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2012 DIGILAW 135 (KER)

G. Sreekumar v. State of Kerala

2012-01-30

P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON

body2012
JUDGMENT P.R. Ramachandra Menon, J. 1. Selection and appointment of Industrial Tribunal, Idukki at Peerumedu is under challenge in this writ petition. 2. Is it necessary to satisfy the requirements of Article 234 of the Constitution of India and if not, does it in any manner violate the ratio of the decision rendered by the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioner's Association & ors. ( AIR 1998 SC 1233 ) in this regard, is the point to be considered. 3. The petitioner is a lawyer by profession, mainly practising before the District and other subordinate Courts at Kollam, besides various Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals in the State. The petitioner was desirous of being appointed as Industrial Tribunal and had participated in the process of selection long ago, he could not secure appointment due to some or other reasons . Later, the petitioner was let known of the ongoing steps to fill up the post of Industrial Tribunal, Idukki; pursuant to which, he submitted his proforma and willingness / consent to be considered and appointed, if selected. Pursuant to this, the petitioner was served with Ext.P1 memo dated 18.10.2010 to appear for an interview scheduled on 01.11.2010. The petitioner has quite surprisingly approached this Court seeking to stall the process of selection, including the interview scheduled on 01.11.2010 contending that the constitution of the Selection Committee was against the procedure declared by the Apex Court and that the process itself was bad as the zone of consideration was restricted only to 'one source', despite the amendment of the Statute, denying opportunity to persons belonging to other sources from being considered. 4. When the matter came up for consideration before this Court on 29.10.2010, the writ petition was admitted and the petitioner was also directed to be interviewed on the relevant date .Subsequently, as per the interim order dated 11.11.2010 passed in the connected case i.e., W.P.(C) No.31963 of 2010, the respondent Government was directed not to make any appointment, without obtaining orders from the Court and the said case was ordered to be listed along with this writ petition. Later, W.P.(C) No.31963 of 2010 came up for further consideration before this Court on 28.10.2011, when the learned Counsel for the concerned petitioner submitted that the main relief sought for in the writ petition had already been satisfied in so far as the said writ petitioner was also interviewed, pursuant to the interim order dated 27.07.2010 and was ranked at 'Sl.No. 13' in the Select List. In view of the said ranked position, based on the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, in view of availability of only 'one vacancy', the said writ petition was dismissed as infructuous, as per the judgment dated 28.10.2011. 5. In the course of the proceedings, the additional third respondent came to be impleaded vide order dated 25.05.2011 in I.A.No.7517 of 2011, who projected himself as a candidate placed at the top of the rank list. However, no appointment has been effected so far, in view of pendency of the matter. The contention of the petitioner is that the process of selection being pursued by the concerned respondents is nothing but a farce; that it is not in tune with the constitutional mandate under Article 234 of the Constitution of India and is rather alien to the law declared by the Apex Court in AIR 1998 SC 1233 (cited supra). The specific case of the petitioner is that, no consultation has been made with the PSC, which is a pre-requisite for effecting appointment under Article 234 of the Constitution. It is also contended that the selection of the Industrial Tribunal being made by a Committee constituted by the Government consisting of members like the Law Secretary and the Secretary to Labour Department, it so happens that a member of the 'Judicial service' is sought to be selected and appointed by the 'Executive", which is alien to the scheme of the Constitution, in view of the mandate under Article 50 and Articles 234 to 236 of the Constitution of India, as explained by the Apex Court on different occasions. 6. The first and second respondents have filed their counter affidavits pointing out that the selection being conducted by the respondents is perfectly in tune with the statutory/constitutional requirements and it is not in contravention of any of the mandatory requirement of law or any binding judicial precedents. 6. The first and second respondents have filed their counter affidavits pointing out that the selection being conducted by the respondents is perfectly in tune with the statutory/constitutional requirements and it is not in contravention of any of the mandatory requirement of law or any binding judicial precedents. It is pointed out that the statutory position and method of recruitment with regard to appointment of the Industrial Tribunal, Kerala, by virtue of relevant State amendments, stands on a different footing and as such, the law laid down by the Apex Court in AIR 1998 SC 1233 (cited supra) is not applicable to the case in hand. It is also brought on record that the petitioner himself used to participate in the process of selection earlier 'as well; he had approached this Court at different points of time for appropriate reliefs and that there was no challenge with regard to the process and procedure of selection at any point of time earlier. It is further stated that, pursuant to retirement of the Presiding officer. Industrial Tribunal, Idukki , one vacancy arose on 31.05.2010, which was decided to be filled up by the most eligible candidate, for which application was called for, through the various Industrial Tribunals/Labour Courts situated in the State of Kerala and also through the office of the learned Advocate General of the State, as it was the practice being followed hitherto, so as to identify the most suitable candidate. The particulars of the earlier round of litigation pursued by the petitioner and the turn of events have also been described in the said affidavit, contending that the 'procedure' of selection stands already upheld by this Court as per the common judgment dated 19.01.2007 in W.P.(C) No. 865/2006 and connected cases, which has been confirmed by the Division Bench, as per the judgment dated 13.04.2007 in W.A.No.416 of 2007 and connected cases. The said procedure in respect of the filling up the vacancies of Industrial Tribunal, Kollam and Kozhikode (to which also the petitioner was a contestant) is being pursued and followed in the case of appointment to the post of Industrial Tribunal, Idukki, as involved in the present writ petition as well. The said procedure in respect of the filling up the vacancies of Industrial Tribunal, Kollam and Kozhikode (to which also the petitioner was a contestant) is being pursued and followed in the case of appointment to the post of Industrial Tribunal, Idukki, as involved in the present writ petition as well. Reliance is also sought to be placed on the decision rendered by this Court in Paulose v. State of Kerala ( 1993 (1) KLT 795 ) upholding such procedure, which still stands good, having not been overruled so far. 7. The respondent/Government has pointed out in the counter affidavit that the members of the Selection Committee consisted of persons of high status and reputation; that no allegation whatsoever has been made against any such members; nor is there any specific allegation of malpractice. It is also brought on record that the Selection Committee consisted of a retired judge of this Court, besides the Secretary of Law Department and also the Secretary to the Labour and Rehabilitation Department. Since the functioning of the Industrial Tribunal is solely related to the Labour disputes, inclusion of the Labour Secretary and the Law Secretacy in the Selection Committee for selecting the most suitable and efficient candidate for the post is sought to be justified. It has also been pointed out that the petitioner could secure only the 9th rank' and that the right of the petitioner being only the right to be considered, there is no violation of any fundamental right or such other legal rights. 8. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit, virtually reiterating the contentions in the writ petition and also pointing out the necessity to have wide publication, by way of newspaper advertisement, so as to give opportunity to all candidates for participating in the process of selection. Reliance is sought to be placed on the decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Othes v. Umadevi (3) & others, 2006(4) SCC 1 and also in Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayanthi Lal Vaghela & Others, 2006 (2) LLN 1. 9. Reliance is sought to be placed on the decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Othes v. Umadevi (3) & others, 2006(4) SCC 1 and also in Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayanthi Lal Vaghela & Others, 2006 (2) LLN 1. 9. It is pointed out that there is an observation by the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. B. Renjith Kumar, 2005 (3) KLT 33 that the nature of duties and functions of the Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals are the same and as such, there is no reason to treat them differently with regard to the benefits payable to them. In view of the above judgment, it is contended that there cannot be any difference in the source of their recruitment as well. While the District Judges are being recruited based on the written test and interview, recruitment of the Presiding Officers of Industrial Tribunals by means of interview alone, is stated as illegal and hence that the earlier decision rendered by this Court in 1993 (1) KLT 795 (Paulose v. State of Kerala) is no longer a good law, in view of the subsequent decisions rendered by the Apex Court . 10. The Addl. third respondent has filed a counter affidavit seeking to sustain the process of selection and projecting his better credentials as the topper in the Rank List, having been assigned the first rank. Copy of the select list has been produced as Ext.R3(a), while the rank list with the marks awarded to the persons placed in the said list has been produced as Ext.R3(b) [obtained to the said respondent, pursuant to the interference made by the appellate authority under the RTI Act, as borne by Ext.R3(c)]. A copy of the communication dated 14.06.2010 issued by the Government, requesting for a panel of qualified advocates from the Advocate General and also from Presiding Officers of the various Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals in Kerala, for appointment as Industrial Tribunal, Idukki, is produced as Ext.R3(d). 11. Heard Mr. C.Rajendran, the learned counsel for the petitioner, as well as the Mr. Noushad Thottathil, the learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of R1 and R2 and Mr. T.V. George, the learned Counsel who entered appearance for the Additional third respondent. 12. 11. Heard Mr. C.Rajendran, the learned counsel for the petitioner, as well as the Mr. Noushad Thottathil, the learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of R1 and R2 and Mr. T.V. George, the learned Counsel who entered appearance for the Additional third respondent. 12. The history of litigation relates to the steps taken by the Government in the year 1999, for appointment of Industrial Tribunals at Kollam and Alappuzha, calling for a list of eligible candidates, who satisfied the requirements under Section 7A of the I.D.Act. The petitioner had also participated in the process of selection and all the candidates were interviewed by a team consisting of the Addl. Chief Secretary, Secretary (Labour) and Secretary (Law) on 02.01.2001 and a rank list consisting of seven persons was prepared. But the same was not published, for the reason that the Government subsequently took a decision to restore the retirement age of Industrial Tribunals as 60 years, as per G.O.(MS) 45/2002/LBR dated 28.06.2002. In the said circumstance, the Industrial Tribunals at Kollam and Alappuzha, who were made to retire on attaining the age of 55 yeas were re-inducted into service and were allowed to continue upto the age of 60 years. Thus, no actual vacancy of Industrial Tribunal at Kollam and Alappuzha was available; nor could it be deemed as arisen, so as to give appointment to the persons placed in the Rank List prepared on the basis of the interview held on 02.01.2001. The case of the petitioner was that, he was already placed as 'Rank No.2' in the aforesaid selection process, and that by the time the writ petition filed by him challenging the 'age enhancement' came up for hearing, the re-inducted Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals at Alappuzha and Kollam reached the age of 60 years and in the said circumstance, the writ petition was disposed of, directing the Government to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment. However, the State Government cancelled the selection and decided to proceed with 'fresh selection'. When the petitioner challenged the fresh selection, this Court directed the petitioner to appear for the interview along with other candidates, pursuant to which the petitioner also appeared for the interview. But according to the petitioner, he was wrongly sidelined. 13. However, the State Government cancelled the selection and decided to proceed with 'fresh selection'. When the petitioner challenged the fresh selection, this Court directed the petitioner to appear for the interview along with other candidates, pursuant to which the petitioner also appeared for the interview. But according to the petitioner, he was wrongly sidelined. 13. In the meanwhile, the Presiding officer of the Industrial Tribunal, Kozhikode was transferred and posted as the Industrial Tribunal, Alappuzha and as such, the fresh selection was proceeded with for filling up the two vacant posts of Industrial Tribunals at 'Kollam' and 'Kozhikode', calling for panels of eligible candidates from all the Presiding Officers of the Labour Courts, Industrial Tribunals and from the Advocate General of the State. The said course was upheld by this Court in the common judgment dated 19.01.2007 in W.P.(C) Nos. 865 OF 2006 (preferred by the petitioner herein) and other connected cases, which was confirmed vide judgment dated 13.04.2007 in W.A.No.416 of 2007 and connected cases. It was pursuant to the above verdict passed by the Division Bench, that the selection to the two posts of Industrial Tribunals at Kollam and Kozhikode was finalised and the vacancies were filled up as per G.O.(Ms)No.125/2007/LBR dated 20.09.2007. This selection has become final, the petitioner having not challenged the same. 14. As mentioned herein before, pursuant to Ext. R3(d) communication dated 14.06.2010 issued by the Government, calling for a panel of eligible candidates from different sources, the candidates including the petitioner were interviewed and the merit of the candidates was assessed by a Committee constituted by the Government, headed by a retired Judge of this Court and the Law Secretary as well as the Secretary to the Dept. of Labour &. Rehabilitation, as members. On evaluation of the traits, the additional 3rd respondent secured the maximum marks and hence was placed at Rank No.1 (199 marks) in Ext.R3(b) rank list, while the petitioner could secure only the 9th' rank, having scored 163' marks. of Labour &. Rehabilitation, as members. On evaluation of the traits, the additional 3rd respondent secured the maximum marks and hence was placed at Rank No.1 (199 marks) in Ext.R3(b) rank list, while the petitioner could secure only the 9th' rank, having scored 163' marks. This Court finds that there is no specific averment or allegation against any of the members of the Committee constituted by the Government for conducting the selection; nor is there any specific pleading that the relevant traits have not been considered by the Committee or that any irrelevant aspect in respect of the persons placed above the petitioner has been assessed so as to give any undue advantage over the petitioner. In the said circumstances, the selection and placement given to the additional third respondent does not call for any interference. 15. Coming to the alleged violation of the constitutional mandate in respect of the selection, the petitioner heavily relied upon the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 1998 SC 1233 = 1998 (1) LLN 961 (State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners' Association and others). The issue involved therein was, whether the Notification dated 08.03.1979 issued by the State of Maharashtra under the Industrial Disputes Act and the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the amended Section 7 of the I.D.Act, 1947 (in so far as the relevant provisions authorise appointment of Asst. Commissioner (Labour) working as Judges of the Labour Court), was void and illegal and in contravention of Art. 234 of the Constitution. The contention of the writ petitioner was accepted by a Single Judge of the High Court, who set aside the Notification and directed the State to comply with the provisions of Art.234 while appointing judges of the Labour Court. Since, interference was declined in the appeal preferred before the Division Bench of the High Court, the matter was taken up before the Apex Court. After considering the various aspects, the Apex Court observed in paragraph 5' as follows: "There is not much difficulty in holding that the Labour Court performs judicial functions and is a Court. Since, interference was declined in the appeal preferred before the Division Bench of the High Court, the matter was taken up before the Apex Court. After considering the various aspects, the Apex Court observed in paragraph 5' as follows: "There is not much difficulty in holding that the Labour Court performs judicial functions and is a Court. The Labour Court adjudicates upon disputes that, had it not been for the Industrial Disputes Act, the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, would have been within the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts to decide, although the ordinary civil courts may not be able to grant all the reliefs that are contemplated by these Acts. The Labour Court are, therefore, Courts and decide disputes that are civil in nature. " 16. In the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. the Employees of the Bharat Bank, AIR 1950 SC 188 , the question considered was whether an Industrial Tribunal is a Court. It was observed that, one cannot go by mere nomenclature, but has to examine the functions of a Tribunal and how it proceeds to discharge those functions. After elaborate discussion, it was held that an Industrial Tribunal had all the trappings of a Court and performed functions which cannot but be regarded as judicial. Applying the test, the Supreme Court held in AIR 1998 SC 1233 (cited supra) that Labour Court (appointment to which post was under challenge therein) would undoubtedly be a Court in the true sense of the term. But the question however was, whether such a Court and the Presiding Officer of such a Court can be said to hold a post in the 'Judicial Service' of the State as defined under Article 236 of the Constitution. (Paragraph 6). But the question however was, whether such a Court and the Presiding Officer of such a Court can be said to hold a post in the 'Judicial Service' of the State as defined under Article 236 of the Constitution. (Paragraph 6). It was further observed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision (paragraphs 10,11 and 12) that the term 'District Judge' covers 'a Judge of any Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction'; with an increase in numbers of specialised courts and Tribunals which are being set up to deal with specific kinds of civil litigations, which otherwise would have been dealt with by the ordinary civil Courts, which could be Labour and Industrial Courts with specialised civil original jurisdiction pertaining to Labour and Industrial disputes, specified in the relevant Acts or Debt Recovery Tribunals pertaining to recovery of bank debts and so on and that the structure of the civil courts exercising original jurisdiction is no longer monolithic. The Apex Court observed that the Industrial Tribunal is a Civil Court, exercising civil original jurisdiction and hence the term 'District Judge' should not be confined only to the Judge of the Principal Civil Court in the hierarchy of General Civil Courts, which would now have to include also the hierarchy of the specialised Civil Courts, such as the Labour Courts and Industrial Courts as well, thus indicating the extensive definition of the term 'District Judge' under Article 236(a). 17. A reference is made to another Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1987 , though reliance sought to be placed by the State of Maharashtra on the said decision was held as not acceptable/ applicable . In Chandramohan's case, the Court was required to consider the question of eligibility of judicial officers for appointment as 'District Judges' under Article 233 of the Constitution. Under the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules, the Judicial Officers were eligible for appointment as District Judges and the expression was meant to cover members of the Executive Department, who discharge some Revenue and Magisterial duties as well and it became necessary to consider and interpret the provisions of Articles 233 to 236 of the Constitution, when selection of such persons was subjected to challenge. The Apex Court held that the Governor could not appoint a 'District Judge' from persons belonging to any service other than the 'Judicial service' (like Police, Excise ,Revenue or such other service)defined under Art. 236(b). It was made clear that the 'Judicial service' contemplated under Article 236 (b) consists only of persons intended to fill up the post of District Judges and other civil Judicial posts, which is an exclusive service, consisting of Judicial officers alone, in contra distinction to 'Executive service', where some executive officers may also be performing judicial or quasi judicial functions. The constitutional scheme providing for independence of judiciary so as to keep away such officers belonging to Executive was also highlighted in the aforesaid decision. It was in the above circumstance, that interference was declined and the appeal was dismissed upholding the verdict passed by the High Court, intercepting the notification issued by the State of Maharashtra enabling appointment of Asst. Commissioners of Labour to be appointed as Judges of the Labour Court. 18. Coming to the case in hand, the statutory provision as considered by the Apex Court in AIR 1998 SC 1233 (cited supra), with regard to appointment of a Labour Court under Section 7 and appointment of an Industrial Tribunal under Section 7A of the I.D. Act in Kerala, there is substantial difference by virtue of the State amendment on the subject. As per the Industrial Disputes (Kerala Amendment )Act (Act 28 of 1961), application of the provisions to the State of Kerala under sub-section (3) of Section 7A of the I.D. Act, 1947 stands modified. Clause (a) of sub section (3) of Section 7A of the I.D. Act, has been substituted by virtue of the above amendment which reads as follows: Section 7A (Kerala Amendment) Act: "7A. Tribunals:- (1)The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter, whether specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act. (2) A Tribunal shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the appropriate Government. (2) A Tribunal shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the appropriate Government. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the presiding officer of a Tribunal unless-- (a) he is, or has been, a judicial officer not below the rank of a District Judge, or is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court; or (aa) he has, for a period of not less than three years, been a District Judge or an Additional District Judge; (4) The appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, appoint two persons as assessors to advise the Tribunal in the proceedings before it." 19. Thus, in the State of Kerala, in terms of the above substituted clause (a) in sub-section (3) of Section 7 A of the I.D. Act, a person qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court is eligible to be appointed as the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal. The requirements to be qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court are stipulated under Article 217 of the Constitution of India and Ext.R3(d) communication issued by the Government, calling for a panel of eligible candidates from various sources including from the Advocate General, Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals in Kerala, is in respect of such persons who could be considered for appointment. No doubt, the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals, (dealing with exclusively Labour matters), before whom the concerned lawyers are practising as advocates in the field in question, are the best sources to identify the persons and to forward the list for consideration. So also is the position with regard to the Advocate General, who heads the legal fraternity in the State. It is the merit and suitability of such candidates, that is being considered by the Selection Committee which is headed by a retired Judge of this Court with the Secretary (Dept. of Law) and the Secretary of the Labour Department as its members. Incidentally, it is to be noted that the Secretary to the Department of Law of the State happens to be a District Judge belonging to the Higher Judicial Service of the State on deputation, who has been selected and appointed as a Judge in conformity with the mandate under Article 233 of the Constitution of India, in consultation with the PSC and the High Court of Kerala. In the said circumstance, the alleged 'executive bias' apprehended by the petitioner is quite out of place and is rather wrong and unfounded . 20. Another question that arises for consideration is whether the post of Industrial Tribunal in Kerala can be treated as part of 'Judicial service' of the State. Industrial Tribunal is of course a Court, as per the decision rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi, 1950 SCR 459 = AIR 1950 SC 188 and in view of the observation made by the Apex Court in AIR 1998 SC 1233 ( cited supra), (where the question was with regard to the appointment to the post of Labour Court). A case was filed before this Court by the Kerala Judicial Officers' Association for a direction to declare that the post of Industrial Tribunal should be treated as a promotion post for the members of the subordinate judiciary of the State. The contention was that, Section 7 and 7A of the ID Act are similarly worded; that the presiding officers of the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals discharge the judicial functions and hence they would come under the category of 'Judicial service' within the meaning of Article 234 of the Constitution of India. It was contended that since District Judges were being posted as Presiding Officers of the Labour Court, there was no reason why the members of the 'Judicial service', who are otherwise qualified under the said section, should not be considered for appointment as Industrial Tribunal . Reliance was also sought to be placed on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in AIR 1998 SC 1233 (cited supra) and it was contended that on a parity of reasoning , the same course ought to be adopted in the case of appointment to the post of Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunal as well and therefore, only the members of the Judicial Service ought to be considered for appointment as Industrial Tribunals. After discussing the matter at length, with reference to the State amendment to Section 7A of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court as per the decision reported in 2007 (4) KLT 226 (Kerala Judicial Officers' Association v. State of Kerala and others) held that there cannot be any declaration that the post of Presiding Officers of the Labour court and Industrial Tribunal are identical on the premise that involve same type of duties and responsibilities. It was also served that the Legislature has consciously made a distinction while prescribing the zone of consideration and qualification for appointment to the post of Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals in Kerala under Section 7A of the I.D. Act, in contra distinction to the requirement under Section 7 of the I.D. Act. This Court also observed that appointment of District Judge is done by the Governor, as per the rules framed in this behalf , namely, the 'Kerala State Higher Judicial Service Rules 1991', whereby some posts are to be filled up by Direct Recruitment and the remaining posts are to be filled up by Promotion, in the ratio prescribed. The feeder category for promotion to the post of District Judge is also mentioned in the very same Rules and the said Rules framed by the State in exercise of the power under Article 309 do not mention the post of Industrial Tribunal as a post to be aspired by the feeder category to be promoted. Accordingly, interference was declined and the writ petition was dismissed, holding that the post of Industrial Tribunal stands on a different footing. This Court fully agrees with the finding and reasoning given by the learned brother Judge, as aforesaid. 21. The distinctive nature and character of the post of Industrial Tribunal was a subject matter of consideration before this Court again, in respect of the claim for 'pay parity' sought for by the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunal. Prior to 01.07.1988, the pay scale of the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunal and the District Judges was Rs.2600-3800/-. The District Judges were granted Selection Grade in the scale of pay of Rs.3700-4200/- and the three Industrial Tribunals at that time were placed in the said Selection Grade. Prior to 01.07.1988, the pay scale of the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunal and the District Judges was Rs.2600-3800/-. The District Judges were granted Selection Grade in the scale of pay of Rs.3700-4200/- and the three Industrial Tribunals at that time were placed in the said Selection Grade. 'Justice T. Chandrasekhara Menon Commission' appointed by the State of Kerala recommended Pay Revision in the case of Government employees, as per which, the revised scale of pay of Rs.3175-4605/- was prescribed to Industrial Tribunals (entry cadre) and Rs.4435-5285/- was prescribed to the Selection Grade Industrial Tribunals. Similar recommendation was made in respect of the District Judges/Sessions Judges and Selection Grade District Judges/Sessions Judges as well, which was accepted and implemented accordingly. Subsequently, the pay scales of the State Government employees were revised again based on the recommendation of the Pay Commission, as per G.O.(P) 600/93/Fin dated 08.12.1993, which benefit was given to the District Judges as well as the Industrial Tribunals in the State. In the meanwhile, the Government of India, based on the recommendation made by the Apex Court, constituted the First National Judicial Pay Commission '(Shetty Commission)' to go into the question of pay scales and to recommend uniform scale pay for the subordinate judiciary in the State and Union Territories. 22. Pursuant to the recommendation of the 'Shetty mission' in the year 1998, the recommendation was implemented by the State in respect of the District Judges; which however was denied to the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals, merely on the ground that the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals were not appointed under Article 233 of the Constitution of India, nor were they appointed to the 'Judicial service' of the State under Article 234 . This was under challenge before this Court in a writ petition filed by the Industrial Tribunals. After considering the nature of duties and other relevant aspects and the law laid down by the Apex court in various binding judicial precedents, the learned Judge observed that there was no reason to disturb the pay parity which was being maintained for several decades, thus ordering to grant similar benefits. This was challenged at the instance of the State, where interference was declined by the Division Bench, which made the State to approach the Apex Court. This was challenged at the instance of the State, where interference was declined by the Division Bench, which made the State to approach the Apex Court. After a hair-split analysis of the relevant facts and figures, the relevant provisions of law and the binding judicial precedents, interference was declined and the appeal was dismissed as per the decision reported in 2008(3) KLT 33 (SC)(cited supra), where the particular nature of appointment to the post in question ie. Industrial Tribunal, based on the State amendment to Sec.7A of the I.D. Act has also been specifically taken note of. 23. The Supreme Court has observed in para 10 of the said decision that the ratio of the judgment in Chandramohan v. State of U.P. And others, AIR 1966 SC 1987 relied upon by the appellant State had no bearing upon the legal proposition and the factual situation involved in the case in hand. The Court also observed that the respondents' claim before the High Court was only confined to 'equal scale of pay' as that of the District Judges, which was based on the fact that the respondents were discharging similar duties and functions in the administration of justice and their scale of pay was equal to that of the District Judges, till revision of pay scales of the judicial officers effected in the year 1998. The Apex Court further observed that the Industrial Tribunals are indisputably judicial Tribunals manned by legal professionals who are eligible to be appointed as District Judges or Judges of the High Courts, who exercise the judicial powers and duties under the I.D. Act and whose decisions are subject matter of challenge before the High Court by way of writ petitions, while the only difference was with regard to their source of recruitment. The scope and effect of the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in AIR 1998 SC 1233 (relied on by the petitioner herein), AIR 1950 SC 188 , AIR 1966 SC 1987 (cited supra ) and several other decisions have also been considered; holding that denial of pay parity to the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals in Kerala, merely by referring to the difference in the source of recruitment was quite wrong and unfounded, thus dismissing the appeal preferred by the State. 24. 24. Quite recently, another issue had come up for consideration before the Apex Court, as to whether the Presiding Officers of 'Family Courts' in the State of Maharashtra were members of the 'Judicial Service' and whether they could claim parity in this regard and could be considered for elevation as High Court Judges. It was observed by the Court that, in exercise of the power under Article 233, 234 and proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India read with Art. 235, the Governor of Maharashtra, after consultation with the Maharashtra PSC and High court of Bombay had framed 'Bombay Judicial Service Recruitment Rules 2008'. Rule 3(2) of the said rules stipulates that the services shall consist of the cadres (as specified in column 2 of the Schedule appended to the Rules of 2008), while Rule 5 provides for method of recruitment, qualification and age limit in relation to different posts including the post of District Judge. The Apex Court also observed that, once the Governor of Maharashtra had framed the Rules of 2008 in exercise of its constitutional powers and in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein explaining who would be a District Judge, what would be the service and its constitution and thereby excluded the Judges of the Family Court from the 'service' consciously, then, it was never permissible or possible for the Court to direct such inclusion, by implication. It was accordingly held that, the judges of the Family Court could not be treated as having any parity with the Judges of the Higher Judicial Service or that their service was inter changeable; further making it clear that the Judges of the Family Court do not hold 'judicial office' and cannot be considered for elevation as High Court Judges . 25. In the case of Industrial Tribunals in Kerala, though pay parity was confirmed by virtue of the nature of functions and duties and other circumstances as continued till the year 1998, as per the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in State of Kerala v. B. Renjith Kumar and others, 2008 (3) KLT 33, the fact remains that the post of Industrial Tribunal is not considered for elevation as High Court Judges in the State of Kerala. 26. 26. The steps for selection and appointment of Industrial Tribunal, Idukki are sought to be challenged by the petitioner, also raising a contention as to the denial of opportunity for confining the selection only to one particular source, instead of inviting applications by Newspaper advertisements. This Court primarily finds that the said contention is not liable to be entertained for the fact that no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the writ petitioner in so far as he has admittedly given the consent for being considered, pursuant to the intimation given to him by the Presiding officer of the Industrial Tribunal, Kollam, as conceded in paragraph 2 of the writ petition. Thereafter, he was called for the interview by issuing Ext.P1 memo dated 18.10.2010, as stated in paragraph'3' of the writ petition and was directed to be interviewed as per the order passed by this Court on 29.10.2010. 27. It is also revealed from the materials on record, that panel of eligible candidates were called for by the Government from different sources, as borne by Ext.R3(d) by sending necessary communication to the Advocate General and also to the various Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals in the State. Nobody else has come up before this Court, stating as prejudiced for want of paper publication or as to any loss of opportunity to contest for the post. The only other case which came to be filed is W.P(C) 31963 of 2010. As admitted by the petitioner therein, he was also interviewed, pursuant to the interim order dated 27.10.2010, but was ranked at 'Sl.No. 13' in the select list, which made him to bring the said factual position to the notice of this Court, leading to dismissal of the writ petition as 'infructuous' vide judgment dated 28.10.2011 passed therein. 28. It is to be noted that exactly similar course of selection was being pursued by the State for quite long, by constituting a Committee, which is now headed by a retired Judge of this Court. Similar course of selection pursued earlier (where the petitioner had also participated), has been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court as per the judgment in W.A.No.416 of 2007, preferred by the petitioner himself. It is also relevant to note that, there was no challenge for the petitioner, as now raised in the present writ petition, in the earlier rounds of litigation. It is also relevant to note that, there was no challenge for the petitioner, as now raised in the present writ petition, in the earlier rounds of litigation. Above all, the Government's decision to choose the candidates from panel of names furnished by the existing Tribunals/Labour Courts and also by the Advocate General, after the interview by the Selection Committee, has been held as valid as per the decision rendered in Paulose v. State of Kerala, 1993 (1) KLT 795 . It has been made clear in the said decision that, absence of advertisement or wide publicity will not result in infraction of 'equality clause' of Constitution in every case and it is well settled that, in the absence of any statutory regulations or rules, the State Government can regulate its public services, in exercise of its executive powers. Referring to the law declared by the Apex Court in AIR 1992 SCW 2035 (National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. Dr. Kalyana Raman) , it was also held therein that, 'fairness' or 'fair procedure' in the administrative action implied that a decision should be taken without being guided by extraneous or irrelevant consideration; also alerting that before interfering with the selection made by a Selection Committee consisting of 'experts' who are men of high status and also of unquestionable impartiality, the Court should be extremely slow. In the instant case, the members of the Selection Committee consisted of persons of high status including a retired Judge of this Court and a District Judge on deputation acting as the Law Secretary; besides the Secretary to Department of Labour . Admittedly, no specific allegation whatsoever is made against any of the members of the Selection Committee; nor is there any insinuation against a particular candidate or as to any design to sideline the petitioner or anybody else. 29. It is also worthwhile to note that the circumstance as available in the case considered by the Apex Court in AIR 1998 SC 1233 , appointing persons belonging to the 'Executive service of the State, is not in existence in the present case. In the case dealt with by the Apex Court, as mentioned already, the notification enabled the Asst. It is also worthwhile to note that the circumstance as available in the case considered by the Apex Court in AIR 1998 SC 1233 , appointing persons belonging to the 'Executive service of the State, is not in existence in the present case. In the case dealt with by the Apex Court, as mentioned already, the notification enabled the Asst. Commissioners of Labour, to be appointed as Judges of the Labour Court; when the necessity to maintain judicial independence was highlighted by the Apex Court with reference to the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1987 and also with reference to the Art.50 and 234 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, Ext.R3(d) clearly reveals that the communication issued by the State Government, seeks for panel of suitable candidates to be sponsored by the Advocate General and various Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals situated in the State of Kerala, which pertain to such eligible "lawyers" who are practising before such Courts/Tribunals, who do not hold any post in the 'Executive'. As such, the apprehension expressed by the writ petitioner is quite out of place and it is only by virtue of such enabling course and procedure, that the petitioner himself could place forth his candidature in the earlier round of litigation and also in the present round as well, though he could not fare well to have placed on the top. 30. In the earlier round of selection, when the petitioner happened to be listed as 'rank No.2', pursuant to the steps taken to fill up the vacancies of Industrial Tribunal at Alappuzha and Kollam in the year 1999-2000, the rank list was not approved or published by the Government, in view of the steps to enhance the superannuation age, which accordingly was effected, leading to re-induction of the retired presiding officers of the concerned Tribunal, till they came out of service, after attaining the age of 60 years' in the year 2005. Unlike this, in the present case, Ext. R3(d) select list has been approved by the Government as stated in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit filed by the Government and as such, it is for the Government to proceed with further steps for filling up the post, taking the procedure to a logical conclusion. 31. Unlike this, in the present case, Ext. R3(d) select list has been approved by the Government as stated in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit filed by the Government and as such, it is for the Government to proceed with further steps for filling up the post, taking the procedure to a logical conclusion. 31. In the above circumstances, this Court finds that the challenge raised by the petitioner against the 'selection' is thoroughly wrong, misconceived and unfounded. It is declared that, there is no violation of any of the statutory prescriptions nor is there any infringement of the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India or the mandate given by the Apex Court in AIR 1998 SC 1233 (cited supra). Accordingly, interference is declined and the writ petition is dismissed.