JUDGMENT B.K. NAYAK, J. - In this writ application the petitioner assails the order dated 13.10.2010 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar in C.S. No.423 of 2004 whereby the learned Civil Judge has rejected his petition under Order 1 Rule 10(2), C.P.C. to be impleaded as a party-defendant to the suit. 2. The present opposite party No.1 has filed the aforesaid civil suit against the present opposite party Nos.2 to 11 seeking relief of partition of the suit property and allotment of his separate share. Admittedly in FAO No.278 of 2005 (arising out of the suit) between the parties to the suit, this Court vide order dated 07.11.2006 injuncted the parties from alienating any portion of the suit property during the pendency of the suit. While the injunction order was operating, defendant Nos.1 and 2 sold a specific portion of the suit property appertaining to Plot No.1000, Khata No.1416 measuring Ac.0.200 in Mouza-Bhubaneswar to the intervenor writ petitioner vide two registered sale deeds on 13.11.2009. Thereafter, the present petitioner filed a petition under Order 1 Rule 10(2), C.P.C. before the trial Court stating that after purchase of the said portion of the suit land while he was constructing a house thereover, the plaintiff opposite party No.1 along with some others prohibited him from proceeding with the construction stating that the said property is the subject matter of a partition suit. It was further asserted by the petitioner that his vendors (defendant Nos.1 and 2) never disclosed before him about the pendency of the suit and rather represented that the property 'was free from all encumbrances and litigation. It was, therefore, stated that the intervenor having purchased the property bona fide for value has acquired interest therein and, therefore, he being a necessary as well as proper party should be impleaded as a defendant in the suit. The Court below has rejected the said petition by the impugned order stating that this Court in FAO No.278 of 2005 not only restrained the parties from alienating any portion of the suit property but also targeted the suit for disposal within six months and that in the meantime evidence from the side of the plaintiff has already been closed. 3. 3. In assailing the impugned order, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that even though the petitioner is a lis pendense purchaser, he is a bonafide transferee for value and has acquired right to the property and, therefore, he is a necessary party to the suit and should be impleaded. It is his further submission that the petitioner purchased the property being unaware of the order of injunction passed by this Court in the earlier FAO and that the sale by his vendors in violation of the injunction order does not become invalid. Learned counsel for the contesting opposite party No.1 (plaintiff), on the other hand, relying on the decisions of the apex Court reported in (1996) 5 SCC 539 ; Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh and others and AIR 2007 SC 1332 ; Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy and others, submits that defendant Nos.1 and 2 were prohibited by the injunction order from selling any portion of the suit property affecting the right of the plaintiff and, therefore, the sale by them of a part of the suit land in favour of the intervenor-petitioner is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens and, as such the intervenor-purchaser cannot be considered to be either a necessary or proper party to the suit. He also relies on the decision reported in AIR 1996 SC 135 ; Surjit Singh and others etc., v. Harbans Singh and others etc. 4. The first question to be decided is whether the petitioner by virtue of his purchase of part of the suit land from defendant Nos.1 and 2 in violation or breach of the injunction order has acquired valid right, title and interest thereto or the sale is invalid? In the case of Surjit Singh (supra) where in a partition suit, in spite of order of injunction restraining the parties from alienation of any part of the suit property one of the defendants transferred his rights under the preliminary decree, and the transferees made an application under Order 22 Rule 10, C.P.C. to be impleaded as parties, the apex Court held as follows: "4. As said before, the assignment is by means of a registered deed. The assignment had taken place after the passing of the preliminary decree' in which Pritam Singh has been allotted 1/3rd share. His right to property to that extent stood established. As said before, the assignment is by means of a registered deed. The assignment had taken place after the passing of the preliminary decree' in which Pritam Singh has been allotted 1/3rd share. His right to property to that extent stood established. A decree relating to immovable property worth more than hundred rupees, if being assigned, was required to be registered. That has instantly been done. It is per se property, for it relates to the immovable property involved in the suit. It clearly and squarely fell within the ambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did not make any appreciable difference whether property per se had been alienated or a decree pertaining to that property. In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes. Once that is so, Pritam Singh and his assignees, respondents herein, cannot claim to be impleaded as parties on the basis of assignment. Therefore, the assignees-respondents could not have been impleaded by the trial Court as parties to the suit, in disobedience of its orders. The principles of lis pendens are altogether on a different footing. We do not propose to examine their involvement presently. All what is emphasised is that the assignees in the present facts and circumstances had no cause to be impleaded as parties to the suit. It appears that the apex Court did not consider the question of validity or invalidity of the assignment/alienation made in violation of any injunction order. It only emphasized that if the alienation is made while the order of injunction is in force, the Court has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes. It only emphasized that if the alienation is made while the order of injunction is in force, the Court has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes. In the case of Sarvinder Singh (supra) the apex Court, applying the principle of lis pendens as envisaged in Section 52, T.P. Act, held that a lis pendense purchaser is neither a necessary nor proper party. Similar view was expressed in the case of Sanjay Verma (supra). 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has invited the attention of this Court to a larger Bench decision of the apex Court reported in AIR 1999 SC 976 ; Savitri Devi v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and others in support of his contention that the decision in the case of Surjit Singh (supra) was noticed in the said case and the same was distinguished' explaining that the lis pendens alienation in Surjit Singh (supra) was made, while both the transferror and the transferee were aware of the order of injunction that was operating. On going through the decision in the case of Savitri Devi (supra), it found that in a suit filed by the mother against the sons for maintenance and creation of a charge over the ancestral property, the Court granted injunction restraining her sons from alienating the suit property. One of the sons, however, sold his share in the property and the purchasers 'filed application under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151, C.P.C. for their impleation in the suit with allegation that the plaintiff and the defendants had colluded together in order to cause loss to the purchasers and that they were bonafide purchasers for value and have acted in good faith. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the apex Court upheld the impletion of the purchasers holding as follows: "8. The facts set out by us in the earlier paragraphs are sufficient to show that there is a dispute as to whether the first defendant in the suit was party to the order of injunction made by the Court on 18.08.1992. The proceedings for punishing him for contempt are admittedly pending. The facts set out by us in the earlier paragraphs are sufficient to show that there is a dispute as to whether the first defendant in the suit was party to the order of injunction made by the Court on 18.08.1992. The proceedings for punishing him for contempt are admittedly pending. The plea raised by him that the first respondent had played a fraud not only against him but also on the Court would have to be decided before it can be said that the sales effected by the first defendant were in violation of the order of the Court. The plea raised by respondents 3 to 5 that they were bona fide transferees for value in good faith may have to be decided before it can be held that the sales in their favour created no interest in the property. The aforesaid questions have to be decided by the Court either in the suit or in the application filed by respondents 3 to 5 for impleadment in the suit. If the application for impleadment is thrown out without a decision on the aforesaid questions, respondents 3 to 5 will certainly come up with a separate suit to enforce their alleged rights which means multiplicity of proceedings in such circumstances, it can not be said that respondents 3 to 5 are neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit. 9. Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. enables the Court to add any person as party at any stage of the proceedings if the person whose presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings is also one of the objects of the said provision in the Code." In paragraph-11 thereof the Court also observed as follows: "11. Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings is also one of the objects of the said provision in the Code." In paragraph-11 thereof the Court also observed as follows: "11. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524 ; (1992 AIR SCW 846), this Court discussed the matter at length and held that though the plaintiff is 'dominus litis' and not bound to sue every possible adverse claimant in the same suit, the Court may at any stage of the suit direct addition of parties and generally it is a matter of judicial discretion which is to be exercised in view of the facts and circumstances of a particular case....." While distinguishing the case of Surjit Singh (supra), the apex Court in paragraph-12 of the judgment explained as follows: "xxx xxx... .... There was no dispute in that case that the assignors and the assignees had knowledge of the order of the injunction passed by the Court. On those facts, this Court held that the deed of assignment was not capable of conveying any right to the assignees and the order of impleadment of the assignees as parties was unsustainable. xxxx XXXX....." . 6. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pranakrushna @ Ramakrishna Panda and others v. Umakanta Panda and others; 1988 (II) OLR 521 has held that alienation in violation of an injunction order is not void but valid inasmuch as the only consequence of such transfer is that the transferer (person injuncted) is liable to be punished. 7. Considering the questions of impletion of lis pendense purchaser a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Sri Jagannath Mahaprabhu, represented by Marfatder Jagannath Ballav Endowment Trustee Board through the Executive Officer v. Pravat Chandra Chaterjee and others; 1992 (I) OLR 17 held as follows: "9. 7. Considering the questions of impletion of lis pendense purchaser a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Sri Jagannath Mahaprabhu, represented by Marfatder Jagannath Ballav Endowment Trustee Board through the Executive Officer v. Pravat Chandra Chaterjee and others; 1992 (I) OLR 17 held as follows: "9. Though in Basanta Ram's case (supra), it has been held that a lis pendense transferee is not a proper party, we are of the view that even if a lis pendens transferee is not a necessary party and the plaintiff can ignore the transfer even if he has notice thereof and a decree or order obtained by him would be binding on the lis pendens transferee, when a motion is made by the lis pendens transferee to be impleaded as a party, the Court may, in exercise of its discretion judicially, add him as a proper party to prevent multiplicity of suits. 10. Assuming that he is not a proper party, he may be impleaded as an assignee under the provisions of Order 22, Rule 10(1). Even if an application has been filed under Order 1, Rule 10, labelling the application being misconceived, the Court should ignore the labelling of the application as one under Order 1, Rule 10 and treat the same as one filed under Order 22, Rule 10 (1), C.P.C., if the ingredients thereof are satisfied. This aspect of the law was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench which decided Pranakrushna's case (supra) and rejected the application of the pendente lite transferee solely upon a consideration of the principles embodied in Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C." 8. The apex Court in the case of Dhanalakshmi and others v. P. Mohan and others; 2007 (I) OLR (SC) 494 have held that bona fide purchasers for value are entitled to come on record in order to work equity in their favour in the final decree proceeding and, therefore, they are necessary and proper parties to the suit. 9. It is not borne out from the record that the petitioner-transferee-intervenor was aware of the order of injunction passed by this Court in the FAO restraining the parties from transferring any part of the suit land. In such circumstances, the decision in the case of Surjit Singh (supra) will have no application. 10. 9. It is not borne out from the record that the petitioner-transferee-intervenor was aware of the order of injunction passed by this Court in the FAO restraining the parties from transferring any part of the suit land. In such circumstances, the decision in the case of Surjit Singh (supra) will have no application. 10. Considering the ratio of the aforesaid decisions including the larger Bench decision in the case of Savitri Devi (supra), since the intervenor-petitioner has himself filed the petition to be impleaded as a party and in the absence of any material to the effect that he was aware of the order of injunction restraining the parties from transferring any part of the suit land and in order to facilitate the petitioner to work out equity in the final decree proceeding, he should be impleaded as a party. Accordingly, I allow the writ application, set aside the impugned order and allow the petitioner's prayer to be impleaded as a party to the suit. Interim order of stay stands vacated. The parties are directed to appear before the Court below on 30.03.2012. The writ application is disposed of. Application disposed of