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2012 DIGILAW 1408 (PAT)

Dinesh Kumar v. State Of Bihar

2012-10-04

AJAY KUMAR TRIPATHI

body2012
ORDER A bunch of Writ Applications have been filed, seeking a direction upon the respondent, Bharat Petroleum Corporation (East) as well as the State of Bihar to ensure that these petitioners whose lands were acquired are given employment under the corporation. The claim or the right including the assertion for employment is based on the allotment letter made to Bharat Petroleum Corporation, which is Annexure-2. Clause 8 has been pressed into service, by the petitioner from where their right emerges. It is also the contention of these petitioners that employment has been offered by other industrial units in the same area and only the corporation is resisting offering any employment to the persons, who have lost their land on which a bottling unit of the corporation has been set up. 2. The stand of the corporation is that the land in question on which the bottling unit has been set up was not acquired for Bharat Petroleum. This was an acquisition which was made by the State of Bihar many many years ago in the year 1973-74. The object of acquisition was industrialization or setting up of an industrial estate. The land had been subsequently transferred to what is known as Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (BIADA). The allotment was made to the corporation by BIADA to set up a bottling unit. No doubt in a standard form the letter of allotment, contained in Annexure – 2, was served upon the petitioner. But the question of employment would arise provided there was obligation and scope for offering employment. Right of the petitioner would accrue may be against the State, when acquisition was made, for which compensation was also paid to all those persons more than 30 years ago. 3. In the counter affidavit, which has been filed on behalf of the corporation, it is further their stand that the circular contained in Annexure – 1 does not apply to the corporation but binds State or Union of India. The acquisition not being for the corporation the obligation of the corporation will not emerge from clause 8 as such. Not only this in a similar matter which arose before the High Court, which was C.W.J.C. No. 6089 of 2003, disposed off 28.07.2005, the Learned Single Judge had very succinctly put the law or the right of a person who had lost his land on acquisition. Not only this in a similar matter which arose before the High Court, which was C.W.J.C. No. 6089 of 2003, disposed off 28.07.2005, the Learned Single Judge had very succinctly put the law or the right of a person who had lost his land on acquisition. The Court had clearly held that no such right as such arises which is enforceable. The said decision of the Learned Single Judge was also upheld by a Division Bench. 4. The Court would also like to take into consideration yet another decision of a Learned Single Judge, rendered in the case of C.W.J.C. No. 23015 of 2011, decided on 30.01.2012. 5. No doubt this Order was rendered in relation to an acquisition and demand for employment against Indian Railways, but the Learned Single Judge has taken note of several decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court in the said order and has held that no right accrues merely because of an acquisition. The Learned Single Judge in his Order, dated 30.01.2012, passed in C.W.J.C. No. 23015 of 20011 has said:- “A person whose lands are acquired has a statutory right to receive compensation only. There is no vested right in the person to simultaneously seek other modes of rehabilitation much less employment as a matter of right. In 1995 Supplement (2) SCC 225 (Butu Prasad Kumbhar v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.), it has been held at paragraph 6 as follows:- “6 ......................... Even if the Government or the steel plant would not have offered any employment to any person it would not have resulted in violation of any fundamental right ................ We fail to appreciate how such a step by the Government is violative of Article 21. The claim of the petitioners that unless each adult member is given employment or the future generation is ensured of a preferential claim it would be arbitrary or contrary with the constitutional guarantee is indeed stretching Article 21 without any regard to its scope and ambit as explained by this Court. Truly speaking it is just the other way. Acceptance of such a demand would be against Article 14.” In (2007) 4 SCC 710 (DGM (HR) PG Corporation of India Ltd. v. T. Venkat Reddy) considering a similar claim relying on Butu Prasad Kumbhar (supra) at paragraph7 as follows:- “7 ...................... Truly speaking it is just the other way. Acceptance of such a demand would be against Article 14.” In (2007) 4 SCC 710 (DGM (HR) PG Corporation of India Ltd. v. T. Venkat Reddy) considering a similar claim relying on Butu Prasad Kumbhar (supra) at paragraph7 as follows:- “7 ...................... Obviously, if there is no scheme, there cannot be any consideration of any prayer for employment on the basis of land oustees or his dependants ..........” In (2010) 10 SCC 43 (Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab), it was held at paragraph 49 as follows: “We must, in fairness to Mr. Gupta mention that he did not suggest that rehabilitation of the oustees was an essential part of any process of compulsory acquisition so as to render illegal any acquisition that is not accompanied by such measure. He did not pitch his case that high and in our opinion rightly so. The decisions of this Court in New Reviera Corporation Housing Society v. Land Acquisition Officer and Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. have repelled the contention that rehabilitation of the property owners is a part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution so as to render any compulsory acquisition for public purpose bad for want of any such measures.” 6. In the present set of cases, since the acquisition was never made by Bharat Petroleum, but was a case of transfer of land to the Bharat Petroleum. Since acquisition was made 30 years ago, the right of the petitioner based on clause 8 of Annexure- 2 is not a right which can beget them a direction for employment under the respondents corporation by way of writs. 7. The Writ Applications are dismissed for the reasons indicated above.