JUDGMENT S. Talapatra, J. 1. Heard Ms. B. Bhuyan, Learned Counsel in W.P.(C) No. 1441/2009, Mr. K.K. Phukan, Learned Counsel in W.P.(C) No. 5121/2009, W.P.(C) No. 156/2010 and W.P(C) No. 5503/2010, Mr. R.S. Chouhan, Learned Counsel in W.P.(C) No. 2190/2009, Mr. A. Dutta, Learned Counsel in W.P.(C) No. 333/2010 as well as Mr. N. Dhar, Learned Counsel in W.P.(C) No. 3179/2010 for the writ petitioners. Also heard Mr. A.K. Sarma, learned Standing Counsel, ASCARD Bank. These writ petitions were tied up for the purpose of disposal as those are embraced by identical facts and questions of law. 2. By the order No. ASCARDB(G)999/ 96/201, dated 25.02.1999, the respondent-ASCARD Bank declared the petitioners and others as excess and terminated them with immediate effect. Earlier some persons so terminated by the said order dated 25.02.1999, filed writ petitions before this Court, being W.P.(C) No. 1090/1999, WP.(C) No. 982/1999 and WP.(C) No. 863/1999. That batch of writ petitions as stated, was allowed by the judgment and order dated 25.09.2002, quashing the declaration dated 10.02.1999 of the respondent-Bank as well as the said impugned termination order dated 25.02.1999. 3. It is stated in the Bar that being aggrieved, the respondent Bank filed writ appeals against all the writ petitions including those mentioned herein. By a common order dated 06.11.2003 as passed in Writ Appeal Nos. 722/2002, 723/2002, 724/2002, 725/2002, 726/2002 and 728/2002, all those writ appeals were dismissed but it was clarified that the order so passed by the learned Single Judge, setting aside the resolution and the order of termination by the respondent-Bank dated 10.02.1999 shall remain confined to the writ petitioners only. 4. The respondent-Bank carried on Special Leave Petitions being SLP No. 4365-4370 of 2004 under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against the said common order dated 06.11.2003, culminating thereafter to Civil Appeal No. 1836/2011 and others. By the order dated 05.04.2007, the Supreme Court modified the order of the High Court in the following terms : However having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the financial health of the appellant Bank, we direct that the respondents shall be entitled to 50% of backwages and not 100% as ordered by the High Court. 5. 5. It is contended by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners that in the same line, order dated 29.02.2009 was passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 162/2008, which is usefully reproduced hereunder. The petitioners have been terminated by order dated 2502-1999, which order has already been set aside by this Court in WP(C) No. 1417 of 1999 and other connected cases. The aforesaid order of this Court dated 25-09-2002 passed in WP(C) No. 1417/1999 and other connected cases have been upheld in appeal subject to the modification that the concerned employees of the Bank will be entitled to 50% of the arrears/back wages instead of full back wages. The above order of the Court will cover the present case also, a position which had not been disputed. In the above circumstances, writ petition is disposed of on similar lines with the direction that the order dated 25-02-1999 terminating the services of the petitioners stands interfered with and the petitioners shall be paid 50% of the back wages due to them. This will dispose of the writ petition. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners also referred to the similar orders dated 16.05.2008 and 06.11.2009 as passed in W.P.(C) No. 1131/2008 and W.P.(C) No. 4761/2009 respectively, where the said order dated 25.02.1999 was under challenge. 6. By the present batch of writ petitions, the petitioners have also put that order dated 25.02.1999 under challenge, questioning its legality inasmuch as the said order was passed in complete disregard to the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In Mohan Lal v. Bharat Electronics Limited, reported in (1981) 3 SCC 225 , the Apex Court held that the breach of that Section would render the decision/order void ab initio inasmuch as the said Section engrafted the inviolable principles of natural justice for retrenchment of the workers Learned Counsel for the petitioners quite emphatically submitted that this batch of writ petitions are squarely covered by the said decisions of this Court as well as of the Apex Court as stated. Similar order is therefore warranted. 7. Mr. A.K. Sharma, learned Standing Counsel, ASCARD Bank, stoutly confronted that submission, stating that this batch of writ petitions suffer from delay and laches and those are required to be slashed at the threshold. Similar order is therefore warranted. 7. Mr. A.K. Sharma, learned Standing Counsel, ASCARD Bank, stoutly confronted that submission, stating that this batch of writ petitions suffer from delay and laches and those are required to be slashed at the threshold. He further drawing attention of this Court to the financial health of the Bank-respondents, submitted that if similar order is passed in view of the decisions of this High Court and the Apex Court, it would be uphill task for the Bank-respondents to mobilise resource for payments of the back wages as well as to discharge the liability that would surface in the event of reinstatements. 8. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners set up a stout rejoinder against the submission of the learned Standing Counsel for the ASCARD Bank and submitted in unison that in the writ petitions sufficient explanation for the delay has been demonstrated. The Bank-respondents assured the writ petitioners to uniformly implement the decision of the Courts when it would reach its finality and on holding out such assurance they kept the petitioners waiting for a considerable period. Apart that, in some writ petitions it has been stated that for poverty, the petitioners could not approach this Court. As the order of termination dated 25.02.1999 was interfered by the Courts, the fruits of such judgment and order were expected to be made available to the petitioners, but that was not done. When they realised that their legitimate expectation was belied, they approached this Court in no time. Apart that, a few decisions of the Apex Court have been pressed to buttress the said contention. 9. In K. C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1997) 6 SCC 721 , the Apex Court held : Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that this was a fit case in which the Tribunal should have condoned the delay in the filing of the application and the appellants should have been given relief in the same terms as was granted by the Full Bench of the Tribunal. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is set aside, the delay in filing of GA No. 774 of 1994 is condoned and the said application is allowed. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is set aside, the delay in filing of GA No. 774 of 1994 is condoned and the said application is allowed. The appellants would be entitled to the same relief in the matter of pension as has been granted by the Full Bench of the Tribunal in its judgment dated 16-12-1993 in GAs Nos. 395-403 of 1993 and connected matters..... (Emphasis added) 10. In Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors. v. Dharampal & Ors., reported in (1990) 4 SCC 13 , the Apex Court held : Subsequently, some other constables whose services were similarly terminated but were not reinstated in service even as fresh entrants, filed writ petitions in the High Court of Delhi being CWP Nos. 110 and 937 of 1978. These writ petitions were heard by Anand, J. who rejected the contention raised by the respondents in the writ petitions regarding the delay and laches in moving the writ petitions, allowed the writ petitions quashing the impugned order of termination declaring that the petitioners will be deemed to have been in service and would be treated as such subject to certain conditions... (Emphasis added) 11. In Shankara Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. M. Prabhakar & Ors., as, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 607 , following the principles as laid down in the previous judgments'; the Supreme Court held : 47. The Privy Council in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221, which was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329 , has stated : (Lindsay Petroleum Co. case, LR pp. 239-40). Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy. (Emphasis added) 12. In K.B. Shephard & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., as reported in AIR 1998 SC 686, the Apex Court has laid down a principle to ensure the substantive ends of justice, the relevant part of the judgment is extracted hereunder : Some of the excluded employees have not come to Court. There is no justification to penalise them for not having litigated. They too shall be entitled to the same benefits as the petitioners. Ordinarily the successful parties should have been entitled to costs but in view of the fact that they are going back to employment we do not propose to make orders of costs against their employers. We hope and trust that the transferee banks would look at the matter with an open mind and would keep themselves alive to the human problem involved in it. (Emphasis added) 13. On the other hand, Mr. A.K. Sharma, learned Standing Counsel, ASCARD Bank placed the following judgments of the Supreme Court: (1) M/s Rup Diamonds & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., as reported in (1989) 2 SCC 356 ; (2) P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., as, reported in AIR 1974 SC 2271 and (3) Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, as, reported in 1969 (1) SCC 185 . 14. In those cases, the fact is entirely different and not circumstanced with situations where the same order was put under challenge and interfered with by the Court. As such the Apex Court decisions as relied by Mr. Sharma, learned Standing Counsel, ASCARD Bank cannot eclipse the decisions as referred by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners. 15. 14. In those cases, the fact is entirely different and not circumstanced with situations where the same order was put under challenge and interfered with by the Court. As such the Apex Court decisions as relied by Mr. Sharma, learned Standing Counsel, ASCARD Bank cannot eclipse the decisions as referred by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners. 15. Moreover, this Court finds that there is no justification to penalise the writ petitioners in this batch of writ petitions by denying them from the benefits as provided to the similarly situated persons in other writ petitions including the writ petitions which were filed in the year 2008 and 2009 for not having litigated. Orders passed in the writ petitions filed in the year 2008 and 2009 as stated were also not challenged by the respondent-Bank and the respondent-Bank has implemented those judgments. Apart that, the Supreme Court on consideration of the financial health of the respondent-Bank has reduced the back wages from 100% as was ordered by this Court to 50%. 16. In view of this, the order dated 25.02.1999 terminating the services of the petitioners stands interfered with and quashed so far the writ petitioners are concerned. The petitioners except the petitioner No. 2 in W.P.(C) No. 5121/2009 shall be reinstated as expeditiously as possible by any rate not later than 3(three) months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order to be submitted by the petitioners. It is further directed that the petitioners shall be entitled to 50% of their back-wages from 25.02.1999 to the date of reinstatement. The petitioner No. 2 in W.P.(C) No. 5121/2009 is the widow of a terminated employee, namely Anisur Rahman and as such there is no question of her reinstatement in service but the petitioner No. 2 and other legal heirs, if any of said Anisur Rahman, shall be entitled to get 50% of the back wages from 25.02.1999 till the date of death of said Anisur Rahman. For ascertaining the date of death, the petitioner No. 2 in W.P.(C) No. 5121/2009 shall furnish an authenticated certificate of death to the Bank-respondent along with a certified copy of this order. With this observation and direction, all these writ petitions stand allowed to the extent as indicated above. No order as to cost. Petition allowed