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2012 DIGILAW 1437 (ALL)

Aamina v. Nagar Palika Parishad, Pratapgarh and Others

2012-07-03

DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA

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Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, J.— Heard Sri Rajeev Singh, leaned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sampurnanand, learned counsel for Nagar Palika Parishad, Pratapgarh. The petitioner, who was regularly appointed Safai Karamchari in Nagar Palika Parishad, Bela-Pratapgarh, by means of the instant writ petition assails the order dated 29.05.2003 whereby her services have been terminated and also the order dated 15.04.2004 passed by the Chairman, Nagar Palika Parishad whereby appeal preferred by her against the order dated 29.05.2003 was rejected. A perusal of the impugned order dated 29.05.2003 passed by the Executive Officer, Nagar Palika Parishad, Bela-Pratapgarh which has been annexed as Annenxure No.1 to the writ petition, though recites that it is an order terminating the services of the petitioner, however, since the petitioner was regularly appointed Safai Karamchari with the respondent-Nagar Palika Parishad and the impugned order, whereby her relationship with her employer has been severed, was passed after issuance of the charge-sheet and holding some kind of domestic enquiry, hence, in fact, it is an order of dismissal of services of the petitioner. Assailing the impugned order dated 29.05.2003 passed by the disciplinary authority and the order 15.04.2004 passed by the appellate authority on the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of dismissal, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Rajeev Singh has submitted that no charge-sheet was served on the petitioner, that no enquiry was held against the petitioner, that no date, time and place for holding oral enquiry was ever either fixed or intimated to the petitioner before passing the order of dismissal, that the impugned orders do not discuss the evidence available on record and also do not disclose the reason for arriving at the conclusion regarding the charges against the petitioner being proved and hence, the impugned orders are absolutely unlawful. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that even if the petitioner refused to receive the charge-sheet and she did not participate in the enquiry, it was legally incumbent upon the authorities of Nagar Palika Parishad to have held the enquiry ex-parte i.e. in absence of the petitioner and the charges still ought to have been proved. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that even if the petitioner refused to receive the charge-sheet and she did not participate in the enquiry, it was legally incumbent upon the authorities of Nagar Palika Parishad to have held the enquiry ex-parte i.e. in absence of the petitioner and the charges still ought to have been proved. He states that the impugned order of dismissal of services of the petitioner does not even discuss the evidence available on record adduced by the employer and further that it does not assign any reason for arriving at the conclusion that the charges against the petitioner are proved. In such a view, learned counsel for the petitioner asserted that the impugned order of dismissal of service of the petitioner can not be permitted to be sustained. It has also been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even the appellate authority has not looked into the record of the departmental proceedings drawn against the petitioner and has not discussed and evaluated the evidence available on the said record. He further states that the appellate authority has also failed to appreciate the legal position that even in case of an ex-parte enquiry, it is incumbent upon on the employer to hold an enquiry and prove charges and further that absence thereof makes the impugned appellate order dated 15.04.2004 bad in law. In support of his contention leaned counsel for the petitioner has cited the judgment reported in 2003 (21) LCD 610, Radhey Kant Khare Vs. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation Ltd., wherein it has, inter alia, been held that any disciplinary proceedings held in violation of the principles of natural justice cannot be permitted to be legally sustained. On the basis of said judgement, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after service of charge-sheet to the delinquent employee, an oral enquiry is a must; whether the employee requests for it or not and as such a notice should be issued to the delinquent employee intimating him date, time and place of enquiry. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that in the instant case no such notice was ever issued intimating the petitioner date, time and place for oral enquiry and hence the entire disciplinary proceedings are vitiated and further that on the basis of such disciplinary proceedings no punishment order could be passed. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that in the instant case no such notice was ever issued intimating the petitioner date, time and place for oral enquiry and hence the entire disciplinary proceedings are vitiated and further that on the basis of such disciplinary proceedings no punishment order could be passed. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has also cited another judgment, namely, Nanhey Lal Gupta vs. U.P. Upbhokta Sahkari Sangh Ltd., reported in 2007 (25) LCD 826 and has asserted that even if the delinquent employee does not submit his/her reply to the charge-sheet, neither does he/she in any manner cooperates in the enquiry, it shall still be incumbent upon on the enquiry officer to complete the enquiry ex-parte and record the evidence and fix a date for defence and thereafter submit a report to the disciplinary authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in absence of the aforesaid procedures which ought to have been adopted by enquiry officer, even in case of an ex-parte enquiry, any punishment order based on such an enquiry will legally not sustain. On the other hand, Sri Sampurnanand, learned counsel appearing for respondent-Nagar Palika Parishad submitted that the authorities of Nagar Palika Parishad tried to serve the charge-sheet upon the petitioner but she, for one reason or the other and making lame excuses, refused to receive the same and hence the disciplinary proceedings proceeded ex-parte in absence of any reply of the petitioner. He has submitted that the petitioner did not cooperate in the disciplinary proceedings and she chose not to participate in the proceedings, hence no fault can be found with the enquiry officer or disciplinary authority. On these counts, learned counsel for appearing for Nagar Palika Parishad tried to justify the impugned orders. A perusal of the documents available on record clearly indicate that the entire disciplinary proceedings in the present case against the petitioner have proceeded ex-parte and further that the petitioner did not cooperate in the enquiry, neither did she submit reply to the charge-sheet. A perusal of the documents available on record clearly indicate that the entire disciplinary proceedings in the present case against the petitioner have proceeded ex-parte and further that the petitioner did not cooperate in the enquiry, neither did she submit reply to the charge-sheet. However, the question for consideration before the Court is as to whether in the given facts and circumstances of the present case, the impugned order of dismissal of the services of the petitioner passed by the Executive Officer, Nagar Palika Partishad is sustainable in absence of any discussion of evidence and also in absence of availability of any reasons for arriving at the finding that petitioner was guilty of the charges levelled against her. Admittedly, it is well settled principle of law that even in case of an ex-parte enquiry, the enquiry officer has to conduct the enquiry according to the procedure prescribed and intimation should be given to the delinquent about the date, time and place of oral enquiry. It is also equally well settled that the charges levelled against the delinquent employee need to be proved even if no response to the charge-sheet is submitted by the employee concerned and he/she does not participate in the enquiry. The order dated 29.05.2003 passed by the Executive Officer, as observed above, is couched in a language which make it appear as if it is an order terminating the services of the petitioner, however, since the petitioner was a regular Safai Karamchari working with Nagar Palika Parishad and the impugned order was passed after issuance of the charge-sheet and holding some kind of full fledged departmental proceedings, hence it is an order of dismissal and not an order of termination of service. The order dated 29.05.2003 does not disclose the evidence which might have been adduced by the employer to prove the charges against the petitioner. It also does not disclose any reason, whatsoever, in any form or manner to arrive at the finding that the petitioner was guilty of the charges levelled against her. As observed above, in the case of Nanhey Lal Gupta vs. U.P. Upbhokta Sahkari Sangh Ltd. (supra), it has been held by this Court that even in case of an ex-parte enquiry, the charges against the delinquent employee need to be proved. As observed above, in the case of Nanhey Lal Gupta vs. U.P. Upbhokta Sahkari Sangh Ltd. (supra), it has been held by this Court that even in case of an ex-parte enquiry, the charges against the delinquent employee need to be proved. In the instant case, admittedly, the impugned order does not discuss any evidence nor does it give any reason on the basis of which charges against the petitioner could be proved. The material available on record of the case also does not disclose that petitioner was ever served with any notice intimating her date, time and place for holding oral enquiry. The order dated 29.05.2003 passed by the Executive Officer only states that by a publication in 'Daily Hindustan' dated 25.04.2003, the petitioner was provided thirty days time to explain the factual position as she had refused to receive the charge-sheet and since the petitioner did not submit her reply, charges against her are proved. The order does not disclose as to on the basis of which material or evidence, charges levelled against the petitioner stood proved. The impugned order does not disclose the evidence available on record against the petitioner, what to say of its discussion on the basis of which the Executive Officer states in the impugned order that charges against the petitioner are proved. As far as the appellate order dated 15.04.2004 passed by the Chairman of Nagar Palika Parishad is concerned, the said appellate order also does not disclose the reason and the evidence available on record against the petitioner. It only says that the charges against the petitioner are proved on the basis of the reply submitted by her in response to the notice published in 'Daily Hindustan' dated 25.04.2003. It is thus clear the appellate order dated 15.04.2004 though recites certain facts but does not disclose or discuss the evidence/material to prove the charges against the petitioner. It only says that the charges against the petitioner are proved on the basis of the reply submitted by her in response to the notice published in 'Daily Hindustan' dated 25.04.2003. It is thus clear the appellate order dated 15.04.2004 though recites certain facts but does not disclose or discuss the evidence/material to prove the charges against the petitioner. As regards recording of reasons in the orders passed by the disciplinary authority and appellate authority in the matter of departmental proceedings, regard may be had to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and others, reported in (2009) 1 Supreme Court Cases (L & S) 398, wherein their Lordships' of Hon'ble Supreme Court, emphasizing on the duty to record reasons while passing the orders by disciplinary authority and appellate authority, have held that decision in such matters must be arrived at on some evidence and further that since the orders passed in disciplinary proceedings have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should be assigned. In the said judgment, Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 23 has observed as under: 23.Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the criminal court on the basis of selfsame evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof. For the reasons aforesaid and in view of law laid down in the case of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and others (supra), and in the case of Nanhey Lal Gupta vs. U.P. Upbhokta Sahkari Sangh Ltd. (supra), the Court comes to the conclusion that the impugned order of dismissal of services of the petitioner dated 29.05.2003 passed by the Executive Officer and the appellate order dated 15.04.2004 passed by the Chairman, Nagar Palika Parishad, Bela-Pratapgarh are not sustainable. Accordingly, both the orders dated 29.05.2003 passed by Executive Officer, Nagar Palika Parishad, Bela-Pratapgarh contained as contained in Annexure No.1 to the writ petition and the order dated 15.04.2004 passed by the Chairman, Nagar Palika Parishad as contained in Annexure No.2 to the writ petition are hereby quashed and the writ petition is allowed. As a result of quashing of the aforesaid impugned orders dated 29.05.2003 and 15.04.2004, the petitioner shall be reinstated in service forthwith. As regards prayer for payment of back wages, the normal rule is that when the dismissal order is set aside, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages has to be granted. However, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and considering that petitioner is a lady and a low paid Safai Karamchari, the Court feels that the interest of justice would be served in case the petitioner is paid 50% of the back wages. Accordingly, petitioner shall be entitled to be paid 50% of the back wages from the date of order of dismissal which has been set aside by this judgement. Back wages shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of four months from the date a certified copy of this judgement is produced before the authority concerned. However, there will be no order as to cost. _