JUDGMENT Mr. Paramjeet Singh, J.: - Present petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of complaint titled “Indiabulls Financial Services Ltd. vs. K.S. Plastic India Pvt. Limited and another” (Annexure P/5) filed under Sections 138/142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 357 of Cr.P.C. and also the summoning order dated 18.02.2010 (Annexure P/6) and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom. 2. Brief facts of the case are that criminal complaint was filed by the respondent-complainant against the petitioner under Section 138/142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act with the averments that the petitioners took a loan from the complainant of Rs.25,00,000/- and in order to discharge their liability, the accused issued cheque bearing No. 880999 dated 01.11.2009 of Rs.7,51,609/-. Said cheque on presentation at Gurgaon for encashment was dishonoured and returned unpaid with remarks “EXCEEDS ARRANGEMENT”. Thereafter, the complainant served notice upon the accused, but the accused failed to comply with the notice. Taking cognizance of the matter and after considering the preliminary evidence, the learned trial Court vide order dated 18.02.2010 summoned the petitioners. Hence, this criminal petition. 3. While issuing notice of motion, this Court passed the following order on 29.04.2011: “Learned counsel for the petitioners by relying on the judgment in the case of M/s Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. and another vs M/s National Panasonic India Limited, [2009(1) Law Herald (SC) 107] : 2009(1) SCC 720 submits that the Court at Gurgaon has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the present complaint and further that the enquiry in the case has not been done, which is mandatory as required under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Notice of motion for 12.05.2011. Notice re: stay also. Mrs. Kiran Bala Jain, Advocate, who is present in Court, accepts notice on behalf of respondent No.2. Copy of the petition be supplied to the learned counsel for the respondent during the course of the day.” 4. The respondent has filed reply wherein it has been averred that the respondent has its corporate/head office in Gurgaon. The drawee Bank ING VYSYA BANK LTD. in which the cheque was presented for encashment is also at Gurgaon. Copy of the petition be supplied to the learned counsel for the respondent during the course of the day.” 4. The respondent has filed reply wherein it has been averred that the respondent has its corporate/head office in Gurgaon. The drawee Bank ING VYSYA BANK LTD. in which the cheque was presented for encashment is also at Gurgaon. The information regarding the dishonor of the cheque was given to the respondent by its banker by way of cheque returning memo dated 26.12.2009 at Gurgaon and the legal notice was sent from Gurgaon, Hence, the cause of action for filing of the present complaint arose at Gurgaon. So, the complaint was rightly filed in Gurgaon Court and the Gurgaon Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the present complaint. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the petitioners took loan from the respondent-complainant. The respondent-complainant have their place of business at Ludhiana. The cheque in question was issued at Ludhiana. The bank on which the cheque was to be drawn was at Ludhiana. Earlier, all the cheques issued by the petitioners were being deposited at Ludhiana. It is for the first time that the cheque was deposited at Gurgaon only to create jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the order of the learned Magistrate summoning the petitioners is non-speaking. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently denied the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners and submitted that the respondent company has its head office at Gurgaon and loan was sanctioned at Gurgaon. Cheque in question was presented for encashment before their banker i.e. Ing Vysya Bank, Gurgaon and the said cheque was dishonoured and returned unpaid with remarks “EXCEEDS ARRANGEMENT”. Intimation in this regard was also received at its head office at Gurgaon. Legal notice dated 03.01.2010 was also sent by registered post from Gurgaon. In spite of receipt of the notice, the said cheque amount was not paid. So, the Court at Gurgaon has the jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the respondent in his reply has specifically denied that liability to pay arose outside the jurisdiction of the Court at Gurgaon. Moreover, now a days, core banking and RTGS banking is in practice and amount can be transferred by that process to any bank account at different place. So, the Court at Gurgaon has the jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the respondent in his reply has specifically denied that liability to pay arose outside the jurisdiction of the Court at Gurgaon. Moreover, now a days, core banking and RTGS banking is in practice and amount can be transferred by that process to any bank account at different place. 8. I have considered the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. 9. This Court in the case of M/s Rattan Industries ltd. vs. another vs. Shruti Gupta, CRM M-26943 of 2012, decided on 03.09.2012 [2012(4) Law Herald (P&H) 2917] has observed as under:- “18. Needless to mention that the complaint, in such a situation, has naturally to be filed by the payee in the course of recovering the impugned amount of the cheque and not by the accused. Therefore, the cause of action has to be construed with a view point of the payee for the purpose of filing the complaint by him and not as per the wishes of the defaulter accused. Section 138 of NI Act is the speedy, beneficial provision to recover the impugned amount, to punish the defaulter and it cannot possibly be interpreted to create the hurdles to defeat the real cause of justice and public interest to enable the accused to defeat the rightful claim of the complainant. In that eventuality, the words “the issuance of cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him and returned by the bank unpaid”, occurring in this section, pales into insignificance and cannot possibly be read in isolation. If the pointed contention of learned senior counsel for petitioners is accepted, then, there will be no end of anything and the very purpose of section 138 of NI Act would be frustrated, which is not legally permissible. Moreover, the matter of jurisdiction, in such a situation, is no more res integra and is now well settled.” 10. If the pointed contention of learned senior counsel for petitioners is accepted, then, there will be no end of anything and the very purpose of section 138 of NI Act would be frustrated, which is not legally permissible. Moreover, the matter of jurisdiction, in such a situation, is no more res integra and is now well settled.” 10. Similar, question came to be decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another (1999) 7 SCC 510 , wherein having interpreted the provisions of Section 138 of NI Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “The complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of the following five acts, the components of the offence, took place: (1) drawing of the cheque; (ii) presentation of the cheque to the bank; (iii) returning of the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank; (iv) giving of notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount; (v) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. It may, therefore, be an idle exercise to question jurisdiction relating to this offence. High Court in appeal rightly set aside the finding of the trial court that it had no territorial jurisdiction because the cheque had been dishonoured in a different district, outside its jurisdiction. Further on facts, High Court rightly held that trial court had jurisdiction as the cheque had been issued at a shop within its jurisdiction.” 11. The perusal of the record indicates that the petitioners-accused took the loan from the respondent-complainant at Ludhiana which was sanctioned at its Head office at Gurgaon. The impugned cheque was presented by the complainant at Gurgaon. The respondent-complainant received the information of dishonour of cheque at Gurgaon. The respondent issued statutory legal notice to the petitioners-accused for making the payment from Gurgaon. In that eventuality, it cannot possibly be said that the Court at Gurgaon did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the impugned complaint, as urged on behalf of petitionersaccused. The respondent-complainant received the information of dishonour of cheque at Gurgaon. The respondent issued statutory legal notice to the petitioners-accused for making the payment from Gurgaon. In that eventuality, it cannot possibly be said that the Court at Gurgaon did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the impugned complaint, as urged on behalf of petitionersaccused. Therefore, the contrary arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners “stricto sensu” deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances, as the law laid down in K.Bhaskaran’s case (supra) is “mutatis mutandis” applicable to the facts of the present case and provides complete answer to the problem in hand. 12. It is also well settled legal proposition that at the time of summoning, the Magistrate, prima facie, has to form an opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. The Magistrate at this stage is not legally required to pass a detailed judgment in this regard. Thus, the contention of the petitioner that order passed by Magistrate was non speaking has no merit. 13. In view of the above, the trial Court has rightly summoned the petitioners-accused and no interference is warranted in the impugned summoning order. 14. No other point has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 15. In the light of the aforesaid reasons and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial of the main complaint case, therefore, the present petition is dismissed for having no merits.