Hon'ble BHAGWATI, J.—This intra court appeal is as against the order dated 22nd May, 2012, whereby the learned Single Judge admitted the writ petition and another order dated 22nd May, 2012 rendered in stay application no. 3559/2012, whereby the learned Single Judge stayed the operation of order dated 24th March, 2012 passed by the appellants-respondents. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts of the case, in nub, are that pursuant to advertisement in news paper namely Times of India and Rajasthan Patrika on 13th March, 2010 for the appointment of LPG Distributorship at Pratap Nagar, Jaipur, the respondent-petitioner M/s. Raghav Bharat Gas through its Proprietor Naresh Kumar Gupta applied for Pratap Nagar LPG Distributorship and submitted an application dated 3rd May, 2010 in requisite proforma along-with relevant documents. On the basis of application duly supported by relevant documents and the interview, the appellants-respondents issued a Letter of Intent dated 7th April, 2011 to the respondent-petitioner and Distributorship agreement dated 5th September, 2011 was signed by both the parties. It is averred that one clause of the application form was to the following effect, where the applicant was required to furnish the correct information, which runs thus: “Clause-15: Have you ever been convicted or charges have been framed by the court of law for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude and / or economic offence (other than freedom of struggle)? (If yes, then you are not eligible to apply.) 3. The respondent-petitioner gave a certificate to the effect that he had read the conditions applicable for the LPG Distributorship mentioned in the advertisement and confirmed that he fulfilled the eligibility criteria for the LPG Distributorship, he had applied for in the said application. Along-with this application, he had also submitted Notorized affidavit dated 30th April, 2010, wherein in clause 5, he had made the following statement: “That I have never been convicted nor charges have ever been framed against him by any court of law for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude and / or economic offences (other than freedom of struggle).” 4. The respondent thereafter verified that what had been stated above was true and correct to the best of his knowledge and nothing material had been concealed therefrom. The respondent thereafter verified that what had been stated above was true and correct to the best of his knowledge and nothing material had been concealed therefrom. When the respondent was appointed as LPG Distributor at Pratap Nagar, District Jaipur, he executed an agreement, Clause 28 whereof reads as under: “Clause – 28: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, the Corporation shall also be at liberty at its discretion to terminate this agreement forthwith upon or at any time after the happening of any of the following events, namely:- (i) if any information given by the Distributor in his application for appointment as a Distributor shall be found to be untrue or incorrect in any material particular. 5. Thereafter the fact of pendency of a criminal case for the offence under Section 3 readwith Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act in the court situated at Jaipur came into the notice of the appellant, whereupon the appellant-respondent issued a show cause notice to the respondent-petitioner. The respondent-petitioner filed the reply, but the reply was not found to be correct and thus, the appellants-respondents terminated the LPG Distributorship of the respondent vide order dated 24th March, 2012. Aggrieved with the said order, the respondent-petitioner filed the writ petition in the High Court and the learned Single Judge having admitted the writ petition, stayed the operation of order dated 24th March, 2012 passed by the appellants-respondents – Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the relevant material on record, it is revealed that the respondent-petitioner stated in the application form that he had never been convicted nor the charges had ever been framed against him by any court of law for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude and/or economic offences and substantiated this information by an affidavit dated 30th April, 2010, but later-on it came into the notice of the appellants-Corporation that one FIR came to be registered against the respondent-petitioner for the offence under Section 3/7 of Essential Commodities Act in Bajaj Nagar Police Station when the respondent Naresh Kumar was serving as a Clerk in Urmil Gas Agency, Jaipur. The charge of the offence under Section 3 readwith 7 of Essential Commodities Act had been settled against him, despite this he suppressed this information and furnished a false affidavit to the effect that he had never been convicted nor charges had ever been framed against him by any court of law. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent took us through the order sheets dated 1.4.1997, 16.4.1997 and 17.4.1997 recorded by Special Judge, Essential Commodities Act, Jaipur in Case No. 3/1994 of State vs. Prabhu Dayal and others and canvassed that initially the Court had wrongly framed charge for the offence under Section 3 readwith Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act against the respondent-petitioner and on 1st October, 1997 having detected this mistake observed that the case being a summons case, the particulars of the offences were to readover to the accused persons. Learned counsel further canvassed that if the particulars of the offences are readover under Section 251 of CrPC in any summon case, the same does not fall within the category of a 'charge', as envisaged under Section 212 of Criminal Procedure Code because the charge / charges of offence / offences are framed only in warrant trial cases. Thus, the respondent – petitioner neither suppressed any fact nor furnished any false information to this effect that he was never convicted nor any charge was framed against him for any offence of moral turpitude or economic offences. Learned counsel Mr. Rajendra Prasad further contended that the impugned order dated 22nd May, 2012 is just and proper, whereby the order dated 24th March, 2012 passed by the appellant-respondent was stayed and it did not warrant any intervention. Thus, the special appeal, in the facts and circumstances of the case deserves to be dismissed. 8. E Converso, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the order, whereby operation of the impugned order dated 24th March, 2012 passed by the appellants-respondents, had been stayed, was arbitrary, capricious as the same had been passed sans assigning any cogent reason. Learned counsel further contended that there was ample evidence on record, which tangibly reflected that the respondent-petitioner had suppressed the material fact and furnished the false affidavit with regard to the fact that he had never been convicted and charges had not been framed against him by any court of law for any criminal offence. Learned counsel further contended that there was ample evidence on record, which tangibly reflected that the respondent-petitioner had suppressed the material fact and furnished the false affidavit with regard to the fact that he had never been convicted and charges had not been framed against him by any court of law for any criminal offence. Thus, by way of staying the operation of order dated 24th March, 2012 passed by the appellants, the learned Single Judge finally decided the writ petition at the interim stage. Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned interim stay order being arbitrary deserves to be set-aside. 9. At the very out-set, it is relevant to emphasize that the term 'charge' has nowhere been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, but Sec. 212 of CrPC contemplates that the charge shall contain such particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence, and the person (if any) against whom, or the thing (if any) in respect of which, it was committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. Sec. 211 of the Code envisages the form of charges, wherein the contents of charge are required to be incorporated. Sec. 213 of the Code envisages, when the nature of the case is such that the particulars mentioned in Secs. 211 and 212 do not give the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged, the charge shall also contain such particulars of the manner in which the alleged offence was committed as will be sufficient for that purpose. 10. Chapter XIX of CrPC deals with trial of warrant cases by Magistrates instituted on a police report. Sec. 240 of CrPC contemplates that a charge shall be framed against an accused in a warrant case, if the Magistrate is of the opinion that there are grounds for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter. Chapter-XX deals with trial of summons cases by Magistrates and it is deduced from bare perusal of the Procedure as laid down for the trial of summons cases that no formal charge is required to be framed by the Magistrate in summons cases. Chapter-XX deals with trial of summons cases by Magistrates and it is deduced from bare perusal of the Procedure as laid down for the trial of summons cases that no formal charge is required to be framed by the Magistrate in summons cases. Section 251 envisages that when in summons cases, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make, but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge. Thus, from the scheme as laid down in the trial of warrant cases and summons cases by the Magistrates in CrPC, it is apparent that in warrant cases, a formal charge is framed, whereas in summons cases, Magistrate states particulars of the offence to a person, of which he is an accused. So far as the procedure laid down for the trial of warrant cases,is concerned, it is relevant to point out that when the accused does not plead guilty to the charge and claims to be tried, the Magistrate is required to proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. Similarly, in summons cases also, when the accused does not plead guilty to the charge, the Magistrate is required to proceed to hear prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution and also to hear the accused and take all such evidence as he produces in his defence. Thus, the basic difference between the trial of summons cases and warrant cases is only this much that the formal charge is not framed against the accused in a summons case. 11. Albeit in summons case, there is no formal charge, it is now well settled that the accusation made against the accused and intimated to him during his examination under Section 251, takes the place of a formal charge. On the other hand, in warrant cases instituted on a police report and in sessions trials, the charge is read out and explained to the accused and his plea of guilty or not guilty is recorded at the commencement of the trial before the prosecution evidence is recorded. On the other hand, in warrant cases instituted on a police report and in sessions trials, the charge is read out and explained to the accused and his plea of guilty or not guilty is recorded at the commencement of the trial before the prosecution evidence is recorded. Section 251 itself postulates that no formal charge need be framed, but that does not mean that there is no criminal charge against the accused in summons cases. The word 'charge' is used generally as meaning an accusation is also clear from a reading of Section 252 in which the word 'accused' has been used where the word 'charge' could also have been used. Although it is not incumbent upon a magistrate to frame a charge against an accused in a case which is being tried as a summons case, but it would have been proper if the Magistrate had actually framed a charge or had summarized the ingredients of the offence (and read them over to the accused before the trial began) which the accused were required to meet in the case. The phrase “particulars of the offence” means that the Magistrate is required by the section as an imperative requirement to put to the accused the precise and particular circumstances constituting the offence. The section of-course dispenses with a formal charge in summons cases, but that does not dispense with a statement of particulars of the offence for which the accused is to be dealt with. Not only must the provisions of the section be complied with, but the magistrate should further take care to see that the record on its face establishes this compliance. Even in summons cases, the court should apprise the accused of the ingredients of the particular offence alleged against him. 12. In the case of K. Shanmugasundara Pattar vs. State Inspector, Railway Police (1977 LW (cr. 184), it has been held that there was absolutely no impediment for the Court to frame charges even in summons cases and, therefore, even in summons cases, provisions of Section 216 (amendment of the charge) and 221 (conviction in respect of an offence proved to have been committed) are applicable. 13. 184), it has been held that there was absolutely no impediment for the Court to frame charges even in summons cases and, therefore, even in summons cases, provisions of Section 216 (amendment of the charge) and 221 (conviction in respect of an offence proved to have been committed) are applicable. 13. The upshot of the above discussion is that in summons cases, the requirement to state the particulars of the offence is akin to framing a charge, but the concept of discharge is not applicable in relation to Section 251, as is provided in warrant trial cases. 14. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, it is noticed that in Criminal Case No. 3/1994 titled as State vs. Prabhu Dayal and others, the Special Judge (Essential Commodities Act), Jaipur had read over the particulars of the offence under Section 3 read with Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act to the respondent-petitioner Naresh Kumar Gupta, but on 1st October, 1997, the Court found that the particulars of the offence under Section 3/7 of Essential Commodities Act were wrongly read over to the accused, rather the court ought to have read over the particulars of the offence under Section 8 read with Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act and the case was adjourned to 3rd October, 1997 for reading over the particulars of the offence under section 8 read with Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act again to the accused. The main contention of the learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner is that if the particulars of the offence under Section 3 read with Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act were read over to the respondent-petitioner in a summons case and no charge was framed against him, it cannot be said that any 'charge' was ever framed against the accused petitioner and the condition with regard to the charge of criminal offence for LPG distributorship, as mentioned in the advertisement, was applicable to him and the same was violated by him by supplying a false affidavit in this regard. The respondent-petitioner neither was facing any charge of a criminal offence nor he had suppressed any material, hence the learned Single Judge has rightly stayed the operation of order dated 24th March, 2012 passed by the appellants-respondents and thus, the appeal needs to be dismissed. 15. The respondent-petitioner neither was facing any charge of a criminal offence nor he had suppressed any material, hence the learned Single Judge has rightly stayed the operation of order dated 24th March, 2012 passed by the appellants-respondents and thus, the appeal needs to be dismissed. 15. In the light of the above discussion and the scheme of the CrPC, the argument put forth by the learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner is neither tenable nor does sustain in the facts and circumstances of the case for the simple reason that in a summons case, the requirement to state the particulars of the offence to the accused is akin to framing a charge in a warrant trial case. There does not appear to be any prima-facie case in favour of the respondent-petitioner and the learned single Judge sans assigning any cogent reason has arbitrarily stayed the operation of the impugned order dated 24.3.2012 passed in S.B. Civil Misc. Stay Application No. 3559/2012. 16. Other-wise too, the learned Single Judge is not required to grant the final relief in the form of interim order to the respondent-petitioner, as has been rightly held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of U.P. vs. Visheshwar reported in 1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 590 that grant of final relief in the form of interim order is not permissible to the Courts / Tribunals. 17. In the case of Bharat Bhushan Sonaji vs. Abdul K. Mohd. Reported in 1995 Suppl. (2) SCC 593, their Lordships have held that the interim order passed pending the application / petition having affect of allowing the petition / application is not proper. The courts should deprecate this practice. 18. In the case of Secretary & Commissioner, Home Department vs. R. Krirubakaran reported in 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 155, their Lordships of Hon'ble Apex Court held that the interim order should not amount to grant of main relief, which ultimately may or may not be granted. 19. In view of above, the learned Single Judge is found to have committed grave error while staying the operation of the impugned order dated 24th March, 2012 passed by the appellants-respondents in S.B. Civil Misc. Stay Application No. 3559/2012, which deserves to be set-aside. 20. There is one more order dated 22nd May, 2012, whereby the learned Single Judge has admitted the writ petition. Stay Application No. 3559/2012, which deserves to be set-aside. 20. There is one more order dated 22nd May, 2012, whereby the learned Single Judge has admitted the writ petition. We do not find any reason to interfere with this order passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4299/2012. 21. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is partly allowed and the impugned order dated 22.5.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge in Stay Application No. 3559/2012 stands set-aside. Since the writ petition has been admitted and the same has been pending before Single Judge, we request the Single Judge to decide the case on merits. 22. Consequent upon the disposal of special appeal, the stay application, filed herewith, does not survive and the same also stands disposed of. 23. No order as to costs.