Research › Search › Judgment

Patna High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 1358 (PAT)

Amrendra Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar

2012-09-24

NAVIN SINHA

body2012
ORDER Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 13.1.2012 passed by District Teachers Appointment Appellate Authority, Bojpur in Appeal No. 220 of 2010. He is further aggrieved by consequential order of the Mukhiya dated 28.6.2012 terminating his appointment in favour of Respondent no. 6. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that he was an applicant in the handicapped category. Pursuant to counseling and having followed procedures in the law, he came to be appointed and joined on 17.8.2010. Respondent no. 6 preferred an appeal on 8.9.2010 without impleading him as party respondent and neither did the Mukhiya issue any notice to him. The petitioner has been condemned unheard leading to loss of employment. Respondent no. 6 did not participate in the counseling and is not entitled to be considered for appointment. The fact that he may have had higher marks is irrelevant for that reason. 4. Counsel for the State submits that notices may be issued to Respondent no. 6. 5. The Tribunal is the creation of a statutory order. No provision for any appeal against the same has been provided. Orders passed by it are final. That does not exclude judicial review under Article 226. The very purpose of creating the Tribunal was to facilitate and make access to justice cheaper, quicker and less hide bound by technicalities of law. That however does not mean and include putting aside the basic rudimentary principles of natural justice that no person can be condemned unheard. Time and again the Court has come across orders of the District Teachers Appointment Appellate Tribunals where despite noticing that another was going to be affected or without ascertaining necessary facts if another had been appointed and may be affected the Tribunals are passing orders committing grave irretrievable illegality in the decision making process. The result is that the entire purpose for which the Tribunal, was created is being frustrated. It has become one more avenue of litigation instead of reducing an avenue for litigation. Neither does accessibility to justice remain quick and cheap nor does it reduce the burden of the Court. The manner in which the Tribunals are functioning the whole exercise appears to have become counterproductive. It has become one more avenue of litigation instead of reducing an avenue for litigation. Neither does accessibility to justice remain quick and cheap nor does it reduce the burden of the Court. The manner in which the Tribunals are functioning the whole exercise appears to have become counterproductive. Having said so, in fairness, the Court must also notice that some of the orders, perhaps those being passed by personnel trained in law, manning Tribunals facilitates judicial review properly. Such orders as passed by administrative personnel manning the Tribunal, also at times reflect acumen, but rarely. In more than one order the Court has already taken notice of this aspect and relied on a Supreme Court judgement for the imperative need to train such administrative personnel who may be having good administrative acumen but not to decide quasi judicial matters. It is not known whether the State Government has taken any such steps. The present is again one such a case. At this stage the Court is not concerned with whether the petitioner has a defence or not. Whether respondent no. 6 had participated in the counseling or not is also not very important at this stage. The concern of the Court is the grave infirmity in the decision making process. Whether it be the claims of Respondent no. 6 or the contention of the petitioner that he was not heard, the order of the Tribunal, on the face of it is not sustainable on either aspect. 6. The Tribunal is a quasi judicial body created to decide a lis. If Respondent no. 6 was not appointed he raised a dispute. A dispute is required to be decided by a reasoned order and a quasi judicial Tribunal has no jurisdiction in law to pass orders on assumptions and presumptions. The impugned order does not reflect any consideration of what case was made out by the Respondent no. 6 as aggrieved raising a lis. It does not contain an iota of discussion from the records stated to have been produced by Panchayat Savhiv and what the Respondent no. 6 may have placed and such candidates who may have been appointed after him may be with lesser marks. 7. If another had been appointed and the Tribunal, was giving a direction to hold counseling of Respondent no. 6 may have placed and such candidates who may have been appointed after him may be with lesser marks. 7. If another had been appointed and the Tribunal, was giving a direction to hold counseling of Respondent no. 6 and appoint him, if any person with lesser marks had been appointed did it not amount to direction by the Tribunal, to remove the another not before it. Even if Respondent no. 6 did not implead the petitioner, the Tribunal as its inherent duty to dispense justice was required to ensure that no one was being affected by its order without hearing him. 8. Issuing notice to Respondent no. 6 at this stage shall serve no useful purpose. Even after he appears the matter will have to be remanded to the Tribunal. It will only delay matters unnecessarily. The Court is already burdened with litigations of the present nature where rudimentary principles of natural justice are not being followed by the Tribunal generating litigations involving no complicated question of law. 9. The notification creating the Tribunal does not prescribe the procedure under which the Tribunal shall conduct matters before it. Every Tribunal therefore has inherent powers to devise its own procedure to facilitate adjudication without going into high bound technicalities of the law. But that does not vest power ion a Tribunal to conduct the matter before it contrary to the basis principle of decision making that no person can be condemned unheard. This requirement applies not only to administrative authority but with equal force to quasi judicial Tribunal and Courts. 10. To set aside the impugned order shall require notice to Respondent no. 6. It has already been observed that no useful purpose shall be served even if that be done. 11. In CWJC No. 12801 of 2012 and 13992 of 2012 the Court has elaborately discussed the inherent powers of the District Teachers Appointment Appellate Tribunal to ensure that it performs its primary duty to dispense justice properly. The Court has also taken note of AIR 1999 SC 2089 Budhia Swain and others, Vs. Gopinath Deb and others) particularly para 8 (iii) and (iv). 12. The present is a fit case where if the petitioner files a petition invoking inherent powers of the Tribunal on grounds as discussed by the Supreme Court, the Tribunal has a bounden duty to rehear matters afresh in accordance with law. Gopinath Deb and others) particularly para 8 (iii) and (iv). 12. The present is a fit case where if the petitioner files a petition invoking inherent powers of the Tribunal on grounds as discussed by the Supreme Court, the Tribunal has a bounden duty to rehear matters afresh in accordance with law. Once the Tribunal had passed an order perhaps the Mukhiya had little option. 13. If the petitioner files such an application within four weeks from today the Tribunal is bound to consider invocation of its inherent powers, issue notice to the concerned and pass a fresh reasoned and speaking adjudicatory order considering the claims of the appellant, the counter contention of the petitioner, the materials as may be found in the records of the Panchayat with regard to what the appellant may have to say and what the petitioner may rebutt and then pass final orders preferably within a maximum period of three months from the date of receipt and/or presentation of a copy of this order. 14. The Court directs a copy of this order to be forwarded to the Principal Secretary, Education Department. It is expected that the State Government, shall consider the need for imparting training to administrative personnel manning Quasi Judicial Tribunal. 15. The writ application stands disposed. 16. The Principal Secretary is also requested to furnish a report on the steps taken by him in light of the observations contained in the present matter. 17. The matter may be placed under the heading “Orders” for that limited purpose after two months.