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2012 DIGILAW 1339 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Mithalal

2012-05-21

MAHESH BHAGWATI

body2012
Hon'ble BHAGWATI, J.—By way of the instant writ petition, the petitioners have beseeched to quash and set-aside the orders dated 27th April, 2011 as also 5th November, 2007 passed by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Karauli and Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Karauli respectively. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts of the case, in nub, are that the respondent-plaintiff filed a civil suit for permanent injunction against the defendants-petitioners together with an application of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC in the court of Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Karauli. During the pendency of suit, the trial court found a prima-faice case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss in faovur of the respondent-plaintiff and granted injunction in favour of the respondent-plaintiff directing the petitioners defendants not to dispossess the plaintiff without observing due process of law. It was also directed that if the respondent-plaintiff did not comply with the conditions of lease deed, the petitioners-defendants were at liberty to act in accordance with law. Aggrieved with this order, the petitioners-defendants preferred an appeal and the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Karauli dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order dated 5th November, 2007 passed by the trial court. Thus, there has been a concurrent finding of two courts below. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the relevant material on record including the impugned orders. 4. Learned Government Counsel appearing for the State took me through the order dated 14th March, 2005 and canvassed that the respondent-plaintiff did not comply with the conditions of lease deed, hence the same was cancelled accordingly. The learned trial court as also the appellate court did not consider these aspects and arbitrarily granted injunction in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. Hence, both the orders deserve to be set-aside. 5. E Converso, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff defended the impugned order and stated the same to be just and proper and contended that both these orders have been passed pursuant to the order of the Division Bench of this High Court rendered in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 739/2003. Mr. 5. E Converso, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff defended the impugned order and stated the same to be just and proper and contended that both these orders have been passed pursuant to the order of the Division Bench of this High Court rendered in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 739/2003. Mr. Sharma further contended that it was categorically observed by the Division Bench of this Court in the said D.B. Civil Special Appeal that “in case, in the meanwhile, the period of lease has expired, they have to take all the care to renew the lease for the remaining period i.e. the left out period of the original lease.”. 6. Learned counsel further submitted that the lease granted in favour of the respondent-plaintiff became effective on 21st December, 1974 and the period was to expire on 20th December, 1994. The order of the Division Bench came to be passed on 4th July, 2003. Thereafter pursuant to this order, the petitioners-defendants handed over the possession of the mines on 21st July, 2003. In the light of the judgment passed by the Division Bench, the period of lease deed is to expire on 6th March, 2019. Prior to that the lease granted in favour of the respondent-plaintiff cannot be cancelled. It is categorically observed in unequivocal terms that the petitioners-defendants shall take all the care to renew the lease for the remaining period i.e. the left out period of the original lease, the Division Bench of this Court had made it clear that even after the expiry of the period of lease deed, the period was to be renewed for the remaining period i.e. the left out period of the original lease. Since the respondent-plaintiff worked on the mines only from 21st December, 1974 to 6th May, 1979, in the light of the order of the Division Bench, he was required to further work for the left out period of the original lease. Keeping in view the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court as also the suit decreed by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, the trial court found prima-facie case to be in favour of the respondent-plaintiff and granted injunction in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. The defendants-petitioners albeit preferred an appeal, but that too also stood dismissed. 7. The defendants-petitioners albeit preferred an appeal, but that too also stood dismissed. 7. Learned Government Counsel appearing for the State has utterly failed to convince me so as to take a contrary view to that of the view already taken by the two courts below. Hence, I do not find any ground to interfere with the order of the trial court as also of the appellate court. 8. The Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex court in the case of Kshitish Chandra Bose vs. Commissioner of Ranchi reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court 707 (1) categorically observed that the Patna High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in reversing the pure concurrent findings of fact given by the trial court and the then appellate court. 9. In the case of Mst. Kharbuja Kuer vs. Jangbahadur Rai (1963) 1 SCR 456 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain second appeal on findings of fact even if it was erroneous. In this connection, the Apex court observed as follows: “It is settled law that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact. As the two Courts, approached the evidence from a correct perspective and gave a concurrent finding of fact, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the said finding.” 10. To the same effect is another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of R. Ramachandra Ayyar V. Ramalingam, Chettiar reported in (1963) 3 SCR 604 , where the Court observed as follows: “But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower Appellate Court, however erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court, because as the Privy Council observed, however, gross or inexcusably the error may seem to be there is no jurisdiction under Section 100 to correct that error.” 11. The same view was taken in two earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Apex court in the case of D. Pattabhiramaswamy V. Hanymayya reported in AIR 1959 SC 57 and Raruha Singh vs. Achal Singh reported in AIR 1961 SC 1097 . 12. In this case, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the High Court had no jurisdiction after reversing the concurrent findings of fact of the courts below and remand the case to the Additional Judicial Commissioner. 13. 12. In this case, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the High Court had no jurisdiction after reversing the concurrent findings of fact of the courts below and remand the case to the Additional Judicial Commissioner. 13. The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that this Court should not invoke extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to upset the pure findings of fact of two courts below. The scope of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited. This extraordinary jurisdiction can be invoked only when the judgment of the court below is found to be perverse or contrary to material or it results in manifesting injustice. 14. This writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 329, their Lordships of Hon'ble Apex Court have held that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is a reserved and exceptional power for judicial intervention to be exercised not merely for the grant of relief in any even of the case, but only to be directed for the promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice. It has been held that the power is unfettered, but subject to high degree of judicial discipline and interference is to be kept at the minimum. 15. If viewed the case of the petitioners-defendants from the above angle in the light of the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble Apex court, it is found that the trial court as also the appellate court found the prima-facie case to be in favour of the respondent-plaintiff and granted injunction in its favour. The impugned orders, in the facts and circumstances of the case, are found to be just and proper and suffer from no infirmity. 16. I do not find any ground so as to interfere with the said orders and thus, the writ petition being devoid of any substance deserves to be dismissed. 17. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and the same being bereft of any merit stands dismissed accordingly. 18. Consequent upon the dismissal of writ petition, the stay application, filed herewith, does not survive and that also stands dismissed.