Judgment M.L. Tahaliyani, J. The appellant has been convicted by the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Thane, by order dated 28.9.2004 for the offence punishable u/s.302 of IPC and is sentenced to suffer RI for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default, to suffer RI for three months. 2. The alleged incident had occurred on 22.12.95 at the house of the deceased Chhaya Ganpat Gaikwad. She was staying at Ambus Tekdi, Narpoli, Bhiwandi. She had three children and was earning her livelihood by selling bananas. The appellant was staying with her. The appellant and the deceased had live-in-relationship. On 22.12.95 at about 4 p.m., the appellant had allegedly abused the deceased and thereafter had poured kerosene on her person and had set her on fire. Mother of the deceased, who was staying nearby locality, had come to the rescue of deceased. The deceased was taken to hospital and her statement was recorded which was treated as FIR (Exhibit 25). The Special Executive Magistrate Mrs.Charushila More was also called. She had also recorded the statement of the deceased in the hospital. In the statement before SEM also, the deceased had stated that she was set on fire by Abdul Nizam Sardar. The deceased had further specifically stated before the SEM that Abdul Nijam Sardar was not her husband and they had live-in-relationship. The said Abdul Nijam Sardar was in the habit of drinking liquor and assaulting the deceased. The SEM had recorded the statement of the deceased after ascertaining that she was conscious and was able to make coherent statements. Investigation continued. Statement of witnesses were recorded. It appears that the deceased had succumbed to the injuries. The post mortem examination of dead body was carried out on 26.12.95. There were 85% superficial deep burn injuries. It was opined by the Medical Officer that the deceased had died "due to shock due to burn injuries". 3. It is alleged that the appellant had absconded. The police tried to arrest him and in an attempt to apprehend him, they had visited his native place Azamgad in Uttar Pradesh. It is alleged that the appellant could not be found anywhere and therefore, the police had filed 'A' Summary Report in the court of Metropolitan Magistrate. It further appears that the appellant was arrested by one Mr.Sambhaji Jagtap (PW 14) on 2.8.2003 and case was reopened. It is alleged that the appellant could not be found anywhere and therefore, the police had filed 'A' Summary Report in the court of Metropolitan Magistrate. It further appears that the appellant was arrested by one Mr.Sambhaji Jagtap (PW 14) on 2.8.2003 and case was reopened. After completion of investigation, chargesheet was filed in the court of Magistrate and it was committed to the Court of Sessions. 4. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder. 5. The prosecution had examined in all 15 witnesses in support of its case. PW 1 Jalindar Pawar was panch witness to the spot panchnama. PW 2 Sagarbhai was neighbour of the deceased. PW 3 was also neighbour of the deceased. PW 4 is sister of the deceased. PW 5 was also neighbour of the deceased. PW 6 was working as PSI at Narpoli police station and he had recorded first statement of the deceased after getting certificate from the Medical Officer that the deceased was in a position to make a statement. PW 7 was a Medical Officer who had conducted post mortem examination on dead body of the deceased. PW 8 is a Medical Officer who had examined the deceased after arrival in the hospital and who had given certificate to the police that she was in a fit condition to make a statement. PW 9 is mother of the deceased. PW 10 is the Police Officer who had taken the deceased to the hospital from the spot. PW 11 had also accompanied the PW 10. PW 12 had taken further investigation of the case. PW 13 is one of the witnesses before whom oral dying declaration was allegedly made by the deceased. PW 14 is the Police Officer who had reopened the case after arrest of the appellant. PW 15 is the Medical Officer who had given fitness certificate to the Special Executive Magistrate to enable her to record statement of the deceased. 6. After having gone through the statement of all the witnesses, It is seen that almost all the witnesses who had seen the deceased in the flames or before whom the deceased had made statement involving the appellant, have not supported the prosecution case. PW 2 has denied that she had stated before the police that the appellant was husband of the deceased. PW 3 has also hostile. PW 2 has denied that she had stated before the police that the appellant was husband of the deceased. PW 3 has also hostile. She has also denied to have stated that the appellant was staying with the deceased. PW 4 and 5 were also hostile. Even mother of the deceased, who has been examined as PW 9, has not supported the prosecution case. Though it is the case of prosecution that the mother had reached the spot immediately after the incident, she had not supported the prosecution case during the course of trial. 7. As such, it is not established that the appellant was staying with the deceased and that they had live-in-relationship. Even if it is assumed that the dying declaration given to the police officer and Special Executive Officer are true and correct, the prime question which arises for determination is whether the person named by the deceased in her statements before the police officer and before the Special Executive Magistrate was the same or otherwise. There is no evidence at all of any nature to establish that the appellant was the person who was staying with he deceased. Therefore, even if both the dying declarations are accepted to be true and correct, the prosecution case does not advance in any way. Apart from this, it is also necessary to be mentioned here that the PW 14, who had reopened the case after arrest of the appellant, has not stated anything in his evidence to show as to how did he suspect that the appellant was the same person. He could have recorded further statement of the witnesses and could have ascertained whether the appellant is the same person or not. As such, we do not think that it is necessary to examine the issue whether the dying declarations were voluntary or otherwise. Even if the Court gives any finding on that issue, it will not help to give judgment on the culpability of the appellant as the identification of the person named in the dying declarations has not been established. For all these reasons, we pass the following Order:- 8. The criminal appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the Trial Court is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 9. Appellant be released forthwith unless he is required in any other case. 10. For all these reasons, we pass the following Order:- 8. The criminal appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the Trial Court is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 9. Appellant be released forthwith unless he is required in any other case. 10. Since the appeal is allowed, the criminal application for bail does not survive and the same is accordingly disposed of.