JUDGMENT 1. This is defendants first appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the C.P.C.) against the Judgment and Decree dated 30-01-2004 passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Durg in Civil Appeal No. 5A of 2002 whereby and whereunder the plaintiffs suit filed for eviction of the appellant has been decreed. 2. To appreciate the controversy raised in the appeal, a few relevant facts may be stated. 3. Smt. Savita Devi owned a plot at station road, Durg, having dimension of 126 feet on the north, 90 feet on the south, 60.9 feet on the east and 60 feet on the west (hereinafter referred to as the suit accommodation). Late Aditya Narayan Tiwari was a tenant on this plot on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/- and he was running saw mill there. 4. According to the original plaintiff Smt. Sheela Devi, she purchased the suit accommodation on 11-03-1970 from Smt. Savita Devi through registered sale deed and since then she is the owner of the suit accommodation. The intimation about the purchase was given by the plaintiff to the tenant. However, the original tenant Aditya Narayan Tiwari did not pay the rent and stated that prior to transfer of the suit accommodation to the plaintiff, he had entered into an oral agreement for sale on 21-10-1969 with the original owner Smt. Savita Devi for a sum of Rs. 9,000/- and had paid Rs. 1000/- as advance to Smt. Savita Devi. However, this contention of Aditya Narayan Tiwari was contradicted by Smt. Savita Devi, who stated that she had sold the property to the plaintiff Smt. Sheela Devi. 5. Said Aditya Narayan Tiwari, thereafter, filed a suit for specific performance of contract, bearing Civil Suit No. 9A/1971, in the Court of Civil Judge, Class-1, against Smt. Savita Devi and Smt. Sheela Devi. The above suit was decreed on 23-07-1973 in his favour. 6. The plaintiff and Smt. Savita Devi preferred first appeal against the judgment and decree of Civil Judge and the same was dismissed by the first appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 30-03-1974. Against the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, the plaintiff and Smt. Savita Devi preferred Second Appeal No. 3661/1974 before the Hon’ble High Court of M.P. at Jabalpur. Against the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, the plaintiff and Smt. Savita Devi preferred Second Appeal No. 3661/1974 before the Hon’ble High Court of M.P. at Jabalpur. The Hon’ble High Court of M.P. allowed the Second Appeal vide its judgment and decree dated 24-11-1981 and set aside the judgment and decrees of both the Courts below. 7. Aditya Narayan Tiwari preferred a special leave petition (civil) No. 1946/82 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.P. vide order dated 28-11-1991. 8. The original plaintiff gave a legal notice to Aditya Narayan Tiwari dated 08-02-1988 directing him to vacate the suit accommodation terminating the tenancy and further directing him to pay arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 3600/- for the last three years. 9. However, the appellant/defendant did not vacate the suit accommodation nor did pay the arrears of rent. The plaintiff did not file the suit immediately after service of legal notice as there was stay order in favour of defendant by the Supreme Court and as the S.L.P. of the defendant was dismissed on 28-11-1991, even after dismissal of the S.L.P., the appellant did not pay the rent nor did handover the suit accommodation to the plaintiff. Therefore, the suit for eviction and arrears of rent was filed. 10. According to original plaintiff, she was in the bona fide need of the suit accommodation for her business. 11. During the pendency of the suit, the original plaintiff has died on 6-11-1997 and her legal representatives including Anil Sabbarwal were brought on record in her place on 19-03-1998. Vide order dated 12-05-2000, the trial Court permitted the legal representatives of deceased plaintiff Smt. Sheela Devi for deleting the plea of bona fide need of Smt. Sheela Devi and for adding the plea bona fide need of Anil Sabbarwal. 12. The defendant No. 1, in his written statement, stated that the suit accommodation was taken on rent by Aditya Narayan Tiwari on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/- and was a permanent tenant. After taking the land on rent, he invested lakhs of rupees in levelling and construction. Late Aditya Narayan Tiwari had subsequently entered into oral agreement of sale with the original owner Smt. Savita Devi through her husband Biththal Das, for purchase of the suit accommodation, for a sale consideration of Rs. 9,000/- and had paid Rs. 1000/- as advance. After taking the land on rent, he invested lakhs of rupees in levelling and construction. Late Aditya Narayan Tiwari had subsequently entered into oral agreement of sale with the original owner Smt. Savita Devi through her husband Biththal Das, for purchase of the suit accommodation, for a sale consideration of Rs. 9,000/- and had paid Rs. 1000/- as advance. Smt. Savita Devi agreed to execute the sale deed on 30-03-1970 in his favour after receiving full sale consideration. Late Aditya Narayan Tiwari informed the husband of the plaintiff - Smt. Sheela Devi regarding the above oral agreement of sale. Also requested Smt. Savita Devi and Biththal Das to execute the sale deed, however, they did not execute the sale deed. Then a notice dated 09-04-1970 was sent to Smt. Savita Devi directing her to execute the sale deed as per agreement of sale and thereafter a suit for specific performance was filed by late Aditya Narayan Tiwari. It was admitted by the defendant No. 1 that the suit for specific performance filed by late Aditya Narayan Tiwari was dismissed on the ground that in the plaint it has not been pleaded that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. However, it was contended by the defendant that Smt. Savita Devi and Biththal Das had executed an agreement of sale of suit accommodation in favour late Aditya Narayan and had immediately given possession to him and since then late Aditya Narayan Tiwari was in possession of the suit accommodation as purchaser till his lifetime and after his death, the defendants are in possession, and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to obtain possession of the suit accommodation as she is claiming her title through Savita Devi and Biththal Das, and as such, she is their representative. Thus, the plaintiff as the representative of Smt. Savita Devi has a right to obtain the remaining consideration and after that execute a registered sale deed in favour of the defendants but she is not entitled to obtain vacant possession. It was further submitted by the defendants that Biththal Das had returned the sum of Rs.15,000/- to Smt. Sheela Devi as refund towards consideration of the sale deed, and as such, the sale in favour of the plaintiff had been foreclosed with the consent of both and so also the plaintiff was not authorized to file a suit. 13. It was further submitted by the defendants that Biththal Das had returned the sum of Rs.15,000/- to Smt. Sheela Devi as refund towards consideration of the sale deed, and as such, the sale in favour of the plaintiff had been foreclosed with the consent of both and so also the plaintiff was not authorized to file a suit. 13. Apart from the above submissions, the defendant further submitted that even if the plaintiff is considered to be landlord and the defendant being her tenant, in that case also she is not entitled for eviction because the suit accommodation in question has been leased out in contravention of the provisions of the Land Revenue Code, and as such, the defendant has become occupancy tenant and in these circumstances she shall only be entitled to recover monthly rent of Rs. 100/-. 14. The defendant No. 2 was proceeded ex parte. 15. The trial Court, on the basis of the pleadings of the respective parties, framed the following issues as under : i) Whether the defendants are tenants of plaintiff of the suit accommodation? ii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover Rs. 1400/- as arrears of rent? iii) Whether the plaintiffs bona fidely requires the suit accommodation for his own business? iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages@ Rs. 30/- per day from 29-11-1991 to 29-09-93 amounting to Rs. 20100/-? v) Whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear the suit? 16. The plaintiff examined Anil Sabbarwal P.W. 1 whereas the defendant examined Girija Shankar Tiwari as D.W.1, Jagdish Prasad Tiwari as D.W.2 in support of their case. 17. The trial Court decreed the suit by the judgment impugned holding the defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff of the suit accommodation; plaintiff requires the disputed suit accommodation bona fidely for the business of Anil Sabbarwal; plaintiffs are also entitled for the arrears of rent w.e.f. March, 1999; accordingly directed the defendants to pay arrears of rent and hand over the vacant possession of the suit accommodation within a period of two months. Hence, this first appeal. 18. During the pendency of the appeal, respondent No. 2/defendant No. 2 has died and his name has been deleted from the cause title of the memo of appeal. 19. Hence, this first appeal. 18. During the pendency of the appeal, respondent No. 2/defendant No. 2 has died and his name has been deleted from the cause title of the memo of appeal. 19. Although the judgment and decree of the trial Court has been assailed by the appellant in the memorandum of appeal assailing the finding of bona fide need arrived at by the trial Court but during the course of arguments, Shri B.P. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailed the judgment and decree of the trial Court also on the following grounds; a) the appellant is holding the suit accommodation as a prospective vendor and in part-performance of the agreement to purchase the property, which relationship has superseded the erstwhile tenancy relationship and altered the nature and character of the appellants possession over the suit accommodation from that of tenant to that of a purchaser-in-possession in part-performance of agreement to sell the property. b) after the death of Smt. Sheela Devi, the original plaintiff, the right acquired by the present plaintiffs by succession is a transfer, within the meaning of Section 12(4) of the C.G. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short the Act of 1961) and the suit filed by them within a period of one year from date of acquisition of title was not maintainable. c) the bona fide need pleaded by the original plaintiff was her personal need and not of members of her family. On the death of original plaintiff, her right to seek eviction on the ground of personal requirement for the suit accommodation became extinct and the trial Court has fallen in error in passing the eviction decree on the basis of bona fide need of one of her legal representatives, i.e. Anil Sabbarwal, in the same suit. For this, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of High Court of M.P. in the case of Pushkar Sharma and others v. Smt. Sudha Mishra, 1996 JLJ 524 : AIR 1996 MP 177 the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Joseph Kantharaj and another v. Attharunnisa Begum S., (2010) 2 SCC 619 : AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 670, Sheshambal (dead) through L.Rs. v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and others, (2010) 3 SCC 470 : AIR 2010 SC 1521 and P. Veerappa v. M.A. Mohammad Amannullah, 1996 (1) SCC 415 : AIR 1996 SC 2917 . 20. v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and others, (2010) 3 SCC 470 : AIR 2010 SC 1521 and P. Veerappa v. M.A. Mohammad Amannullah, 1996 (1) SCC 415 : AIR 1996 SC 2917 . 20. Per contra, supporting the judgment and decree impugned, Smt. Fouzia Mirza, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents, would submit : the judgment and decree is strictly in conformity with the provisions of the Act of 1961. The plaintiff needs suit accommodation bona fidely for the business of wood and furniture and the plea of the appellant/defendant that the plaintiffs want to sell away the suit accommodation and want to settle down elsewhere has not been proved by the appellant/tenant and is also neither rationale nor sustainable. It was further contended that the amendment with regard to bona fide need of Anil Sabbarwal has been incorporated on 12-05-2000, much after the expiry of one year from the date of inheritance and the bar contained in Section 12(4) of the Act of 1961 is at all not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It was further contended that the appellant/defendant did not enter into written agreement of sale, which is pre-requisite for application of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (henceforth the Act of 1882). The appellant/defendant also failed to allege and prove that Smt. Savita Devi delivered the possession of the suit accommodation in part-performance of alleged contract and nature and character of possession of the appellant was and is as tenant and not as a prospective vendor. It is also submitted after the death of original plaintiff-Smt. Sheela Devi, the legal representatives were brought on record, pleadings were amended under Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC, both the parties led evidence, and therefore, no prejudice is caused to the tenant and the need cannot get eclipsed. Smt. Fouzia Mirza has placed reliance upon the judgments of Supreme Court in the cases of P. Veerappa v. M.A. Mohammad Amannullah, AIR 1996 SC 2917 (supra), Shakuntala Bai and others v. Narayan Das and others, (2004) 5 SCC 772 : AIR 2004 SC 3484 and Raghunath G. Panhale (dead) by L.Rs. v. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co., (1999) 8 SCC 1 : AIR 1999 SC 3864 . 21. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the Court below including the judgment and decree impugned. 22. v. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co., (1999) 8 SCC 1 : AIR 1999 SC 3864 . 21. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the Court below including the judgment and decree impugned. 22. Indisputably, late Aditya Narayan Tiwari was a tenant on the suit accommodation on a rent of Rs. 100/- per month and was running a saw mill. It is also not in dispute that the alleged agreement of sale was oral and not written and the suit for specific performance of contract filed by late Aditya Narayan Tiwari was dismissed on merits. As per factual finding recorded by the High Court of M.P. in Second Appeal No. 391 of 1974 (Ex.P.8), late Aditya Narayan Tiwari continued to pay rent upto 31-03-1970, i.e. even after entering into alleged oral agreement of sale on 20-10-1969. 23. Section 53A of the Act of 1882 reads as under : 53-A. Part performance. Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty : and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract. and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. then, notwithstanding that (...) where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract : Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof. 24. 24. The conditions necessary for making out the defence of part-performance to an action in ejectment by the owner are : (i) that the transferor has contracted to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty; (ii) that the transferee, has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract. (iii) that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract; and (iv) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. (Please see Nathulal v. Phoolchand, 1969 (3) SCC 120 B : AIR 1970 SC 546 (para 9) and D. S. Parvathamma v. A. Srinivasan, (2003) 4 SCC 705 : AIR 2003 SC 3542 (para 6). 25. The alleged agreement of sale was not in writing; the suit for specific performance of contract filed by late Aditya Narayan Tiwari has been dismissed on merits and his disentitlement to seek enforcement of the contract has been adjudicated upon by a judicial verdict, and therefore, it cannot be said that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. Further, the appellant failed to adduce any evidence showing he has, in part-performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or in part thereof or he being already in possession as tenant, continues in possession in part-performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract. 26. The Supreme Court, in the case of D. S. Parvathamma v. A. Srinivasan, (2003) 4 SCC 705 : AIR 2003 SC 3542 , has held that if defendants suit for specific performance of the contract filed by the transferee has been dismissed on merits and his disentitlement to seek enforcement of the contract has been adjudicated upon by a judicial verdict, it cannot be said that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract and observed in paras 6, 9 and 10 of its judgment as under : 6. The essential features of the equitable doctrine of part-performance as statutorily modified and incorporated in Section 53-A abovesaid, to the extent relevant for the purposes of this case, are : (i) that the transferee has, in part-performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part-performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, (ii) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, and (iii) that the plea of part-performance is not available to be raised against a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part-performance thereof. 9. Secondly, the appellant has failed to allege and prove that he was delivered possession in part-performance of the contract or he, being already in possession as lessee, continued in possession in part-performance of the agreement to purchase i.e. by mutual agreement between the parties his possession as lessee ceased and commenced as that of a transferee under the contract. On the contrary, there is a finding recorded in the earlier suit that in spite of his having entered into a contract to purchase the property he had not disowned his character as lessee and he was treated as such by the parties. The judgment dated 1-9-1999 in the civil suit notes the conduct of the plaintiff as inconsistent with his conduct as a vendee-in-possession. When a person already in possession of the property in some other capacity enters into a contract to purchase the property, to confer the benefit of protecting possession under the plea of part-performance, his act effective from that day must be consistent with the contract alleged and also such as cannot be referred to the preceding title. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh had occasion to deal with the facts very near to the fact before us in Bhagwandas Parsadilal v. Surajmal, AIR 1961 MP 237 . A tenant-in-possession entered into an agreement to purchase the house forming the subject-matter of tenancy. However, he failed to show his nature of possession having altered from that of a tenant into that of a transferee. In a suit of ejectment based on landlord-tenant relationship, the tenant sought to protect his possession by raising the plea of part-performance as against the subsequent purchaser of the property. However, he failed to show his nature of possession having altered from that of a tenant into that of a transferee. In a suit of ejectment based on landlord-tenant relationship, the tenant sought to protect his possession by raising the plea of part-performance as against the subsequent purchaser of the property. Referring to Section 91 of the Indian Trusts Act, the High Court held that a subsequent purchaser of the property with notice of an existing contract affecting that property must hold the property for the benefit of the person in whose favour the prior agreement to sell has been executed to the extent it is necessary to give effect to that contract. But that does not mean that till a final decision has been reached the contract creates a right in the person-in-possession i.e. the tenant, to refuse to surrender possession of the premises even if such possession was obtained by him not in part-performance of the contract but in his capacity as a tenant. Having entered into possession as a tenant and having continued to remain in possession in that capacity he cannot be heard to say that by reason of the agreement to sell his possession was no longer that of a tenant. (Also see Dakshinamurthi Mudaliar v. Dhanakoti Ammal, AIR 1925 Mad 965 and A.M.A. Sultan v. Seydu Zohra Beevi, AIR 1990 Ker 1869. In our opinion the law has been correctly stated by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the abovesaid decision. 10. Thirdly, as already stated hereinabove, in view of his suit for specific performance having been dismissed, it cannot be said that he had performed or was willing to perform his part of the contract. 27. In our opinion the law has been correctly stated by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the abovesaid decision. 10. Thirdly, as already stated hereinabove, in view of his suit for specific performance having been dismissed, it cannot be said that he had performed or was willing to perform his part of the contract. 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Joseph Kantharaj and another v. Attharunnisa Begum S., AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 670 (supra) relied upon by Shri B.P. Sharma, in a case where the suit for specific performance of the contract filed by the prospective vendor was pending consideration and in a suit for eviction, he took specific plea that the previous owner had executed an agreement of sale and permitted him to continue in possession in part-performance of the said agreement of the sale and that therefore, he ceased to be a tenant from the date of agreement, had stayed the eviction suit till decision of the suit filed by the prospective vendor for specific performance of agreement of sale with a condition that in the event of the first appellant failing in the suit for specific performance, the respondent will be entitled to seek restoration of eviction petition and pursue it in accordance with law. The Supreme Court, in the above case, has also held: the Court should be cautious that mere assertion by a tenant that he is in possession in part-performance of an agreement of sale, or the mere filing of a suit for specific performance, by itself will not lead to deferment of the eviction proceedings. In the instant case, the suit filed by late Aditya Narayan Tiwari for specific performance of a contract has already been dismissed meaning thereby, the appellant failed to fulfill the pre-condition for application of doctrine of part-performance that he has performed or was willing to perform his part of the contract and the ratio of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case is of no help to the appellant. 28. 28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is crystal clear that the ground raised by Shri B. P. Sharma that from the date of execution of agreement of sale, the appellant is holding the suit accommodation as a prospective vendor and in part-performance of the agreement to purchase the property, which relationship has superseded the erstwhile tenancy relationship and altered the nature and character of the appellants possession over the suit accommodation from that of tenant to that of a purchaser-in-possession in part-performance of agreement to sell the property, is devoid of merit. 29. Now, I shall examine the other grounds (b) & (c) raised by the appellants counsel. 30. As per Section 12(4) of the Act of 1961, where a landlord has acquired any accommodation by transfer, no suit for the eviction of tenant shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) on the ground specified in Clause (e) or Clause (f) thereof, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of the acquisition. 31. The learned Single Judge of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Pushkar Sharma and others v. Smt. Sudha Mishra, AIR 1996 MP 177 has observed as under : The acquisition of the right, title and interest may be by way of some transfer. But in any case it is an acquisition. It cannot be gainsaid that the acquisition can be by two modes i.e. by way of transfer under Transfer of Property Act and by way of succession under Indian Succession Act. In either of the case the title passes to the transferee. The accommodation is acquired by transfer irrespective of whether it is by way of sale, mortgage, gift or any other mode known under the Transfer of Property Act and such a transfer would also include a transfer which becomes effective only on the death of the testator. The plaintiff prior to the death of the testator had no right in the property. The succession would open on the death and the Will would become effective immediately. Under these circumstances even if the plaintiff acquired in the succession, then too the bar of S. 12(4) is applicable. 32. The plaintiff prior to the death of the testator had no right in the property. The succession would open on the death and the Will would become effective immediately. Under these circumstances even if the plaintiff acquired in the succession, then too the bar of S. 12(4) is applicable. 32. The other learned single Judge of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Nisar Ahmad Qureshi v. Hazra Begam, 1997 (2) MPLJ 17 has held: the words acquire or transfer referred in Section 12(4) or proviso to Section 23-A are not used in a very wide sense. They are used in a narrow sense. These words were confined to getting of ownership solely on the volition of transferor and the transferee without interference by any natural event like death. The word transfer was used in the sense of conveyance as understood in English Law. The provisions under the two sections cannot apply to a transaction when it became operative on the death of a party. Such acquirement of an accommodation would not be a transfer within the meaning of provisions contained in Section 12(4) of the Act of 1961, thus, has expressed a different view on the point given by the learned Single Judge of M.P. High Court in the case of Pushkar Sharma and others v. Smt. P. Sudha Mishra, AIR 1996 MP 177 (supra). 33. Be that as it may, in the present case, the bona fide need of one of the legal representatives of late Smt. Sheela Devi, i.e. Anil Sabbarwal, was pleaded on 12-05-2000, i.e. much after the period of one year from the date of death of Smt. Sheela Devi. The suit for eviction of a tenant, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, at the most, can be held to be filed on the ground of bona fide need of Anil Sabbarwal on 12-05-2000, the therefore, the bar contained in Section 12(4) of the Act is not applicable in the present case. 34. For the same reason, I do not find any scope to refer the matter to larger bench to settle the law on this point, and therefore, the application under Rule 32 of the Chhattisgarh High Court Rules, 2007 filed by the appellant also deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 35. 34. For the same reason, I do not find any scope to refer the matter to larger bench to settle the law on this point, and therefore, the application under Rule 32 of the Chhattisgarh High Court Rules, 2007 filed by the appellant also deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 35. The Supreme Court, in the case of Shakuntala Bai and others v. Narayan Das and others, AIR 2004 SC 3484 (supra) has observed in paras 15 and 16 of its judgment as under : 15. As the preamble shows, the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 has been enacted for expeditious trial of eviction cases on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlords and generally to regulate and control eviction of tenants. If the subsequent event like the death of the landlord is to be taken note of at every stage till the decree attains finality, there will be no end to litigation. By the time a second appeal gets decided by the High Court, generally a long period elapses and on such a principle if during this period the landlord who instituted the proceedings dies, the suit will have to be dismissed without going into merits. The same thing may happen in a fresh suit filed by the heirs it may become an unending process. Taking into consideration the subsequent events may, at times, lead to rendering the whole proceedings taken infructuous and colossal waste of public time. There is no warrant for interpreting a rent control legislation in such a manner, the basic object of which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The object is not to deprive the owners of their properties for all times to come. 16. There is another aspect of the matter which needs consideration. After the case had been remanded, the plaint had been amended and the need of the sons had been set up who had all attained majority by that time. The Courts thereafter proceeded to decide the controversy on the basis of the need of the sons and the lower appellate Court, after finding their need to be bona fide, passed a decree for eviction in their favour. The Courts thereafter proceeded to decide the controversy on the basis of the need of the sons and the lower appellate Court, after finding their need to be bona fide, passed a decree for eviction in their favour. In the second appeal preferred by the tenant, the High Court, instead of examining the issues on the basis of which the case had been decided, went on to hold that on account of death of Girdhari Lal, the need set up by him came to an end and on that finding dismissed the suit. The parties having amended their respective pleadings and the two Courts below having decided the matter on such amended pleadings and the evidence adduced thereon, it was wholly impermissible on the part of the High Court to examine the question as to the effect of death of the original plaintiff and thereafter to dismiss the suit on the finding that his need having come to an end, the suit ought to have been dismissed. It is well settled that when amendment is allowed, the proceedings have to be decided on the basis of such amended pleadings. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court is wholly illegal. 36. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is crystal clear that the trial Court was conscious of the facts that after the death of Smt. Sheela Devi, her bona fide need ceased to exist and permitted her legal representative to amend the plaint and plead the need of her legal representative, i.e., Anil Sabbarwal, in her place. The same was not objected by the appellant, on the other hand, by way of amendment a specific defence has been taken by the appellant that his need is not genuine. The parties having amended their respective pleadings and the Court below having decided the matter on such amended pleadings and the evidence adduced thereon, the question raised by the appellants counsel that after death of Smt. Sheela Devi, the need set up by her comes to an end and on that finding the suit is liable to be dismissed is also devoid of merit. The ratio of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Shakuntala Bai and others : ( AIR 2004 SC 3484 ) (supra) squarely applies in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 37. The ratio of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Shakuntala Bai and others : ( AIR 2004 SC 3484 ) (supra) squarely applies in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 37. In the case of Sheshambal (dead) through L. Rs. v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and others : ( AIR 2010 SC 1521 ) (supra), the Supreme Court has observed in para 21 as under : 21. To the same effect is the decision of this Court Baba Kashinath Bhinge case, (1994 Supp. 3 SCC 698) where relying upon the decision in Hasmat Rai case, ( 1981 3 SCC 103 ) : ( AIR 1981 SC 1711 ) this Court held that in a case of bona fide requirement it is necessary to establish that the landlord needs the premises and the need subsists till a decree is passed in his favour. In a case where such need is available at the time of the filing of the petition but becomes extinct by the time the matter attains finality in appeal for revision no decree will be justified. For that purpose the Court should take all the subsequent events into consideration and mould the relief accordingly. 38. In the instant case, the pleadings were amended and the need of the one of the legal representatives, i.e., Anil Sabbarwal, has been set up and proved by the plaintiffs, and therefore, the ratio of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sheshambal (dead) through L. Rs. v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and others : ( AIR 2010 SC 1521 ) (supra) is also of no help to the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 39. In view of above, the other grounds (b) and (c) raised by the appellants counsel are also sans substance. 40. Admittedly, late Aditya Narayan Tiwari entered into suit accommodation as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-. The suit land comes within the definition of accommodation, within the meaning of Section 2(a)(i) of the Act of 1961. Therefore, the plea regarding Mourishi Kastkar and permanent tenant taken by the appellant is on the face devoid of merit. 41. Admittedly, late Aditya Narayan Tiwari entered into suit accommodation as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-. The suit land comes within the definition of accommodation, within the meaning of Section 2(a)(i) of the Act of 1961. Therefore, the plea regarding Mourishi Kastkar and permanent tenant taken by the appellant is on the face devoid of merit. 41. As regards bona fide need of the plaintiff, a bare perusal of the evidence adduced by the appellant would reveal that he did not utter a single word to challenge the bona fide need of the appellant. His whole effort was to claim ownership. The son previously was assisting his father does not mean that he cannot start his own business after death of his father. The appropriate licence for running the business can only be obtained when there is vacant premises available and in the absence of any vacant premises, licence cannot be obtained and merely because he had no licence to run the shop cannot be a ground to hold, the need of landlord is not genuine, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and others v. Atul Fasterns Ltd., (2007) 4 SCC 471 . 42. As per the plaintiffs evidence, Anil Sabbarwal is unemployed and he bona fidely required the suit accommodation for the purpose of starting his business. On facts, I do not find any infirmity in the finding recorded by the trial Court that the suit accommodation is required by the plaintiffs for the purpose of starting business of Anil Sabbarwal. 43. The document filed by the appellant along with the application under O. 41, Rule 27 of the C. P. C. is not relevant to enable this Court to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, inasmuch as, the sale deed annexed along with the application does not belong to the respondent or his father but is the land of his uncle, and therefore, I do not find any ground to admit the above document at the appellate stage and the application deserves to be and is hereby dismissed also. 44. For the reasons mentioned herein above, I do not find any merit in the appeal. The appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 45. A decree be drawn accordingly. 46. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.