JUDGMENT : GULAM MINHAJUDDIN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant/insurance company u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the award dated 30-9-2010 passed by the Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Katghora, Distt. Korba (in short "the Tribunal"), in Claim Case No. 19/09, whereby liability to pay the amount of compensation has been fastened upon the appellant/insurance company, jointly and severally, along with respondent No. 6/owner. Brief facts of the case, as per averments made in the claim petition, are that Pramod Kumar was the employee of respondent No. 6/owner. On the fateful day i.e. 12-9-2008 at about 1.00 in the night while Pramod Kumar after unloading coal was returning back from the phase by driving Hyva bearing registration No. CG 12/C-0492, ail of a sudden due to failure of brakes on the slope the vehicle became uncontrollable and turned turtle twice. As a result, Pramod Kumar sustained grievous injuries and while being taken to hospital succumbed to the same. At the relevant time, the vehicle in question was owned by respondent No. 6 and insured with the appellant. 2. At the time of accident, the deceased was 30 years old and as a driver he was earning Rs. 9,111/- per month. Therefore, the claimants, who are widow, minor children and parents of the deceased, being his legal heirs/dependents filed a claim petition u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short "the Act, 1988") before the Tribunal for a total compensation of Rs. 15,00,000/- against the death of Pramod Kumar under various heads. 3. However, learned Tribunal after hearing counsel for the respective parties and on close scrutiny of the evidence adduced by the parties before it, by the impugned award granted a total compensation of Rs. 13,30,500/- in favour of the claimants, fastening the liability, jointly and severally, upon the appellant/insurance company along with respondent No. 6/owner of the vehicle. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the LCR as also the impugned award. 5. 13,30,500/- in favour of the claimants, fastening the liability, jointly and severally, upon the appellant/insurance company along with respondent No. 6/owner of the vehicle. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the LCR as also the impugned award. 5. Contention of learned counsel for the appellant/insurance company is that the application filed by the respondents/claimants u/s 166 of the Act, 1988 itself was not maintainable in law and ought to have been dismissed at the threshold because liability to pay compensation u/s 166 of the Act, 1988 is a tortious liability and is fault based, as distinguished u/s 163A of the Act 1988, which deals with no fault liability. He has further contended that for maintaining an application u/s 166 of the Act, 1988, negligence on the part of owner or driver of the offending vehicle is the sine qua non or condition precedent. However, in the instant case, no other vehicle was involved and the deceased himself was negligent and therefore, the respondents/claimants are not entitled for compensation under the said provision. 6. In the alternate, he has also contended that in the absence of evidence, the monthly income of the deceased has been assessed by the Tribunal as Rs. 9,111/- and consequently, the amount of compensation has been assessed exorbitantly. Further, it has been argued that as per terms and conditions of the insurance policy, the liability of the appellant/insurance company was not unlimited, but limited to the extent of liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 7. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matters of Minu B. Mehta and Another Vs. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan and Another, (1977) 2 SCC 441 Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi and Others Vs. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. (P) Ltd. and Another, (1977) 2 SCC 745 and The Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Meena Variyal and Others, (2007) 5 SCC 428 . 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents have supported the impugned award. In addition to oral argument, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 to 5/claimants has also submitted written arguments. 9. (P) Ltd. and Another, (1977) 2 SCC 745 and The Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Meena Variyal and Others, (2007) 5 SCC 428 . 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents have supported the impugned award. In addition to oral argument, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 to 5/claimants has also submitted written arguments. 9. There is no doubt that liability to pay compensation to the claimants u/s 166 of the Act, 1988 is a tortious and fault based liability and negligence on the part of the owner or the driver of the offending vehicle is the sine qua non for maintaining an application for compensation under the said provision. Admittedly, in the instant case, no second vehicle, which could be termed as offending vehicle, is involved. When Pramod Kumar was returning in the midnight, at about 1 am, after unloading coal and was going down the slope driving the vehicle in question Hyva, that the vehicle turned turtle twice, on account of which he sustained grievous injuries and while being taken to hospital succumbed to the same. 10. As per the appellant/insurance company, the deceased at the time of accident while going down the slope was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently, on account of which it turned turtle resulting in his death and as such, since the deceased was himself negligent, the respondents/claimants cannot claim compensation u/s 166 of the Act, 1988. 11. The respondents/claimants in support of the averments made in their claim petition have examined Anita Devi-widow of the deceased, Girjakant Sahu-Supervisor, Arjun Coal Transport, Deepka, Distt. Korba and Kaptan Singh-Office Superintendent, Chhattisgarh Coal Transport Pvt. Ltd. Deepka Chainpur, Distt. Korba, as AW-1, AW-2 and AW-3 respectively. On the other hand, on behalf of respondent No. 6/owner, his Supervisor Bramhadev Prasad and on behalf of the appellant/insurance company, its Law Officer Pankaj Kumar have been examined as NAW-1 and NAW-1 respectively. 12. Girjakant Sahu (AW-2), Supervisor in Arjun Coal Transport, Deepka, who in his jeep was following the vehicle driven by the deceased, has categorically denied the suggestion that at the time of accident, the vehicle was being driven by the deceased in a rash and negligent manner. 12. Girjakant Sahu (AW-2), Supervisor in Arjun Coal Transport, Deepka, who in his jeep was following the vehicle driven by the deceased, has categorically denied the suggestion that at the time of accident, the vehicle was being driven by the deceased in a rash and negligent manner. He has further stated that immediately after the accident, when he (Girjakant Sahu, AW-2) and his driver Bhagirathi Patel had gone to the spot and had taken the injured/deceased out of the vehicle, then on being asked the injured/deceased had told them that on account of failure of brakes, the accident had occurred. 13. After the accident the vehicle was got mechanically examined by the police and true photocopy of the examination report of the vehicle has been filed on behalf of the respondents/claimants and the same was got exhibited during examination of claimant/respondent No. 1 Smt. Anita Devi as Ex. P/4. Although this document (Ex. P/4) has not been duly proved by examining Ishwar Ekka (Mechanic), who had prepared the said report, but at the same time, there is no reason to disbelieve the statement of the eyewitness of the accident named Girjakant Sahu (AW-2), who has categorically stated that immediately before the accident, he was following the vehicle driven by the deceased, the distance between both the vehicles was not much and at that time, while going down the slope, the deceased was not driving the vehicle rashly. In the cross-examination also, on suggestion being given to this witness (AW-2), he has in very clear terms denied that at the relevant point of time the vehicle was being driven by the deceased in a rash and negligent manner. In addition to this, he has stated that immediately after the accident when he and his jeep driver Bhagirathi Patel had gone to the spot and taken out the injured/deceased from under the vehicle, that he (deceased) had told them that on account of failure of brakes, the accident had occurred. 14. As per Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act, any statement made by a person, who is dead or cannot be found, as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction, which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question, is relevant and admissible in evidence. As such, on the basis of evidence adduced, it stands proved that the accident resulting in death of Pramod Kumar had not occurred on account of rashness and negligence on his part, but on account of sudden failure of brakes while going down the slope. 15. Besides this, Bramhadev Prasad (NAW-1 for the owner) has specifically stated in para-9 of his cross-examination that in their company, the vehicles are checked daily to ensure that they are in roadworthy condition. Thus, on the basis of evidence adduced, it also stands proved that the owner of the vehicle (respondent No. 6 herein) had taken all due care and precaution to keep his vehicle in a roadworthy condition and it was due to sudden failure of brakes that the accident had occurred, resulting in death of driver Pramod Kumar, for which the deceased/driver cannot be held liable. 16. In the case of Jitendra Kumar Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another, (2003) 6 SCC 420 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that when any accident had taken place for no fault of the driver, then in that case, the insurance company cannot escape from its liability to pay compensation. Although the said case relates to own damage claim, but the principle of law laid down therein applies squarely to all cases, in which there has been no negligence on the part of the driver and the accident had occurred on account of reason, which was beyond the control of the driver. 17. It is no doubt true that in the instant case, there is no second vehicle involved, which can be said to be the offending vehicle. As per statement of Bramhadev Prasad (NAW-1), who is Supervisor of the respondent/owner, the vehicle in question was daily checked in their company with a view to keep it in a roadworthy condition. But as per statement of Girjakant Sahu (AW-2) and the dying declaration made by the deceased to this witness (AW-2) immediately after the accident, it is found that despite taking due care and caution by the respondent/owner to keep the vehicle in roadworthy condition, brakes of the same had all of a sudden failed while going down the slope, on account of which the accident had occurred, for which the owner or the deceased/driver cannot be, even remotely, held liable for the same as it was not within their control. 18. 18. Now the question is-whether in a case where there is no offending vehicle, no negligence on the part of the owner or the driver of the vehicle and the accident had occurred on account of the reason beyond the control of the driver and the owner of the vehicle, the insurance company can be saddled with the liability to pay compensation? 19. A complete answer to this question has been given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kaushnuma Begum and Others Vs. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Others, (2001) 2 SCC 9 in which from paras 12 to 20, it has been observed as under: 12. Even if there is no negligence on the part of the driver or owner of the motor vehicle, but accident happens while the vehicle was in use, should not the owner be made liable for damages to the person who suffered on account of such accident? This question depends upon how far the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1861-73 All ER(Reprint) 1) (supra) can apply in motor accident cases. The said Rule is summarised by Blackburn, J., thus: The true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiffs default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but, as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient. 13. The House of Lords considered it and upheld the ratio with the following dictum: We think that the true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiffs default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major or the act of God; but, as nothing of this sort exists, here it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient. 14. The above Rule eventually gained approval in a large number of decisions rendered by courts in England and abroad. Winfield on Tort has brought out even a chapter on the "Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher". At page 543 of the 15th Edn. of the calibrated work the learned author has pointed out that "over the years Rylands v. Fletcher has been applied to a remarkable variety of things: fire, gas, explosions, electricity, oil, noxious fumes, colliery spoil, rusty wire from a decayed fence, vibrations, poisonous vegetation......". He has elaborated seven defences recognised in common law against action brought on the strength of the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1861-73 All ER (Reprint) 1). They are: (1) Consent of the plaintiff i.e. volenti non fit injuria. (2) Common benefit i.e. where the source of the danger is maintained for the common benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant is not liable for its escape. (3) Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply. (4) Exercise of statutory authority i.e. the rule will stand excluded either when the act was done under a statutory duty or when a statute provides otherwise. (5) Act of God or vis major i.e. circumstances which no human foresight can provide against and of which human prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility. (6) Default of the plaintiff i.e. if the damage is caused solely by the act or default of the plaintiff himself, the rule will not apply. (7) Remoteness of consequences i.e. the rule cannot be applied ad infinitum, because even according to the formulation of the rule made by Blackburn, J., the defendant is answerable only for all the damage "which is the natural consequence of its escape". 15. The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1861-73 All ER (Reprint) 1) has been referred to by this Court in a number of decisions. 15. The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1861-73 All ER (Reprint) 1) has been referred to by this Court in a number of decisions. While dealing with the liability of industries engaged in hazardous or dangerous activities P.N. Bhagwati, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench in M.C. Mehta and another Vs. Union of India and others, (1987) 1 SCC 395 , expressed the view that there is no necessity to bank on the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. What the learned Judge observed as thus: We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialised economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order. 16. It is pertinent to point out that the Constitution Bench did not disapprove the Rule. On the contrary, learned Judges further said that "we are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes". It means that the Constitution Bench did not foreclose the application of the Rule as a legal proposition. 17. In Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613 another Constitution Bench of this Court while dealing with Bhopal gas leak disaster cases, made a reference to the earlier decisions in M.C. Mehta and another Vs. Union of India and others, (1987) 1 SCC 395 but did not take the same view. The rule of strict liability was found favour with. Yet another Constitution Bench in Union Carbide Corporation, etc., etc. Vs. Union of India, etc. etc., (1991) 4 SCC 584 referred to M.C. Mehta's decision but did not detract from the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, ( 1861-73 All ER (Reprint) 1). 18. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad Vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Another, (1987) 3 SCC 234 the question considered was regarding the application of the Rule in cases arising out of motor accidents. 18. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad Vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Another, (1987) 3 SCC 234 the question considered was regarding the application of the Rule in cases arising out of motor accidents. The observation made by E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) can profitably be extracted here (Para 8 of AIR): Today, thanks to the modern civilization, thousands of motor vehicles are put on the road and the largest number of injuries and deaths are taking place on the roads on account of the motor vehicles accidents. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, the motor vehicles upon the roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher. From the point of view of the pedestrian the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles who have caused the accidents are not known are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives as the case may be should be entitled to recover damages if the principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. In order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents there has been a continuous agitation throughout the world to make the liability for damages arising out of motor vehicles accidents as a liability without fault. 19. Like any other common law principle, which is acceptable to our jurisprudence, the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1861-73 All ER (Reprint) 1) can be followed at least until any other new principle which excels the former can be evolved, or until legislation provides differently. Hence, we are disposed to adopt the Rule in claims for compensation made in respect of motor accidents. 20. "No Fault Liability" envisaged in Section 140 of the M.V. Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if anyone of the exceptions to the Rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under that count. "No Fault Liability" envisaged in Section 140 of the M.V. Act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if anyone of the exceptions to the Rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under that count. Compensation on account of accident arising from the use of motor vehicles can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of a statute. The provisions of the M.V. Act permit that compensation paid under no fault liability can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore, these two are resting on two different premises. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from Section 140 of the M.V. Act, a victim in an accident which occurred while using a motor vehicle, is entitled to get compensation from a Tribunal unless anyone of the exceptions would apply. The Tribunal and the High Court have, therefore, gone into error in divesting the claimants of the compensation payable to them. 20. As such, in view of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Kumar (supra) and Smt. Kaushnuma Begum (supra), the respondent/owner and the appellant/insurance company cannot escape from their liability to pay compensation to the respondents/claimants. 21. So far as the quantum of compensation is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant/insurance company has contended that despite want of cogent and reliable evidence, the monthly income of the deceased has been assessed as Rs. 9,000/- and consequently, the compensation has been assessed exorbitantly, which needs to be modified and suitably reduced, if at all the insurance company is held liable to pay compensation. 22. As per respondents No. 1 to 5/claimants, the deceased was engaged by respondent No. 6/owner as a driver to drive the vehicle in question. The said vehicle was hired on monthly basis with driver and as per the direction of respondent No. 6/owner, the hirer i.e. Chhattisgarh Coal Transport Company used to pay Rs. 9,111/- p.m. as salary to the deceased and the same was deducted from the bill amount payable to respondent No. 6/owner. The said vehicle was hired on monthly basis with driver and as per the direction of respondent No. 6/owner, the hirer i.e. Chhattisgarh Coal Transport Company used to pay Rs. 9,111/- p.m. as salary to the deceased and the same was deducted from the bill amount payable to respondent No. 6/owner. Regarding salary of the deceased, his widow/claimant Smt. Anita Devi (AW-1) has stated that her husband (deceased) was getting salary of Rs. 9,111/- p.m. On this point, statement of Smt. Anita Devi (AW-1) has been corroborated by the statement of Kaptan Singh (AW-3), who is Office-Incharge in the office of hirer company i.e. Chhattisgarh Coal Transport Company. Salary certificate (Ex. P/9) dated 5-10-2009 issued by Kaptan Singh (AW-3) in the capacity of Office-Incharge of the hirer company has also been filed. Bramhadev Prasad (NAW-1 for the owner) has also stated that the vehicle in question was hired by the Chhattisgarh Coal Transport Company, the same was driven by the deceased, who was paid salary at the rate of Rs. 9,111/- p.m. by the Chhattisgarh Coal Transport Company as per direction of respondent No. 6/owner and the same used to be deducted from the monthly bill of respondent No. 6/owner. 23. It is not in dispute that the vehicle in question is not an ordinary transport vehicle but Hyva, which is a long transport vehicle with trailer having 10 wheels. Although these witnesses Kaptan Singh (AW-3) and Bramhadev Prasad (NAW-1 for the owner) have not produced records relating to payment of monthly salary @ Rs. 9,111/- to the deceased in support of their statements, but looking to the type of vehicle, which was being driven by the deceased, the statements of these witnesses cannot be disbelieved on the point that the deceased was being paid salary @ Rs. 9,111/- per month, 24. The claims Tribunal has assessed the monthly salary of the deceased as Rs. 9,000/- and after deducing 1/3rd i.e. Rs. 3,000/- towards his personal and living expenses has assessed Rs. 6,000/- per month as loss of dependency, which comes to Rs. 72,000/- per year. As per postmortem, age of the deceased was 25 years and as per driving licence of the deceased, his date of birth is 1-2-1981. The date of birth mentioned in the driving licence must be taken to be conclusive. 6,000/- per month as loss of dependency, which comes to Rs. 72,000/- per year. As per postmortem, age of the deceased was 25 years and as per driving licence of the deceased, his date of birth is 1-2-1981. The date of birth mentioned in the driving licence must be taken to be conclusive. As such, the deceased on the date of accident i.e. 12-9-2008 was between 27 and 28 years of age. As per law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 the multiplier of 17 should have been applied, whereas the claims Tribunal has applied the multiplier of 18 as per Second Schedule of the Act, 1988, which is applicable to applications filed u/s 163A of the Act, 1988. As such, after applying the multiplier of 17, the annual loss of dependency comes to Rs. 12,24,000/-. In addition to this, widow of the deceased, respondent No. 1/claimant Smt. Anita Devi shall be entitled to Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of consortium. Respondents No. 1 to 5/claimants shall also be entitled to Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of estate and Rs. 5,000/- for funeral expenses. As such, the total amount of compensation comes to Rs. 12,49,000/-, whereas the claims Tribunal has awarded a total sum of Rs. 13,30,500/-, which is definitely on the higher side and deserves to be reduced to the above extent. At this juncture, it is necessary to mention that as in the instant case the number of dependents are five, therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sarla Verma (supra), the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased should have been 1/4th. Had the deduction under this head been 1/4th, then the amount of compensation would have been definitely assessed more. However, since no cross-objection has been filed for enhancement of the amount of compensation, the same cannot be enhanced. 25. Moreover, the claims Tribunal has also awarded penal interest @ 9% per annum, which is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Keshav Bahadur and Others, (2004) 2 SCC 370 and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 25. Moreover, the claims Tribunal has also awarded penal interest @ 9% per annum, which is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Keshav Bahadur and Others, (2004) 2 SCC 370 and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. So far as awarding of interest @ 6% per annum on the amount of compensation from the date of presentation of the claim petition till its realization is concerned, the same being just and proper needs no interference. 26. Learned counsel for the appellant/insurance company has also contended that in case, the appellant is held liable for payment of compensation, then the liability of the appellant/insurance company in this respect is not unlimited but is limited to that under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. 27. In this regard, perusal of the insurance policy as well as statement of Pankaj Kumar (NAW-1 for the appellant/insurance company), who is the Law Officer of the appellant, is necessary. From perusal of the insurance policy, which has been marked as Ex. D/4C along with its "Standard Form for Commercial Vehicles Package Policy", it is found that the policy (Ex. D/4C), which was issued by the appellant/insurance company in favour of respondent No. 6/owner in respect of the vehicle in question, is not an Act Policy but it is a Commercial Vehicles Package Policy. In all Rs. 8,378/- has been charged as premium, Rs. 800/- for basic 3rd party liability, Rs. 100/- towards PA cover for owner-driver of Rs. 2 lacs, and Rs. 50/- for legal liability to person for operation/maintenance for two persons. 28. As per proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the Act, 1988, a person driving a vehicle is automatically covered under the Act Policy. Although Pankaj Kumar (NAW-1 for the appellant), Law Officer, has stated that the premium has been taken for employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act, but in his cross-examination he has admitted that there is no mention of "WC Employee" in the insurance policy (Ex. D/4C). He has also admitted that Ex. D/4C is a Package Policy and the entire risk is covered by it. 29. There is no dispute that the insurance policy is not an Act Policy, but a Commercial Vehicles Package Policy. D/4C). He has also admitted that Ex. D/4C is a Package Policy and the entire risk is covered by it. 29. There is no dispute that the insurance policy is not an Act Policy, but a Commercial Vehicles Package Policy. As per provisions of Section 147 of the Act, 1988, driver of the vehicle is automatically covered under the Act Policy. There is no mention of premium having been taken for WC Employee in the insurance policy. As such, the contention of the appellant/insurance company that the liability, if any of the appellant/insurance company, is limited to that under the Workmen's Compensation Act only cannot be accepted and it is held that the liability of the appellant/insurance company in respect of compensation is not limited, but unlimited. 30. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. While affirming the findings of Tribunal regarding liability of the appellant/insurance company, the impugned award is modified to the extent that instead of Rs. 13,30,500/-, the appellant/insurance company shall pay a total sum of Rs. 12,49,000/- to respondents No. 1 to 5/claimants with interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of presentation of the claim petition till its realization. However, finding of the Tribunal in respect of penal interest @ 9% p.a. is hereby set aside. Rest of the conditions of the impugned award shall remain intact. No order as to costs.