Judgment : 1. The Petitioner, the Government of India undertaking, dealing in business of refining and marketing of Petroleum and Petroleum products, have filed this present Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short “the Arbitration Act”) and thereby challenged Award dated 10th April, 2008. 2. The basic facts are as under: The Petitioners entered into a dealership agreement with the Respondent on 1st June, 1995. During inspection on 19/20th February, 2001 the Petitioners noticed malpractices and irregularities. They also noticed variation in the stock of petrol and HSD. A show cause notice was issued dated 30th August, 2001. The same was replied by the Respondent on 5th September, 2001. An inspection conducted by Anti Adulteration Cell and, accordingly, submitted inspection report dated 28th September, 2002. The same was forwarded to the dealer. Therefore, again a show cause notice dated 30th September, 2002 was issued referring to various defaults. As the negative report dated 1st October, 2002 of Manmad Laboratory as sample fails, a letter issued from Assistant Director Investigation of Anti Adulteration Cell for taking action against the Respondent dealers on 16th October, 2002. The Petitioners wrote the Respondent by letter dated 26th October, 2002 that the Unleaded Petrol (ULP) sample failed to meet the requirement of BSI specifications in respect of Research Octane Number (RON). 3. The Petitioners terminated the dealership and taken possession of site on 11th December, 2002. The Regional Director of Anti Adulteration Cell clarified certain points on 20th January, 2003. As Petitioners were dissatisfied with the explanation suspended the supply from 21st January, 2005. 4. There arose dispute and, therefore, in view of the Arbitration clause Respondent requested for Arbitration on 20th June, 2005. The parties proceeded before the Arbitrator Tribunal lead their respective evidence and made their submissions. The learned Arbitrator passed the impugned Award on 10th April, 2008. 5. The relevant Arbitration Clause is as under : “66. Any dispute or difference of any nature whatsoever or regarding any right, liability, act, omission or account of any of the parties hereto arising out of or in relation to this agreement shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Managing Director of the Corporation or of some officer of the Corporation who may be nominated by the Managing Director. The Dealer will not be entitled to raise any objection to any such arbitrator on the ground that the arbitrator is an officer of the Corporation or that he has to deal with the matters to which the contract relates or that in the course of his duties as an officer of the Corporation he had expressed views on all or any of the matters in dispute or difference in the event of the Arbitrator to whom the mater is originally referred being transferred or vacating his unable to act for any reason to Managing Director as aforesaid such transfer, vacation of office or inability to act, shall designated another as arbitrator in accordance with the terms of the Agreement such person shall be entitled to proceed with the reference from the point at which it was left by his predecessor. It is also a term of the Contract that no person other than the Managing Director or a person nominated by such Managing Director of the Corporation as aforesaid shall act as Arbitrator hereunder. The Award of the Arbitrator so appointed shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to the Agreement, subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 or any statutory modifications of or reenactment thereof and the rules made thereunder and for the time be in force shall apply to the Arbitration proceedings under this clause. The Award shall be made in writing within six months after entering upon the reference or within such extended time not exceeding further four months as the sole arbitrator shall by a writing under his own hands appoint.” 6. The Arbitrator entered into Reference on 4th May, 2006. The arguments were completed on 21st December, 2006. Period of 10 months (six months plus four months) expired as per Clause, on 3rd March, 2007. The written submissions were filed by the parties on 12th March, 2007. Award was passed on 10th April, 2008 approximately after 13 months. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as dispute arose with regard to the power of Arbitrator to proceed further with the matter and even on merits to dealt with the dispute after lapse of alleged agreed period as referred above. Award was passed on 10th April, 2008 approximately after 13 months. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as dispute arose with regard to the power of Arbitrator to proceed further with the matter and even on merits to dealt with the dispute after lapse of alleged agreed period as referred above. A single Bench of this Court by order dated 13th January, 2012 allowed the Arbitration Petition filed by the Petitioners on the ground that the Award itself was made after the period provided under the agreement and as the mandate of the Arbitrator had expired, the Award itself was set aside on that ground. 7. In Appeal No.143 of 2012 [M/s. Snehdeep Auto Centre V/s. Hindustan Petroleum Corpooration Ltd.], the Respondent challenged the said Award in Appeal. A Division Bench of this Court presided over by Chief Justice on 16th April, 2012 allowed the Appeal. Operative part of the order is as under: “12. Thus, in conclusion we are not in agreement with the learned single Judge that the present arbitration Petition needs to be automatically allowed because the award of the arbitrator was passed after the period stipulated in the agreement had come to an end without looking into any other aspect. Having considered the facts narrated above, we find that the conduct of the respondent is such that a clear inference can be drawn that it had waived the time limit stipulated in the agreement and the objection regarding the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. 13. In the result, the Appeal is allowed. The order passed by the learned single Jude dated January 13, 2012 in Arbitration Petition No.430 of 2008 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the learned Single Judge for consideration of the Petition on merits. We make it clear that we have not observed anything on the merits of the case of both the parties in the Arbitration Petition.” 8. We have dealt with the same Judgment [M/s. Snehdeep Auto Centre (supra)] in different circumstances between the different parties. In the case of [Bharat Oman Refineries Ltd. V/s. M/s. Mantech Consultants], in paragraph 27, this Court observed as under: “27. In Snehadeep, (Supra) the written statement was filed before the Arbitrator, though period was expired. Both the parties, participated, before the Arbitrator, even after expiry of mandatory period. The facts are totally different here. In the case of [Bharat Oman Refineries Ltd. V/s. M/s. Mantech Consultants], in paragraph 27, this Court observed as under: “27. In Snehadeep, (Supra) the written statement was filed before the Arbitrator, though period was expired. Both the parties, participated, before the Arbitrator, even after expiry of mandatory period. The facts are totally different here. The clause also very distinctive in the present case. There is no conflict of law in view of clear distinguishable facts. The law is binding if facts are similar and not when facts are different. In the present case such objection was raised and the Court had decided the same. Even the challenge about mandate of Arbitration was not raised in Section 34 Petition. The fact based decision cannot be treated as precedents, specially when those are distinct and distinguishable.”. 9. Admittedly, the order of remand of the Division Bench has attained finality, as there is no challenge raised. The finding and the reason therefore, is binding between the parties. The Single Judge is bound by the same, as it is based upon the Supreme Court Judgment. Therefore, this judgment on the merits of the matter, as ordered, and heard accordingly. 10. In view of this, the first submission of the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners to interfere with the above, on the same ground, as decided by the Division Bench in M/s. Snehdeep (Supra) is impermissible. In the present facts and circumstances, the issues are settled and decided and as directed, there is no option but to deal with the merits of the matter. 11. The operative part of the award is as under:“ AWARD: Having dwelled on the averments brought out by both the parties to the dispute and having studied the documents and submissions based on the proceedings, I hereby pass the following award on the claims by the claimant & counter claims by the respondent: 1) I hold that the theory of conspiracy & ulterior motive by the respondent to take over the outlet has not been established and the claim by the claimant to this effect is rejected. 2) The charged on the claimant of not full filling the sales target obligation by the retail outlet run by him has not been proved convincingly and hence set aside. 2) The charged on the claimant of not full filling the sales target obligation by the retail outlet run by him has not been proved convincingly and hence set aside. 3) As detailed in my findings on specific averments in this dispute, both the respondent Corporation & Anti Adulteration Cell have not followed the prescribed guidelines for sampling and testing of the samples taken during inspection of the Outlet on 28.09.2002 and the quality of the reference sample of supply location was not properly established. Hence the sample result of BPCL Manmade lab showing RON failure cannot be relied upon for taking any action against the Claimant and hence I direct that: I. The respondent to pay to the claimant Rs.9,94,068/towards full value of the product stock taken over at the time of Termination of the retail outlet., within 30 days of this award. II. The Termination of Dealership Agreement dated 01.06.1995 by issuing the Termination letter dated 11.12.2002 by the respondent corporation is set aside as the grounds for the same are not found valid. 4) The respondent to establish the claim of Rs.1,25,855.60 through reconciliation of the statement of accounts pointing out the specific transaction that has resulted in the debit entry if due, the claimant to pay the amount within 30 days from the date of establishment of the claim. For the present the respondent's claim for Rs.1,25,855.60 has been rejected. 5) The claim of the respondent of Rs. 10 lakhs towards damages for adverse publicity to the respondent Corporation is rejected. 6) The Respondent is hereby directed to hand over the computer, Furniture etc. as per panchanama, to the Claimant within 30 days of this order. 7) All other claims & counter claims made by the claimant & respondent respectively are rejected, as I do not find them justified. 8) The claims by the claimant & the respondent towards cost of Arbitration are rejected, as the parties are not entitled and these claims were not substantiated by both the parties.” 12. The reasons given by the experienced Arbitrator in the field, are based upon the contract, rules and regulations and material placed on record by the parties. The submission that the Arbitrator failed to take notes of various clauses of the Dealership Agreement dated 1 June 1995, are not correct. The reasons given by the experienced Arbitrator in the field, are based upon the contract, rules and regulations and material placed on record by the parties. The submission that the Arbitrator failed to take notes of various clauses of the Dealership Agreement dated 1 June 1995, are not correct. Both the parties have rightly referred the documents, its contents and the contract terms and the related laws and regulations/orders. The Arbitrator has also recorded and dealt with all these aspects in detailed and in fact distinguished and dealt with them, referring to the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, considering the scope and purpose of Section 34 and as the view so expressed by the learned Arbitrator is well within the purview of the Arbitration Act and record, and in no way stated to be perverse and/or contrary to the law. 13. The learned Arbitrator has recorded rightly that the drawing of sample directly from the underground MS tank 1 during the inspection on 28 September 2002, and further using the ordinary soft drink Coca Cola bottles instead of sampling equipment for the purpose were not correct; and as per the recommended procedures, by further observing that sample could have been easily taken by any of the dispensing pumps. The Arbitrator right in observing that the marketing discipline guidelines is a document formulated by the Oil Industry and approved by the ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas for the Oil companies to follow, for ensuring discipline in respect storage and sale of MS and HSD at the Retail Outlets. The acquiesced, though not recorded of any kind by the Respondent, in no way sufficient to dislodge the procedure as prescribed. The petitioner, as rightly recorded, could have taken a fresh sample by following correct method and sent the same for testing. The finding, therefore, recorded that the sampling procedure followed by the Petitioner's officer and AAC officers on 28 September 2002, was not proper and not according to the procedure, cannot be stated to be perverse and/or incorrect. 14. Admittedly, samples were sent to Manmad Laboratory of BPCL which was not included in schedule III of the MS and HSD control order 1998. There is no justification and/or reasoning provided before the overlooking this obligatory rules. 14. Admittedly, samples were sent to Manmad Laboratory of BPCL which was not included in schedule III of the MS and HSD control order 1998. There is no justification and/or reasoning provided before the overlooking this obligatory rules. The learned Arbitrator after discussing, even not accepting the justification given by the Petitioner, rightly come to the conclusion that the action of AAC in sending the sample to BPCL Manmad laboratory, not as per the law in force. Therefore, the test report so given by the Lab, rightly discarded as valid evidence to take action against the Respondent. There is no details provided how the Respondent failed to take the precautions against the contamination of the Respondent's product and further that the stock variation at the time of inspection is well within the limits, the adulteration charge based on the said test report rightly held to be invalid. 15. The Petitioner in reply, denied that the samples were tested after the stipulated time as required under the Control Order and MDG. The learned Arbitrator was also held that the quality of the samples of the supply location was not properly established as the samples were from different tanks (82 and 85) were tested instead of dispatch tank 88. Therefore, it is not possible to compare the test reports of the retail outlet sample with the reference sample, which was a requirement under the law. The learned Arbitrator has also considered that the stock variation observed on 28 September 2002 considering the receipts based on the invoices was well within the permissible limits. The density register was update till 27 September 2002. The inspection took place on 28 September 2002. It is also noted that the seal of the dispensing unit was intact and also the stock variation which was well within the limits, except one unit of MS and HSD which was found delivering short beyond permissible limits. The petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent original claimant was in habit of committing malpractices and irregularities, based upon the earlier inspection of February 2001. The second inspection was in September 2002 i.e. after 19 months, whereby only irregularities of short delivery (with seals intact) has been proved. No other irregularities at the Claimant's outlet during the intervening period of 19 months proved. The second inspection was in September 2002 i.e. after 19 months, whereby only irregularities of short delivery (with seals intact) has been proved. No other irregularities at the Claimant's outlet during the intervening period of 19 months proved. The Arbitrator, right in holding that even if the charges of short delivery is accepted to the above extent, that itself is not sufficient when the other major charges of adulteration and other offences were not proved, as recorded above. 16. The Arbitrator right in observing that the Respondent Claimant failed to prove the charges of conspiracy, malpractices, ulterior motive and harassment by the officials, non following the procedure in no way stated to be an act of commission but it is an act of omission. Any way, that itself is not sufficient to overlook the case of the Respondent and accept the case of the Petitioner. There is force in the contention that the Petitioner never raised serious objections with regard to the retail sales not in line with commitment in the dealership agreement, except at the time of taking the action. The Arbitrator also hold the charges of sales were not established as required under the law. 17. The Arbitrator, after considering the rival contention, including no material placed on record by the Respondent and as there is no challenge, the rejection of counterclaim for loss of reputation, as alleged, just cannot be gone into now. The remedy is elsewhere, if any. The dues from the claimant were also denied for want of material. What remained was the dues from the Respondent Petitioner. In para 10, the Arbitrator has given sufficient reason and arrived at figure and considering the commercial nature of the transaction, I am inclined to maintain the order so passed except the grant of 18% interest w.e.f. 1 October 2002. 18. After considering the facts and in view of the decisions and reasons given by the Arbitrator and as not accepting the case of the Petitioner on various technical defaults, I am inclined to reduce the interest rate by 12% w.e.f. 1 October 2002 instead of 18%, as granted in para 10. 19. So far as the cost is concerned, as the Arbitrator refused to grant the cost and there is no challenge raised, I see there is no reason to grant cost, first time, in Section 34 Petition. 20. 19. So far as the cost is concerned, as the Arbitrator refused to grant the cost and there is no challenge raised, I see there is no reason to grant cost, first time, in Section 34 Petition. 20. In the result, the following order: ORDER a) The impugned award dated 10 April 2008 is modified only for the rate of interest. The rate of interest from 1 October 2002 be read as 12%, instead of 18%. b) The rest of the award is maintained. c) There shall be no order as to costs.