Judgment Jawad Rahim, J. 1. Complainant’s appeal against acquittal of the respondent-accused by the judgment impugned in appeal. 2. Perused records. 3. Material facts needing reference are: a) Appellant sought prosecution of the respondent-T.C. Govindegowda for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act, for brevity) on the plea he had borrowed Rs. 70,000/-from him and issued the impugned cheque dated 7.6.1998 drawn on Sringeri Branch of Syndicate Bank. The cheque on presentation was dishonoured necessitating issuance of statutory notice on 19.12.1998. b) Accused received the notice, but failed to comply with the demand made. He denied there was any such transaction with the complainant. c) During trial, complainant tendered evidence as PW1 and produced the impugned cheque at Ex.P1 and produced 4 documents. The learned trial Judge found the defence of the accused was not tenable and convicted him, directing him to pay Rs. 70,000/-covered under the cheque. d) Assailing it, he was in appeal in Cri. A. No.27/01. Learned appellate Judge has reversed the finding of the trial Court and granted acquittal. Against it, complainant is in appeal under Section 378(4), Cr.P.C. 4. Learned Counsel submits the appellate Court seriously erred in reversing the finding of the trial Court without any reason. He submits complainant has proved his case that the accused had issued the cheque towards existing debt or legal liability and on presentation it had bounced. Therefore, burden had shifted on the accused to establish that the cheque was not issued towards any existing debt or legal liability. 5. I have examined the records and re-appraised the evidence available. No doubt both the Courts below have held complainant had produced the cheque under the signature of the respondent which, on presentation had bounced. The contention of the accused that Ex.P1 was altered was not considered by the trial Court as an important circumstance whereas the learned appellate Judge has perused Ex.P1-cheque and found it contains material alteration in the date. 6. The learned appellate Judge has further noticed the complainant had admitted he had obtained a blank cheque from the accused and had filled up the contents. On the basis of that evidence, learned Judge held that though giving a blank cheque was legally permissible and the complainant could have filled it up, material alteration was something different. 6. The learned appellate Judge has further noticed the complainant had admitted he had obtained a blank cheque from the accused and had filled up the contents. On the basis of that evidence, learned Judge held that though giving a blank cheque was legally permissible and the complainant could have filled it up, material alteration was something different. The learned Judge was right in noticing that it was not a case of inchoate instrument as permissible under Section 20 of the Act. It was a case of material alteration covered by Section 87 of the Act. 7. Section 87 of the Act envisages ‘any material alteration of a negotiable instrument renders the same void as against any one who is a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and does not consent thereto, unless it was made in order to carry out the common intention of the original parties.’ Therefore, burden was on the complainant to establish that the alteration in Ex.P1 was by consent of both sides or was made by the respondent himself. In the absence of any such evidence, it amounts to material alteration which renders the cheque unenforceable in this fact situation, the opinion of the learned appellate Judge that the cheque was unenforceable and prosecution against the accused was, therefore, vitiated cannot be faulted. 8. I am satisfied the appellate Court’s judgment reversing the finding of the trial Court is just and proper and legal, and calls for no interference. In the result, the appeal fails.