Research › Search › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 1495 (BOM)

Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Sunil

2012-08-08

S.S.SHINDE

body2012
Judgment : 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent, heard finally. 2. This petition takes exception to the judgment and order dated 11.11.2009, passed by the Judge, Labour Court, Aurangabad in I.D.A. No. 42 of 2005. 3. The respondents herein filed an application under Section 33 (C-2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (for short “the said Act”), bearing IDA No. 42 of 2005, before the Labour Court at Aurangabad praying for directions to the respondent No.29 to pay wages from January 1993 to 31.12.2001 alongwith interest. The respondent Nos. 1 to 28 had also prayed for prohibitory orders in the application. The Labour Court, on 3.3.2007, has passed “No W.S.” order in the said application against respondent No.29 and the petitioners herein. Respondent No.1 on 17.11.2007 had filed his affidavit as examination in chief before the Labour court and he was cross examined by the advocate for the petitioner on 29.1.2008. The ‘No W.S.’ order passed against the petitioner came to be set aside on 17.7.2009 by the Labour Court in view of the order passed below Exh. C-6 by the said Court. The petitioner, on 22.8.2009, has filed written say before the Labour Court Exh. C-7 in the said application. On 28.7.2009, the labour Court has framed issues below Exh. O-4. It is the case of the petitioners that respondent No.29 did not appear and lead the oral evidence before the Labour Court in the said proceeding. Similarly, the petitioner has also not led any oral evidence before the Labour Court. However, written say was filed by the petitioner herein. The Labour Court heard the matter on merits and passed impugned judgment and order on 11.11.2009, thereby allowing the application filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 28. Hence, this writ petition. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that, the respondent Nos. 1 to 28 are not employees of the petitioner and they have no legal right to assert their claim against the petitioner. The Labour Court without calculating the amount, qua each of the respondent Nos. 1 to 28, passed the impugned judgment and order, thereby directing the petitioner herein to pay the said amount. It is further submitted that out of 28 employees, one employee, had deposed before the Court, and in his cross examination he has specifically stated that he is deposing for himself and not for other employees. 1 to 28, passed the impugned judgment and order, thereby directing the petitioner herein to pay the said amount. It is further submitted that out of 28 employees, one employee, had deposed before the Court, and in his cross examination he has specifically stated that he is deposing for himself and not for other employees. Learned counsel also invited my attention to the admission given by the said employee in his cross examination. It is submitted that the Labour Court travelled beyond the pleadings and the prayers in the application and granted reliefs in favour of the applicants, which was not prayed by them. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner pressed into service an exposition of this court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. John Anton D’Souza and Ors, reported in 1996 I CLR 729 and submitted that it is only in case where the entitlement is determined, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 33-C(2) of the said Act. Learned counsel further placed reliance upon the reported judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High court in the case of Kakatiya Picture and Ors. Vs, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Warangal & Ors, reported in 2001 (90) FLR 1116 and submitted that the power of the Court under Section 33-C(2) of the said Act is very limited. As an executing Court, the Labour Court can exercise its jurisdiction only when a legal right clearly exists and not in a case where such right is required to be established. Learned counsel further pressed into service a reported judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Gurminder Singh & Ors Vs. Batal Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. Batala & Ors, reported in 1995 I CLR 910 and in particular para 6 of the said judgment and contend that where it is a question of determination of rights, a reference under Section 10 of the Act has to be sought and it is not within the purview of the Labour Court to make an investigation with a view to determine the status of the workman on the basis of evidence produced before it under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. Learned counsel further invited my attention to another reported judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Allahabad Development Authority vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Allahabad and Anr, reported in 2007 (114) FLR 440 and in particular para 10 of the said judgment, which more or less takes similar view, as taken by the other High Courts. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Allahabad High court in the case of District Manager, Food Corporation of India, Allahabad vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, and others, reported in 2007 (114) FLR 444, which reiterates the same view, as taken in the earlier judgments, referred herein above, by the Allahabad High Court. Therefore, relying upon the afore mentioned expositions of various High Courts, provisions of Section 33-C(2) of the said Act and also pleadings in the petition, annexures thereto, counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that this petition deserves to be allowed. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for contesting respondents submits that alongwith the application, a chart was placed on record, in which claim of each of the employees was mentioned. Learned counsel invited my attention to para 5 of the written statement filed by the petitioners herein before the Labour Court and submitted that the petitioner herein has accepted the liability and therefore, now it is not open for the petitioner to contend that petitioner is not responsible/liable to make the payment in pursuance to the order passed by the Labour Court. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents invited my attention to the exposition of the Supreme Court in the case of VijayaBank vs. Shyamal Kumar Lodh, reported in (2010) 7 SCC 635 and in particular para 16 of the said judgment and submitted that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain application under section 33-C(2) of the said Act, therefore, the Labour Court has rightly passed the order exercising jurisdiction and therefore, this court may not interfere in the impugned judgment and order. Learned counsel also invited my attention to the affidavit in reply filed on behalf the respondents and submitted that after considering all aspects of the matter, the Labour court has passed the impugned order. Therefore, this Court in the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction may not interfere in the impugned judgment and order, passed by the Labour Court. Learned counsel also invited my attention to the affidavit in reply filed on behalf the respondents and submitted that after considering all aspects of the matter, the Labour court has passed the impugned order. Therefore, this Court in the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction may not interfere in the impugned judgment and order, passed by the Labour Court. Learned counsel invited my attention to the provisions of Section 33-C(2) sub Section 5 and submitted that in view of the said provisions, one applicant can file an application on behalf of others and in the present case, out of 28 respondents, one employee filed the said application, therefore, it cannot be said that the said application was not on behalf of other 28 employees. 6. I have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced by the respective counsel. I have also perused the contents in the writ petition, annexures thereto, reply filed by the respondents and the judgments cited by the counsel appearing for the parties. At the outset, it would be relevant to reproduce herein below the prayers in the application, which was filed by the respondent nos. 1 to 28 before the Labour court. The said prayers read thus:- “A) To allow this application. B) To direct the respondent No.1 to pay the wages since from January 1997 to 31st December, 2001 to the applicants in the interest of justice. C) That, the necessary prohibitory orders as against the respondent No. 1 & 2 may kindly be issued in pursuance of the advertisement dated 25.8.2005 in the interest of justice. D) Any other suitable and equitable relief may kindly be granted in favour of the applicants.” Therefore, upon perusal of prayer “B” in the said application, it is crystal clear that, respondent Nos. 1 to 28 herein, who are original applicants sought directions to non applicant No.1 before the Labour court, to pay wages from January, 1997 to 31st December, 2001. Admittedly, the petitioner herein was the respondent No.2 before the Labour Court. Respondent Nos. 1 to 28 herein, by way of prayer clause “C” sought prohibitory orders against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 not to take any steps in pursuance to the advertisement dated 25.8.2005. Therefore, so far as the payment of wages is concerned, the prayer “B” is relevant. 7. Respondent Nos. 1 to 28 herein, by way of prayer clause “C” sought prohibitory orders against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 not to take any steps in pursuance to the advertisement dated 25.8.2005. Therefore, so far as the payment of wages is concerned, the prayer “B” is relevant. 7. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to reproduce herein below the provisions of Section 33-C(2) of the said act, which reads thus:- “33-C(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government; 1[within a period not exceeding three months:] 2*[Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.] ” Upon perusal of the provisions of said section, it is abundantly clear that the said provisions contemplates the situation, where any workman is entitled to received from the employer money or any benefit. In the present case, admittedly, respondent No.29 is employer of the respondent Nos. 1 to 28 herein. It is further admitted position that respondent No.29 did not lead any evidence before the Labour Court. Therefore, upon careful perusal of the prayers in the application, which was filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 28, it is abundantly clear that reliefs of wages or monetary reliefs sought were only against respondent No.29 herein-employer. However, the Court directed petitioner to pay the wages as claimed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 28. Therefore, there is no manner of doubt that, the Labour Court travelled beyond the pleadings in the application and granted reliefs against the petitioner. The concerned court should have confined itself to the prayers in the application. As observed earlier, the relief of monetary or relief of wages under relevant provisions is contemplated against the employer only. The petitioner herein is not the employer of the respondent Nos. 1 to 28. 8. The concerned court should have confined itself to the prayers in the application. As observed earlier, the relief of monetary or relief of wages under relevant provisions is contemplated against the employer only. The petitioner herein is not the employer of the respondent Nos. 1 to 28. 8. Counsel appearing for the petitioner has rightly contended that one employee entered into witness box on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 28 and has given admission that he is deposing for himself, therefore, the Labour Court ought to have taken into consideration the cross examination of the said employee that, he has confined the said statement before the court qua his own case and not on behalf of other employees. There are other admissions given in the cross examination of the said employee, however, it is not necessary to elaborate the said aspects. 9. Though learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 28 was at pains to argue that the petitioner herein in written statement has admitted the claim, said contention is devoid of any merits. It appears that in para 5 there is some error/mistake, however, the reply of the present petitioner before the Labour Court, if taken into consideration in its entirety, there is no manner of doubt that the respondent No.2 has never admitted the liability. 10. Though, counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 28 is right in placing reliance upon the reported judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of VijayaBank (supra), however, for the reasons aforesaid, it is not necessary to enter into the issue of jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Suffice it to say that the Labour Court has travelled beyond pleadings and prayers in the application. The petitioner is not employer of the respondent Nos. 1 to 28. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order is quashed and set aside. 11. Rule is made absolute to the above extent. Writ petition is allowed and disposed of. 12. Disposal of this writ petition will not come in the way of the respondent Nos. 1 to 28 to file further application against the employer i.e. respondent No.29 herein, praying for relief under section 33-C(2) of the said Act. 11. Rule is made absolute to the above extent. Writ petition is allowed and disposed of. 12. Disposal of this writ petition will not come in the way of the respondent Nos. 1 to 28 to file further application against the employer i.e. respondent No.29 herein, praying for relief under section 33-C(2) of the said Act. This Court has not expressed any opinion about the maintainability of the application, and upon presentation of such application, if any, it is for the concerned Court to hear the parties and to decide the said application on its own merits.