recorded by him. The defence representative had raised the following objections before the Investigating Officer, which reads as follows: "Regarding the statement of Shri G.R.Samy, of course it has been noted that there are two witnesses namely Shri Kannan and Shri Murthy. However during the deposition, it has been brought out that they were not present during the interrogation and investigation of Mr.G.R.Samy by the Inspector. The statement was read to them and they have fixed their signature. As such even these two cannot throw any lights on the purported statement of Shri G.R.Samy, the only person who had knowledge all the above documents is the Inspector of Police. Naturally, he only could speak on the documents and throw light on its details. In the above background only we have been requesting and insisting that the author of all the above documents namely the Inspector be made available to the forum which will enable us to cross examine him and find out the truth from the concerned person himself. In as much as these documents have not been even identified no reliance could be made on these documents. In the above background we once again request arrangements may please be made to bring the Inspector to the forum." 11. The Enquiry Officer gave the following reply which reads as follows: "As above-mentioned documents have been obtained from the court, it itself can be taken as evidence." 12. M.W.1 in his chief examination had observed as follows; "I have narrated to the police what I have mentioned earlier verbatically. After the interrogation was done individually the police called Sri RM. Subramanian, Sri.Ranganathan, myself and Sri G.R.Samy inside the room. In our presence the police asked Mr.G.R.Samy about the incident. For which he has admitted his guilt before the police and he said I am responsible for the same." 13. After the interrogation was done individually the police called Sri RM. Subramanian, Sri.Ranganathan, myself and Sri G.R.Samy inside the room. In our presence the police asked Mr.G.R.Samy about the incident. For which he has admitted his guilt before the police and he said I am responsible for the same." 13. In his cross examination, M.W.6 Mr.Kannan who is a Clerk/Shroff had observed as follows: "MW6 : The statement shown to me is confession statement given by Mr.G.R.Samy, before the Inspector Mr.Murugesan of Crime Branch, Commissioner of Police, Chennai8, at about 3.00 p.m and 4.00 p.m. on 05.04.2001 and the same was witnessed by me. During that time both Mr.RM.Subramaniam, Branch Manager and Mr.M.K.Murthy, clerk/Shroff of out branch were present."(Emphasis added) 14. It is only on the basis of the alleged confession before the police officer and which was identified by M.W.6 in the police station, the petitioner was found guilty. 15. As to how far, the confession given to the police during the course of criminal investigation is admissible in evidence has to be examined first. It must be noted that under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, the confession to the police officer is inadmissible. Under Section 26, it is not admissible unless it is made before the Magistrate. The criminal court had rejected the very same confession statement and that is judgment was marked as Ex.W.1. Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as follows: "25.) Confession to police officer not to be proved. “No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. 26.) Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him. “No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person." 16. Notwithsanding the same, the learned counsel for the respondent Mr.V.Karthik, learned counsel for M/s.T.S.Gopalan and Co., appearing for the second respondent placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh reported in (1977) 2 SCC 491 for contending that the Evidence Act will not apply to domestic enquiry and even at times, an hearsay can be acceptable as evidence in the domestic enquiry. For this purpose he relied upon the following passage found in paragraph 4 of the said judgment which reads as follows: “4.) It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good......” 17. Subsequently, he referred to an another judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1990 Supp SCC 541 (2) and contended that though not the statement made to the police cannot be accepted as evidence in a criminal trial, but yet for other purposes it can be relied upon. In this context, he referred to paragraph 3 of the said judgment which reads as follows: “3.) In Queen Empress v. Tribhovan Manekchand1 a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court laid down that the statement made to the police by the accused persons as to the ownership of property which was the subject matter of the proceedings against them although inadmissible as evidence against them at the trial for the offence with which they were charged, were admissible as evidence with regard to the ownership of the property in an enquiry held by the Criminal Procedure Code. The same view was reiterated in Pohlu v. Emperor2 where it was pointed out that though there is a bar in Section 25 of the Evidence Act, or in Section 162 CrPC for being made use of as evidence against the accused, this statement could be made use of in an enquiry under Section 517 CrPC when determining the question of return of property. These two decisions have been followed by the Rajasthan High Court in Dhanraj Baldeokishan v. State3 and the Mysore High Court in Veerabhadrappa v. Govinda.....” 18. He further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Srinath Gupta reported in (1996) 6 SCC 486 and in paragraphs 13,14,16 to 19, it was observed as follows: "13.) The statements under Section 161 CrPC may not be admissible in the criminal trial, but the said statements can be produced in a disciplinary inquiry like the present. The person who made the statement has been examined before the Inquiry Officer. It was open to the witness to have stated orally the entire contents of what was recorded in his statement under Section 161 CrPC. Instead of following this time-consuming procedure, the said statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC was read over to the witness who admitted the contents thereof. In this way the earlier statement under Section 161 CrPC became a part of the examination-in-chief of the witness before the Inquiry Officer. It is not in dispute that the said statements had been given to the respondent in advance and full opportunity was granted to the respondent to cross-examine the said witnesses. This being the case, it is difficult to appreciate as to how the High Court could have come to the conclusion that the inquiry proceedings stood vitiated. 14.) In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, we are fortified by the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. S.S. Makapur2. In that case also, statements of witnesses which had been recorded behind the back of the delinquent officer were taken on record and an opportunity of cross-examination was given. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the principles of natural justice had not been followed because of the admission in evidence of such statements. In that case also, statements of witnesses which had been recorded behind the back of the delinquent officer were taken on record and an opportunity of cross-examination was given. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the principles of natural justice had not been followed because of the admission in evidence of such statements. While allowing the appeal and rejecting the contention of the respondent therein, this Court in S.S. Makapur case at SCR p. 951 observed as follows: “When the evidence is oral, normally the examination of the witness will in its entirety, take place before the party charged, who will have full opportunity of cross-examining him. The position is the same when a witness is called, the statement given previously by him behind the back of the party is put to him, and admitted in evidence, a copy thereof is given to the party, and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine him. To require in that case that the contents of the previous statement should be repeated by the witness word by word, and sentence by sentence, is to insist on bare technicalities, and rules of natural justice are matters not of form but of substance. In our opinion they are sufficiently complied with when previous statements given by witnesses are read over to them, marked on their admission, copies thereof given to the person charged, and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine them.” 16.) Mr Tarkunde, learned counsel for the respondent, however, placed strong reliance on the following observations of this Court in Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar4 SCR at p. 827: “Further we can take judicial notice of the fact that many of our industrial workers are illiterate and sometimes even the representatives of labour union may not be present to defend them. In such a case to read over a prepared statement in a few minutes and then ask the workmen to cross-examine would make a mockery of the opportunity that the rules of natural justice require that the workmen should have to defend themselves. It seems to us therefore that when one is dealing with domestic inquiries in industrial matters, the proper course for the management is to examine the witnesses from the beginning to the end in the presence of the workman at the enquiry itself. It seems to us therefore that when one is dealing with domestic inquiries in industrial matters, the proper course for the management is to examine the witnesses from the beginning to the end in the presence of the workman at the enquiry itself. Oral examination always takes much longer than a mere reading of a prepared statement of the same length and brings home the evidence more clearly to the person against whom the inquiry is being held. Generally speaking therefore we should expect a domestic inquiry by the management to be of this kind.” 17.) The aforesaid observations do imply that oral examination should take place and reading of a prepared statement may cause prejudice but the Court did not hold that the procedure which was referred to in Shivabasappa case2 was illegal. In fact in the very next sentence, it was observed in the said case as follows: “Even so, we recognise the force of the argument on behalf of the appellant that the main principles of natural justice cannot change from tribunal to tribunal and therefore it may be possible to have another method of conducting a domestic inquiry (though we again repeat that this should not be the rule but the exception) and that is in the manner laid down in Shivabasappa case2. The minimum that we shall expect where witnesses are not examined from the very beginning at the enquiry in the presence of the person charged is that the person charged should be given a copy of the statements made by the witnesses which are to be used at the inquiry well in advance before the inquiry begins and when we say that the copy of the statements should be given well in advance we mean that it should be given at least two days before the inquiry is to begin.” 18.) In the present case, statements under Section 161 CrPC had been given to Respondent 1 a number of months before the witnesses were examined. Therefore, even the minimum requirement which is referred to in Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. case4 was complied with. Therefore, even the minimum requirement which is referred to in Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. case4 was complied with. 19.) From the aforesaid discussion the only conclusion which could be arrived at is that in the present case no illegality had been committed by taking on record the statements which had been made under Section 161 CrPC and the conclusion of the High Court which has held that the disciplinary proceedings stood vitiated, is not correct." 19. The learned counsel further placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (1996) 10 SCC 659 for the similar proposition and in paragraphs 10 and 11, it was observed as follows: "10.) Now coming to the main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, it is true that a confession or admission of guilt made by a person accused of an offence before, or while in the custody of, a police officer is not admissible in a court of law according to Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, 1872 but it is equally well settled that these rules of evidence do not apply to departmental enquiries - See State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makapur2 and State of Assam v. Mahendra Kumar Das wherein the only test is compliance with the principles of natural justice and, of course, compliance with the rules governing the enquiries, if any. In this context, it is well to remember that in India, evidence recovered or discovered as a result of an illegal search is held relevant departing from the law in the United States. We may refer to the following observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Kurma v. R.4, quoted approvingly by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (Investigation)5: (SCC p. 365, para 24) “The test to be applied, both in civil and in criminal cases, in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the Court is not concerned with how it was obtained.” 11.) In this sense, if the appellant's confession is relevant, the fact that it was made to the police or while in the custody of the police may not be of much consequence for the reason that strict rules of Evidence Act do not apply to departmenta1/disciplinary enquiries. In a departmental enquiry, it would perhaps be permissible for the authorities to prove that the appellant did make such a confession/admission during the course of interrogation and it would be for the disciplinary authority to decide whether it is a voluntary confession/admission or not. If the disciplinary authority comes to the conclusion that the statement was indeed voluntary and true, he may well be entitled to act upon the said statement. Here, the authorities say that they were satisfied about the truth of the appellant's confession. There is undoubtedly no other material. There is also the fact that the appellant has been acquitted by the Designated Court. We must say that the facts of this case did present us with a difficult choice. The fact, however, remains that the High Court has opined that there was enough material before the appropriate authority upon which it could come to a reasonable conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry as contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. Nothing has been brought to our notice to persuade us not to accept the said finding of the High Court. Even a copy of the counter filed by the respondents in the High Court is not placed before us. Once proviso (b) is held to have been validly invoked, the government servant concerned is left with no legitimate ground to impugn the action except perhaps to say that the facts said to have been found against him do not warrant the punishment actually awarded. So far as the present case is concerned, if one believes that the confession made by the appellant was voluntary and true, the punishment awarded cannot be said to be excessive. The appellant along with some others caused the death of the Superintendent of Police and a few other police officials. It must be remembered that we are dealing with a situation obtaining in Punjab during the years 1990-91. The appellant along with some others caused the death of the Superintendent of Police and a few other police officials. It must be remembered that we are dealing with a situation obtaining in Punjab during the years 1990-91. Moreover, the appellate authority has also agreed with the disciplinary authority that there were good grounds for coming to the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a disciplinary enquiry against the appellant and that the appellant was guilty of the crime confessed by him. There is no allegation of mala fides levelled against the appellate authority. The disciplinary and the appellate authorities are the men on the spot and we have no reason to believe that their decision has not been arrived at fairly. The High Court is also satisfied with the reasons for which the disciplinary enquiry was dispensed with. In the face of all these circumstances, it is not possible for us to take a different view at this stage. It is not permissible for us to go into the question whether the confession made by the appellant is voluntary or not, once it has been accepted as voluntary by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. 20. The learned counsel also contended that what was required was the evaluating the probabilities of the case and not the finding beyond the reasonable doubt. For this purpose, he relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Food Corpn. of India Workers' Union v. Food Corpn. of India reported in (1996) 9 SCC 439 and in paragraph 16, the Supreme Court had observed as follows: “16) ......The approach made by the Tribunal, even in the matter of marshalling or considering the material placed before it, seems to be wrong for the following reasons. The Tribunal was apparently of the view, that there should be ‘evidence’ to prove the facts, as per the provisions of the Evidence Act. It is not so. The Tribunal is not a court. There should be only ‘material’ and not evidence as required by the Evidence Act. It appears that a good many witnesses were examined by another member who was the predecessor of the member, who delivered the final award. The Tribunal has stated thatthe evidence of the petitioner (workman) is not ‘duly proved’, ‘legally proved’ or proved ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. This approach was also wrong. It appears that a good many witnesses were examined by another member who was the predecessor of the member, who delivered the final award. The Tribunal has stated thatthe evidence of the petitioner (workman) is not ‘duly proved’, ‘legally proved’ or proved ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. This approach was also wrong. The only question was whether on weighing the probabilities, the material placed by the petitioner was acceptable or rendered probable. The Tribunal has considered at length the minute particulars in the case, in the light of the requirements of the Evidence Act and has made much of the minor lapses in evaluating the probabilities. There are vague generalisations and an unreal or impractical approach to the materials available before it. Even where the predecessor has found resemblance in the signatures of the identity cards with other records, the later Tribunal has discarded them. The Tribunal has categorised the identity cards as falling under four groups ‘no resemblance’, ‘some resemblance’, ‘little resemblance’ and ‘clear resemblance’ based on no clear guidelines or principles and has based the conclusion at its ipse dixit. To crown all this, the Tribunal has totally failed to note that the management has no explanation, regarding workmen other than ‘203’ admitted by it, and it did not produce any person bearing the name in the list of ‘464’ nor did it offer any explanation, regarding such other persons (other than 203)." 21. The learned counsel further placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Narender Singh reported in (2006) 4 SCC 265 and in paragraphs 21 and 23 it was observed as follows: "21.) The correctness or otherwise of the statement contained in Ext. PW 8-A has also not been disputed. The Tribunal, therefore, was not correct in its view that the confession made by the respondent herein had not been proved in accordance with law. So far as the evidentiary value of the said confession is concerned, we may notice that Section 25 of the Evidence Act and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for an embargo as regards admissibility of a confession in a criminal trial. The said provisions have per se no application in a departmental proceeding. Section 25 of the Evidence Act and Section 162(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure read thus: “25.) Confession to police officer not to be proved. The said provisions have per se no application in a departmental proceeding. Section 25 of the Evidence Act and Section 162(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure read thus: “25.) Confession to police officer not to be proved. “No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.” *** “162.) Statements to police not to be signed: Use of statements in evidence. “(1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made:” 23.) The Tribunal as also the High Court were, therefore, not correct in arriving at the finding that the said confession was not admissible even in a departmental proceeding." 22. The learned counsel also subsequently referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court for contending that even for circumstantial evidence, the misconduct can be said to be proved, vide judgment in Vinay D. Nagar v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2008) 5 SCC 597 and in paragraph 9, the Supreme Court had observed as follows : "9.) The principle of law is well established that where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and the facts, so established, should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and they should be such as to exclude hypothesis than the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 23. The learned counsel thereafter referred to a judgment of this Court in Prasad Film Laboratories Vs. The learned counsel thereafter referred to a judgment of this Court in Prasad Film Laboratories Vs. Presiding Officer and another reported in 2002 FJR Vol.100 page 728, for contending that subsequent acquittal has no relevance to the case on hand and referred to the following passage found in page 731, which reads as follows: "As laid down by this court as well as the apex court, the result of the criminal case would not be relevant either in the domestic enquiry or before the Labour Court. Moreover, in this case, the finding given by the enquiry officer after domestic enquiry that he was guilty of theft was accepted by the Labour Court. Furthermore, the second respondent himself would not choose to challenge the finding of theft in spite of the fact that he was acquitted in the criminal case. Therefore, the criminal court's finding should not be allowed to weigh the mind of the Labour Court in regard to the imposition of punishment on the delinquent." 24. The learned counsel further relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 for the very same proposition and referred to paragraph 10 of the said judgment which reads as follows: "10.) The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceedings invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him." 25. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him." 25. Per contra, Mr.K.M.Ramesh,learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 , wherein the Supreme Court had reviewed all the previous case laws, which are as follows; "Narender Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2006) 4 SCC 713 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 840; Union of India v. H.C.Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 4 SCR 718 ; Moni Shankar v. Union of India, (2008) 3 SCC 484 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 819; Capt.M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810; M.V.Bijlani v. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 919; Jasbir Singh v. Punjab & Sind Bank, (2007) 1 SCC 566 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 401. KuldeepSingh v. Commr. Of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429; Bhagwati Prasad Dubey v. Food Corpn. Of India, 1987 Supp SCC 579 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 243 : (1987) 5 ATC 321; State of Assam v. Mahendra Kumar Das, (1970) 1 SCC 709 ; Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 : 1958 SCR 1080 ; State of U.P. v. Om Prakash Gupta, (1969) 3 SCC 775 ; K.L.Tripathi v. SBI, (1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62; Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1986) 3 SCC 454 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 662; Export Inspection Council of India v. Kalyan Kumar Mitra, (1987) 2 Cal LJ 344; Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain, AIR 1969 SC 983 : (1969) 1 SCR 735 ; Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh, (2004) 8 SCC 200 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1067; RBI v. S.Mani (2005) 5 SCC 100 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 609." 26. The Supreme Court after reviewing all the earlier cases in paragraphs 14 and 15 had observed as follows: 14.) Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The Supreme Court after reviewing all the earlier cases in paragraphs 14 and 15 had observed as follows: 14.) Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. 15.) We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left." (Emphasis added) 27. On the question of the effect of a subsequent acquittal and also as to whether suspicion can replace proof, in the same judgment, in paragraph 23, the Supreme Court had observed as follows: "23.) Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the criminal court on the basis of selfsame evidence should not have been taken into consideration. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the criminal court on the basis of selfsame evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof." 28. In the present case the criminal court's judgment was very much available as Ex.W.1. The Tribunal did not advert to the recent document. The person who made use of the BPO was also not examined. In this case, the witnesses examined by the management were also examined subsequently in the criminal case. The investigating officer was also not examined in the domestic enquiry. The examination of the witnesses who saw the petitioner's confession before the police cannot be raised to the level of proof against the petitioner especially when the beneficiary of the pay order was not before the enquiry. The person who made use of the pay order was not before the domestic enquiry, but was available before the criminal court. Therefore, this court is not inclined to accept the contentions of the respondent Bank in the absence of the investigating officer being examined. In the absence of the worker pleading guilty before the domestic enquiry and when the document's credibility was impeached by the criminal court cannot become the sole basis for holding the petitioner guilty of stealing the empty BPO from the bank. Therefore, the CGIT had committed a grave error in not adhering to the legal precedents and evidence made available in the domestic enquiry. 29. Under these circumstances, the impugned Award is set aside. The second respondent Bank is directed to reinstate the petitioner with full backwages. Therefore, the CGIT had committed a grave error in not adhering to the legal precedents and evidence made available in the domestic enquiry. 29. Under these circumstances, the impugned Award is set aside. The second respondent Bank is directed to reinstate the petitioner with full backwages. Accordingly, the writ petition will stand allowed. No costs.