ORDER 1. Brief facts necessaryfor adjudication of this matter are as under : 2. The respondent filed a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘N.I. Act’) before the competent Court at Gwalior. The present petitioners by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of CrPC have called in question the legality, validity and propriety of this complaint. 3. The case of the petitioners is that Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was entered into which is placed as Annexure P-2. As per this MOU, the petitioners paid certain amount to the respondent. However, yet another MOU was entered into between the parties, which is Annexure P-3. As per the MOU (Annexure P-3), an understanding was made between the parties. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that by communication, Annexure P-5, the petitioners informed the respondent that earlier cheque No.068522 dated 5.5.2010 for an amount of Rs.5.00 lacs be not presented in the bank for realisation and same be returned to the petitioners for cancellation. In lieu thereof the petitioners enclosed a cheque No.069976 dated 12.5.2010 for Rs.5.00 lacs. In nutshell, the petitioner’s case as reflected from MOU is that the total amount required to be paid by the petitioners was Rs.29,21,695/-. Petitioners submit that Rs.15 lacs was paid and remaining Rs.14,21,695/- was required to be paid. This amount was paid by issuance of two cheques No.069976 for Rs.5,00,000/- and No.068523 for Rs.9,21,695/- respectively. Out of these two amounts, a cheque of Rs.5,00,000/- was sought to be withdrawn by paying a different cheque as mentioned above. However, the petitioners submit that the respondent after getting the new cheque of Rs.5,00,000/- produced all the three cheques, i.e., two cheques for Rs.5,00,000/- and one cheque for Rs.9,21,695/-. 4. Learned senior counsel submits that once amount was returned to the respondent, as per the MOU, the machineries were required to be sent back to the petitioners by the respondent. However, the machineries were not sent to the petitioners and, therefore, a civil suit was filed on the original side before the High Court of Madras. This civil suit is placed on record as Civil Suit No.715/2010 (Annexure P-8). However, the machineries were not sent to the petitioners and, therefore, a civil suit was filed on the original side before the High Court of Madras. This civil suit is placed on record as Civil Suit No.715/2010 (Annexure P-8). In the said civil suit, the petitioners have prayed for following reliefs : “(a) Directing the defendants to pay a sum of Rs.37,88,983/- together with interest @ 18% per annum from the date of plaint till the realization of the amount. (b) To declare the cheques bearing Nos.068522 dated 5.5.2010 for Rs.5,00,000/-, 068523 dated 10.5.2010 for Rs.9,21,695/- and 069976 dated 12.5.2010 for Rs.5,00,000/- drawn on ICICI Bank, T.Nagar Branch issued by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant as cancelled. (c) To pay the cost of the suit tothe plaintiff. (d) To pass such further orders of other orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper and thus render justice.” The two cheques issued by the petitioners for Rs.14,21,695/- to the respondent could not be realised by the respondent for some time because of an interim order passed by Madras High Court in the aforesaid civil suit. However, the said interim order was vacated lateron and, therefore, admittedly, the respondent had realised this amount of Rs.14,21,695/-. 5. The aforesaid civil suit before Madras High Court was filed before 28.8.2010 by the petitioners. The respondent herein filed the impugned complaint on 28.8.2010 at Gwalior. The learned senior counsel submits that apart from this, two more civil proceedings arising out of same matter are pending before the competent civil Courts. One civil suit is filed as Annexure P-12 along with the petition. The respondent herein filed the impugned complaint on 28.8.2010 at Gwalior. The learned senior counsel submits that apart from this, two more civil proceedings arising out of same matter are pending before the competent civil Courts. One civil suit is filed as Annexure P-12 along with the petition. In this suit filed for declaration and permanent injunction, the respondent has prayed for allowing relief : ^^vr% ekuuh; U;k;ky; ls fouez fuosnu gS fd oknh dk okn fMdzh fd;k tkdj] fuEu vk’k; dk t;&i= iznku fd;k tk, % v- ;g ?kksf”kr fd;k tk, fd oknh fookfnr e’khu ¼;w-oh0- ‘ksVj o izkslslj½ izfroknh dz-1 ¼,d½ dks ifjnku dj pqdk gS A c- ;g Hkh ?kksf”kr fd;k tk, fd izfroknh dz-1 ¼,d½ ;k mlds deZpkjh] izfroknh dz-2 ¼nks½] 3 ¼rhu½] 4 ¼pkj½ eSusftax Mk;jsDVj] Mk;jsDVj] eSutj fookfnr e’khu dks ifjnku uk fd, tkus dh dgdj dksbZ dk;Zokgh djus ds vf/kdkjh ugha gSa A l- LFkkbZ fu”ks/kkKk ds )kjk izfroknhx.k dks fu”ksf/kr fd;k tk, fd fookfnr e’khu ¼;w-oh- ‘ksVj o izkslslj½ ds ifjnku uk djus dh dgdj] oknh QeZ ;k mlds ikVZujh ds fo:) dksbZ dk;Zokgh uk djs vkSj uk gh fdlh vU; ls djk, rFkk vU; izdkj ls Hkh ijs’kku uk djs u djk, A n- vkKkRed fu”ks/kkKk tkjh dj izfroknhx.k dks funsf’kZr fd;k tk, fd foofnr e’khu ds ifjnku u fd, tkus dh dgdj] izfroknhx.k dh xbZ leLr dk;Zokgh lekIr djsa A b- okn O;; fnyk;k tk,] vU; U;k;ksfpr lgk;rk tks ekuuh; U;k;ky; U;k;fgr esa iznku djuk mfpr le>s] iznku dh tk, A** 6. Yet another civil suit was filed by respondents for recovery of an amount of Rs.14,82,295/-. Yet another civil suit was filed by respondents for recovery of an amount of Rs.14,82,295/-. In this recovery suit, the respondent has prayed for following relief : ^^v- oknh dks izfroknh dz-1 ¼,d½ ls jkf’k :-24]38]860@& ¼pkSchl yk[k vM+rhl gtkj vkB lkS lkB½ rFkk mDr jkf’k ij nkSjku okn o vk;ank olwyh fnukad rd 24 ¼pkSchl½ izfr’kr f=ekfld pdzo`f) dh nj ls C;kt fnyk;k tk, A c- oknh dks izfroknh dz-1 ¼,d½ yxk;r 5 ¼ik¡p½ o 10 ¼nl½ ls jkf’k :-60]600@& ¼lkB gtkj N% lkS½ o mDr jkf’k ds nkSjku okn o vk;ank olwyh fnukad rd 12 ¼ckjg½ izfr’kr ekfld pdzo`f) dh nj ls C;kt fnyk;k tk, A l- oknh dks izfroknh dz-1 ¼,d½ yxk;r 9 ¼ukS½ ls :-15]82]835@& ¼ianzg yk[k C;klh gtkj vkB lkS iSarhl½ fnyk;k tk, rFkk mDr jkf’k ij nkSjku okn o vk;ank olwyh fnukad rd 12 ¼ckjg½ izfr’kr ekfld pdzof) dh nj ls C;kt fnyk;k tk, A n- oknh dks izfroknh dz-8@9 ¼vkB@ukS½ ls :- pkj yk[k {kfriwfrZ Lo:i fnyk;k tk, rFkk mDr jkf’k ij nkSjku okn o vk;ank olwyh fnukad rd 12 ¼ckjg½ izfr’kr ekfld pdzof) dh nj ls C;kt fnyk;k tk, A b- oknh dks izfroknh dz-1 ¼,d½ yxk;r 10 ¼nl½ ls :- ik¡p yk[k {kfriwfrZ Lo:i fnyk, tk, rFkk mDr jkf’k ij nkSjku okn o vk;ank olwyh fnukad rd 12 ¼ckjg½ izfr’kr ekfld pdzof) dh nj ls C;kt fnyk;k tk, A bZ- oknh dks izfroknhx.k ls okn O;; fnyk;k tk, o vU; lgk;rk tks ekuuh; U;k;ky; U;k;nku esa mfpr o vko’;d le>s iznku dh tk, A** 7. Shri Saxena, learned senior counsel submits that a bare perusal of para 22 of Annexure P-12 shows that the machineries which were sent by the respondent to the petitioners could not reach to the destination because of some accident. The respondent himself gave this information to the Insurance Corporation and claimed certain amount arising thereto. In turn, the Surveyor of the Insurance Company prepared a report, which is also placed on record as Annexure P-10. By placing reliance on a document which is filed at page 84, learned senior counsel submits that the entire case of the respondent is like house of cards. In turn, the Surveyor of the Insurance Company prepared a report, which is also placed on record as Annexure P-10. By placing reliance on a document which is filed at page 84, learned senior counsel submits that the entire case of the respondent is like house of cards. By placing this document it is stated that the consignee and consignor of the material is same, i.e., the respondent herein and this shows that whole story is a cooked up story by the respondent and on the basis of such a story the petitioners should not be made to suffer and face a criminal proceeding. 8. Learned senior counsel raised the following legal questions for consideration : (i) Whether all the persons/officers of the company can be impleaded in the summary criminal proceeding under section 138 read with section 141 of the N.I. Act? (ii) When three civil suits arising out of same dispute are pending, whether the proceedings under N.I. Act in question can continue and tenable? (iii) Whether an unscrupulous litigant/dishonest person can be permitted to continue with the proceedings of section 138/142 of N.I. Act? 9. To elaborate, learned senior counsel submits that a bare perusal of the complaint itself shows that apart from company various persons have been impleaded and they are Managing Director, Full Time Director, Director, General Manager, Senior Manager and Managers, respectively. Learned senior counsel submits that it is the requirement of the N.I. Act that respondent has to make specific statements/averments in complaint with regard to the specific role played by all these officers. A bald statement will not serve the purpose and on the basis of such an ambigous statement made in the complaint, the complaint cannot continue and it does not fulfill the requirement of section 141 of the N.I. Act. In support thereto, learned senior counsel relied on (2005)6 Supreme 442 (S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla); (2009)10 SCC 48 (K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora); (2010)3 SCC 330 (National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal); 2011 SCC (Cri.) 167 (Central Bank of India v. Asian Global Limited); and (2011)2 Supreme 811 (N.K. Wahi v. Shekhar Singh). In support thereto, learned senior counsel relied on (2005)6 Supreme 442 (S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla); (2009)10 SCC 48 (K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora); (2010)3 SCC 330 (National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal); 2011 SCC (Cri.) 167 (Central Bank of India v. Asian Global Limited); and (2011)2 Supreme 811 (N.K. Wahi v. Shekhar Singh). On the strength of these apex Court judgments, learned senior counsel submits that the allegations against the officers should be specific describing their role which is allegedly played by them in issuance of cheques in question and in absence thereto the proceedings cannot sustain judicial scrutiny. 10. The next attack of learned senior counsel is on the ground that the matter is essentially civil in nature and to support this he placed reliance on the stand of the present respondent in a reply filed before this Court. Learned senior counsel submits that earlier petitioners filed Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.7771/2010 before this Court against the same proceedings which was permitted to be withdrawn with a liberty to file a fresh proceeding. In the said matter the present respondent filed his reply and stated as under in para 18 of the reply : “18. That, in respect of the above dispute respondent firm had filed a civil suit against the petitioner company (Annexure R-1) which is pending in the Court of V ADJ Gwalior as Civil Suit No.13-A/10 and in the above civil suit receiving the notice of the Court petitioner company had failed to appear, therefore ex parte proceeding have started against the petitioner company. All the controversial facts can only be decided by the civil Court.” 11. Learned senior counsel submits that in view of the categorical stand taken by the respondent himself in the very same proceedings, there is no manner of doubt that the dispute in question which became subject-matter of section 138 proceedings is essentially a dispute of civil nature, which is duly admitted by the respondent in the aforesaid reply. Once it is a matter of civil nature, the criminal proceeding of summary nature under section 138 of N.I. Act is not tenable. Learned counsel further submits that cause of action for both the actions, i.e., civil and criminal is exactly same and criminal matter cannot continue. He placed reliance in this regard on 1988(I) MPWN 225= AIR 1988 SC 709 (Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia etc. Learned counsel further submits that cause of action for both the actions, i.e., civil and criminal is exactly same and criminal matter cannot continue. He placed reliance in this regard on 1988(I) MPWN 225= AIR 1988 SC 709 (Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia etc. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre) (paras 7 and 8). On the basis of this authority, it is stated that when the matter is civil in nature, criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to continue. 12. Lastly, learned senior counsel placed reliance on (2011)7 CC 59 (Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat), to submit that this Court is under a legal and constitutional obligation to ensure that there is no abuse of process of law by any party. In other words, learned senior counsel submits that whole efforts of respondent amounts to arm twisting of the petitioner for his illegal deeds and misdeeds and, therefore, to secure the ends of justice, this Court has ample and tremendous power under section 482 CrPC to interfere and that is a fit case where the jurisdiction under section 482 can be invoked. 13. Learned senior counsel further submits that legal technicalities should not come in the way of rendering complete justice. The respondent since has not disputed the genuineness of the documents filed by the petitioners along with the petition, this Court can examine whether section 138 proceedings can continue against the petitioners in the aforesaid factual backdrop. 14. Per contra, Shri Amit Lahoti, learned counsel for the respondent by placing reliance on the language of the Statute, i.e., section 141 of the N.I. Act, submits that sub-section (1) is very clearly worded which shows that every person who was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business as well as company, is deemed to be guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Learned counsel submits that intention of the Parliament while making this law is clear that whenever such an offence is made, the officers are deemed to be guilty and it is further made clear that burden is shifted in the first proviso on the officer to show that offence was committed without his knowledge. Learned counsel submits that intention of the Parliament while making this law is clear that whenever such an offence is made, the officers are deemed to be guilty and it is further made clear that burden is shifted in the first proviso on the officer to show that offence was committed without his knowledge. On the strength of the language of this section, Shri Lahoti submits that a bare perusal of his pleadings in the complaint clearly shows that sufficient and specific pleadings are made in paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 to show that the aforesaid officers are responsible and on the strength of these pleadings, the contention of petitioners must fail. On the strength of the language of this section, Shri Lahoti submits that a bare perusal of his pleadings in the complaint clearly shows that sufficient and specific pleadings are made in paragraphs 2, 3 and 6 to show that the aforesaid officers are responsible and on the strength of these pleadings, the contention of petitioners must fail. Aforesaid paragraphs No.2, 3 and 6 are reproduced as under : ^^2- ;g fd] vfHk;qDr dz-1 ifCyd fyfeVsM daiuh gS rFkk daiuh ,DV ds varxZr jftLVMZ gS A vkt fnukad dks o ?kVuk fnukad dks vfHk;qDr dz-1 daiuh ds eSusftax Mk;jsDVj vfHk;qDr dzz-2] iw.kZdkfyd Mk;jsDVj vfHk;qDr dz-3] Mk;jsDVj vfHk;qDr dz-4 o 5] tujy eSustj vfHk;qDr dz-6] lhfu;j eSustj ¼,Q ,aM ,½ o vf/kd`r gLrk{kjdrkZ vfHk;qDr dz-7] lhfu;j eSustj ykWftfLVd vfHk;qDr dz-8 gS A 3- ;g fd] vfHk;qDr dz-2 eSusftax Mk;jsDVj gksdj vfHk;qDr dz-1 daiuh ds izHkkjh gSa A vfHk;qDr dz-3 yxk;r 5 daiuh ds Mk;jsDVj o vfHk;qDr dz-6 yxk;r 8 daiuh ds inkf/kdkjh gksdj vfHk;qDr dz-1 daiuh ds fnu&izfrfnu ds O;kikj dk nkf;Ro dk fuoZgu djrs gSa vkSj daiuh ds )kjk fd, x, O;kikj ds fy, daiuh ds izfr mRrjnk;h gSa A 6- ;g fd] blds vfrfjDr vfHk;ksxh QeZ dks :-11]700@& iwoZ nsunkjh ds vfHk;qDr daiuh dks nsuk Fks A bl nsunkjh dks lek;ksftr djrs gq, vfHk;ksxh QeZ us mDr e’khuksa o ysu&nsu ds fy, fnukad 14-5-2010 vfHk;qDr daiuh dks lsy de MsfcV uksV o e’khusa ns nh A mDrkuqlkj vfHk;ksxh QeZ dks vfHk;qDr daiuh ls :-33]43]390@& ysuk Fks A mDr Hkqxrku ds fof/kd nkf;Roksa dks Lohdkj djrs gq, Hkqxrku isVs vfHk;qDr daiuh us viuk [kkrk dz-602605051582 vkbZ lh vkbZ lh vkbZ cSad fyfeVsM ds rhu pSd] pSd dz-068522 :-5]00]000@& fnukad 5-5-2010] pSd dz-068523 :-9]21]695@& fnukad 10-5-2010] pSd 069976 :-5]00]000@ fnukad 12-5-2010 ds vfHk;ksxh QeZ dks fnukad 16-5-2010 dks fn, A mDr pSdksa ij vfHk;qDr dz-7 us vfHk;qDr dz-1 daiuh ds vf/kd`r gLrk{kjdrkZ dh gSfl;r ls gLrk{kj fd, rFkk mDr pSd vkjksihx.k us dz-1 yxk;r 6 o 8 dh tkudkjh o lgefr ls vkjksih dz-7 )kjk tkjh fd, x, Fks A rFkk vkjksihx.k us mDr pSdksa dks iznku djrs le; ;g vk’oklu vfHk;ksxh QeZ dks fn;k Fkk mDr pSdksa dk Hkqxrku mudh oS/k vof/k esa vfHk;ksxh QeZ dks gks tk,xk rFkk mDr vof/k esa [kkrk can ugha djsaxs vkSj uk gh pSdksa ds Hkqxrku dks jksdsaxs A bl vk’oklu ij gh vfHk;ksxh QeZ us mijksDr pSdksa dks Lohdkj fd;k Fkk A** 15. To elaborate this argument, learned counsel submits that in K.K. Ahuja’s case (supra), the apex Court considered all the other judgments on this subject and culled out the principles which were mentioned in para 27 of the judgment. Learned counsel submits that if the pleadings in his complaint are subjected to x-ray on the basis of principles laid down in para 27 aforesaid, it will show that the respondent’s pleadings are specific and sufficient to make out a case against the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioners argument cannot cut any ice. 16. Shri Lahoti then placed reliance on section 141(2) of N.I. Act to submit that at an appropriate stage before the Court below the respondent will lead evidence and prove his case. At this stage, this Court is under no obligation to conduct a mini trial or short-circuit the proceeding which is going on before the Court below under section 138 of the N.I. Act. By placing reliance on sections 61 and 62 of the Evidence Act Shri Lahoti submits that the said Act prescribes a procedure for the purpose of appreciation and admissibility of evidence. This stage would come before the Court below and the respondent will produce the evidence and the present petitioners will be at liberty to cross-examine or verify the genuineness of the documents and evidence placed by the present respondent. There is no occasion at this stage to interfere in the matter. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on a recent judgment of this Court in 2011(III) MPWN 111 = 2011(4) MPLJ 706 (Naresh Kumar v. Prabhabai). On the basis of this judgment, learned counsel submits that the documents which are required to be appreciated and taken in evidence are not public documents and, therefore, at this stage those documents cannot be examined for the purpose of invoking the powers under section 482 of CrPC. Learned counsel submits that the only test is whether on examination of the pleadings in section 138 complaint a case is made out against the petitioners or not. The deference documents filed by the present petitioners cannot be gone into at this stage in 482 proceedings. In support thereto, he relied on (2007)12 SCC 93 (T. Vengama Naidu v. T. Dora Swamy Naidu); (2007)12 SCC 369 (Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi); and (2008)10 SCC 109 (Bharat Parikh v. Central Bureau of Investigation). The deference documents filed by the present petitioners cannot be gone into at this stage in 482 proceedings. In support thereto, he relied on (2007)12 SCC 93 (T. Vengama Naidu v. T. Dora Swamy Naidu); (2007)12 SCC 369 (Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi); and (2008)10 SCC 109 (Bharat Parikh v. Central Bureau of Investigation). On the basis of this, he submits that as on date there is no reason or any grievance to the petitioners and merely because civil suits are pending before the Madras High Court or before competent Courts at Gwalior, it will not bestow any right to the petitioners to get absolved from their responsibilities or avoid the proceedings arising out of section 138 of N.I. Act. Learned counsel submits that simultaneous proceedings are permissible, as laid down by Supreme Court in (2009)1 SCC 69 (Sri Krishna Agencies v. State of Andhra Pradesh). 18. Shri Lahoti further submits that sections 40 and 43 of the Evidence Act take care of the effect of any judgment on the subject or related subject. This fact can be examined and appreciated as per the manner provided in their aforesaid sections by the competent Court. On the strength of this, it is stated that even if there is a judgment by any of the Courts situated at Madras or Gwalior wherein civil matters are pending, the competent trial Court is able to consider the same in consonance with the provisions of the Act. 19. In nut shell, Shri Lahoti submits that during trial before the Court below the respondent will produce the evidence in support of his case and defence will get the opportunity in accordance with law to put forth his case. At this stage, no interference is warranted in the proceedings under section 482 of CrPC. 20. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 21. Dealing with first point raised by learned senior counsel whether all officers of company can be impleaded in summary proceedings, it will be profitable to refer section 141 of the N.I. Act, which reads as under : “141. Offences by Companies. 20. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 21. Dealing with first point raised by learned senior counsel whether all officers of company can be impleaded in summary proceedings, it will be profitable to refer section 141 of the N.I. Act, which reads as under : “141. Offences by Companies. -- (1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. [Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.] (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation : For the purpose of this section, -- (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.” 22. A bare perusal of this section shows that every person who was incharge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, is responsible for the offence. A bare perusal of this section shows that every person who was incharge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, is responsible for the offence. The first proviso makes it clear that a heavy burden is on the shoulder of such person to show that the offence has been committed without his knowledge. The language of statute shifts the burden on the person who is liable for punishment if he does not prove that the offence is committed without his knowledge. 23. Thus, in the light of this language, it is necessary to examine whether there are sufficient pleadings to implead all officers of the company in the compalint. The legal position in this regard is nomore res integra in view of the judgment in K.K. Ahuja’s case (supra). In para 27 of the said judgment the apex Court held as under : “27. The position under section 141 of the Act can be summarised thus : (i) If the accused is the Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, it is not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that he is in charge of, and is responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. It is sufficient if an averment is made that the accused was the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director at the relevant time. This is because the prefix “Managing” to the word “Director” makes it clear that they were in charge of and are responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. (ii) In the case of a Director or an officer of the company who signed the cheque on behalf of the company, there is no need to make a specific averment that he was in charge of and was responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company or make any specific allegation about consent, connivance or negligence. The very fact that the dishonoured cheque was signed by him on behalf of the company, would give rise to responsibility under sub-section (2) of section 141. The very fact that the dishonoured cheque was signed by him on behalf of the company, would give rise to responsibility under sub-section (2) of section 141. (iii) In the case of a Director, Secretary or Manager [as defined in section 2(24) of the Companies Act] or a person referred to in clauses (e) and (f) of section 5 of the Companies Act, an averment in the complaint that he was in charge of, and was responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company is necessary to bring the case under section 141(1) of the Act. No further averment would be necessary in the complaint, though some particulars will be desirable. They can also be made liable under section 141(2) by making necessary averments relating to consent and connivance or negligence, in the complaint, to bring the matter under that sub-section. (iv) Other officers of a company cannot be made liable under sub-section (1) of section 141. Other officers of a company can be made liable only under sub-section (2) of section 141, by averring in the complaint their position and duties in the company and their role in regard to the issue and dishonour of the cheque, disclosing consent, connivance or negligence.” 24. By interpreting section 141 of N.I. Act, the apex Court laid down the test to examine whether different officers can be impleaded under the provisions of N.I. Act. The relevant paragraphs of the complaint are already reproduced in pages 8 and 9 of this judgment. In the opinion of this Court, if those pleadings are examined in the light of the test laid down in K.K. Ahuja’s case (supra), it is clear that there are sufficient pleadings in the complaint to implead all the officers of the petitioner company. In this view of the matter, point No.(i) is decided against the petitioner. 25. So far point No.(ii) regarding continuance of criminal proceedings despite pendency of three civil suits is concerned, in various judgments it has been held that when matter is purely a civil matter, criminal proceedings shall not be permitted to continue. In a recent judgment in Joseph Salvaraj A.’s case (supra), the apex Court held that such criminal proceedings cannot be allowed to go through the rigmarole when matter is purely civil in nature. In a recent judgment in Joseph Salvaraj A.’s case (supra), the apex Court held that such criminal proceedings cannot be allowed to go through the rigmarole when matter is purely civil in nature. In para 10 of the said judgment it is held that the allegations in the FIR clearly disclose a civil dispute between the parties and FIR seems to have been filed only with an intention to harass and humiliate the appellant. This was a pre-emptive move by the complainant. Thus, as per the said case, when the allegations mentioned in the FIR itself show it to be a civil dispute and no offence is made out, certainly in section 482 petition such proceedings can be quashed. The same view is taken by the apex Court in the judgment reported in (2009)1 SCC 516 (R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta) and (2010)8 SCC 442 (Rajeshwar Tiwari v. Nanda Kishore Roy). 26. The basic question which needs analysis is whether the complaint preferred by the respondent discloses a civil dispute only. In other words, whether a bare perusal of complaint discloses an offence which is cognizable under the N.I. Act or not. A bare reading of complaint shows that prima facie material/averments are available which disclose an offence under section 138 of N.I. Act. Thus, it is not a case whereby upon reading all the averments of complaint it can be said that it is only a civil dispute and no ingredients of N.I. Act are applicable. 27. The petitioners and respondent have narrated two diagonally opposite stories in their petition/complaint respectively. At this stage, in section 482 proceedings I am under no obligation to act as an appellate authority to appreciate respective cases on merits. The main test is whether on reading the complaint as such the offence under N.I. Act is attracted or not. Once the same is attracted, it is for the Court below to record the evidence and appreciate the respective cases of the parties. Thus, I find force in the argument of Shri Amit Lahoti that this Court, at this stage, cannot undertake to appreciate the evidence including the documentary evidence. 28. It is true as stated by Shri V.K. Saxena, learned senior counsel, that the powers under section 482 CrPC are tremendous powers and nothing prevents this Court to examine the documents filed by the petitioner. 28. It is true as stated by Shri V.K. Saxena, learned senior counsel, that the powers under section 482 CrPC are tremendous powers and nothing prevents this Court to examine the documents filed by the petitioner. It is true that in very rare cases the Court can examine the documents filed by the defence at this stage. However, the apex Court while dealing with this aspect in (2009)4 SCC 439 (Mahesh Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan), held as under in para 12 : “12. It is also well settled that save and except in very exceptional circumstances, the Court would not look to any document relied upon by the accused in support of his defence. Although allegations contained in the complaint petition may disclose a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue. For the purpose of exercising its jurisdiction, the superior Courts are also required to consider as to whether the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint petition fulfill the ingredients of the offences alleged against the accused.” (Emphasis supplied) 29. In (2008)13 SCC 678 (Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Limited v. Rajvir Industries Limited), in para 22 the apex Court held as under : “22. Ordinarily, a defence of an accused although appears to be plausible should not be taken into consideration for exercise of the said jurisdiction. Yet again, the High Court at the stage would not ordinarily enter into a disputed question of fact. It, however, does not mean that documents of unimpeachable character should not be taken into consideration at any cost for the purpose of finding out as to whether continuance of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of Court or that the complaint petition is filed for causing mere harassment to the accused. While we are not oblivious of the fact that although a larger number of disputes should ordinarily be determined only by the civil Courts, but criminal cases are filed only for achieving the ultimate goal, namely, to force the accused to pay the amount due to the complainant immediately. The Courts on the one hand should not encourage such a practice; but, on the other, cannot also travel beyond its jurisdiction to interfere with the proceeding which is otherwise genuine. The Courts on the one hand should not encourage such a practice; but, on the other, cannot also travel beyond its jurisdiction to interfere with the proceeding which is otherwise genuine. The Courts cannot also lose sight of the fact that in certain matters, both civil proceedings and criminal proceedings would be maintainable.” 30. Thus, as per the ratio of these judgments, this Court at this stage is ordinarily not required to enter into the disputed questions of facts.The respective stories advanced by the parties is yet to be examined by the Court below. In the opinion of this Court, there are no documents of unimpeachable character which shows that continuance of criminal proceedings/complaint case would be an abuse of process of law and complaint petition is filed to cause mere harassment to the petitioner. 31. In this view of the matter, I do not propose to examine the documents filed by the petitioner.The petitioners will be at liberty to rely on these documents in the complaint proceedings before the Court below. 32. Apart from this, merely because civil suits are pending, which have some factual similarily with the complaint case, will not absolve the petitioners from the liability under the N.I. Act. If prima facie it is clear that N.I. Act is attracted and necessary ingredients are there in the complaint, no interference is warranted in these section 482 proceedings. I find support from the similar view taken by Bombay High Court in the case reported in 1994 Cri.LJ 887 (Satishkumar s/o Premchand Jain v. Krishnagopal s/o Mohanlal Sarda). The Bombay High Court opined in para 17 as under : “17. The learned advocate for the applicant further submitted that the non-applicant has also filed a civil suit and hence the non-applicant cannot proceed with the present complaint and it should be quashed. It is not possible to accept this contention for the simple reason that the civil suit is for enforcing the civil liability while the prosecution is for punishment as the applicant is guilty of criminal offence.The conviction of the applicant in the present proceeding cannot enable the non-applicant to recover his amount. He can do this by filing the civil suit. Filing of civil suit and criminal proceedings are not alternate remedies available to the non-applicant. They create different types of rights in the non-applicant-complainant and he can legally proceed with both. He can do this by filing the civil suit. Filing of civil suit and criminal proceedings are not alternate remedies available to the non-applicant. They create different types of rights in the non-applicant-complainant and he can legally proceed with both. Hence, I reject this contention.” 33. Thus, I am unable to hold that merely because certain civil suits are pending between the parties, it will bestow any right to the petitioners to stop the proceedings under N.I. Act when necessary ingredients of N.I. Act are fulfilled by the respondent. 34. In view of answer to points No.(i) and (ii) raised by the petitioners, point No.(iii) is not required to be dealt with in extenso. Once it is held that at this stage no finding can be given on merits, I am unable to hold that either of the parties are unscrupulous/dishonest litigant. 35. In nutshell, since necessary ingredients to attract the provisions of N.I. Act are made out by the respondent, no interference in this 482 proceeding is warranted. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and has narrated the facts as stated by the parties only for the purpose of adjudication of the matter under section 482 CrPC. Petition is dismissed. No costs. .............