Judgment : U. V. Bakre, J. This appeal is directed against the Order dated 09/09/2003 passed by the learned District Judge, South Goa (trial Court) in Civil Miscellaneous Application(C.M.A.) No. 4 of 1992. 2. In the said application(C.M.A. No. 4/1992) filed by the respondent no.1 (hereinafter referred to as “MSFC”) under Sections 31 and 32 of State Financial Corporation Act, 1951, against the above named respondents no. 2 and 3, the trial Court had ordered attachment of houses no. 144, 144/A and 144/B of Ward no.1 at Nagorcem, Canacona, which, in terms of the house-tax records maintained by the Canacona Municipal Council, were registered in the name of respondent no. 2. A warrant of attachment of immovable property under Order XXI, Rule 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) was issued by the trial Court, in respect of the said houses, copies of which were duly affixed by the Bailiff of the Court on conspicuous part of the said houses; on the Court building at Canacona; and Taluka Revenue Office, Chaudi Canacona. Subsequently, proclamation of Sale under Order XXI, Rule 66 of C.P.C. was issued in respect of those houses bearing nos. 144, 144A, 144B, admeasuring 2794 square metres in aggregate, situated in the land bearing Survey No. 167/14 of Chaudi, Canacona, with boundaries mentioned in the proclamation. The proclamation was duly published in news papers. Property was to be sold by public auction on 12/04/2002 on which day one Smt. Kamal Manju Naik Gaonkar and others filed objection for exclusion of an area of 895 square metres of the said land and by order of the same day, the said portion was excluded and portions “A” and “B” as shown on the plan at Exhibit 79/C were ordered to be sold. Subsequently, the said order dated 12/04/2002 was confirmed by further order dated 08/10/2002, thereby granting the application filed by Smt. Kamal Manju Naik Gaonkar and three others for exclusion of the said area of 895 square metres. 3. In the auction held on 12/04/2002, the appellant was the highest bidder at Rs. 10,55,000/-whereas the respondent no. 4 was the second highest bidder at Rs. 10,52,000/-. By order dated 14/06/2002, sale in favour of the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the “auction purchaser”) was confirmed and he was ordered to be put in possession. 3. In the auction held on 12/04/2002, the appellant was the highest bidder at Rs. 10,55,000/-whereas the respondent no. 4 was the second highest bidder at Rs. 10,52,000/-. By order dated 14/06/2002, sale in favour of the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the “auction purchaser”) was confirmed and he was ordered to be put in possession. On 24/07/2002, the auction purchaser applied for possession to be given to him but on or about 16/08/2002, when the bailiff of the court went to execute the order for delivery of possession to certified auction purchaser of land, he found one lady by name Hema Fal Gaonkar staying in the house, who refused to vacate. Hence, the bailiff returned the order unexecuted. 4. The respondent no. 4 (hereinafter referred to as the “obstructionist”), then filed an application dated 02/09/2002 under Section 97 read with Section 151 of C.P.C., in that C.M.A. 4/1992. 5. The obstructionist, prior to the auction on 12/04/2002, had filed an application before the trial Court, on 28/03/2002 and the trial Court had ordered notice of the same to be given to MSFC but it seems that the same could not be given as the obstructionist did not pay process fee nor furnished copies of the application. The obstructionist had participated in the auction held on 12/04/2002, but as already stated earlier, he was the second highest bidder. 6. Case of the obstructionist was as follows :- He had appeared on the date of auction and had disclosed to the Court that he was a tenant in respect of the building existing in the suit property, in respect of shop no. 2, by virtue of deed of lease dated 16/12/1985 on annual rent of Rs. 3600/-and in respect of block consisting of one room, one kitchen, toilet, bathroom, pooja room and area occupied by open space, by virtue of another lease deed dated 16/12/1985. The said two lease deeds were executed by the respondent no. 2 and were duly registered before the Sub-Registrar Canacona. 3600/-and in respect of block consisting of one room, one kitchen, toilet, bathroom, pooja room and area occupied by open space, by virtue of another lease deed dated 16/12/1985. The said two lease deeds were executed by the respondent no. 2 and were duly registered before the Sub-Registrar Canacona. The obstructionist is in possession of the said parts of the house right from the time of creation of the lease deeds as tenant and that his rights are required to be protected under the law and he could not be dispossessed in execution proceedings, since he has become statutory tenant in respect of the said premises under the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (Rent Control Act, for short). He, therefore, prayed that the auction purchaser or any other person claiming through him be restrained from taking possession of the suit premises. 7. MSFC, in its reply, alleged as follows:- The application of the obstructionist is not maintainable. Prior to the auction, the property was duly attached and notification thereof was pasted on the house existing in that property and no objection was raised by the obstructionist, who had also not raised any objection at the time of confirmation of the terms of auction and before the auction was held. In fact, the obstructionist himself took part in the said auction and bidded thereby conscientiously accepting the terms of the auction as confirmed by the Court and this conduct of the obstructionist estoppes him from putting up the purported claim. The obstructionist having taken part in the auction has acquiesced and waived off his claim over the suit house. No notice that the obstructionist is a tenant of the part of the building was ever given to MSFC. Even if any lease was created, the period of the said lease had expired and the obstructionist had ceased to occupy the suit premises for the last over 15 years. The purported lease is not in respect of any portion of the suit house and it has nothing to do with the property sold by the Court, in auction. In the last 15 years nobody resided in the suit property. 8. The purported lease is not in respect of any portion of the suit house and it has nothing to do with the property sold by the Court, in auction. In the last 15 years nobody resided in the suit property. 8. The auction purchaser, in his reply, stated as follows:- The obstructionist had appeared in the Court prior to the auction held on 12/04/2002 and had orally staked a claim when he was directed to make a formal application supported with documents, if any, but the obstructionist chose to remain silent and participated in the auction on 12/04/2002 and now at this belated stage has moved the application. The property was attached prior to the auction and notification was pasted on the house in respect of which the obstructionist is making his claim but no objection was raised by him at the relevant time. The obstructionist is now estopped from putting his claim in the proceedings. No notice that the obstructionist was a tenant of the part of the building was ever given to the auction purchaser and when the property was attached and notification was pasted on the building, no objection was raised by the obstructionist. The lease deeds dated 16/12/1985 ended on 14/12/1989 and the obstructionist has ceased to occupy the shop and the block, ever since. After the expiry of the second lease deed dated 14/12/1985, the obstructionist has been residing at Mastimol, Chaudi, Canacona. 9. An inquiry in terms of Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 97 of Order XXI of C.P.C. was duly held by the trial Court. The obstructionist examined himself as T.P.W.-1; one Prasad Manju Naik Gaonkar as T.P.W.-2 and one Vishwas B. Dessai as T.P.W.-3. The auction purchaser examined himself as R.W.-1 and one Shripad Poinguinkar as R.W.-2. MSFC examined their Law Officer Shri Prakash Bandekar as R.W.3. 10. The obstructionist examined himself as T.P.W.-1; one Prasad Manju Naik Gaonkar as T.P.W.-2 and one Vishwas B. Dessai as T.P.W.-3. The auction purchaser examined himself as R.W.-1 and one Shripad Poinguinkar as R.W.-2. MSFC examined their Law Officer Shri Prakash Bandekar as R.W.3. 10. Upon analysis of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record and consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court found that the obstructionist came in possession of the premises namely the shop and block consisting of bed room, dining room, kitchen, pooja room, bathroom and W.C., as shown on the plan Exhibit 94, excluding open spaces, pursuant to two lease agreements which have been produced by him and further the auction purchaser as well as MSFC could not contest the position that it is the obstructionist who is in possession of the disputed premises. The trial Court held that the possession of the obstructionist needs to be protected until he is evicted from the suit premises by following due course of law. The evidence of obstructionist and his two witnesses was accepted by the trial Court without any hesitation. The trial Court even found that clause (b) of the reply of the auction purchaser, dated 14/10/2002, gives an impression that the auction purchaser knew about the claim of the obstructionist and yet participated in the auction. Further, according to trial Court, it was the auction purchaser who ought to have been on guard and found out if there were any encumbrances to the property which he was going to purchase at the court auction. The submissions of the learned counsel for the auction purchaser and MSFC came to be rejected. The application of obstructionist has been partly allowed. The obstructionist has been allowed to continue to remain in possession of the shop and the block (as construed in the impugned order), until he is evicted therefrom in accordance with law. It has been ordered that obstructionist, in other words, shall not be evicted from the said shop (hall) and block ( as construed in the impugned order) and that the possession of the remaining portion of the house and property purchased by the auction purchaser shall be handed over to him. The auction purchaser is aggrieved by the impugned order. 11. Mr. The auction purchaser is aggrieved by the impugned order. 11. Mr. Parag Rao, learned advocate on behalf of the auction purchaser, argued that third party can resist the execution only if he has independent right. According to learned Counsel, the obstructionist who claims to be tenant of respondent no. 2, is claiming through the respondent no. 2 and cannot have independent right. In this regard, he has relied upon “Ittiyachan V/s. Tomy” (AIR 2002 Kerala, 5). He further submitted that the lease deeds dated 16/12/1985 were for a period of three years only and that after December, 1988, there were no fresh lease deeds and the obstructionist stopped occupying the suit premises and paying rent. He contended that on the date of attachment and sale, the obstructionist was not in possession. According to learned counsel, payment of rent is sine qua non for existence of tenancy and in the present case admittedly, there are no rent receipts produced. He submitted that the trial Court has erroneously held that the obstructionist was in possession of the suit premises when there was ample evidence on record to prove that after the expiry of the lease, the obstructionist left and went to stay at Mastimol, Chawdi, Canacona. He, therefore, contended that the obstructionist, impliedly, had surrendered the possession of the suit premises. He relied upon section 111(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (T. P. Act, for short). He argued that the obstructionist took part in the auction without disclosing his tenancy right and only after failure to be the highest bidder has filed application obstructing the decree, by claiming to be tenant. According to Mr. Rao, there is waiver of the right of tenancy and also estoppel from claiming that right. In addition to the above, learned counsel urged that the above reveals the unusual and inconsistent conduct of the obstructionist in taking part in auction without disclosing the right of tenancy in respect of part of the suit premises. He submitted that on account of such conduct, the obstructionist was not entitled to any relief, since the obstructionist by not disclosing his tenancy right, compelled/induced the auction purchaser to purchase the suit premises. Learned counsel, therefore, prayed that the appeal be allowed. 12. Opposing the contentions advanced on behalf of the auction purchaser, Mr. He submitted that on account of such conduct, the obstructionist was not entitled to any relief, since the obstructionist by not disclosing his tenancy right, compelled/induced the auction purchaser to purchase the suit premises. Learned counsel, therefore, prayed that the appeal be allowed. 12. Opposing the contentions advanced on behalf of the auction purchaser, Mr. P. Talaulikar, learned advocate on behalf of the obstructionist, submitted that by virtue of lease deeds dated 16/12/1985 which are registered before sub-registrar, the obstructionist became the lessee of the premises of the shop and block and after the expiry of the period of said lease deeds, continued to be in possession thereof and he became a statutory tenant under the Rent Control Act. He argued that unless the obstructionist is evicted under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, his possession cannot be disturbed. He contended that the evidence on record duly proves that the door of the premises was closed and this proves possession of the obstructionist. He also contended that there is ample evidence produced by the obstructionist to prove his actual possession of the suit premises. Insofar as non-payment of rent or even alleged non-occupation of premises, etc., learned counsel argued that these may be grounds of eviction under the Rent Control Act. He contended that there is no evidence of surrender of lease or surrender of possession of leased premises. He invited my attention to paragraph no. 24 of the impugned Judgment and submitted that the submissions of the auction purchaser and of MSFC with regard to “Waiver” “Estoppel” and “Conduct of the obstructionist” have been fully dealt with by the trial Court. He therefore urged that the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 13. I have gone through the entire material on record in the light of the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties. 14. He therefore urged that the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 13. I have gone through the entire material on record in the light of the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties. 14. Firstly, let us see if there is any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the auction purchaser that a tenant has no independent right to demised premises and to resist the delivery of possession of the premises to the auction purchaser, under Rule 97 of Order XXI of C.P.C. There is no dispute that a person holding possession of an immovable property, as of his own right, can object in the execution proceeding under Order XXI Rule 97 of C.P.C. There can also be no dispute that mere possession by third party would not be sufficient and the third party has also to show a right to possession independent of the Judgment debtor (See “Ittiyachan”, cited supra). 15. In the present case, indisputably, the two registered lease deeds dated 16/12/1985, which are at Exhibits 92 and 93 respectively, executed by the respondent no. 2 in favour of the obstructionist, pertain to shop which is shown as hall in the sketch Exhibit-94 and the block which includes the bed room, dining room, kitchen, Pooja room, bath room and W.C., as shown in the said sketch. Section 105 of T. P. Act, defines lease as follows: “105. Lease defined.-A lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined.-The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent. A lessee of an immovable property has a right to possession and enjoyment of the leased property, to the exclusion of the lessor. A lessee of an immovable property has a right to possession and enjoyment of the leased property, to the exclusion of the lessor. Under the Rent Control Act, a tenant means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any building is, or but for special contract would be, payable and includes in the event of his death the surviving spouse, or any son, or unmarried daughter or father or mother who had been living with him as a member of his family upto the date of his death and a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, but shall not include any person against whom any order, or decree for eviction has been made. 16. In view of the above, after the expiry of the lease period, the lessee, who continues to be in possession of the demised premises, becomes a statutory tenant under the Rent Control Act. There is bar on eviction of tenants, as provided by Section 21 of the Rent Control Act and a tenant can be evicted only on one or the other grounds stated in Section 22 of that Act. Till then, tenant has right to possession and enjoyment of the leased premises, to the exclusion of the landlord. This is independent right of tenant. In the case of “Shreenathand another V/s. Rajesh and others” [ (1998) 4 S.C.C. 543 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court has held thus:- “10. Under sub-clause 1, Order 21, Rule 35, the executing court delivers actual physical possession of the disputed property to the decree-holder and, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the said property. The significant words are by removing any person bound by he decree. Order 21, Rule 36 conceives of immovable property when in occupancy of a tenant or other person not bound by the decree, the Court delivers possession by fixing a copy of the warrant in some conspicuous place of the said property and proclaiming to the occupant by beat of drum or other customary mode at some convenient place, the substance of the decree in regard to the property. In other words, the decree-holder gets the symbolic possession. Order 21, Rule 97 conceives of resistance or obstruction to the possession of immovable property when made in execution of a decree by "any person". In other words, the decree-holder gets the symbolic possession. Order 21, Rule 97 conceives of resistance or obstruction to the possession of immovable property when made in execution of a decree by "any person". This may be either by the person bound by the decree, claiming title through judgment-debtor or claiming independent right of his own including tenant not party to the suit or even a stranger. A decree-holder, in such case, may make an application to the executing court complaining such resistance, for delivery of possession of the property. Sub-clause (2) after 1976 substitution empowers the executing courts when such claim is made to proceed to adjudicate upon the applicant's claim in accordance with provisions contained hereinafter. This refers to Order 21, Rule 101 (as amended by 1976 Act) under which all questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties under Order 21, Rule 97 or Rule 99 shall be determined by the court and not by a separate suit, By the amendment, one has not to go for a fresh suit but all matter pertaining to that property even if obstruction by a stranger is adjudicated and finality given even in the executing proceedings. We find the expression "any person" under sub-clause (1) is used deliberately for widening the scope of power so that the executing court could adjudicate the claim made in any such application under order 21, Rule 97. Thus by the use of the words 'any person' it includes all persons resisting the delivery of possession, claiming right in the property even those not bound by the decree, includes tenants or other persons claiming right on their own including a stranger.” 17. Hence, there is no force in the contention of learned counsel for the auction purchaser that a tenant has no independent right and that he cannot resist delivery of possession to the auction purchaser. 18. Insofar as the submission of the auction purchaser that the lease deeds ended on 14/12/1989 and the obstructionist had ceased to occupy the shop since that date due to which there is implied surrender of the premises, is concerned, there is no force in the same. 18. Insofar as the submission of the auction purchaser that the lease deeds ended on 14/12/1989 and the obstructionist had ceased to occupy the shop since that date due to which there is implied surrender of the premises, is concerned, there is no force in the same. Section 111(e) of T. P. Act deals with determination of lease by express surrender; that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest under the lease to the lessor, by mutual agreement between them whereas Section 111(f) deals with implied surrender. Admittedly, there is no mutual agreement between the obstructionist and respondent no. 2 for express surrender of interest under the lease. Implied surrender is a surrender by operation of law which arises by creation of new relationship. There is no new lease deed between the parties. 19. The lease deeds in favour of the obstructionist had expired sometime in December 1989, but when the bailiff of the Court had gone to the suit premises on 16/8/2002, he found that one Hema Fal Gaonkar was staying in that block and she refused to vacate. Said Hema is wife of the obstructionist. T.P.W.-1, the obstructionist, has deposed to the facts relating to his possession of the shop and the block. He has produced photographs showing Tulsi Vrindavan at the back side of his house, furniture and utensils in the house and people occupying the house. Electricity bill, on a separate electric meter, on his name, for the period from 13th November to 14th January of the year 2002 has been produced by T.P.W.-1 as Exhibit 96. Election identity cards issued on 21/10/94, by the Election Commission of India, in his name and in the name of his wife, Hema have been produced by T.P.W.-1 as exhibit 97. Ration Card for the year 1996 has been produced as Exhibit 98. A Certificate of “No Objection”, dated 13/02/01, for power connection to the said house and House Tax receipt dated 15/04/02, issued by Canacona Municipal Council, in respect of the said house have been produced by T.P.W.-1 as Exhibit 99-colly. The testimony of T.P.W.-1 is not much shaken in his cross examination and has support of the testimonies of his witnesses namely Prasad Manju Naik Gaonkar (T.P.W.-2) and Vishwas Bhikaro Dessai (T.P.W.-3). The testimony of T.P.W.-1 is not much shaken in his cross examination and has support of the testimonies of his witnesses namely Prasad Manju Naik Gaonkar (T.P.W.-2) and Vishwas Bhikaro Dessai (T.P.W.-3). Compared with the evidence produced by the auction purchaser and MSFC, the oral and documentary evidence produced by the obstructionist is far superior and it sufficiently proves the he came into possession of the suit premises namely the shop and the block by virtue of the lease deeds dated 16/12/85 produced as Exhibits 92 and 93 and continues to be in possession thereof. 20. In view of the provisions of the Rent Control Act, after the expiry of the lease deeds, the obstructionist became statutory tenant and if the obstructionist is found sometimes to be not occupying the demised premises then that may be a ground under Section 22 (2)(f) of the Rent Control Act for his eviction. Such non-occupation, therefore, cannot amount to any kind of surrender of the possession of lease. In any case, admittedly the suit premises were found closed and physical possession of the same could not be taken. The evidence on record reveals that the keys are with the obstructionist. The respondent no. 2 has neither stepped into the witness box nor has he been examined by the auction purchaser. As the obstructionist continues to be in possession as lessee, even after the expiry of lease, he is protected under Section 21 of the Rent Control Act. 21. The next contention of the auction purchaser is that the obstructionist has waived his right of tenancy and has acquiesced in his right to contest the matter, by participating in the auction on 12/04/2002. It is also the contention of the auction purchaser that the non-disclosure of the alleged tenancy by obstructionist to the auction purchaser as also to MSFC shows the unusual conduct of the obstructionist. The learned trial Court has dealt with the above point in detail and has held that the fact that the obstructionist remained silent and did not disclose that he was a tenant of the part of the suit house is not sufficient either to invoke the principles of “estoppel” or “waiver” against the obstructionist. The learned trial Court has dealt with the above point in detail and has held that the fact that the obstructionist remained silent and did not disclose that he was a tenant of the part of the suit house is not sufficient either to invoke the principles of “estoppel” or “waiver” against the obstructionist. In fact, the trial Court has held that a reading of Clause (b) of the reply of the auction purchaser dated 14/10/2002 gives an impression that the auction purchaser knew about the claim of the obstructionist and yet participated in the auction. The trial Court has observed that at any event the auction purchaser, who ought to have been on guard and found out if there is any encumbrances to the property which he was going to purchase at the Court auction. I do not find any reason to disagree with the said findings of the learned trial Court and the learned counsel for the auction purchaser has also not been able to convince this court, to reverse the said findings. There is nothing in law preventing a tenant from purchasing the tenanted premises from his landlord. Conduct of the obstructionist, a tenant, as pointed out above, is not a ground of eviction under Section 22 or any other provision of the Rent Control Act. Section 21 of the Rent Control Act, inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Hence, there is absolutely no force in the contention of the auction purchaser, in this regard. 22. In view of the discussion supra, there is no merit in this appeal, which deserves to be dismissed. 23. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.