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Karnataka High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 138 (KAR)

R. H. Raddi v. High Court of Karnataka, rep. , by its Registrar General

2012-02-17

B.V.PINTO, D.V.SHYLENDRA KUMAR

body2012
Judgment Shylendra Kumar,J 1. These appeals are by three former Judicial Officers who had retired on attaining the age of superannuation i.e., on completing the age of 58 years, but who were not happy with and had questioned the orders of retiring them compulsorily at the age of 58, by filing writ petitions before this Court, mainly on the ground that they are entitled to continue in service till they attain the age of 60 years. 2. It was the stand of the appellants that in terms of Rule 95-A of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules (for short, the Rules), the age of retirement of Judicial Officers shall be raised to 60 years subject to the following conditions viz., (1) The High Court of Karnataka should assess and evaluate the record of the Judicial Officer for his continued utility well within the time before the attains the age of 58 years by following the procedure for the compulsory retirement under the service rules applicable to him and give him the benefit of the extended superannuation age from 58 to 60 years, only if he is found fit and eligible to continue in service. (2) If found not fit and ineligible, he should be compulsorily retired on his attaining the age of 58 years. (3) the assessment as indicated above should be done before the attainment of the age of 58 years. (4) The above assessment is for evaluating the eligibility to continue in service beyond 58 years of age and is in addition to and independent of the assessment for compulsory retirement that may have to be undertaken as per the relevant service rules. (5) Those Judicial Officers who are not desirous of availing of the benefit of enhanced superannuation age with the condition of compulsory retirement at the age of 58 years, may give an option to retire at the age of 58 years and such an option shall be exercised in writing by the Judicial Officer before he attains the age of 57 years. (6) Such of the Judicial Officers who do not exercise the said option mentioned above before attaining the age of 57 years, shall be deemed to have opted for continuing in service till the enhanced superannuation age of 60 years with the liability to compulsory retirement at the age of 58 years. (6) Such of the Judicial Officers who do not exercise the said option mentioned above before attaining the age of 57 years, shall be deemed to have opted for continuing in service till the enhanced superannuation age of 60 years with the liability to compulsory retirement at the age of 58 years. (7) the benefit of the increase of the retirement age to 60 years shall not be available automatically to all Judicial Officers irrespective of their past record of service and evidence of their continued utility to the Judicial System. The benefit will be available to those who in the opinion of the High Court have a potential for continued useful service. The potential for continued utility shall be assessed and evaluated by appropriate committees of judges of the High Court constituted and headed by the Chief Justice of the High Court and the evaluation shall be made on the basis of the Judicial Officer’s past record of service, character rolls, quality of judgments and other relevant matters. Explanation: For the purpose of this rule Judicial Officer means” District Judge or Civil Judge (Senior Division) or Civil Judge (Junior Division) belonging to Karnataka Judicial Service. 3. Not only based on this rule, but on the basis of the judgments of the Supreme Court, in a series of cases starting from 1) ALL INDIA JUDGES’ ASSOCITION vs. UNION OF INDIA (1992)1 SCC 119 2) ALL INDIA JUDGES’S ASSOCIATION vs. UNION OF INDIA (1993) 4 SCC 288 3) ALL INDIA JUDGES’ ASSOCIATION vs. UNION OF INDIA (2002)3 SCC 247 [hereinafter referred to as first, second and third Judges’ case respectively]. 4. Such contentions have been canvassed before a Learned Single Judge, particularly to claim that the retirement as enshrined in Rule 95-A of the Act as a condition precedent to extend the retirement age from 58 years to 60 years, had virtually lost any significance and had become redundant in the wake of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the third Judges’ case contained in para-26, reading as under: 26.) The Shetty Commission had recommended that there should be an increase in retirement age from 60 to 62 years. In our opinion, this cannot be done for the simple reason that the age of retirement of a High Court Judge is constitutionally fixed at 62 years. In our opinion, this cannot be done for the simple reason that the age of retirement of a High Court Judge is constitutionally fixed at 62 years. It will not be appropriate, seeing the Constitutional framework with regard to the Judiciary, to have an identical age of retirement between the members of the Subordinate Judicial Service and a High Court. As of today, the age of retirement of a Supreme Court Judge in 65 years, of a High Court Judge it is 62 years and logically the age of retirement of a Judicial Officer to 60 years. This difference is appropriate and has to be maintained. However, as there is a backlog of vacancies which has to be filled and as the Judge strength has to be increased, as directed by us, it would be appropriate for the State in consultation with High Court to amend the service rules and Officers till the age of 62 years if there are vacancies in the cadre of the District Judge. We direct this to be done as early as possible. 5. Learned Single Judge did accept this contention, for the reason that though there was certain recommendations for framing new rules, it has not been done and though there is such an observation in the third Judges’ case, indicating the age of retirement for District Judges should not be increased from 60 years to 62 years for certain reasons mentioned therein, it does not necessarily mean that either an amendment had been carried out to the Rules, which had, in any way, diluted the requirement of Rule 95-A of the Rules or in terms of any existing rule, the age of compulsory retirement itself had been enhanced to 60 years. It is for this reasons, Learned Single Judge dismissed the petitions. 6. We have heard Ms Archana Magadum, Learned Counsel for the appellant in W.A. No.396/2006, Sri Manjunath G Patil for first appellant in W.A. No. 1676 of 2006, Ms Anuradha Deshpande, Learned Counsel for second appellant in W.A. No. 1676/2006, Sri K.B. Adhyapak, Learned AGA for the State of Karnataka. 7. 6. We have heard Ms Archana Magadum, Learned Counsel for the appellant in W.A. No.396/2006, Sri Manjunath G Patil for first appellant in W.A. No. 1676 of 2006, Ms Anuradha Deshpande, Learned Counsel for second appellant in W.A. No. 1676/2006, Sri K.B. Adhyapak, Learned AGA for the State of Karnataka. 7. Submissions of Learned Counsel for the appellants is that in terms of Rule 95-A itself, appellants are entitled to continue up to the age of 60 years; Rule 95-A specifically provided for in the case of Judicial Officers while Rule 95 governs the service conditions of other civil servants of the State Government; that the Judicial Officers are treated as special class of civil servants; as judicial work involves considerable mental work; that Supreme Court having recognized this aspect in the first and the second Judges’ cases and having made extensive recommendation for not only improving the service conditions of Judicial Officers and putting them on the higher pedestal but also having recommended increase of the age of compulsory retirement from 58 to 62 years and having noticed that the subordinate judiciary having different service conditions governing them indifferent States, there was imminent need for bringing about uniformity and by setting up All India Judicial Service and as a result of these things, State Government having introduced Rule 95-A, the letter and spirit of Rule 95-A should have been taken note of by the Learned Single Judge, that too in the background of earlier two judgments of the Supreme Court i.e., first and the second Judges’ cases, and not merely reject the claim and contentions of the petitioners-appellants on the ground that their Judges’ case is not applicable to them etc. 8. 8. By drawing specific attention to the observations made by the Supreme Court in paras-24 and 25 of the first Judges’ case and para-27 of the second Judges case, submission of Ms Archana Magadum, Learned Counsel for the appellant is that the observations as contained in these paragraphs leaves one with no doubt or ambiguity that it was an order and desire of the Supreme Court to see that the age of compulsory retirement of District Judges was enhanced to even up to 62 year, but should never be pegged down to 58 years and it can go up 62 years and in the wake of such consisted observations, it should be taken to be the law declared by the Supreme Court that the age of normal retirement of Judicial Officer should be only 60 year and there cannot be compulsory retirement at the age of 58 years, as has been done in the instant case. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellants would also submit that the age of retirement of other civil servants itself has been enhanced to 60 years by the State Government by amending Rule 95 itself, and while Rule 95-A should be taken as a temporary measure and for a limited period, now that the State Government has enhanced the age of all civil servants to 60 years, retiring Judicial Officers, that too compulsorily retiring at the age of 58 years is doing violations of the Rule and the intention and spirit of the Rule. 10. Sri K.B. Adhyapak, Learned AGA, has supported the order passed by the Learned Single Judge. 11. We have perused the impugned order, examined the relevant rule and record and also looked into the Judgments relied upon by the Learned Counsel for the appellants. 12. Rule 95-A was in the statute book for a limited duration starting from 1-1-1993 upto 17-7-2008, though Notifications introducing this Rule was dated 26-8-1997 and Notifications omitting this Rule is dated 18-12-2008. 13. Be that as it may, it is not in dispute that at the time when the Government issued Annexure-A orders, the Rule was in operation. 12. Rule 95-A was in the statute book for a limited duration starting from 1-1-1993 upto 17-7-2008, though Notifications introducing this Rule was dated 26-8-1997 and Notifications omitting this Rule is dated 18-12-2008. 13. Be that as it may, it is not in dispute that at the time when the Government issued Annexure-A orders, the Rule was in operation. It is because of the Learned Counsel for the appellants are aware that the Rule did operate during that time, support is also drawn from the Judgment of the Supreme Court to contend that notwithstanding the Rule, normal age of retirement of Judicial Officers should be taken to be only 60 years and it is not 58 years, but with an extension by a positive order. Submission is that with or without any positive order, the age of retirement ha to be taken at 60 year and if it I at 58 year, it should be for any special reasons etc. 14. In this regard, Learned Counsel for the appellants strongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the second Judges’ case, wherein the Supreme Court summed up at para-52 observing as under: 52. To sum up, we hold as follows: (a) The legal practice of three years should be made one of the essential qualifications for recruitment to the judicial posts at the lower rung in the judicial hierarchy. Further, wherever the recruitment of the Judicial Officers at the lowest rung is made through the Public Service Commission, a representative of the High Court should be associated with the selection process and his advice should prevail unless there are strong and cogent reasons for not accepting it, which reasons should be recorded in writing. The rules for recruitment of the Judicial Officer should be amended forthwith to incorporate the above directions. The rules for recruitment of the Judicial Officer should be amended forthwith to incorporate the above directions. (b) The direction with regard to the enhancement of the superannuation age is modified as follows: While the superannuation age of every subordinate Judicial Officer shall stand extended up to 60 years, the respective High Courts should, as stated above assess and evaluate the record of the Judicial Officer for his continued utility well within time before he attains the age of 58 years by following the procedure for the compulsory retirement under the service rules applicable to him and give him the benefit of the extended superannuation age from 58 to 60 years only if he is found fit and eligible to continue in service. In case he is not found fit and eligible, he should be compulsorily retired on his attaining the age of 58 years. The assessment in question should be done before the attainment of age of 58 years even in cases where the earlier superannuation age was less than 58 years. The assessment directed here is for evaluating the eligibility to continue in service beyond 58 years of age and is in addition to and independent of the assessment under the relevant service rules, at the earliest stage/s. Since the service conditions with regard to superannuation age of the existing Judicial Officers is hereby changed, those Judicial Officers who are not desirous of availing of the benefit of the enhanced superannuation age with the condition for compulsory retirement at the age of 58 years, have the option to retire at the age of 58 years. They should exercise this option in writing before they attain the age of 57 years. Those who do not exercise the said option before they attain the age of 57 years, would be deemed to have opted for continuing in service till the enhanced superannuation age of 60 years with the liability to compulsorily retirement at the age of 58 years. Those who have crossed the age of 57 years and those who have cross the age of 58 years, soon after the date of this decision. If they do not do so, they will be deemed to have opted for continuing in service till the age of 60 years. Those who have crossed the age of 57 years and those who have cross the age of 58 years, soon after the date of this decision. If they do not do so, they will be deemed to have opted for continuing in service till the age of 60 years. In that case, they will also be subjected to the review for compulsory retirement, if any, notwithstanding the fact that there was not enough time to undertake such review before they attained the age of 58 years. However, in their case, the review should be undertaken within two months from the date of the expiry of the period given to them above for exercising their option and if found unfit, they should be retired compulsorily according to the procedure for compulsory retirement under the Rules. *** and that without such exercise, the appellants would not have been compulsorily retired at the age of 58 years. 15. However strong observations might have been made by the Supreme Court in the second Judges’ case, they are in the nature of recommendations and wishful thinking by way of review of its earlier judgment in the first Judges’ case. Nevertheless, even this judgment also having been examined by the Supreme Court in the third Judges’ case and further observations having been made, same not necessarily consistent with these observations and the expressions as indicated in para-52 of the judgment, in the second Judges’ case, we cannot accept the submission that Rule 95-A has to be interpreted and understood in the background of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the second Judges’ case. The ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of RAJAT BARAN ROY vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AIR 1999 SC 1661 also does not allow any scope to accept this submission. 16. We find that the Rule 95-A itself has been introduced in the statute book as a sequel to second Judges’ case and to provide for an expression to the wishes and though introduced by Notification dated 26-8-1997, it has been given effect to from 1-1-1993, interfering keeping in view the expressions in the second Judges’ case. 17. 16. We find that the Rule 95-A itself has been introduced in the statute book as a sequel to second Judges’ case and to provide for an expression to the wishes and though introduced by Notification dated 26-8-1997, it has been given effect to from 1-1-1993, interfering keeping in view the expressions in the second Judges’ case. 17. However strong may be the expressions of the Supreme Court in the first and the second Judge’s cases, examination being general in nature and keeping in view the deplorable service conditions of Judicial Officers in the country, strong recommendation having been made to the executive wing of the State, we cannot accept the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the appellants that it amounts to law declared within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court of India was not examining the scope and meaning of the statutory Rule 95-A of the Rules, while rendering these judgments. 18. A law which binds all other Courts in this country in terms of Article 141 is a law declared by the Supreme Court in the context of an existing statutory provision or a Constitutional provision. If the Supreme Court was examining any statutory provision and in that context has given a ruling interpreting that particular statutory provision or even Constitutional provision, that amounts to law declared by the Supreme Court and which is required to be followed and applied by all Courts in the country; {See the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of ICICI BANK LIMITED vs. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY AIR 2005 SC 3315 para 9 at page 3321 and in the case of U.P. STATE BRASSWARE CORRPORATION LIMITED vs. UDAINARAINJ PANDEY (2006) 1 SCC 479 para 26 at page 491.} 19. In the first and the second Judges’ case we find no particular law was examined, but the examination was general in nature and at any rate provisions of the Rules were not in examination. Rule 95-A of the Rules having been advisedly introduced in the Rules in deference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the second judge’ case, this is the statutory provision which holds the field and regulates the service conditions of Judicial Officers, so far as age of retirement and extension of age of retirement is concerned. Rule 95-A of the Rules having been advisedly introduced in the Rules in deference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the second judge’ case, this is the statutory provision which holds the field and regulates the service conditions of Judicial Officers, so far as age of retirement and extension of age of retirement is concerned. It is for this reason, we are unable to give a go-by to the Rules and to accept that the normal age of retirement of Judicial Officers at the relevant time was only 60 years and not 58 years. 20. A Judicial Officers, who is found suitable in terms of Rule 95-A, no doubt, continues in service up to the age of 60, but not without that. In the instant case of the appellants, an order having been positively made for the retirement at 58 years and not for their extension, the appellants having no entitlement to continue upto 60 years cannot also make a grievance that they have been compulsorily retired at the age of 58, while they had an entitlement to continue in service upto the age of 60. 21. we are also unable to accept the submission of Learned Counsel for the appellants that Rule 95-A is ultra vires the judgment of the Supreme Court in the wake of the observations contained in para-26 of the third Judges’ case, as the observations made in this paragraph do not necessarily mean that the age of retirement of District Judges is raised to 60 years or it has in any way found fault with the operation of Rule 95-A of the Rules at that time which held the field. 22. We are also not inclined to accept the submission of Learned Counsel for the appellants that even the age of retirement of all other civil servants regulated by the Rules having been enhanced to 60 years, that should have been taken as normal age of retirement, for the simple reason that enhancement of age of compulsory retirement to 60 years has come into effect by amendment to Rule 95 of the Rules with effect from 17-7-2008 by Notification dated 15-9-2008, but operate from the earlier date. Unfortunately for the appellants, this Rule is amended a little later in the day and cannot enure to the benefit of the present appellants. Unfortunately for the appellants, this Rule is amended a little later in the day and cannot enure to the benefit of the present appellants. We find that the reasons assigned by the Learned Single Judge for dismissing the writ petitions are proper, not one erring on facts or on law and while we endorse the reasoning, we have further supplemented the reasons in this judgment in the wake of the arguments advanced before us. We find no need to discuss the order of the Learned Single Judge in this appeal. 23. In that view of the matter, as we do not find anything positive in favour of the appellants to allow these appeals, the impugned order is not disturbed. Write Appeals dismissed. 24. We place on record our appreciation of the very skillful and persuasive manner in which the case of the appellants was presented before us by the Learned Counsel for the appellants, particularly by Ms Archana Magadum, who has not only made a good case study of the facts but has also looked up a law and has brought to our notice of relevant Supreme Court Cases governing the issue involved in these appeals. It is a different matter that the appellants could not succeed notwithstanding the skills of their Counsel.