Judgment : Both petitions are filed by the petitioner/Accused No.4 to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.287 of 2006 on the file of the Court of Judicial First Class Magistrate, Pathikonda and in C.C.452 of 2007 on the file of the Court of II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam, Krishna District. The petitioner/Accused No.4 was prosecuted for an offence under Section 16 (1) (a)(i), 7(i) and 2(ia)(m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,1954 ( for short “the Act”). Both petitions involve the common question. Therefore, they are heard together and disposed of by this common order. The petitioner herein is the manufacturer and prosecuted for violation of the provisions of the Act as the “dalda” was taken as a sample in C.C.No.287 of 2006 from the stockist, who is Accused No.1 and mixed fruit jam of “Kissan brand” manufactured by the petitioner was taken as sample from Accused No.1 in C.C.No.452 of 2007 along with the persons who sold and supplied the stock. The petitioner is the manufacturer and consequently prosecution was filed. The applications are filed to quash the proceedings on the ground that the prosecution is not valid under Section 20 of the Act and there is violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act and there is a delay and consequently the accused is entitled for acquittal. According to the strength of the contentions, there is no proper consent for prosecution. Now the point that arises for consideration is:- Whether the prosecution against the petitioner is liable to be quashed? POINT:- The learned counsel for the petitioner in both the cases contends that in order to initiate a valid prosecution, there must be a proper consent and in the absence of failure to give proper description of the accused, the prosecution is not valid. According to him, in C.C.No.287 of 2006 the sanction order does not disclose the name of C.S.Khosla as a nominee of the Company and, therefore, he cannot be prosecuted. In C.C.No.452 of 2007 the name of the nominee is also not given and, therefore, both the prosecutions are bad. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of this Court in Crl.P.No.1081 of 2004 and also the decision reported in The Food Inspector, Div.III, Warangal Vs. Balde Ramuloo (2004(2) L.S.107). He also relied on a decision of this Court in Crl.P.No.1425 of 2003. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of this Court in Crl.P.No.1081 of 2004 and also the decision reported in The Food Inspector, Div.III, Warangal Vs. Balde Ramuloo (2004(2) L.S.107). He also relied on a decision of this Court in Crl.P.No.1425 of 2003. So far as Crl.P.No.1425 of 2003 is concerned, the consent order does not speak the names of the offenders, though a valid consent is given, and, therefore, the court was inclined to accept the contention. But, however, in Crl.P.No.1081 of 2004 this court has taken the view that as the name of the nominee is not mentioned and as the name of another person was also not mentioned, the prosecution was quashed. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision reported in Dalawar Singh Vs. Parvinder Singh @ Iqbal Singh and another (2006(1) ALD (Crl) 57 (SC)) whereunder Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,1988 with regard to sanction for prosecution was considered and in fact this decision was also referred in Crl.P.No.1081 of 2004. It is to be noted that the sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act is quite different from the consent for initiation of the prosecution under Section 20 of the Food Adulteration Act. Therefore, no comparison can be made with the cases of prosecution requiring sanction and in cases where there is only consent for initiation of the prosecution. In this connection, the scope of Section 20 of the Act was considered by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa Vs. K.Rajeshwar Rao ( (1992) 1 SCC 365 )and in para.2 their lordships held as under:- “What Section 20 envisages is that no prosecution for an offence under the Act should be instituted except by or by the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person otherwise authorised in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority. Therefore, grant of sanction to prosecute for an offence under the Act is a condition precedent. The relevant criteria under S. 20(1) is the competence of the officer to grant the sanction for the offence. It does not postulate whether the person sold should be the owner or a servant or a person on behalf of the owner (son of the owner). The relevant criteria under S. 20(1) is the competence of the officer to grant the sanction for the offence. It does not postulate whether the person sold should be the owner or a servant or a person on behalf of the owner (son of the owner). Section 7 prohibits manufacture, sale of certain, articles of food. No 'person' shall himself or any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store or sell or distribute (i) any adulterated food etc. The phrase "himself or any person on his behalf' obviously included any other person like servant, son, father, or agent irrespective of the relationship legal or jural etc. The person so sold during the course of business either the owner or the person that sold the adulterated food or article of food or both are liable to prosecution”. It was also further held that it is not necessary for the sanctioning authority to consider that the person who sold the food article is the owner, servant, agent, partner or relative of the owner or was duly authorised in this behalf. In fact, this decision was not considered in Crl.P.No.1081 of 2004. The scheme of Section 20 of the Act is to give consent to initiate the prosecution to the competent person and to prosecute the offender. There cannot be any dispute about this though the reliance is placed by the counsel for the petitioner on several judgments to the fact that the consent shall also disclose the offenders against whom the prosecution is to be initiated. The question before is whether the sanction order is bad for not naming the nominee in the consent order. So far as C.C.287 of 2006 is concerned, the consent order for prosecution dated 30-01-2003 clearly shows that apart from Accused Nos.1 to 3, A-4 who is now the present petitioner (represented by responsible person). Therefore, it is quite clear the offender which is the Company is clearly mentioned and there is no ambiguity. Who is to represent the Company is a different matter and in fact prior to the sanction order itself a notice is said to have been given on 05-03-2003 to inform the name of the nominee as contemplated under Section 17 of the Act, but, that is said to have been not furnished. In the other C.C.No.452 of 2007 also the consent order refers to the petitioner represented by a nominee. In the other C.C.No.452 of 2007 also the consent order refers to the petitioner represented by a nominee. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be contended that the consent order does not disclose the offender who is Accused No.4 in both the cases. The question for consideration is whether the failure to mention the name of the nominee vitiates the entire proceedings? It was the view taken in Crl.P.No.1081 of 2004. It is to be noted that with regard to the prosecution of the Company, the Act itself provides and it is useful to refer to Section 17 of the Act as under:- “Offences by companies: (1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company- (a) (i) the person, if any, who has been nominated under sub-section (2) to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company (hereinafter in this section referred to as the person responsible), or (ii) where no person has been so nominated, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company; and (b) the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly : Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge and that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Any company may, by order in writing, authorise any of its directors or managers (such manager being employed mainly in a managerial or supervisory capacity) to exercise all such powers and take all such steps as may be necessary or expedient to prevent the commission by the company of any offence under this Act and may give notice to the Local (Health) Authority, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, that it has nominated such director or manager as the person responsible, along with the written consent of such director or manager for being so nominated. Explanation.-Where a company has different establishments or branches or different units in any establishment or branch, different persons may be nominated under this sub-section in relation to different establishments or branches or units and the person nominated in relation to any establishment, branch or unit shall be deemed to be the person responsible in respect of such establishment, branch or unit. (3) The person nominated under sub-section (2) shall, until- (i) further notice cancelling such nomination is received from the company by the Local (Health) Authority ; or (ii) he ceases to be a director or, as the case may be; manager of the company; or (iii) he makes a request in writing to the Local (Health) Authority, under intimation to the company, to cancel the nomination [which request shall be complied with by the Local (Health) Authority], whichever is the earliest, continue to be the person responsible : Provided that where such person ceases to be a director or, as the case may be, manager of the company, he shall intimate the fact of such cesser to the Local (Health) Authority : Provided further that where such person makes a request under clause (iii), the Local (Health) Authority shall not cancel such nomination with effect from a date earlier than the date on which the request is made. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-sections, where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, [not being a person nominated under sub-section (2) ] such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section-(a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals ; (b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm ; and (c) "manager", in relation to a company engaged in hotel industry, includes the person in charge of the catering department of any hotel managed or run by it.] A reading of the above Section clearly shows that if a person is nominee he will be responsible, if not the person who was in-charge at the time of the offence and Company are liable for the punishment. Therefore, even if the particulars of the nominee is not mentioned in the consent order, still a valid prosecution can be initiated against the Company or by alleging as to who was the person, who was in management of the affairs at the time of the offence. If such person proves that he was not the in charge of the affairs, he may have the benefit of acquittal. But, however, the offence by the Company itself is not defeated, and, therefore, the consent order referring to the Company to be prosecuted is in the spirit of Section 17 of the Act. In fact, it is the duty of the Company also to inform the person in charge of the affairs. Therefore, when once the consent order for initiation of the prosecution under Section 20 of the Act refers the offender which is the Company, it cannot be said that the prosecution against the Company is not valid for the reason that the name of the nominee was not mentioned. Therefore, the argument of the counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted and in fact in Crl.P.No.1081 of 2004 a reference was not made to the provisions of Section 17 of the Act and consequently it is not a case for reference to a Bench as suggested by a counsel for the petitioner. The learned counsel has relied on the decisions of other High Courts which did not deal the provisions under Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, I hold that as the consent order for prosecution under Section 20 of the Act clearly describes the offender, which is the Company, it cannot be said that the prosecution is vitiated for not mentioning the name of the nominee. Therefore, I hold that as the consent order for prosecution under Section 20 of the Act clearly describes the offender, which is the Company, it cannot be said that the prosecution is vitiated for not mentioning the name of the nominee. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in C.C.No.287 of 2006 the sample was taken on 25-10-2002 and the prosecution was initiated in 2004 and when the petitioner was served with 13(2) Notice on 25-10-2006 and, therefore, at all stages there was a delay in prosecuting the case and in fact the life of the sample was only six(6) months and, therefore, the prosecution is to be quashed. In C.C.No.452 of 2007 the sample was taken on 13-12-2006; the analyst report was received on 27-01-2007 and the prosecution was initiated on 27-11-2007 and notice under Section 13(2) of the Act was served on 28-11-2007. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions reported in Mohd.Yaseen Khan Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another (2010(1) ALD (Crl.) 73 (A.P)), C.Rama Murthy and another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh rep by the Food Inspector, Division I Ranga Reddy District (2007(3) ALT (Crl.) 113 (A.P.))and Radheshyam Lohiya and another Vs. State of A.P., rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad (2007(3) ALT (Crl.) 350 (A.P.)). Therefore, in view of the above circumstances, the proceedings against the petitioner/Accused No.4 in C.C.No.287 of 2006 on the file of the Court of Judicial First Class Magistrate, Pathikonda and in C.C.452 of 2007 on the file of the Court of II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam, Krishna District are liable to be quashed. Accordingly, both Criminal Petitions are allowed.