Shashi Kant Gupta, J.— 1. This writ petition is directed against the Judgement and order dated 1.9.1982 passed by the District Judge , Kanpur in Rent revision NO. 18 of 1982 whereby the order dated 1.1.1982 passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer dated 16(5) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 ( in Short "the Act") and the allotment order dated 8.4. 1981 passed in favour of the petitioner was set aside . 2. The brief facts of the case, as set out in the writ petition, are as follows: 3. On 13.10. 1980 the petitioner applied for allotment of a Quarter No. 98 at premises no. 95/91 Aminganj District Kanpur ( in short 'disputed premises') in dispute under section 16 (1) (a) of the Act in his favour . The Rent Control Inspector submitted its report on 29.11.1980 stating therein that the respondent no. 3 Haqim Ullah was found in possession of the premises in dispute since last 30 years. The respondent no. 3 Hakim Ullah filed his objection on the ground that that he has been residing in the disputed premises since last 30 years as joint tenant with Mohammad Alam , who left for Delhi 3-4 years back and claimed benefit of Section 14 of the Act . Both the parties filed their affidavits and examined witnesses. The respondent no. 2 vide his order dated 30.3.1981 declared vacancy repelling the contentions raised by the respondent no. 3 and held that the respondent no. 3 was not entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Act as he was not residing in the disputed premises as tenant with the consent of the landlord. Subsequently, the respondent no. 2 by order dated 8.4.1981 allotted the disputed premises in favour of the petitioner under section 16(1)(a) of the Act. 4. Thereafter the respondent no. 3 moved an application on 16.4.1981 under section 16(5) of the Act for review of the orders dated 30.3.1981 and 8.4.1981. The Rent Control & Eviction Officer vide his order dated 1.1.1982 rejected the review application of the respondent no. 3. 5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 1.1.1982, the respondent no. 3 preferred a revision before the respondent no. 1 under section 18 of the Act . 6. The revisional court vide its judgement and order dated 1.9.1982 allowed the revision of the respondent no. 3. 5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 1.1.1982, the respondent no. 3 preferred a revision before the respondent no. 1 under section 18 of the Act . 6. The revisional court vide its judgement and order dated 1.9.1982 allowed the revision of the respondent no. 3 and set aside the order dated 1.1.1982 as well as the order dated 8.4.1981. Hence, the present writ petition. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order passed by the revisional court is illegal, arbitrary and is based on a complete misreading of the case and misconception of legal position relevant to the matter and has not considered the evidence on record in right perspective. He further submitted that since the respondent no. 3 has never been the tenant of the disputed premises , he was not entitled to the benefit provided under section 14 of the Act . He further submitted that the application filed under section 16(5) of the Act was not maintainable since the respondent no. 3 had participated and seriously contested the proceedings for declaration of vacancy by filing objections and evidence. The vacancy was declared after affording fullest opportunity to the respondent no. 3 and moreover the said review application was filed after the period of limitation was over . 8. The petitioner has filed a supplementary affidavit before this court stating therein that the disputed premises has been purchased by him by a registered sale deed dated 6.9.1999 , as such, now, he has become the owner of the disputed premises . 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 submitted that the revisional court was fully justified in setting aside the order passed by the respondent no. 2, Rent Control & Eviction Officer declaring vacancy of the disputed premises. He further submitted that the respondent no. 3 has been in uninterrupted possession of the premises in dispute since 1943, therefore, he is very much entitled to the benefit under section 14 of the Act. He further submitted that in support of his case he had filed a number of documentary evidences before the court below. 10. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not disputed that the premises in dispute is covered by the provisions of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 ( in short the 'Act'). 10. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not disputed that the premises in dispute is covered by the provisions of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 ( in short the 'Act'). According to the respondent no. 3 he is in occupation of the disputed premises since before 1976. Admittedly, there is no allotment order in favour of the respondent no. 3. 12. It is not disputed that the respondent no.3 was in possession of the premises in dispute since a very long time without any allotment order in his favour . The contention of the respondent no. 3 is that he was a joint tenant alongwith Mohd. Alam. It is pertinent to mention here that the respondent no. 3 appeared during the vacancy proceeding before the respondent no. 2 but neither he pleaded /argued that the rent receipts were ever issued in his favour nor filed any rent receipts before the trial court to establish that he was the joint tenant along with Samim Ullah/ Mohd. Alam. No cogent and convincing evidence was adduced by the Respondent No. 3 to establish that he was in fact the tenant of the disputed premises with the consent of the landlord. It was only for the first time i.e. after passing of the order dated 30.3.1981 declaring vacancy of the disputed premises, rent receipts purported to have been issued in joint names of Samim Ullah and Respondent No. 3 were produced. The Respondent No. 2 while declaring vacancy recorded a finding that erstwhile tenant Mohd. Alam of the disputed premises, prior to the commencement of the vacancy proceedings, shifted to Delhi and the Respondent No. 3 has failed to establish that either there was any privity of contract with the landlord or he was occupying the premises as a tenant with the consent of the landlord in his favour. The respondent No. 3 had seriously contested and participated in the vacancy proceedings by filing objection and adducing evidence. The vacancy was declared by the Respondent No. 2 after giving fullest opportunity to the Respondent No. 3 . The respondent No. 3 had seriously contested and participated in the vacancy proceedings by filing objection and adducing evidence. The vacancy was declared by the Respondent No. 2 after giving fullest opportunity to the Respondent No. 3 . Against the order of declaring vacancy and allotment order, the Respondent No. 3 preferred an application after the period of limitation, as prescribed under Section 16 (5) of the Act, was over, as such, the application under Section 16 (5) of the Act itself was not maintainable. It is notable that the Respondent No. 3 during the course of vacancy proceedings neither made any averment nor filed any rent receipt purported to have been issued in his favour as a joint tenant. However, later on, in the review proceedings (under Section 16 (5) of the Act) he filed alleged rent receipts for the first time without explaining as to why such rent receipts were not brought earlier on record. The respondent no. 2 was fully justified in disbelieving the alleged rent receipts and rightly held to be forged and fabricated. The order passed by the lower revisional court is absolutely illegal as it is based on a complete misreading of the case and misconception of legal position relevant to the matter and has not considered the evidence on record in right perspective. 13. The revisional court erred in observing that merely because the respondent no. 3 was in possession of the premises in dispute for a very long time, therefore, there was an implied consent of the landlord . A bare perusal of the record shows that there was no cogent and convincing evidence to establish that the petitioner was the tenant of the disputed premises . It is also pertinent to mention that Sajjad Hussain, the attorney of the landlord, also had filed his affidavit before the respondent no. 2 to the effect that respondent no. 3 neither paid any rent nor there was any contract of tenancy with the respondent no. 3 but the said affidavit was ignored by the revisional court. Apart from this, Mohd. Alam , the erstwhile tenant of the disputed premises , who had left the said premises and shifted to Delhi, also filed an application before the court stating that the respondent no. 3 but the said affidavit was ignored by the revisional court. Apart from this, Mohd. Alam , the erstwhile tenant of the disputed premises , who had left the said premises and shifted to Delhi, also filed an application before the court stating that the respondent no. 3 was neither the tenant nor the legal occupant of the premises and further stated that after surrendering the tenancy he had shifted to Delhi. The petitioner also filed the documentary evidences in the form of Account Register 1943-44 and also a copy of the extract of Nagar Palika assessment of the disputed premises to show that the respondent was never the tenant of the disputed premises. The revisional court allowed the revision merely on the basis that since the respondent no. 3 was residing in the premises in dispute before 1976, there was an implied consent of the landlord. 14. In this connection, it would be relevant to refer to the following decisions: (i) The Apex Court in the case of Girja Shankar and another Vs. Hirday Ranjan Chakraborty and another: 1988(2)501, in paras 9,10 and 11 has held as under: 9. The tenant of the premises in question has long left. An employee without the consent though, perhaps, with knowledge of the Landlord was occupying the premises, but in such circumstances it cannot be held as the High Court has done that there was no deemed vacancy. 'The High Court was in error in holding that the Aushdhalaya was a tenant through the petitioners. The tenant was the Aushdhalaya and the proprietors thereof. It is an admitted factual position and the High Court has recognised that the Aushdhalaya was closed in the year 1976. The High Court commented that the landlord recognised Sh. Hirday Ranjan Chakraborty as a tenant and was charging rent from him. That is wrong and incorrect. There was no such evidence. No rent was charged from Hirday Ranjan Chakraborty. He never paid any rent. The rent paid in the name of the Aushdhalaya by Hirday Ranjan Chakraborty. 10. The High Court has rightly commented that the landlord knew that there was a change in the occupation but the landlord did not consent as there was no evidence and Hirday Ranjan Chakraborty has not said that there was any change of tenancy. The tenancy was not in the name of Hirday Ranjan Chakraborty. 10. The High Court has rightly commented that the landlord knew that there was a change in the occupation but the landlord did not consent as there was no evidence and Hirday Ranjan Chakraborty has not said that there was any change of tenancy. The tenancy was not in the name of Hirday Ranjan Chakraborty. The premises, indubitably, was in the name of the Aushdhalaya. It was not in occupation or possession of the Aushdhalaya, its proprietors or partners, and at the relevant time Hirday Ranjan Chakraborty did not claim or purported to occupy the same on behalf of the Aushdhalaya. He claimed and asserted his own right of occupation. He was not the tenant. The premises, indubitably, was occupied by a person other than the tenant without his consent but perhaps with the knowledge of the landlord. 11. In those circumstances, in our opinion, the High Court was not right. The Rent Controller in his order had held that Hirday Ranjan Chakraborty could not be given the benefit of Regulations 6 & 14 of the Act because at no stage the landlord had accepted him as the tenant. In view of this categorical finding, it could not be said that Hirday Ranjan Chakraborty was occupying the premises in question with the consent of the landlord." (ii)This court in the case of Amar Nath Sharma ( since deceased) Vs. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Bulandshahr : 2009 (2) ARC 55 in para 11, interalia, has held that a person who is claiming benefit of Section 14 has necessarily to establish not only his occupation but occupation of a licensee or a tenant. In the present case, the respondent no. 3 failed to establish that any tenancy right ever existed in his favour. (iii) This court in the case of Bimal Kishore Paliwal Vs. IVth Addl. District And Sessions Judge : 2005 (2) ARC 672 , in para 15 has held as under: "In the present case the rent has been admittedly paid in the name of Om Prakash the main tenant. The landlord has denied any consent to the occupation of Jagdish Prasad. Jagdish Prasad has never paid any rent in his own name. Even if it may be taken that the landlord had knowledge of occupation by Jagdish Prasad, still Jagdish Prasad cannot be held to be entitled to benefit of Section 14 of 1972 Act. The landlord has denied any consent to the occupation of Jagdish Prasad. Jagdish Prasad has never paid any rent in his own name. Even if it may be taken that the landlord had knowledge of occupation by Jagdish Prasad, still Jagdish Prasad cannot be held to be entitled to benefit of Section 14 of 1972 Act. in the absence of any specific consent of the landlord. Therefore, to take advantage of section 14 of the Act it has to be necessarily established firstly that the occupation is from before 05.07.1976 and secondly there was specific consent of the land lord. Mere knowledge of the landlord is not sufficient." (iv)This court in the case of Dharam Narain Agawal Vs. Vth Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Meerut : 1983(2)ARC 167 in its para 4 has held as under: "Counsel for the respondent no. 2, on the other hand, urged that the finding of the Delegated Authority that the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Act suffered from a manifest error of law inasmuch as he has not recorded any finding that the possession of the petitioner before 1976 was in his own rights as a tenant. A perusal of the order dated 30th November, 1978 passed by the Delegated Authority does indicate that the submission made by counsel for respondent no. 2 is well founded. After referring to the various affidavits filed by the parties, the Delegated Authority in the last paragraph of his order has held: "I have gone through the record of file and heard arguments of the learned counsels for the parties. From the record it is established that Sri Dharam Narain Agarwal is residing in this house since before 1976. Even if, it is accepted that Sri Agarwal was living as a sub-tenant with Smt. Raj Kumari Agarwal, who has vacated it, the question of vacancy or deemed vacancy does not arise as the rights of Sri Dharam Narain Agarwal are protected under Section 14 of the Act." 15. Thus , the aforementioned case laws clearly indicate that for taking benefit of section 14 of the Act , the person claiming benefit under the said Act, has necessarily to establish that he was in occupation of the premises in dispute since before 1976 and that there was specific consent of the landlord . Here, in the present case, the respondent no. Here, in the present case, the respondent no. 3 has not been able to establish that any tenancy right exists in his favour or there was any specific consent in respect thereof entitling him to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Act." 16. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case , I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declaring the vacancy and passing the allotment order in favour of the petitioner. 17. The findings recorded by the revisional court are patently illegal and erroneous and are not supported by any cogent and convincing reasons. The revisional court while setting aside the order passed by the trial court was swayed by irrelevant considerations and has exceeded its jurisdiction. The impugned order is based on a complete misreading of the case and misconception of the legal position relevant to the matter. 18. The reasons assigned by the revisional court are superficial. It has adopted a very casual approach, resulting in a cryptic, abrupt and erroneous conclusion. The impugned order passed by the revisional court, looking from any angle, cannot stand the scrutiny of law. The order passed by the revisional court is totally illegal and against the settled provisions of law . 19. In view of what has been discussed herein above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The Judgement and order dated 1.9.1982 passed by the District Judge , Kanpur in Rent Revision No. 18 of 1982 is hereby set aside. _