JUDGMENT 1. Complainant is the appellant in this appeal. The appellant has come forward with this appeal challenging the judgment dated 9.8.2005 by the learned Judicial Magistrate No. I, Chegalpet made in C.C. No. 272 of 1997 acquitting the appellants for the offence under Sections 221 and 223 IPC. 2. The following is the brief account of the prosecution case sans unnecessary details :- 2.1 On 29.4.1993, at about 19.00 hrs., under the orders of the superiors, the first accused who is the Sub-Inspector of Police in Armed Reserve alongwith other accused and the deceased Mohan who was the head constable with the drivers of the vehicle took four Tada accused by name Victor, Kruban, Ravi and Chandran from Central Jail, Chennai to Pattukottai Judicial Magistrate Court to produce them on 30.4.1993. While the police van was coming along GST Road, at Mamandur, on the west side of the road, the vehicle was stopped near a hotel by name Bismillah Hotel. The inmates of the van alighted from the vehicle had their night food in the hotel and while they were returning back to the van at about 22.50 hrs., a white colour Ambasador car appeared in the scene which came to a halt and some persons came out from the car, shot at the inmates of the police van and the first accused shot with his revolver twice and the head constable 7164 also shot two rounds. 2.2 In the melee, three prisoners by name Kruban, Ravi and Chandran were taken in the Ambassador car which fled away. First accused caught hold of Victor, the another prisoner from escaping. In the incident, Mohan, Police constable No. 12060 sustained bullet injury on the stomach and he died on the spot. The police driver by name Chakravarthy sustained bullet injuries on his left knee and left hand. A bomb was also found in the scene of crime. The deceased and the injured were admitted to Government Hospital, Chengalpet. Narrating the above said incidents, the first accused lodged a complaint with the Sub-Inspector of Police by name Gunasekaran in Maduranthagam Police Station. P.W.1, Inspector of Police, took up the case for investigation on getting the FIR lodged by the said Gunasekaran and proceeded to the scene of crime. The case was registered in Crime No. 360 of 1993. P.W.1 called for finger print expert and lens men and also bomb disposal squad. P.W.1, Inspector of Police, took up the case for investigation on getting the FIR lodged by the said Gunasekaran and proceeded to the scene of crime. The case was registered in Crime No. 360 of 1993. P.W.1 called for finger print expert and lens men and also bomb disposal squad. 2.3 On the next day, i.e. on 30.4.1993, at about 5.30 a.m., he prepared observation mahazar and drew rough sketch. He went to the Government Hospital, Chengalpet and conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased Mohan. He also seized unexploded bomb in the scene of crime. He further seized revolver and cartridges from the first accused. He laid complaint, Exhibit P-2 with the ‘Q‘ Brach, CID, Kanchipuram for taking action against the police officials who came as escort for the prisoners. Exhibits P-2/P-25, FIR was lodged on the said complaint. P.W.53, Inspector of Policea ‘Q‘ Branch CID got the FIR and took up the case for investigation. He arrested the accused and kept them in the Chengalpet town police station. On 1.5.1993, he sent them for judicial custody. He examined the witnesses and recorded their statements. On 2.5.1993, at about 4.00 p.m., he proceeded to the scene of crime, seized one brandy bottle and two glass tumblers under cover of mahazar Exhibit P-9, in the presence of P.Ws.19, 20 and 27. He sent the case properties under Form 95, Exhibit P-28 to the Court. He gave requisition to the Court to send M.Os1 and 2 for forensic lab analysis. 2.4 P.W.35, the doctor attached to Chengalpet Medical College Hospital examined and treated Chakravarthy, the 5th accused and gave Exhibit P-17, accident register. He found fractures in the right thigh bone and also in the ulna bone on the left forearm. P.W.36, also examined the 5th accused and found three injuries and issued Exhibit P-18, accident register. P.W.37, doctor examined the 5th accused and gave Exhibit P-19 stating about the fractures sustained by him. P.W.38, doctor further examined the 5th accused and gave opinion that he sustained grievous injuries. 2.5 P.W.53 continued the investigation. He examined the finger print expert as well as the doctors and recorded their statements. After getting proper permission, he examined Victor in the Central Jail. He got report with regard to the value of the damage caused to the wind screen of the vehicle. 2.5 P.W.53 continued the investigation. He examined the finger print expert as well as the doctors and recorded their statements. After getting proper permission, he examined Victor in the Central Jail. He got report with regard to the value of the damage caused to the wind screen of the vehicle. He got the xerox copies of general diary particulars maintained for 29.4.1993 and 30.4.1993 which is marked as Exhibit P-36. M.O.21 series are the photographs and the negatives for same is M.O.22 series. Since he found various lapses on the part of the accused in discharging their official duties in the investigation, he laid charge sheet against them. 3 . After the prosecution evidence was over, the trial Court questioned the appellants/accused under Section313 Cr.P.C. as regards incriminating materials available against them in the prosecution evidence. They denied the complicity to the offence. They did not examine any witness nor had they marked any documents. 4 . After analysing the evidence and materials on record, the learned Judicial Magistrate No. I, Chengalpet sentenced the appellants as stated above. Challenging the judgment of acquittal, the appellant is before this Court. 5 . The point for consideration is, “whether the prosecution has established the charges framed against the respondents/accused beyond all reasonable doubt?”. 4 . After analysing the evidence and materials on record, the learned Judicial Magistrate No. I, Chengalpet sentenced the appellants as stated above. Challenging the judgment of acquittal, the appellant is before this Court. 5 . The point for consideration is, “whether the prosecution has established the charges framed against the respondents/accused beyond all reasonable doubt?”. Point : 5.1 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant would contend that cogent and reliable evidence are available on record to show serious lapses on the part of the accused, that it is in the evidence that the prisoners were handed over to the accused persons after providing night food by 5.00 p.m. and there was no necessity for the accused to stop the vehicle at Mamandur for further taking food, that instructions the escort police have to follow have been recorded in GD entries which is Exhibit P-36 to the effect that the accused should not stop the vehicle anywhere else, that nobody should talk to each other while travelling, etc., that it is in the evidence of P.W.20, the tea master in Bismillah hotel that the police consumed liquor in the hotel which is also supported by P.W.21, supplier of the hotel, that even though it is evident and a known fact that the prisoners are Tada accused, hand guns should have been provided to them but they were taken from the Central Jail without hand guns which show the negligence of the escort officials, that there is no limitation for taking cognizance of the offence and that the prosecution has established the charges beyond reasonable doubt. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel Mr. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel Mr. R. Vijayakumar, appearing for the respondents/accused would contend that the first accused, aftermath the occurrence in preferring Exhibit P-1, complaint with P.W.1 within one hour from the time of occurrence would show that he acted bona fidely and had there been any lapse or non-violation of procedure on his part, he might not have preferred the complaint, that after sunset, no prisoner shall be taken out from the jail and there shall be no hand cuffing, that the eye-witness have been inserted to the case as if they were examined by the investigator, when they did not witness the occurrence, as evident from the receipt of their 161 statements by the Court on 9.12.2004 while they are allegedly examined by the investigation officer on the next date of occurrence, that even though it is stated by P.W.11, Sub-Inspector Manokaran that he gave instructions, that P.W.26 would say that no modern weapons were provided to the escort officials that there was no specific order for the first accused to take A.K.47 gun, that Victor was caught hold by A.1 which shows the conduct of the first accused after the occurrence, that the oral testimonies of alleged witnesses are not reliable, that P.Ws.1 and 3 have suppressed material records which they claim to have been prepared by them during the course of investigation, that hand cuffing is prohibited in Tamil Nadu and it is also the decision of the Supreme Court that unless circumstances warrant hand cuffing should not be made and that the case is not sustainable in the absence of proper sanction by the authority concerned to prosecute the respondents. 7. As far as the prosecution of the respondents is concerned, since they are police officials, it is incumbent upon the investigation officer to place requisition before their superior officers for passing sanction to prosecute them. But, the sanction has not been obtained by the investigation officer. Sanction is sine qua non for prosecuting the public servants like the respondents. In this context, the learned counsel for the respondents would rely upon a Full Bench decision of Supreme Court in Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar and Another AIR 2000 SC 3187 : (2000) 8 SCC 500 : (2001) 1 MLJ (Crl) 171 , wherein Their Lordships, after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court held as follows - “7. Previous sanction of the competent authority being a precondition for the Court in taking cognizance of the offence if the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused can be said to be an act in discharge of his official duty, the question touches the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in the matter of taking cognizance and, therefore, there is no requirement that an accused should wait for taking such plea till the charges are framed. In Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. Pandey Ajay Bhushan a similar contention had been advanced by Mr Sibal, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in that case. In that case, the High Court had held on the application of the accused that the provisions of Section 197 get attracted. Rejecting the contention, this Court had observed: “The legislative mandate engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 197 debarring a Court from taking cognizance of an offence except with a previous sanction of the Government concerned in a case where the acts complained of are alleged to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or purporting to be in the discharge of his official duty and such public servant is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government touches the jurisdiction of the Court itself. It is a prohibition imposed by the statute from taking cognizance, the accused after appearing before the Court on process being issued, by an application indicating that Section 197(1) is attracted merely assists the Court to rectify its error where jurisdiction has been exercised which it does not possess. In such a case, there should not be any bar for the accused producing the relevant documents and materials which will be ipso facto admissible, for adjudication of the question as to whether in fact Section 197 has any application in the case in hand. In such a case, there should not be any bar for the accused producing the relevant documents and materials which will be ipso facto admissible, for adjudication of the question as to whether in fact Section 197 has any application in the case in hand. It is no longer in dispute and has been indicated by this Court in several cases that the question of sanction can be considered at any stage of the proceedings.” The Court had further observed: “The question of applicability of Section 197 of the Code and the consequential ouster of jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance without a valid sanction is genetically different from the plea of the accused that the averments in the complaint do not make out an offence and as such the order of cognizance and/or the criminal proceedings be quashed. In the aforesaid premises we are of the considered opinion that an accused is not debarred from producing the relevant documentary materials which can be legally looked into without any formal proof, in support of the stand that the acts complained of were committed in exercise of his jurisdiction or purported jurisdiction as a public servant in discharge of his official duty thereby requiring sanction of the appropriate authority.” 8. It is also held in B. Saha v. M.S. Kochaar , (1979) SCC (Cri) 939 : that the question of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. could be raised and considered at any stage of the proceedings. In Ashok Sahu v. Gokul Saikia (1990) Supp SCC 41 : (1990) SCC (Cri) 611 : the Supreme Court has held that want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is a prohibition against institution of the proceedings and the applicability as to the Section must be judged at the earliest stage of proceedings and in that case, the Court directed the Magistrate to consider the question of sanction before framing the charge. But in the case in Abdul Wahab Ansari v. State of Bihar and Another (supra), it is stated that it is not the correct law by directing that the objection on the question of sanction can be raised at the stage of framing of charge and not at any prior point of time. 9. In view of the above said preposition of law, the prosecution cannot proceed against the respondents without getting prior sanction of the superior authority for same. 9. In view of the above said preposition of law, the prosecution cannot proceed against the respondents without getting prior sanction of the superior authority for same. 10. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that there shall be no hand cuffing except under special cases and there shall be a specific order for hand cuffing the prisoners. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon a Full Bench decision of Supreme Court in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration AIR 1980 SC 1535 : (1980) SCC (Cri) 815 : in which it is observed as follows - “To handcuff is to hoop harshly and to punish humiliatingly. It is necessarily implicit in Articles 14 and 19 that when there is no compulsive need to fetter a person‘s limbs, it is sadistic, capricious, despotic and demoralising to humble a man manacling him. The minimal freedom of movement, which even a detainee is entitled to under Article 19, cannot be cut down by application of handcuffs.” 11. In Sunil Gupta and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (1990) SCC (Cri) 440 : (1990) 1 MLJ (Crl) 622 , the Supreme Court has held as follows - 12. In view of the above decisions, it transpires that unless the specific order from the Court or the Superintendent of Prisons, the prisoners shall not be hand cuffed. There is no order produced by the prosecution for hand cuffing the prisoners. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents would take much pains to show that the accused were acting as per the procedure to be adopted by them First of all, the first accused immediately lodged complaint that Maduranthagam Police Station. P.W.28, Victor, one of the prisoners was caught hold of by the first accused/respondent at the time of occurrence from escaping from the scene. P.W.28 also says that the first accused was attempting to nap the person who shot the police but he prevented him from going there. The evidence given by him in the chief examination has not been controverted in the cross examination. He also says that the prisoners were taken to the hotel safely by the police and also on return, they provided proper safety to them. 14. The evidence given by him in the chief examination has not been controverted in the cross examination. He also says that the prisoners were taken to the hotel safely by the police and also on return, they provided proper safety to them. 14. The prosecution very much relies upon the evidence of P.Ws.19 and 20 alleged eye-witnesses, employees in the Bismillah Hotel would say that the police people were sitting in the chairs and consumed liquor. But, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that which of the two police men were sitting or consuming liquor. Further, these witnesses were stated to have been examined by P.W.33 on 30.4.2003. But their statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were received by the Court only on 9.12.2004, after a long time. Hence, the contention that only for supporting the case of the prosecution they were introduced into the case belatedly, has considerable force. Further, P.W.1 himself says that he did not record any statement from the eye-witnesses. P.W.53 would say that he was at 2.45 a.m. on 30.4.1993 till early morning on 1.5.1993. He saw P.W.1, 19, 20, 21, 27, 22, 23 and 24 among whom he examined P.Ws.18 and 20 but he did not produce the statements recorded by him from P.Ws.18 and 20 on 30.4.1993. In this context, it is difficult to place reliance upon the evidence of alleged eye-witness as if they saw the police consuming liquor. 15. Even though the prisoners were provided food in the prison at 5.00 p.m., the escort officials and the prisoners should take food in the night, for which they have stopped the vehicle near the hotel, the learned counsel for the respondents further added. Further, the witness P.W.27 who is witness to mahazar for seizure of brandy bottles would say in his chief examination that on the next day of occurrence, the police came and recovered the bottle but it is claimed that P.W.53 seized them on 2.5.1993 at about 4.00 p.m. The next date to occurrence was 30.4.1993. It is the version of eye-witness that on 30.4.1993, the brandy bottle and tumblers were seized but the investigator P.W.53 would say that on 2.5.1993 alone at 4.00 p.m. he seized the brandy bottles and two glass tumblers in the scene of crime. It is the version of eye-witness that on 30.4.1993, the brandy bottle and tumblers were seized but the investigator P.W.53 would say that on 2.5.1993 alone at 4.00 p.m. he seized the brandy bottles and two glass tumblers in the scene of crime. Hence, no reliance could be placed upon the prosecution case with regard to the seizure of bottle and glass tumblers. This is also a suspicious circumstance in the prosecution case. 16. P.W.26 is the head constable in Tamil Nadu Special Police. He would say that there was no order to him to give modern weapons to the first accused. P.W.10 is also a head constable incharge of the arms in the Reserved Police who would say that he gave third accused a 303 revolver and 10 cartridges to Mohan 303 revolver and 10 cartridges to 3rd accused and two hand guns for A.1. He gave 380 revolver and 12 cartridges. The relevant documents for handing over above said arms to the accused are Exhibits P-5 and 6. In the cross examination, he would say that as per normal procedure, the arms were given to the accused. He did not say that there was a specific order from the superiors to give any latest weapon such as AK47. In view of the above, it is not true that inspite of proper permission, the accused persons did not take any machine gun, as stated by P.W.23, investigating officer. 17. As far as the inference to be made by the Appellate Court in the order of acquittal, the Appellate Court has to see that there were any perverse findings in the trial Court judgments, that there was miscarriage of justice and that material evidence have been ignored by the trial Court. But in this case, this Court is unable to find out any perverse finding in the trial Court‘s judgment. There is no circumstance to show that any miscarriage of justice has been caused and that material evidence was omitted to be appreciated by the trial Court. This Court does not find any justification to dislodge the findings of the trial Court. This Court is of the considered view that the acquittal order has been passed on valid reasons and also after following the well settled principles of law as laid down by this Court and Supreme Court. This Court does not find any justification to dislodge the findings of the trial Court. This Court is of the considered view that the acquittal order has been passed on valid reasons and also after following the well settled principles of law as laid down by this Court and Supreme Court. There is no scintilla of the evidence to infer that the accused persons have acted negligently so as to enable the prisoners to escape from the clutches of law and that they have not violated any procedure as laid down in the Prisoner‘s Manual and also the procedure to be followed by them. In these circumstances, this Court is of the firm view that the respondents are innocent and the charges framed against them have not been established beyond reasonable doubt. They are entitled for getting the benefit of doubt which has arisen in this case. In view of this, there is no valid ground either to set aside the judgment passed by the Court below or to find the respondents guilty under any of the charges. This point is answered accordingly. 18. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment passed by the trial Court. Appeal dismissed.