Hon'ble AGARWAL, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The defendant-appellant has preferred this civil second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the impugned judgment and decree dated 29.4.2000 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 7, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil Regular Appeal No. 20/98 whereby the learned Appellate Court has upheld and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 11.3.1998 passed by the trial Court i.e. Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil Suit No. 190/92 whereby the learned trial Court has decreed the suit for eviction filed by the plaintiff-respondent. 3. Brief relevant facts for the disposal of this appeal are that the respondent-landlord filed a suit in the trial Court against the defendant-appellant Shri Abdulla and one Shri Nanargram for eviction from the suit shop bearing Municipal No. 395 and from an another shop bearing Municipal No. 394 with the averment that suit shop is on rent with the appellant whereas the another shop is in the tenancy of Shri Nanargram and both the shops are required by her so as she can use and occupy them to start her business of general merchandise and printed textile cloths. It was also averred in the plaint that both the shops were purchased by her on 18.2.1992 from the previous owner to use them for her business. The tenant-appellant filed written statement and he denied the requirement shown by the respondent with the averment that her father is a renowned Advocate of Jaipur City having a huge earning by profession of law and she is only child of her father and, therefore, she is not required to do any business or profession to earn and thus, the requirement shown by her for the suit shop is not bonafide and reasonable. It was also averred that the appellant has sole earning source from the suit shop and his whole family is dependent on the earnings made by the business conducted in the same. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, necessary issues were framed and both the parties produced oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. The learned trial Court after hearing both the parties found that the requirement shown by the respondent is bonafide and reasonable. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, necessary issues were framed and both the parties produced oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. The learned trial Court after hearing both the parties found that the requirement shown by the respondent is bonafide and reasonable. It was also found by the Court that if decree of eviction is not passed more hardship will be faced by the respondent in comparison to the appellant as appellant has four vacant showrooms in his possession whereas no other alternative and suitable accommodation is available with the respondent for her use and occupation and, therefore, he cannot be allowed to say that if he has to be evicted from the suit shop more hardship would be caused to him. In regard to partial eviction from the suit shop, it was found by the trial Court that looking to the requirement shown by the respondent to the effect that both the shops are required, her requirement cannot be fulfilled if decree for partial eviction from the suit shop is passed. As a consequence of the findings arrived at by the trial Court, the suit was decreed. It is to be noted that during the pendency of the suit another tenant Shri Nanargram died and in his place his legal representatives were brought on record and they and landlord-respondent entered into compromise and as a consequence of that adjoining shop bearing No. 394 was vacated and the respondent got vacant possession of the same. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court the appellant filed appeal under Section 96 CPC before the First Appellate Court and the same was dismissed vide impugned judgment and decree dated 29.4.2000. During the pendency of that appeal, appellant moved an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment in written statement but the same was dismissed by the Appellate Court vide order dated 3.9.1998. That order was challenged by the appellant by way of SB Civil Revision Petition No. 1595/1998 and the same was allowed and as a consequence of that the application for amendment of written statement was also allowed and in compliance of that the appellant filed amended written statement on 14.12.1998 incorporating therein the further pleadings in the form of Para No. 2 of the additional pleas of the written statement. With the permission of the Court the respondent filed rejoinder to the amended written statement on 11.1.1999. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC on 25.1.1999 praying therein that on the basis of additional pleas taken in the written statement two additional issues are required to be framed. Reply to the application was filed by the respondent on 25.1.1999 itself and that application came to be dismissed by the Appellate Court vide order dated 25.1.1999. Although, the Court citing detailed reasons refused to frame additional issues as prayed by the appellant, but liberty was granted to both the parties to produce additional evidence in the form of affidavits and documents in support of the facts added by the appellant by way of amendment made in the written statement and in the rejoinder filed by the respondent. In compliance of that order, the appellant filed affidavits and some documents on 4.3.1999 and respondent also produced affidavits and documents in support of pleas taken by her in the rejoinder. Witnesses whose affidavits were filed as additional evidence during the appeal as referred above were cross-examined by the respective opposite party. The learned trial Court after hearing both the parties and considering the evidence produced by the parties during trial as well as during the pendency of appeal by upholding and affirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant. Still dissatisfied, the tenant-appellant is before this Court by way of this civil second appeal. During the pendency of this appeal original tenant-appellant Shri Abdulla died and in his place his legal representatives were brought on record as appellants. 4. After hearing the counsel for both the parties, the appeal was admitted vide order dated 20.7.2000 on the following substantial questions of law: "(1) Whether the first appellate has committed substantial error of law in amending written statement under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC in pursuant to order passed by this Court on 30.11.1998? (2) Whether material proposition of fact introduced in written statement by way of amendment moved before the first appellate court Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC, which was allowed by this Court on 30.11.1998 and was denied by the landlord-plaintiff-respondent make it legally obligatory upon the first appellate court to frame a distinction issue? (2) Whether material proposition of fact introduced in written statement by way of amendment moved before the first appellate court Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC, which was allowed by this Court on 30.11.1998 and was denied by the landlord-plaintiff-respondent make it legally obligatory upon the first appellate court to frame a distinction issue? (3) Whether object of framing issue is to focus the attention of the party to adduce relevant evidence in support of their respective claims and in the present case as the first appellate court declined to frame a distinic issue on the material proposition of facts alleged by tenant-defendant in his amended written statement and denied by the landlord-plaintiff-respondent has resulted in miscarriage of justice and fairpllay? (4) Whether in a suit between landlord and tenant, filed under Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 which is triable by the court as a result suit, a fact alleged by the one party and denied by the other can be proved by affidavits irrespective of the fact that affidavits have been excluded from the purview of definition of the evidence under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act? (5) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case the first appellate court instead of recording evidence itself under Order 41 Rule 28 of CPC ought to have framed an issue on fact on which both the parties were at variance and remitted the same to the trial court as envisaged under Order 41 Rule 25 of CPC and a procedure otherwise adopted by first appellate court is not sustainable in eye of law?" 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and also gone through the record made available for my perusal as well as the relevant legal provisions and the case law. My findings on each of the substantial questions of law with reasons are as below: (I) In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the First Appellate Court has committed substantial error of law in amending written statement under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC in pursuant to the order passed by the High Court on 30.11.1998 as the amendment was effected on the application moved by the appellant himself. As already stated during the pendency of the first appeal the appellant moved an application for amendment in written statement under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC on 17.8.1998 and it was stated in the same that subsequent to the institution of the suit the shop which was previously in the tenancy of Shri Nanargram was got vacated and possession was obtained by the respondent and thereafter a basement has been constructed in that shop and the shop as well as the basement has been let out by the respondent to one Shri Mahendra, who is conducting ready made garments business in the same and thus the requirement shown for the shop is no more bonafide and reasonable. Reply to the application was filed by the respondent on 22.8.1998 in which the facts stated in the application were denied and the First Appellate Court dismissed the application vide order dated 3.9.1998. As already stated that order was challenged by the appellant by way of S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 1595/1998 before this Court and the revision petition was allowed and as a consequence of that the amendment application was also allowed. Incompliance of the order of this Court, the appellant filed amended written statement before the First Appellate Court on 14.12.1998 incorporating therein the amended pleadings in the form of para No. 2 of the additional pleas. It is thus clear that the First Appellate Court allowed the appellant to file amended written statement in pursuant to the order passed by this Court on 30.11.1998 and, therefore, there is no question that the First Appellate Court has committed substantial error of law by allowing the appellant to file amended written statement. When amended written statement has been filed by the appellant as a consequence of an order passed on the revision petition filed by the appellant himself the appellant has no right to contend that the First Appellate Court has committed an error of law in amending written statement. (II) In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that it was legally obligatory upon the First Appellate Court to frame a distinct issue on the basis of amended written statement filed by the appellant and the rejoinder filed by the respondent and in absence of the same any error of law has been committed by the First Appellate Court. As already stated in compliance of the order dated 30.11.1998 passed by this Court in the revision petition the appellant filed amended written statement before the First Appellate Court on 14.12.1998 incorporating therein amended pleadings based on some subsequent events developed during the pendency of the suit as already referred above. The respondent filed rejoinder to the amended written statement on 11.1.1999 denying the facts alleged by the appellant in the amended written statement. Thereafter an application under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC was moved by the appellant on 25.1.1999 praying therein that two additional issues as referred in the application are required to be framed. Reply to the application was filed by the respondent on 25.1.1999 and the application was heard and dismissed by the First Appellate Court on 25.1.1999 itself. It was held by the Court that additional pleas taken by the appellant in the amended written statement are basically regarding the bonafide and reasonability of the requirement shown by the respondent for suit shop and it is covered under Issue No. 1 already framed by the trial Court to the effect "whether the respondent requires the suit shop for her personal use and it is bonafide and reasonable." For its conclusion the learned First Appellate Court relied upon the case law cited on behalf of the parties. Although, the First Appellate Court refused to frame additional issues but liberty was given to both the parties to produce additional evidence in the form of affidavits and documents and in compliance of that both the parties produced affidavits as well documents and each of the witnesses of the parties, whose affidavit was filed, was also cross-examined by the respective opposite party and neither the order dated 25.1.1999 was ever challenged by the appellant nor any objection was raised regarding filing of affidavits, documents and cross-examination of the witnesses. Order 14 Rule 1 CPC provides that issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other whereas Rule 5 of the same provides for the power of the Court to amend and to frame additional issues in the circumstances indicating in the rule. Order 14 Rule 1 CPC provides that issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other whereas Rule 5 of the same provides for the power of the Court to amend and to frame additional issues in the circumstances indicating in the rule. It is well settled legal position that once the parties go on trial, being alive to the controversy between them even then, in the absence of specific issue having been framed, the Court is not precluded from recording a finding of fact on the controversy provided that the parties have pleaded the case and have led their evidence. It is also well settled legal position that when parties fully aware of their respective cases lead all necessary evidence not only in support of their case, but in refutation of claims of other side, the non-framing of issues cannot be held to be a ground for remanding the case unless it is fatal to the case or resulted in mistrial which vitiates the proceedings. In the present case, although material proposition of fact taken in the amended written statement filed by the appellant before the First Appellate Court which were specifically denied by the respondent by way of rejoinder raised some issues of fact, but looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case as already stated even if the First Appellate Court refused to frame additional issues, despite the fact that an application for that purpose was filed by the appellant under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC, it cannot be said that it was legal obligation upon the First Appellate Court to frame one or more distinct issues regarding it. (III) Although, the object of framing issue is to focus the attention of the party to adduce relevant evidence in support of their respective claims and in the present case the First Appellate Court declined to frame a distinct issue on the material proposition of fact alleged by the appellant in the amended written statement and denied by the respondent by way of rejoinder, but in the facts and circumstances of the case as already referred it cannot be said that non-framing of one or more distinct issue on the basis of amended written statement has resulted in miscarriage of justice and fair play. As already stated the order dated 25.1.1999 by which the application filed under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC was dismissed was not challenged by the appellant and in compliance of the liberty given by the First Appellate Court he also filed affidavits and documents in support of the additional pleas taken by him in the amended written statement and he cross-examined the witnesses produced by the respondent and also allowed the respondent to cross-examine his witnesses. The appellant at this stage of the proceedings cannot be allowed to contend that one or more additional issues were essential to be framed by the First Appellate Court and the absence of that has resulted in miscarriage of justice and fair play. The well settled legal position is that once the party go on trial, being alive to the controversy between them even then, in the absence of a specific issue having been framed, the Court is not precluded from recording finding of fact on the controversy provided that the parties have pleaded the case and have led their evidence. It is also well settled that once the parties have led evidence by understanding the controversy property then the absence of framing of an issue would not result into prejudice to them. In the present case, it was within the knowledge of the parties what are the additional pleas taken by the appellant in the amended statement and what are the contentions of the respondent controverting the same by way of rejoinder and both the parties being fully aware of that without any objection in compliance of the order dated 25.1.1999 not only produced affidavits and documents, but also allowed each other to cross-examine the witnesses whose affidavits were produced. (IV) In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the First Appellate Court was not entitled to direct the parties to prove their respective cases as raised by them by way of amended written statement and rejoinder respectively by filing affidavits. Although, an affidavit has been excluded from the purview of definition of "evidence" under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act but Order 19 CPC permits a Court to direct parties to file affidavit to prove a fact alleged by him. Although, an affidavit has been excluded from the purview of definition of "evidence" under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act but Order 19 CPC permits a Court to direct parties to file affidavit to prove a fact alleged by him. In the present case, as already stated vide order dated 25.1.1999 although the First Appellate Court refused to frame additional issue, but liberty was given to both the parties to produce additional evidence in the form of affidavits and documents in support of their respective pleas taken before the Court in the form of amended written statement and rejoinder, Rule 1 of Order 19 CPC provides that any Court may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit, or that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing, on such conditions as the Court thinks reasonable. The Proviso provides that where it appears to the Court that either party bonafide desires the production of a witness for cross examination, and that such witness can be produced, an order shall not be made authorising the evidence of such witness to be given by affidavit. This provision clearly provides that the Court has jurisdiction to permit a party to prove particular fact or facts by way of affidavit. It has been held that the ordinary rule is that a decision on facts must be made on evidence recorded viva-voce in Court as provided by Order 18 Rule 4, but that procedure may be dispensed with where either party agrees to a decision on affidavits or in the absence of such agreement the Court makes an order under Order 19 Rule 1 CPC that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit and in that case Rule 4 of Order 18 CPC need not be followed, subject, however, to the right of the opposite party to have the deponent produced for cross-examination. Thus, Rule 1 of Order 19 CPC enables any Court to order that any fact may be proved by affidavit. Thus, it cannot be said that any illegality or perversity has been committed by the First Appellate Court by holding that the pleas raised by the respective parties before the First Appellate Court are to be proved by filing affidavits. Thus, Rule 1 of Order 19 CPC enables any Court to order that any fact may be proved by affidavit. Thus, it cannot be said that any illegality or perversity has been committed by the First Appellate Court by holding that the pleas raised by the respective parties before the First Appellate Court are to be proved by filing affidavits. Apart from that no objection was raised by the appellant to that order rather he voluntarily produced affidavits of three witnesses and allowed the opposite party to cross-examine them and he himself cross-examined the witnesses of the respondent whose affidavits were filed by her. Appellate even filed an applicable for recording the cross-examination of himself on commission and the same was allowed and his cross-examination was recorded on commission. In such circumstances, the appellant can be allowed to contend that oral evidence ought to have been allowed to be produced by him by the Appellate Court. (V) In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it was not obligatory on the First Appellate Court to remit back the case to the trial Court as envisaged under Order 41 Rule 25 CPC and no illegality and perversity has been committed by it in recording evidence itself under Order 41 Rule 28 CPC. As already stated in compliance of the order dated 30.11.1998 passed by this Court in the revision petition filed by the appellant amended written statement was filed by the appellant before the First Appellate Court and rejoinder to the same was filed by the respondent. Vide order dated 25.1.1999, it was ordered by the First Appellate Court that both the parties have liberty to file affidavits and documents in support of their respective case and that order was complied with and affidavits and documents were filed and witnesses were also cross-examined. No plea was raised by the appellant that the First Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to record additional evidence itself and the matter is required to be remitted back to the trial Court for recording additional evidence on the pleas newly raised by the parties. Otherwise also, in the present case Rule 28 of Order 41 CPC was required to be followed and the matter is not covered under Rule 25 of Order 41 CPC. Otherwise also, in the present case Rule 28 of Order 41 CPC was required to be followed and the matter is not covered under Rule 25 of Order 41 CPC. Rule 28 of Order 41 CPC provides that wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced, the Appellate Court may either take such evidence, or direct the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, or any other subordinate Court, to take such evidence and to send it when taken to the Appellate Court. Thus, if additional evidence is required to be produced before Appellate Court discretion has been conferred on the Appellate Court itself either to record the same or direct the trial Court to record it, but it is not obligatory on the Appellate Court in every case to remand the matter to the trial Court only for the purpose of recording additional evidence. In the present case, if the Appellate Court has chosen to take the additional evidence itself it cannot be said that some illegality or perversity has been committed by it. Rule 25 of Order 41 CPC provides that where the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted to frame or try any issue, or to determine any question of fact, which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits, the Appellate Court may, if necessary, frame issues, and refer the same for trial to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, and in such case shall direct such Court to take the additional evidence required and such Court shall proceed to try such issues, and shall return the evidence to the Appellate Court together with its findings thereon and the reasons therefore within such time as may be fixed by the Appellate Court or extended by it from time to time. It is thus clear that Rule 25 is applicable only when Appellate Court finds that the trial Court has omitted to frame or try any issue or to determine any question of fact which is essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits. In the present case, it is nobodys case that the trial Court has omitted to frame or try any issue or to determine any question of fact. In the present case, it is nobodys case that the trial Court has omitted to frame or try any issue or to determine any question of fact. As already referred in the present case application for amendment in the written statement was filed by the appellant before the First Appellate Court and in pursuance of the order passed by this Court in the revision petition amended written statement was filed and rejoinder was also filed by the respondent and on the pleas newly taken by the respective parties, the First Appellate Court vide order dated 25.1.1999 allowed both the parties to produce additional evidence in the form of affidavits and documents. Thus, it is a clear case of production of additional evidence during the pendency of appeal as covered under Rule 27 & Rule 28 of Order 41 CPC and not under Rule 25 of the same. As already held in the facts and circumstances of the present case no additional issue was required to be framed by the First Appellate Court although parties were at variance on the pleas newly taken during the pendency of the appeal and, therefore, the matter was also not required to be remitted under Order 41 Rule 25 CPC and it cannot be held that procedure adopted by the First Appellate Court is not sustainable in the eye of law and it required interference of this Court in this second appeal. 6. Referring to subsequent events allegedly developed during the pendency of the litigation, the learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that from the evidence available on record and the admission made by the respondent herself it is clear that the shop adjoining to the suit shop was got vacated and possession of the same was obtained by the respondent during the pendency of the suit itself and it was renovated and a basement was also constructed in it and a business of readymade garments is being conducted in it. It was also submitted that from the evidence available on record it is clear that the shop so vacated alongwith the basement has been let out by the respondent to one Shri Mahendra Singh and he is doing his readymade garments business in it and this is clear indication of the fact that the requirement shown by the respondent for the suit shop is no more in existence otherwise she would not have let out the adjoining shop to someone else and instead she herself would have used it. It was also submitted that the learned Appellate Court without considering the evidence available on record in a proper perspective rather misinterpreting and misreading the same has wrongly held that in the vacated shop it is respondent herself, who is doing her business and not Shri Mahendra Singh. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent supporting the conclusions arrived at by the First Appellate Court submitted that the appellant has miserably failed to prove his contention that in the adjoining shop Shri Mahendra Singh is doing business independently and at his own and not the respondent. It was further submitted that the Court below has rightly held that Shri Mahendra Singh is a domestic servant of the family of the respondent and he occasionally sits in the shop and looks after the business conducting in it only in the absence of the respondent. 8. As already stated during the pendency of the first appeal amended written statement was filed on behalf of the appellant incorporating therein subsequent events allegedly developed during the pendency of the suit to the effect that the adjoining shop to the suit shop has been got vacated from the other tenant and after renovation and construction of basement in it, it was let out to one Shri Mahendra Singh and it is Shri Singh, who is doing his readymade business in it at his own and independently whereas by filing rejoinder to the amended written statement the case of the respondent was that Shri Mahendra Singh is her domestic servant and mainly he looks after domestic affairs and only in absence of her he sits in the adjoining shop and looks after the business conducted by her in it. In support of their cases both the parties produced oral evidence in the form of affidavits and also various documents and the learned Appellate Court after considering the submissions made on behalf of the parties and critically analyzing the evidence available on record came to a definite conclusion that although the adjoining shop was got vacated during the pendency of the suit and it was renovated and a basement was also constructed in it and business of readymade garments is being conducted in it and Shri Mahendra Singh also sits and looks after the business conducted in the same, but it cannot be held that Shri Mahendra Singh is conducting business at his own and independently rather it is respondent, who is doing business in it and Shri Mahendra Singh occasionally sits in the shop and looks after the business only in the absence of the respondent. The judgment passed by the learned Court clearly indicates that for coming to the above conclusion every aspect of the matter was considered in a right perspective and it cannot be said that the conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Court is result of non-consideration of material evidence available on record or misreading or misinterpreting thereof. It was for the appellant to prove his contentions, but he has miserably failed to do so. It is well settled that the finding of fact cannot be interfered in second appeal unless it is result of non-consideration or misreading of material evidence available on record, but the present case is not of such a nature. Shri Mahendra Singh in his statement has categorically denied the suggestion made on behalf of the appellants that after paying a huge amount as `Pagdi' he took the adjoining shop from the respondent on rent and it is he who is doing business in it independently. It is behind any understanding that a person taking a commercial premises on rent after paying a huge amount as `Pagdi' will deny that fact taking risk that the landlord on the basis of admission made by him can take undue advantage of it against him at a later time. It is behind any understanding that a person taking a commercial premises on rent after paying a huge amount as `Pagdi' will deny that fact taking risk that the landlord on the basis of admission made by him can take undue advantage of it against him at a later time. The need shown by the respondent cannot also be said to have been satisfied only by the reason that she has started her business of readymade garments in the adjoining shop by the reason that from the very beginning the case of the respondent is that both the shops are required by her for her business. The well settled legal position is that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for the business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Neither tenant nor court can advice the landlord how he should adjust himself and satisfy his requirement in some other way. In the present case also the appellant is not legally entitled to say that as the adjoining shop has been vacated and after renovation of it and construction of basement, the respondent has started business of readymade garments in it, it is not required for her to got the suit shop also and after further renovation and reconstruction of both the shops to start the business indicated by her in the plaint. In this regard, the well settled legal position is also that if it is found that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession that by itself would not be sufficient to negative the landlord's requirement shown for tenanted premises but in such a situation it is expected from the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not sufficient and suitable for the purpose for which he requires the tenanted premises. Whether the vacant premises available to the landlord is sufficient and suitable for his requirement or not will depend upon facts and circumstances of each case but mere being in possession of a vacant premises cannot negative the need shown by the landlord. Suitability of alternative accommodation available with the landlord has to been seen from convenience of the landlord and on the basis of totality of circumstances including profession, vocation, style of living, habits and background of the landlord. Suitability of alternative accommodation available with the landlord has to been seen from convenience of the landlord and on the basis of totality of circumstances including profession, vocation, style of living, habits and background of the landlord. The normal rule is that any litigation or a suit or an original proceeding is to be tried in all stages on the cause of action and the rights and obligations of the parties are to be adjudicated upon, as they obtained or existed on the date of commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception that the Court may take notice of the subsequent events of facts or law which may have happened since the commencement of the lis and grant relief to the parties on the basis of altered condition which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief. This rule is to be applied in cases where it is shown that the original relief claimed, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances has become inappropriate or that it is necessary to base the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. In such a case, the Court must take a "cautious cognizance" of the subsequent changes of the fact and law to mould the relief. Such consideration of subsequent events or developments must be taken when they had a material impact on those rights and obligations. The well settled legal position is also that the crucial date for deciding bonafides of the need shown by the landlord is the date of the suit/petition and it must also continue throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of decree of the final court but at the same time if during the pendency of the litigation subsequent developments and events happen and the landlord comes into, possession of vacant premises which is suitable and sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the landlord that events or development may be taken note of to adjudge the bonafide and reasonability of the need shown by the landlord. Such subsequent developments and events are to be taken note only when the need of the landlord can be shown to be completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. Such subsequent developments and events are to be taken note only when the need of the landlord can be shown to be completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. The subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the landlord should have been completely vanished by such subsequent events. In the present case, it cannot be said that the initial requirement shown by the respondent for the suit shop has been completely vanished merely by the reason that in the adjoining shop some business has been started by the respondent as it cannot be expected from the respondent to sit idle till the suit shop is vacated. Merely by the reason that in the waiting period the respondent after renovating the vacated shop and construction of basement has started some business bonafide and reasonability of the requirement shown for the suit shop cannot be adjudged to be negatived. Consequently, I do not find any merit in this second appeal requiring interference by this Court. Accordingly, the same is dismissed with costs throughout.