Judgment : JUDGEMENT (Per D.D.Sinha, J.) 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents. 2. This Writ Petition is directed against the common judgment and order dated 7.3.2012 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay Bench, Mumbai, disposing of Original Application Nos.583 of 2011 and 584 of 2011. 3. The petitioner was appointed as Lower Division Clerk in the year 1991 and promoted as Upper Division Clerk in the year 1995. In the year 1998, the petitioner was posted as UDC in Group VII, New Custom House, Mumbai, and was assigned the duty of verification of Duty Entitlement Pass Book (DEPB) of firms/exporters having names with first letter N to Z. In 2002 the Dy. Director General of Foreign Trade (Enforcement), Mumbai, noticed that non-existing firms had obtained DEPB scrips by submitting forged export documents. It appears that during the course of investigation, CBI noticed that proprietors of non-existing firms, viz., M/s.Ritlene Exports, Vaibhav Sales & TVS Exports had submitted forged documents for obtaining DEPB scrips aggregating credit value of Rs.1.66 crore. The statement of the petitioner was recorded by CBI in the year 2002. The Customs Department carried out its own investigation and came to the conclusion that verification of DEPB scrips was not carried out by the petitioner nor the petitioner made entries in Punching Register/Verification Register, but the same were made by some other persons. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that after recording statement of the concerned persons in the year 2002, the respondents did not do anything further for a long time. On 27.12.2010 the respondent no.2 suddenly issued Memorandum of charge-sheet to the petitioner under rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, for imposing major penalty. The said chargesheet relates to the lapses alleged to have been committed by the petitioner while he was discharging his duty as UDC in Group VII, New Custom House, during the year 1998. It is alleged that the petitioner allowed unauthorised persons to make entries of DEPB scrips of nonexisting firms and that he failed to restrict outsiders from making such entries in the official records of Customs Department which was under his control and thereby caused loss to Government exchequer. 5. The petitioner requested disciplinary authority by filing an application to withdraw the charge-sheet on the ground of inordinate delay. 5. The petitioner requested disciplinary authority by filing an application to withdraw the charge-sheet on the ground of inordinate delay. On 29.4.2011 the petitioner filed Original Application No.336 of 2011 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai, challenging the charge-sheet dated 27.12.2010, which was disposed of by the Tribunal by order dated 29.4.2011 directing the respondents to decide the application dated 23.1.2011 and stayed the inquiry to be initiated on the basis of the charge-sheet dated 27.12.2010 till such decision is taken by the authorities. The representation of the petitioner came to be rejected by the respondent no.2 vide order dated 1.6.2011. The petitioner, therefore, filed another Original Application No.583 of 2011 before the CAT, Mumbai, challenging the charge-sheet dated 27.12.2010. The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 7.3.2012 dismissed the Original Application of the petitioner, being aggrieved thereby the petitioner filed the present petition. 6. Mr.Marne, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the order impugned is challenged by the petitioner in the present petition primarily on the ground that the charge-sheet dated 27.12.2010 is issued by the respondents after inordinate and unexplained delay and, therefore, the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. It is contended that it is an admitted position that the incident alleged in the charge-sheet pertains to the year 1998 and that there was a delay of 12 years in issuance of the charge-sheet. In view of this admitted position, the stand of the petitioner is that the Tribunal was called upon to decide whether the delay was inordinate and unexplained and whether it caused prejudice to the petitioner in the matter of his defence. However, the Tribunal failed to decide and record specific finding on this issue in the impugned order and, therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal as well as the chargesheet dated 27.12.2010 issued by the respondents are liable to be quashed and set aside. 7. In order to substantiate his contention, reliance is placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court dated 21.3.2012 in (O.O.C.J.) Writ Petition No.428 of 2012 filed by Union of India & Ors. 7. In order to substantiate his contention, reliance is placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court dated 21.3.2012 in (O.O.C.J.) Writ Petition No.428 of 2012 filed by Union of India & Ors. The counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the facts involved in that writ petition were that the fraud was detected in the year 2002, the show cause notice was issued in the year 2003, the amended show cause notice was issued in the year 2005 and the actual charge-sheet was issued in the year 2010. The Central Administrative Tribunal set aside the departmental inquiry and petitions filed by the Union of India against the said order in the High Court also came to be dismissed vide order dated 21.3.2012 on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay in issuing the charge-sheet and confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal. The counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan [ (1998) 4 SCC 154 ], particularly on the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 19 of the judgement which read thus:- “19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations.” The counsel for the petitioner, therefore, contended that the impugned order of the Tribunal as well as the charge-sheet dated 27.12.2010 are liable to be quashed and set aside. 8. The counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that the charges levelled against the petitioner are serious in nature and, therefore, the charges cannot be quashed and set aside solely on the ground of delay and laches and, therefore, the impugned order of the Tribunal is just and fair. It is submitted that the Tribunal also directed the respondents to complete the departmental inquiry within four months, however, for want of co-operation from the petitioner, no progress could be made insofar as the department inquiry is concerned. The counsel for the respondents, in order to substantiate his contention, placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court dated 29.5.2012 in The Secretary, Min. of Defence & Ors. v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha (Civil Appeal No.2333 of 2007). 9. Considered the contentions canvassed by the respective counsel. It is no doubt true that if the departmental action is required to be initiated for the misconduct against the employee, the department is expected to issue charge-sheet within a reasonable time from the date of detection of misconduct. v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha (Civil Appeal No.2333 of 2007). 9. Considered the contentions canvassed by the respective counsel. It is no doubt true that if the departmental action is required to be initiated for the misconduct against the employee, the department is expected to issue charge-sheet within a reasonable time from the date of detection of misconduct. However, there is no straight-jacket formula applicable in all types of cases and, therefore, in the case of State of A.P. (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Apex Court has observed that it is not possible to lay down any per-determined principles applicable to all the cases and in all the situations where there is a delay in concluding the departmental proceedings. The said decision of the Apex Court demonstrates that the consequence of delay in holding departmental proceedings by itself does not in all cases result in termination of proceedings and each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances of that case and the Court is required to consider all the relevant factors, including the seriousness of the charge. Now, in the instant case, the charge is of a serious nature and, therefore, the relevant observations made by the Apex Court in the case of The Secretary, Min. of Defence & Ors. made in paragraph 11 of the decision need to be considered which read thus:- “11. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a chargesheet or show cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, chargesheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a chargesheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. (Vide : State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, AIR 1987 SC 943 ; Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh & Ors., (1996) 1 SCC 327 ; Ulagappa & Ors. v. Div. Thus, a chargesheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. (Vide : State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, AIR 1987 SC 943 ; Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh & Ors., (1996) 1 SCC 327 ; Ulagappa & Ors. v. Div. Commr., Mysore & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 3603 (2) Special Director & Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse & Anr., AIR 2004 SC 1467 ; and Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906.” In paragraph 13 of the judgement, the following observations are made by the Supreme Court:- “13. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that chargesheet cannot generally be a subject matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the chargesheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings.” 10. The observations made by the Apex Court make it explicitly clear that departmental proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the ground that the proceedings have been initiated at a belated stage or could not be completed within a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice and results in miscarriage of justice. 11. In the instant case, the charge against the petitioner is serious. The petitioner allowed unauthorised persons to make entries of DEPB scrips of non-existing firms and that he failed to restrict outsiders from making entries in the official records of Customs under his control, thereby causing loss to the Government exchequer. 12. 11. In the instant case, the charge against the petitioner is serious. The petitioner allowed unauthorised persons to make entries of DEPB scrips of non-existing firms and that he failed to restrict outsiders from making entries in the official records of Customs under his control, thereby causing loss to the Government exchequer. 12. In this case, the so-called delay in issuing the charge-sheet has not resulted in causing any prejudice to the petitioner since the petitioner in 2004 was promoted to the post of Inspector (Examiner) and in 2008 was promoted to the post of Appraiser, however, it is not a mitigating factor which will reduce the seriousness of charges alleged against the petitioner and, therefore, the contentions canvassed by the counsel for the petitioner are devoid of merit. Similarly, the decision of this Court as well as the Apex Court cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, do not further case of the petitioner. On the other hand, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of The Secretary, Min. of Defence & Ors. (supra), we do not find any infirmity in respect of the findings recorded by the Tribunal, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. In the result, the petition suffers from lack of merit and the same is dismissed.