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2012 DIGILAW 146 (GAU)

Nawaz Hussain Khan, S/o Late Aktar Hussain, Village-Japorigog, Sundarpur, P. S. Dispur, District: Kamrup, Assam v. State of Assam Represented by the Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Assam, Political and Home Department, Dispur, Guwahati-6.

2012-02-03

I.A.ANSARI

body2012
With the help of this application made under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the accused-petitioner has put to challenge the order, dated 20-12-2007, passed, in GR Case No. 3648 of 2005, by the Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, Guwahati, directing issuance of process against the accused-petitioner and also the order, dated 11-04-2008, passed in the said case, whereby the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, Guwahati, has declined to close the proceeding on the accused-petitioner’s petition, wherein the accused-petitioner had contended that taking of cognizance, in the light of the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C., stood barred, because of the fact that a period of more than one year had already elapsed since the date of the alleged occurrence. 2. In the case at hand, as the record reveals, the process was directed to be issued by order, dated 20-12-2007. The record also reveals that a First Information Report (in short, ‘FIR’) was lodged at Hatigaon Outpost, on 29-07-2005, by one Prakash Kr. Saikia alleging, inter alia, that on 28-05-2005, at about 8:30 PM, when the informant’s younger brother, Dipankar Saikia, was returning home, he was restrained, on the way, by the persons named in the FIR, namely, Sankar, Gautam, Nirish and Rahul and, then, they assaulted him and fled away by taking a gold chain from the neck of the injured and also a sum of Rs. 1,000/-, in cash. Based on the said FIR, Dispur Police Station Case No. 914 of 2005, under Section 341/325/379/34 IPC, was registered and, on completion of investigation, police laid charge-sheet, under Section 341/323/34 IPC, against two of the accused persons named in the FIR including the present petitioner. 3. The sum total of the submissions, made on behalf of the accused-petitioner, is, in brief, thus: The maximum punishment for an offence, under Section 341 IPC, is simple imprisonment for one month and in respect of an offence under Section 323 IPC, the punishment is imprisonment, rigorous or simple, for a term of one year. In terms of the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C., no Court shall take cognizance of an offence beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Sub-Section (2) of Section 468 Cr.P.C. and in terms of the provisions of Clause (b) of Sub-Section (2) of Section 468 Cr.P.C., the period of limitation is one year for an offence, which is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. When the offences, under Section 341 and 323 IPC, can be punished, at the most, with imprisonment for a period of one year, the Court could not have taken cognizance in the present case, because the charge sheet was, admittedly, filed and processes were ordered to be issued after more than one year. 4. While considering the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C., one cannot lose sight of Section 473 Cr.P.C, which allows Court to extend the period of limitation prescribed by Section 468 Cr.P.C. if the Court is satisfied, in the facts and circumstances of the case, that the delay had been properly explained or that „it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice?. Even if, therefore, there is no specific prayer for extension of the period of limitation, the Court has the power to extend, on its own, the period of limitation, in a criminal proceeding, if such an extension is, in the considered view of the Court, necessary in the interest of justice. However, recourse to Section 473 Cr.P.C. has not been taken in the present case nor was it really necessary inasmuch as the FIR was registered, as noted above, under Section 379 IPC too and an offence, under Section 379 IPC, is punishable by imprisonment, rigorous or simple, for a term of three years and, under Section 468 (2)(c) Cr.P.C, the period of limitation shall be three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but not exceeding three years. 5. In the case at hand, since the offence, under Section 379 IPC, is punishable by imprisonment for a terms of three years, the period of limitation for the purpose of taking of cognizance would be, in terms of Section 468(2)(c) Cr.P.C, three years. 6. I have carefully perused the case diary and what I find is that the victim and the informant have clearly stated, in their respective statements made before the police, that the accused had taken away from the neck of the victim a gold chain and a sum of Rs. 1000/-, in cash. In the face of such clear statements made by the victim and the informant, the police ought to have submitted charge sheet against the accused under Section 379 IPC too. 7. However, the charge sheet, as indicated above, was submitted under Sections 341 and 323 IPC. 1000/-, in cash. In the face of such clear statements made by the victim and the informant, the police ought to have submitted charge sheet against the accused under Section 379 IPC too. 7. However, the charge sheet, as indicated above, was submitted under Sections 341 and 323 IPC. Why the charge sheet was not submitted, under Section 379 IPC, has not been explained in the charge sheet nor is there any explanation discernible, in this regard, from the case diary. The report, which is submitted by police, under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., cannot be arbitrary or misleading. No Magistrate shall accept, mechanically and without application of mind, a report submitted under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., be the report, as commonly called, a final report or charge sheet. 8. In view of the fact that the investigation, conducted in the present case, reveals that there was accusation of commission of offence of theft too, omission to submit charge sheet, under Section 379 IPC, did not divest the learned Court below of its power to take cognizance of offence under Section 379 IPC too and proceed with the case. This apart, Section 482 Cr.P.C. vests in the High Court inherent power to secure the ends of justice. Further-more, Section 483 Cr.P.C. casts a duty on the High Court to continuously exercise its superintendence over the Courts of Judicial Magistrates subordinate to it so as to ensure „expeditious and proper disposal of cases? by the Magistrate. The expression “proper disposal of cases” would mean disposal in accordance with law. 9. Surprisingly enough, however, in the case at hand, while directing issuance of processes, the learned Court below did not specify the penal provisions, whereunder cognizance had been taken. This was a serious lapse on the part of the learned Court below. This would not, however, as a collorary, permit this Court to quash the proceeding, which is pending in the learned Court below, and allow thereby the present petition, which the accused-petitioner has filed, inasmuch as this Court is duty bound, in terms of the provisions of Section 482 read with Section 483 Cr.PC, to exercise superintendence over the Courts of the Judicial Magistrates and ensure that there is „proper disposal of cases? and the ends of justice has been secured. This Court does not, therefore, find that the accused-petitioner can be granted the relief, which he has sought for. 10. and the ends of justice has been secured. This Court does not, therefore, find that the accused-petitioner can be granted the relief, which he has sought for. 10. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this criminal petition shall stand dismissed and the learned Court below is hereby directed to take into account, at the time of consideration of charge(s), the statements recorded by the police and the materials collected by the Investigation Officer and, then, frame appropriate charge or charges as may be deemed fit and proper. 11. With the above observations and directions, this criminal petition shall stand disposed of. 12. Send back the LCR. _____________