JUDGMENT ( 1. ) THE prayer in the writ petition is to quash the order dated 14.9.2010, dismissing the petitioner from set vice on the ground of unauthorized absence from service and for a consequential direction to the first respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits. ( 2. ) HEARD the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents. ( 3. ) THE case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as a Home Guard on 14.2.1986 and subsequently promoted as Assistant Section Leader, Section Leader, Assistant Polton Commandant and lastly, while he was serving as Polton Commandant, he was terminated from service on the ground that he unauthorizedly absented from duty from 23.6.2010 to 27.6.2010, A notice dated 30.8.2010 was issued to the petitioner for reporting duty, wherein it is stated that if the petitioner is called for duty, henceforth he should report for duty, failing which he will be terminated from service. ( 4. ) THE impugned order of termination was passed on 14.9.2010 stating that the petitioner failed to report for duty when Tamil Conference was held at Coimbatore. THE impugned order is challenged mainly on the ground that before terminating the service of the petitioner, no charge memo was issued, no explanation was called for and no enquiry was conducted. THE petitioner having been appointed as Home Guard on 14.2.1986 and promoted to various posts, he is entitled to get protection guaranteed under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. THE said procedure having not been followed, the impugned order is unsustainable. ( 5. ) IT is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even assuming that the petitioner unauthorizedly absented for five days, i.e., from 23.6.2010 to 27.6.2010 and failed to report for duty during Tariiil Conference held at Coimbatore, the same cannot be a ground to terminate the service of the petitioner, as the punishment imposed on the petitioner is disproportionate to the gravity of the alleged charges. ( 6. ) THE first respondent has filed a counter affidavit stating that as per the duties assigned to Home Guards, normally a Home Guard should attend compulsorily four traffic duties, one night round and one parade in a month and he has to attend special duties, like festival and other important duties. ( 6. ) THE first respondent has filed a counter affidavit stating that as per the duties assigned to Home Guards, normally a Home Guard should attend compulsorily four traffic duties, one night round and one parade in a month and he has to attend special duties, like festival and other important duties. THE petitioner was irregular and was absent in the month of January 2010 onwards. THE absence of the petitioner during the month of January, February, March and April are mentioned in the counter affidavit. ( 7. ) ACCORDING to the counter affidavit, a show cause notice was issued on 12.4.2010 calling the petitioner to submit his explanation for his habitual absence and the petitioner did not reply to the same. On 15.6.2010, the petitioner was directed to attend the Tamil Conference held at Coimbatore from 23.6.2010 to 27.6.2010 with four male and four female Home Guards without fail specifically stating that not attending duty during the said conference will be viewed seriously. In spite of receipt of the said memo, the petitioner failed to attend duty during the said conference. He did not obtain permission from his superiors and no intimation was also given for not reporting duty. In the above background, the impugned order was passed invoking Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Home Guards Act, 1963, (for brevity, "the Act"). Even though in the impugned order, it is specifically stated that there is an appeal provision available before the Inspector General of Police within a period of thirty days, the petitioner, without exhausting the said appeal remedy provided under Section 14 of the Act, has approached this Court and filed the present Writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. ( 8. ) THE issues arise for consideration in this case are as follows: (i) Whether the first respondent was justified in discharging/terminating the service of the petitioner without issuing charge memo and conducting enquiry. (ii) Whether for the alleged allegation of unauthorized absence from duty, the service of the petitioner can be terminated and whether the punishment imposed on the petitioner is in violation of the doctrine of proportionality. ( 9. (ii) Whether for the alleged allegation of unauthorized absence from duty, the service of the petitioner can be terminated and whether the punishment imposed on the petitioner is in violation of the doctrine of proportionality. ( 9. ) THE only provision relied on by the first respondent in the counter affidavit is Section 5 of the Act, which reads as follows: "(i) Period of service and discharge: (J) A member of the Home Guard shall be required to serve the Government for such period as may be prescribed but any such member may be discharged from the Home Guard at any time by such authority on such grounds and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. Provided that it shall not be necessary for such authority to disclose the grounds of discharge if such authority considers such discharge to be against the public interest." THE said provision nowhere prohibits application of natural justice for conducting an enquiry, particularly, when a person is to be terminated from service based on allegations. THE first respondent is not justifying the order relying on Article 311(2) proviso (b) also, as nowhere in the counter affidavit, the said plea is taken. ( 10. ) IN the decision in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101 : 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991-I-LLJ-395, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Paragraph Nos. 274,277,278 and 302 held thus: "274........a permanent employee of a statutory authority, corporation or instrumentality under Article 12 has a lien on the post till he attains superannuation or is compulsorily retired or service is duly terminated in accordance with the procedure established by law. Security of tenure enures the benefit of pension on retirement. Dismissal, removal or termination of his/her service for inefficiency, corruption or other misconduct is by way of penalty. He/she has a right to security of tenure which is essential to inculcate a sense of belonging to the service or organisation and involvement for maximum production or efficient service. It is also a valuable right which is to be duly put an end to only as per valid law. "277...........rights of the citizens assured in the preamble. He/she has a right to security of tenure which is essential to inculcate a sense of belonging to the service or organisation and involvement for maximum production or efficient service. It is also a valuable right which is to be duly put an end to only as per valid law. "277...........rights of the citizens assured in the preamble. Parts III and IV i. e. the trinity, the question whether the statutory corporation or the instrumentality or the authority under Article 12 of the Constitution is validly empowered to terminate the services of a permanent employee in terms of the contract of employment or rules without conducting an enquiry or an opportunity to show cause against the proposed order of termination of the service. The INdian Contract Act, 1872 operating in British INdia was extended to the merged States in 1949 and 1950 except to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, after Bharat attained independence on 15.8.1947, the INdian Contract Act, is applicable to all States except Jammu and Kashmir. By operation of Article 372 of the Constitution, the INdian Contract Act continues to be in operation subject to the provisions of the Constitution. The INdian Contract Act is an amending as well as consolidating Act as held in Ramdas Vithaldas Durbar v. S. Amerchand and Co. Thereby common law principles applicable in England, if they are inconsistent with the provisions of the INdian Contract Act or the Constitution to that extent they stand excluded. Any law, much less the provisions of Contract Act, which are inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution, by operation of Article 13 of the Constitution, are void. Section 2(h) of the INdian Contract Act defines "an agreement" including an agreement of service and becomes a contract only when it is enforceable by law. If it is not enforceable it would be void by reason of Section 2(g) thereof. The question, therefore, is whether the contract of service or Regulation 9(b) in derogation to the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution, is valid in law and would be enforceable. Contract whether changeable with changing times 278. The law of contract, like the legal system itself, involves a balance between competing sets of values. Freedom of contract emphasises the need of stability, certainty and predictability. Contract whether changeable with changing times 278. The law of contract, like the legal system itself, involves a balance between competing sets of values. Freedom of contract emphasises the need of stability, certainty and predictability. But, important as its values are, they are not absolute, and there comes a point where they "face a serious challenge". Against them must be set the values of protecting the weak, oppressed and the thoughtless (sic powerless) from imposition and oppression. Naturally, at a particular time, one set of values tend to be emphasised at the expense of the other as the time changes the values get changed and the old values are under replacement and new values take their due place. Though certainty and predictability in ordinary commercial contract law is emphasised and insisted upon, the need for progress of the society and to removing the disabilities faced, by the citizens and their relations when encounter with the State or its instrumentalities are in conflict with the assured constitutional rights demand new values and begin to assert themselves, for no civilised system of law can accept the implications of absolute sanctity of contractual obligations and of their immutability." 302........Article 311(2) is a special provision applicable to all civil services under the State. Article 311(2) embodies the principles of natural justice but proviso to Clause (2) of Article 311 excludes the operation of principles of natural justice engrafted in Article 311 (2) as an exception in the given circumstances enumerated in three clauses of the proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Article 14 read with Articles 16(1) and 311 are to be harmoniously interpreted that the proviso to Article 311(2) excludes the application of the principles of natural justice as an exception; and the applicability of Article 311(2) must, therefore, be circumscribed to the civil services and be construed accordingly. IN respect of all other employees covered by Article 12 of the Constitution the dynamic role of Article 14 and other relevant articles like Article 21 must be allowed to have full play without any inhibition, unless the statutory rules themselves, consistent with the mandate of Articles 14, 16, 19 and 21 provide, expressly such an exception." ( 11. IN respect of all other employees covered by Article 12 of the Constitution the dynamic role of Article 14 and other relevant articles like Article 21 must be allowed to have full play without any inhibition, unless the statutory rules themselves, consistent with the mandate of Articles 14, 16, 19 and 21 provide, expressly such an exception." ( 11. ) IN the decision in Uma Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., AIR 2009 SC 2375 : LNIND 2009 SC 578 : (2009) 3 MLJ (Crl) 1107, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the importance of following the principles of natural justice. IN Paragraph Nos. 15 and 19, it is held thus: "15. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. IN its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. 19. Natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental. The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the prevention of miscarriage of justice." ( 12. ) TERMINATION of service of a Noon Meal Organizer without conducting enquiry was considered by me in the decision in Periannan, G v. The Government of Tamil Nadu, 2007 (3) CTC 806 . The defence of the department in the said case was that there is no Service Rule for the Noon Meal Organizers and the protection guaranteed under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India is not applicable to the employees of Noon Meal Scheme. The same were repelled and the order of termination was set aside. ( 13. The defence of the department in the said case was that there is no Service Rule for the Noon Meal Organizers and the protection guaranteed under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India is not applicable to the employees of Noon Meal Scheme. The same were repelled and the order of termination was set aside. ( 13. ) THUS, the protection given under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India is applicable to all employees and their services can be terminated only after framing charges, calling for explanation and if the same are denied, conducting fair enquiry are sine quo non for terminating the service of an employee. In the case on hand, admittedly, the said procedures are not followed. ( 14. ) THE matter may be viewed in another angle, i.e., whether unauthorized absence for one time is a ground to dismiss a police personnel, was considered by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision in Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab and Others (1996) 7 SCC 634 : 1996-II-LLJ-432, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court interfered with the punishment of dismissal of a police personnel on the ground of unauthorized absence and ordered reinstatement without back wages. THE said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was followed by this Court in W.P. No. 26072 of 2004, dated 8.8.2008, W.P. No. 5505 of 2008, dated 25.9.2008 and W.P. No. 20442 of 1998, dated 1.7.2008. THE said decisions were followed by me in W.P. No. 3984 of 2006, dated 16.7.2010. ( 15. ) A Division Bench of this Court in W.A. (MD) No. 388 of 2008, dated 21.10.2009, also interfered with the punishment of dismissal of a police constable on the ground of unauthorized absence by imposing a reduced punishment of stoppage of increment for two years without cumulative effect for the proved charges. ( 16. ) THE Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision in Jagdish Singh v. Punjab Engineer College, AIR 2009 SC 2458 : LNIND 2009 SC 1290 though not in a disciplined Force, modified the punishment of dismissal of a person by ordering reinstatement without back wages with continuity of service. Same view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision in Bhagwana Lal Arya v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi AIR 2004 SC 2131 : (2004) 4 SCC 560 . Same view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision in Bhagwana Lal Arya v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi AIR 2004 SC 2131 : (2004) 4 SCC 560 . In the decision in Chairman cum Managing Director, Coal India Limited and Another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and Others, (2009) 8 MLJ 460 (SC) the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the proportionality of punishment and held as follows: 24. Dealing with the question of proportionality with regard to punishment in disciplinary matters, the Court said: "32. Finally, we come to the present case. It is not contended before us that any fundamental freedom is affected. We need not therefore go into the question of "proportionality". THEre is no contention that the punishment imposed is illegal or vitiated by procedural impropriety. As to "irrationality", there is no finding by the Tribunal that the decision is one which no sensible person who weighed the pros and cons could have arrived at nor is there a finding, based on material, that the punishment is in "outrageous" defiance of logic. Neither Wednesbury nor CCSU tests are satisfied. We have still to explain "Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (supra)." 33. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (supra) this Court interfered with the punishment only after coming to the conclusion that the punishment was in outrageous defiance of logic and was shocking. It was also described as perverse and irrational. In other words, this Court felt that, on facts, Wednesbury and CCSU tests were satisfied. In another case, in B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 484 : (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996-I-LLJ-1231 a three-Judge Bench said the same thing as follows: "18. ... THE High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary authority/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." Similar view was taken in Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora AIR 1997 SC 1030 : (1997) 3 SCC 12 that the Court will not intervene unless the punishment is wholly disproportionate. 34. Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora AIR 1997 SC 1030 : (1997) 3 SCC 12 that the Court will not intervene unless the punishment is wholly disproportionate. 34. In such a situation, unless the Court/Tribunal opines in its secondary role, that the administrator was on the material before him, irrational according to Wednesbury or CCSU norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. Even then, the matter has to be remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration. It is only in very rare cases as pointed out in B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (supra) case that the Court might - to shorten litigation - think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in the place of the punishment awarded by the competent authority. (In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (supra) and other cases referred to therein it has however been made clear that the power of this Court under Article 136 is different.) For the reasons given above, the case cited for the respondent, namely. State of Maharashtra v. M.H. Mazumdar cannot be of any help." 25. Again, in the case of Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Assn. and Another (2007) 4 SCC 669 this Court considered the doctrine of proportionality and it was held: "77. So far as the doctrine of proportionality is concerned, there is no gainsaying that the said doctrine has not only arrived in our legal system but has come to stay. With the rapid growth of administrative law and the need and necessity to control possible abuse of discretionary powers by various administrative authorities, certain principles have been evolved by Courts. If an action taken by any authority is contrary to law, improper, irrational or otherwise unreasonable, a Court of law can interfere with such action by exercising power of judicial review. One of such modes of exercising power; known to law is the "doctrine of proportionality." 18. "Proportionality" is a principle where the Court is concerned with the process, method or manner in which the decision-maker has ordered his priorities, reached a conclusion or arrived at a decision. THE very essence of decision-making consists in the attribution of relative importance to the factors and considerations in the case. THE doctrine of proportionality thus steps in focus true nature of exercise the elaboration of a rule of permissible priorities. 19. THE very essence of decision-making consists in the attribution of relative importance to the factors and considerations in the case. THE doctrine of proportionality thus steps in focus true nature of exercise the elaboration of a rule of permissible priorities. 19. De Smith states that "proportionality" involves "balancing test" and "necessity test." Whereas the former (balancing test) permits scrutiny of excessive onerous penalties or infringement of rights or interests and a manifest imbalance of relevant considerations, the latter (necessity test) requires infringement of human rights to be least restrictive alternative. (Judicial Review Of Administrative Action (1995), pp. 601-05, para 13.085; see also Wade and Forsyth: Administrative Law (2005), p. 366.) 20. In Halsburys Laws Of England (4th Edn.) Reissue, Vol. 1(1), pp. 144-45, para 78, it is stated: "THE Court will quash exercise of 'discretionary powers in which there is no reasonable relationship between the objective which is sought to be achieved and the means used to that end, or where punishments imposed by administrative bodies or inferior Courts are wholly out of proportion to the relevant misconduct. THE principle of proportionality is well established in European law, and will be applied by English Courts where European law is enforceable in the domestic Courts. THE principle of proportionality is still at a stage of development in English law; lack of proportionality is not usually treated as a separate ground for review in English law, but is regarded as one indication of manifest unreasonableness." 21. THE doctrine has its genesis in the field of Administrative Law. THE Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without abuse of discretion. THEre can be no "pick and choose", selective applicability of the government norms or unfairness, arbitrariness or unreasonableness. It is not permissible to use a "Sledgehammer to crack a nut." As has been said many a time; "where paring knife suffices, battle axe is precluded." 22. THEre can be no "pick and choose", selective applicability of the government norms or unfairness, arbitrariness or unreasonableness. It is not permissible to use a "Sledgehammer to crack a nut." As has been said many a time; "where paring knife suffices, battle axe is precluded." 22. In the celebrated decision of Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister for Civil Service (1985) AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL) Lord Diplock proclaimed: (ALL ER p.950 h-j) "Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. THE first ground I would call 'illegality", the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. That is not to say that further development on a case-by-case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality ????"(emphasis supplied) 23. CCSU has been reiterated by English Courts in several subsequent cases. We do not think it necessary to refer to all those cases. 24. So far as our legal system is concerned, the doctrine is well settled. Even prior to CCSU, this Court has held that if punishment imposed on an employee by an employer is grossly excessive, disproportionately high or unduly harsh, it cannot claim immunity from judicial scrutiny, and it is always open to a Court to interfere with such penalty in appropriate cases. 25. In Hind Construction and Engg. Co. Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1965 SC 917 : 1965-I-LLJ-462, some workers remained absent from duty treating a particular day as holiday. THEy were dismissed from service. THE Industrial Tribunal-set aside the action. This Court held that the absence could have been treated as leave without pay. THE workmen might have been warned and fined. (But) at p.465 of LLJ "It is impossible to think that any other reasonable employer would have imposed the extreme punishment of dismissal on its entire permanent staff in this manner." (emphasis supplied) THE Court concluded that the punishment imposed on the workmen was "Not only severe and out of proportion to the fault, but one which, in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed." (emphasis supplied) 26. In Management of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry v. Workmen AIR 1972 SC 763 : (1972) 1 SCC 40 : 1971-I-LLJ-630, the allegation against the employee of the Federation was that he issued legal notices to the Federation and to the International Chamber of Commerce which brought discredit to the Federation the employer. Domestic inquiry was held against the employee and his services were terminated. THE punishment was held to be disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and established. This Court observed that: "(T)he Federation had made a mountain out of a mole hill and made a trivial matter into one involving loss of its prestige and reputation." 27. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (supra) referred to earlier, an army officer did not obey the lawful command of his superior officer by not eating food offered to him. Court-martial proceedings were initiated and a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of one year was imposed. He was also dismissed from service, with added disqualification that he would be unfit for future employment. 28. Applying the doctrine of proportionality and following CCSU, Venkatachaliah, J.(as His Lordship then was) observed: "THE question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. THE doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is , an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review." (emphasis supplied) 26. THE doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well recognized concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. THE doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well recognized concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be: would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company's Rules and Regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. THE punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations. Ordinarily, we would have sent the matter back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration on the question of punishment but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this exercise may not be proper. In our view, the demand of justice would be met if the respondent No. 1 is denied back wages for the entire period by way of punishment for the proved misconduct of unauthorized absence for six months." ( 17. In our view, the demand of justice would be met if the respondent No. 1 is denied back wages for the entire period by way of punishment for the proved misconduct of unauthorized absence for six months." ( 17. ) IN the case on hand, since the petitioner was in employment from the year 1986 and the termination order having been passed, based on allegation of unauthorized absence, the respondents are bound to frame regular charges, call for explanation and if the same is not satisfied, enquiry is to be conducted and based on the enquiry report alone, an order of termination can be passed. The said procedure having not been followed, the impugned order cannot be sustained. ( 18. ) IN fine, the above two issues are answered against the respondents. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 14.9.2010 passed by the first respondent is set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service without back wages with continuity of service and all other benefits. The respondents are granted liberty to issue charge memo and proceed with the same in accordance with law, if it is so warranted. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. Petition allowed.