Shashi Kant Gupta, J.— 1. Supplementary affidavit filed today is taken on record. 2. This writ petition has been filed against the judgement and order dated 04.05.2012 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 3, Bijnor in S.C.C. Revision No. 8 of 2010 upholding the judgement and order dated 17.08.2009 passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Bijnor in S.C.C. Suit No. 35 of 2007, whereby the defence of the petitioner was struck off under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. Brief facts of the case are as follows:- 3. The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the petitioner. During the pendency of the S.C.C. Suit, plaintiff moved an application under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. for striking off the defence of the petitioner. 4. Respondent filed its objections stating that the application for striking off the defence has been filed by plaintiff on wrong facts as she was depositing the rent regularly. She further stated that she deposited the rent in lump sum for some months, if in the opinion of the Court, it is found that there is any delay in depositing the rent, it may be condoned. 5. The Trial Court after considering the material available on record by order dated 17.08.2009 struck off the defence of the petitioner. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order dated 17.08.2011, the petitioner filed a S.C.C revision, which was registered as Rent Revision No. 8 of 2010. The said Revision was dismissed by the Revisional Court on 04.05.2012. Hence the present writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the orders passed by the courts below are illegal, arbitrary and are based on complete misreading of the case and misconception of legal position relevant to the matter and have not considered the evidence on record in the right perspective. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner after depositing the entire rent/damages before the first date of hearing was continuously depositing the amount in lump sum after every three months and the delay in depositing the rent was bonafide. It has also been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on 11.04.2012, he had deposited the rent/damages in advance for the period 22.04.2012 to 21.10.2012. It has also been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on 11.04.2012, he had deposited the rent/damages in advance for the period 22.04.2012 to 21.10.2012. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the Case of Bimal Chand Jain Vs. Gopal Agarwal, AIR 1981, S.C. 1657. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord has supported the impugned order and has contended that the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. has not been complied with, therefore, the Court below were fully justified in striking off the defence of the petitioner. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. Before I advert to the contentions raised before me, it would be proper to refer to the provisions of Order XV Rule V C.P.C., (as applicable in Uttar Pradesh) which reads as under:- "5. Striking off defence for failure to deposit admitted rent, etc.- (1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent, per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), strike off his defence. Explanation 1.-The expression "first hearing" means the date for filing written statement for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 1.-The expression "first hearing" means the date for filing written statement for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 2.-The expression "entire amount admitted by him to be due" means the entire gross amount, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation, calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account and the amount, if any, paid to the lessor acknowledged by the lessor in writing signed by him and the amount, if any, deposited in any Court under section 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Explanation 3.-(1) The expression "monthly amount due" means the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority, in respect of the building on lessor's account. (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the Court may consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in sub-section (1), as the case may be. (3) The amount deposited under this rule may at any time be withdrawn by the plaintiff. Provided that such withdrawal shall not have the effect of prejudicing any claim by the plaintiff disputing the correctness of the amount deposited: Provided further that if the amount deposited includes any sums claimed by the depositor to be deductible on any account, the Court may require the plaintiff to furnish the security for such sum before he is allowed to withdraw the same." 10. Admittedly the rate of rent was Rs.931/- per month and the tenancy commences on 22nd of every month terminates on 21st of next month. Admittedly the rate of rent was Rs.931/- per month and the tenancy commences on 22nd of every month terminates on 21st of next month. Order 15 Rule 5 (U.P) C.P.C., inter alia provides that the tenant through out the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the day of its accrual and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due, the Court may subject the provisions of Sub-rule (2) strike off his defence. 11. The details of the deposit made by the petitioner before the Trial Court has been mentioned in the application filed by the respondent/landlord under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. before the Court below. For ready reference, the details of deposit as stated therein are quoted herein below:- Sl. No. Period of Deposit Rent Date of Rent deposit 1. 22.06.07 to 21.11.07 4,655/- 21.11.2007 2. 22.11.07 to 21.12.07 931/- 04.01.2008 3. 22.12.07 to 21.03.08 2541/- 10.04.2008 4. 22.03.08 to 21.06.08 2793/- 11.07.2008 5. 22.06.08 to 21.11.08 4655/- 21.11.2008 6. 22.11.08 to 21.02.09 2793/- 19.02.2009 12. It is evident from a bare perusal of the aforementioned deposits that amount was not deposited due within a week from the date of its accrual, it was deposited in lump sum after every three/five months. Besides this, there was also shortfall in depositing the amount as is evident from the deposit of Rs.2541/- and Rs.4655/- made on 10.04.2008 and 21.11.2008 for three months and five months respectively. Therefore, in view of the above, the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. (U.P). Apart from it, the petitioner neither filed any representation as provided under Sub-rule (2) of Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. nor given any explanation whatsoever for not complying with the aforementioned provision, even no reasons have been assigned by the petitioner in its objections much less strong and compelling reasons for her failure to comply with the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. Thus the court below was fully justified in striking off the defence of the petitioner. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the Case of Bimal Chand Jain Vs. Gopal Agarwal, AIR 1981, S.C. 1657. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the Case of Bimal Chand Jain Vs. Gopal Agarwal, AIR 1981, S.C. 1657. I am afraid that the aforementioned decision is of no help to the petitioner. There is no quarrel to the proposition that the discretion is vested in the Court entitling it not to strike off the defence if on the facts and circumstances it finds good reason for not doing so. In the present case, admittedly the petitioner did not comply with the provision contained in Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. Neither any representation as provided under Sub-rule (2) was made by the petitioner nor has assigned any reasons in its objections much less strong and compelling reasons for the failure to comply with the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. No application/representation was filed by the petitioner for extension of time under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 15 C.P.C. Thus, the Court below in the facts and circumstances of the case and the material available on record did not find good reasons for not striking off the defence of the petitioner. 14. The aforementioned case Bimal Chand Jain Vs. Gopal Agarwal (Supra) was subsequently considered by the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Satya Kumari Kamthan Vs. Noor Ahmad and others, ARC, 1992(2), page 82, wherein in para 2 and 3, it was observed as follows:- "2. The scope of this rule was considered by this Court in Bimal Chand's Case (Supra). It was held: "It seems to us on a comprehensive understanding of Rule 5 of Order XV that the true construction of the Rule should be thus, sub-rule (1) obliges the defendant to deposit, at or before the first hearing of the suit, the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and further, whether or not be admits any amount to be due to deposit regularly throught the continuation of the suit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual. In the event of any default in making any deposit, "the Court may subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence." We shall presently come to what this means. In the event of any default in making any deposit, "the Court may subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence." We shall presently come to what this means. Sub-rule (2) obliges the Court before making an order for striking off the defence to consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf. In other words, the defendant has been vested with a statutory right to make a representation to the Court against his defence being struck off. If a representation is made the Court must consider it on its merits, and then decide whether the defence should or should not be struck off. This is a right expressly vested in the defendant and enables him to show by bringing material on the record that he has not been guilty of the default alleged or if the default has occurred, there is good reasons for it. Now, it is not impossible that the record may contain such material already. In that event, can it be said that sub-rule (1) obliges the Court to strike off the defence? We must remember that an order under sub-rule (1) striking off the defence is in the nature of a penalty. A serious responsibility rests on the Court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. There is a reserve of discretion vested in the Court entitling it not to strike off the defence if on the facts and circumstances already existing on the record it finds good reason for not doing so. it will always be a matter for the judgment of the Court to decide whether on the material before it, notwithstanding the absence of a representation under sub-rule (2) the defence should or should not be struck off. The word "may" in sub-rule (1) merely vests power in the Court to strike off the defence. It does not oblige it to do so in every case of default. To that extent, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court in Puran Chand (Supra)." 3. Can the ground that the decision of this Court overruled the decision of the Allahabad High Court above referred, be sufficient to set aside the District Judge's order and remand it for fresh disposal? To that extent, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court in Puran Chand (Supra)." 3. Can the ground that the decision of this Court overruled the decision of the Allahabad High Court above referred, be sufficient to set aside the District Judge's order and remand it for fresh disposal? We may point out that in the case on hand when the appellant filed an application for striking off, the tenant filed a written statement objecting to the striking off on the ground that there was no default in payment of the monthly rent as provided under Rule 5(1) of Order XV. The Courts below did not accept this contention and found as a fact there was a default in payment of the admitted rent. The Courts below further held that though there was a default there is no "representation" by the tenant giving any excuse for not depositing the correct amount or praying for extension of time for deposit for valid reasons and that, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to get the defence struck off. The word "representation" may cover a "representation" in answer to an application for striking off or a "representation" praying for an extension of time for making the deposit on sufficient grounds shown. The tenant in this case only made representation that he had deposited the correct money rent but he had not filed any application for extension of time. In the circumstances, therefore, the Courts below were right in holding that there was a default in payment of the monthly rent of Rule 5 of Order XV the defence was liable to be struck off. The order of the High Court in the writ petition, is, therefore, not sustainable. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The Judgment dated 24th February, 1982 in Civil Writ Petition No. 13392 of 1987 is set aside and the Order of the Civil Judge as confirmed by the Additional District Judge striking off the defence is upheld. 15. The Apex Court in the aforementioned case Smt. Satya Kumari Kamthan Vs. Noor Ahmad and others (Supra) after referring to the case of Bimal Chand Jain Vs. 15. The Apex Court in the aforementioned case Smt. Satya Kumari Kamthan Vs. Noor Ahmad and others (Supra) after referring to the case of Bimal Chand Jain Vs. Gopal Agarwal (Supra) and considering the facts and circumstances of the case (Smt. Satya Kumari) was of the view that the Courts below were right in holding that there was default in payment of the monthly rent and since there was no also no application for extension of time under sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order XV, the defence was liable to be struck off and consequently the order the High Court was set aside and order passed by the Trial Court striking off the defence was upheld. 16. In view of what has been discussed, herein above, I do not find any illegality, infirmity or perversity in the impugned orders which may warrant any interference by this Court. 17. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed . _