JUDGMENT : S. Manikumar, J. Being aggrieved by the finding fixing negligence on the driver of a private passenger bus, bearing Regn. No. TN47 S-3800, insured with the appellant, Company and the quantum of compensation;' of Rs. 3,31,500/-, with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, awarded to two daughters, and a son of the deceased Pachammal, the Insurance Company has preferred this appeal. Out of two daughters, the 1st respondent, Sumathy, is stated to have been married. 2. According to the respondents, that on 1-5-2009, when the deceased was proceeding to Neelapadi, in a private bus owned by M/s. Vinayagam Transports, bearing Regn. No. TN47 S-3800, belonging to one Thirumurugan, the 4th respondent herein, about 5.00 am., the bus stopped at Neelapadi bus stop. When the deceased was alighting from the bus, the driver without noticing her, suddenly started the bus and as a result of which, she fell down and that the rear wheel of the bus ran over the deceased. Though, she was rushed to Government Hospital, Tiruvarur, for better treatment, she was referred to Thanjavur Hospital and in spite of treatment, she died. A case in Crime No. 282 of 2009, has been registered against the driver of the private transport bus, under Sections 279 and 304(A), Indian Penal Code on the file of Ktzhvelur Police Station. Before the Claims Tribunal, the 4th respondent, owner of the vehicle remained ex parte. 3. The appellant-Insurance Company denied the manner of accident. The Insurance Company further submitted that the driver of the bus did not possess a valid and effective driving licence. There was no permit to drive the vehicle. Without prejudice to the above, they also disputed the age, avocation, income and the quantum of compensation claimed under various heads. 4. The 1st respondent, Sumathy, examined herself as PW 1, PW2, Post-mortem certificate, Ex. P3, MVI's Report, Ex. P4, legal heirship certificate, Ex. P5, death certificate, Ex. P6 Voter's ID card of the deceased, Ex. P7, Certificate of Insurance, Ex. P8, Driving licence of the driver, Ex. P9, Death certificate of 2nd petitioner/claimant, who died during the pendency of the claim, and Ex. P10, Copy of Application filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate's Court No.1, Nagapattinam and returned, have been marked on the side of the claimants. RW 1, is the Assistant Manager of the National Insurance Company, Thiruvarur. Ex. P8, Driving licence of the driver, Ex. P9, Death certificate of 2nd petitioner/claimant, who died during the pendency of the claim, and Ex. P10, Copy of Application filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate's Court No.1, Nagapattinam and returned, have been marked on the side of the claimants. RW 1, is the Assistant Manager of the National Insurance Company, Thiruvarur. Ex. R1, Ration Card of the deceased and Ex. R2, Legal Heirship Certificate of the deceased, have been marked on the side of the Insurance Company. 5. The tribunal on evaluation of pleadings and evidence found that the driver of the bus bearing Regn. No. TN47 S 3800 and insured with the 4th respondent herein was negligent in causing the accident and accordingly, quantified the compensation at Rs. 3,31,500/- with interest, at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of claim. 6. The claims Tribunal having regard to the age of the deceased, 45 years, as per entry in Ex. P2, Post-mortem certificate, legal heirship certificate and ration card, determined the age as 48 years. Fixing the income of the deceased at Rs. 100/- per day and after deducting 1/3rd towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased, the Claims Tribunal applied 13' multiplier, applicable to the age group of persons between 45 and 50 years, and quantified, the loss of contribution to the family at Rs. 3,12,000/-. In addition to the above, Rs. 2,500/- has been awarded towards loss of estate, Rs. 5,000/- towards transportation charges, Rs. 2,000/- for funeral expenses. A sum of Rs. 10,000/- has been awarded under the head loss of love and affection to the daughters. One of the legal heirs, Mr. Kumar, who made a claim along with daughters, died during the pendency of the claim petition. To prove the same, Ex. P9, death certificate has been marked. 7. Though, an objection for payment of compensation to the married daughters has been made, by observing that merely because the daughters are married, that by itself would not be a ground to deny compensation, on the ground that they are not dependents of the mother, the claims tribunal awarded a total compensation of Rs. 3,31,500/-, as stated supra and consequently, directed the appellant Insurance Company, the insurer of the vehicle to deposit the abovesaid amount within ode month from the date of the award with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum. 3,31,500/-, as stated supra and consequently, directed the appellant Insurance Company, the insurer of the vehicle to deposit the abovesaid amount within ode month from the date of the award with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum. 8. Assailing the correctness of the finding fixing negligence on the driver of the private transport bus, Mr. J. Chandran, the learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company, submitted that the tribunal has erred in fixing negligence on the driver of the bus. He also submitted that the reasoning of the tribunal that merely because, the daughters are married, that by itself would not be a ground to deny compensation, is not correct. According to him, dependency should be the factor to be considered for awarding compensation, whenever a claim is made under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is also his further contention that married daughters are entitled only to restricted claim under no fault liability. Except, the above, no other submissions have been advanced. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company and perused the materials available on record. 9. Insofar as the finding regarding negligence is concerned, PW 1, daughter has not witnessed the accident. However, PW2, a co passenger, has categorically deposed that when the deceased, was alighting, the driver moved the bus, in a rash and negligent manner and as a result of which, she fell down and that the rear wheel of the bus ran over the left hand and chest of the deceased. During the course of examination, the claims tribunal has observed that the manner of accident, has not been seriously disputed by the appellant Insurance Company. The evidence of PW2, has remained unshattered. FIR has been registered against the driver of the bus. RW1, is only an Assistant Manager of National Insurance Company limited, who has not witnessed the accident. From the perusal of the award, it could be deduced that the appellant Insurance Company has not taken any steps to examine the driver of the private bus insured with them. The claims tribunal, after observing that it is the; duty of the crew to see that the passengers, safely alight or board the bus, as the case may be, before moving, and since there was failure on the part of the crew, held that the 'driver of the bus was negligent in causing the accident. The claims tribunal, after observing that it is the; duty of the crew to see that the passengers, safely alight or board the bus, as the case may be, before moving, and since there was failure on the part of the crew, held that the 'driver of the bus was negligent in causing the accident. The finding of the tribunal cannot be said to have been arrived at, without any evidence nor any perversity could be noticed. 10. On the quantum of compensation, the only objection raised by the appellant-Insurance Company, is that married daughters are not entitled to claim compensation more than Rs. 50,000/- and that the quantum has to be restricted to the said sum, under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. On this aspect, this Court deems it fit to consider some of the judgments of the Apex Court, as to how a provision has to be interpreted. 11. In Smt. Hira Devi and others v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, reported in AIR 1952 SC 362 , a Division Bench of the Supreme Court at Paragraph 14, held that, "No doubt, it is the duty of the Court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act." 12. In Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar and others, reported in AIR 1953 SC 148 , a Division Bench of the Apex Court held that, "It is not competent to any Court to proceed upon the assumption that the Legislature has made a mistake. The Court must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said. Even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by the Legislature the Court cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of an Act or add and amend or, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left in the Act. Even where there is casus omissus, it is for others than the Courts to remedy the defect." 13. Even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by the Legislature the Court cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of an Act or add and amend or, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left in the Act. Even where there is casus omissus, it is for others than the Courts to remedy the defect." 13. In Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi and others v. The State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1959 SC 459 , (v 46 C 57), a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 38 of the judgment held that, "If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous it would not be legitimate for the Courts to add any words thereto and evolve therefrom some sense which may be said to carry out the supposed' intentions of the legislature. The intention of the Legislature is to be gathered only from the words used by it and no such liberties can be taken by the Courts for effectuating a supposed intention of the Legislature." 14. In G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam and others, reported in 1972 (3) SCC 717 , a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court held that while interpreting a provision, the Court should interpret in a broad and generous spirit the document which contains the fundamental law of the land or the basic principle of its Government. However, the rule of "plain meaning" or "literal" interpretation, which is "the primary rule" could not be altogether abandoned today in interpreting any document. The object of interpretation and of "construction" (which may be broader than "interpretation") is to discover the intention of the law-makers in every case. This object can, obviously, be best achieved by first looking at the language used in the relevant provisions. Other methods of extracting the meaning can be resorted to only if the language used is contradictory, ambiguous, or leads really to absurd results. This is an elementary and basic rule of interpretation as well as of construction processes which, from the point of view of principles applied, coalesce and converge towards the common purpose of both which is to get at the real sense and meaning, so far as it may be reasonably possible to do this, of what is found laid down. The Supreme Court at Paragraph 18 of the said judgment further held that "Plain meaning" or "Literal" construction which must ordinarily prevail. The Supreme Court at Paragraph 18 of the said judgment further held that "Plain meaning" or "Literal" construction which must ordinarily prevail. A logical corollary of that rule is that a statute may not be extended to meet a case of which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made. An application of the rule necessarily involves that addition to or modification of words used in statutory provisions is not generally permissible. Courts may depart from this rule only to avoid a patent absurdity. 15. In Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth and another, reported in 1977 (4) SCC 193 : AIR 1977 SC 2328 a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 54, held as follows:- 54. Now, it is undoubtedly true that where the language of an enactment is plain and clear upon its face and by itself susceptible to only one meaning, then ordinarily that meaning would have to be given by the Court. In such a case the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. But language at best is an imperfect medium of expression and variety of significations may often lie in a word or expression. It has, therefore, been said that the words of a statute must be understood in the sense which the legislature has in view and their meaning must be found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor in its popular use, as in the subject or the occasion on which they are used and the object to be attained. It was said by Mr. Justice Holmes in felicitous language in Town v. Eisner that "a word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used". The words used in a statute cannot be read in isolation: their colour and content are derived from their context and, therefore, every word in a statute must be examined in its context. And when I use the word "context", I mean it in its widest sense "as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pan materia and the mischief which - the statute was intended to remedy". And when I use the word "context", I mean it in its widest sense "as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pan materia and the mischief which - the statute was intended to remedy". The context is of the greatest importance in the interpretation of the words used in a statute. "It is quite true", pointed out Judge Learned Hand in Helvering v. Gregory "that as the articulation of a statute increases, the room for interpretation must contract; but the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create". Again, it. must be remembered that though the words used are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable source of interpreting the meaning of any writing, be it a statute, or contrast., or anything else, it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary, but to remember that a statute always has some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery, is the surest guide to its meaning. The literal construction should not obsess the Court, because it has only prima facie preference, the real object of interpretation being to find out the true intent of the law maker and that can be done only by reading the statute as an organic whole, with each part throwing light on the other and bearing in mind the rule in Heydon case which requires four things to be "discerned and considered" in arriving at the real meaning: (1) what was the law before the Act was passed; (2) what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (3) what remedy Parliament has appointed; and (4) the reason of the remedy. There is also another rule of interpretation which is equally well settled and which seems to follow as a necessary corollary, namely, where the words, according to their literal meaning "produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the Court that the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification", the Court would be justified in "putting on them some other signification, which, though less proper, is one which the Court thinks the words will bear", vide River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson. It is in the light of these principles of interpretation that I must proceed to consider what is the true meaning and effect of Clause (1) of Article 222 : whether it permits transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another, irrespective of his consent." 16. In P. K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries and others, reported in 1990 (2) SCC 378 : AIR 1990 SC 933 a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that "Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the Legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. "No case can be found to authorise any Court to alter a word so as to produce a casus omissus." Where the language of the statute leads to manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, the Court can, of course, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. In doing so a "judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases." 17. There is a distinction between being a dependent on the income and receiving a contribution from the deceased, either monetarily or through the services rendered by the deceased to the members of the family, legal representatives, which is also a decisive factor, in computing the compensation. There is a distinction between being a dependent on the income and receiving a contribution from the deceased, either monetarily or through the services rendered by the deceased to the members of the family, legal representatives, which is also a decisive factor, in computing the compensation. Though the provision under Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, defines, who are all the dependents entitled to claim compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a clear distinction under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which states that all the legal representatives are entitled to claim compensation. 18. Section 2(1)(d) does not confer any statutory right to a married daughter to seek for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The said Act has come into force in 1923. Whereas, Motor Vehicles Act was enacted in the year 1939. Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, does not restrict the entitlement of a married daughter to prefer any claim along with others. Both Acts are beneficial legislations. Nevertheless, there is a clear distinction insofar as the language employed under the Acts. When Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, speaks about dependency, Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, speak about the right of the legal representatives to succeed to the estate of the deceased. There is a specific inclusion of all legal representatives to claim for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle's Act. Therefore, merely because a married daughter has joined the other claimants/legal representatives, or makes a separate claim, such claim cannot be said to be against the statutory provision, and therefore, to be rejected in limini. 19. If the intention of the framers of the subsequent enactment, viz. Motor Vehicles Act, was also to restrict the payment of compensation only to the dependants, the word "dependant" as defined in Section 2(d) would have been incorporated in Motor Vehicles., Act also. In the case of claim under the., Workmen's Compensation Act, the employee dies, arising out of and during the course of employment, whereas, in the case of a Motor Accident, even the other legal heirs, travelling in the same vehicle may also be victims of the accident. Say for example, a rider and a pillion, in a two wheeler, or the occupants in a car, or passengers in a bus, and so on and so forth. Say for example, a rider and a pillion, in a two wheeler, or the occupants in a car, or passengers in a bus, and so on and so forth. Judicial notice can be taken, that in some cases, the entire family members die in an accident, leaving behind a married daughter or a married sister or a married son. 20. The quantum of compensation or loss of contribution is not determined on the basis of monetary loss alone. It is also determined on the basis of invaluable and gratuitous services rendered by the mother or the wife, as the case may be. The legal representative particularly, a married daughter, may not be totally dependent on the income of the deceased mother for her survival of living, but still, there can be a monetary assistance, during the lifetime of the deceased. 21. Even in the case of married daughters, a father or mother or brother, can still monetarily help a married daughter, depending upon the need or out of love and affection. A mother can continuously render her valuable service to her daughter, even if the daughter is married. Similarly, a married daughter would still continue to assist her mother, or father, in the case of need. Contribution by means of service or income, both can be taken into account to determine the quantum of compensation. A married daughter is a legal representative, as per the law of succession and that she is entitled to make a claim and it is for the Claims Tribunal or Court, to apportion the amount, between the claimants, depending upon the loss of contribution suffered by the married daughter. 22. Exclusion of a married daughter/sister/brother from the claim petition, altogether would be opposed ; to the object of the Act and it would be amounting to adding words to the legislation, which the Court is not supposed to do. As held by the Apex Court, even if there is casus omissus, it is not for the Court to add words to the legislation. The construction and interpretation of the words, "legal representatives" in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, in the context and nature of legislation, being beneficial, should be interpreted in such a way not to take away their rights. The construction and interpretation of the words, "legal representatives" in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, in the context and nature of legislation, being beneficial, should be interpreted in such a way not to take away their rights. Merely because a married daughter/ sister is living with her husband, in a separate house, that by itself would not disentitle her from claiming compensation, as a legal representative, to represent, the estate of the deceased. 23. If a married daughter/sister/brother has to be excluded from the expression, "legal representative", employed in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, then it would virtually amount to substituting the words "legal representatives" with "dependants", used in Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. No doubt, one who is gainfully employed cannot be called as a dependent. At the same time, not all married daughters/sisters can be said to be gainfully employed. The word "dependants" has a different meaning in different connotation. Some may be dependent in terms of money and others may be dependent in terms of service. 24. In a given case, when the parents live with a married daughter and if the mother dies, it cannot be said that the married daughter was dependent on the mother, monetarily all the time, but still would have been dependent on her service. If the married daughter is employed, she leaves her children in the care and custody of her mother, when she is away in her office and in such cases, it cannot be said that married daughter did not lose her valuable services, which can still be a decisive factor, for awarding quantum of compensation. 25. 'Legal Representative' ordinarily includes heirs as well as persons, who represent the estate of the deceased person or a person, on whom, the estate devolves on the death, of an individual. Right to claim for compensation by any or all legal representatives under-Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a legal right. 25. 'Legal Representative' ordinarily includes heirs as well as persons, who represent the estate of the deceased person or a person, on whom, the estate devolves on the death, of an individual. Right to claim for compensation by any or all legal representatives under-Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a legal right. It is an assertable right enforceable before Courts and administrative agencies, in its wider sense and therefore, a legal right has to be understood, as any advantage or benefit conferred upon a person by a rule of law; and having regard to the manner, in which, a provision has to be interpreted, as held by the Supreme Court in the decisions stated supra, this Court is of the view that the definition of "legal representatives" cannot be restricted to exclude married daughters/sisters, from making any claim under Section 166 of the Act and consequently, restrict their claim, only under Section 140 of the Act, which has been engrafted in the statute, with a specific object of compensating all the legal representative, whether there is negligence, on the part of the deceased or not. It is a "No Fault Liability" clause. 26. Courts have consistently held that what has been specifically excluded by a legislation in a provision cannot be imported into the section by the decisions of Court. By engrafting Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, enabling all the legal representatives to make a claim, in contradistinction to, Section 2 (1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which enables only the persons enumerated in the said section to claim compensation under Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the intention of the legislature is clear and the definition, "legal representative" cannot be narrowed down to mean only "dependents", excluding married daughters/sisters. 27. There could still be a case where there is contribution of a portion of the income of the deceased to a legal representative, who had preferred a claim and he/she would not be wholly dependents on the income of the deceased. A likelihood of loss of contribution from the deceased would give rise to a claim for compensation by him under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, though he may not be a wholly dependency as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 28. A likelihood of loss of contribution from the deceased would give rise to a claim for compensation by him under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, though he may not be a wholly dependency as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 28. It is a well recognised rule, of interpretation of statutes that the expression used in the statute, should ordinarily be understood, in which, they harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the objection of the legislature and the Court should adopt an object oriented approach, keeping in mind the language employed in the statute. When the legislature has used the words, "Legal Representatives" in Section 166 of the Act, and having regard to the duty of the Court to act upon the true intention of the legislature, "Mens or Sententia Legis", this Court is not inclined to accept the submissions of the Insurance Company, interpret and circumscribe the meaning of the words, "Legal Representatives" to mean only "dependents". Just because a brother or sister is married, the right to represent the estate of the deceased is not taken away and such an interpretation, would make the provisions of law of succession, ineffective. 29. The expression "legal representative" has been explained in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and another, reported in 1987 ACJ 561: AIR 1987 SC 1690 , as follows : - "10. Clause (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act provide that an application for compensation arising out of an accident may be made where death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal, representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The expression "legal representative" has not been defined in the Act. The expression "legal representative" has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines "legal representative" as a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermediates with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or-sued. The above definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal but it has to be stated that even in ordinary part lance the said expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. A legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act authorises all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal for the death of the deceased on account of a motor vehicle accident and Clause (c) of that sub-section authorises any agent duly authorised by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased to make it. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110-A of the Act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 110A (1) of the Act thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent, and (ii) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the persons for whose benefit such application can be made are thus indicated in Section 110A of the Act." 30. Interpreting Section 110A (now amended as Section 166 (1)), vis-a-vis, a corresponding provision in the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the Apex Court in Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai's case (stated supra) further held that, "These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. Interpreting Section 110A (now amended as Section 166 (1)), vis-a-vis, a corresponding provision in the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the Apex Court in Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai's case (stated supra) further held that, "These provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was "new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new" the right given to the legal representatives under the Act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by all the limitations of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies." 31. While confirming the decision of Gujarat High Court in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, reported in 1977 ACJ 253 (Guj), the Supreme Court at Paragraph 12, held that, "We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family brothers, sisters and brothers' children and some times foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread-winner of the family and if the bread-winner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents." 32. In United India Insurance Company v. Kasiaimmal, reported in 1997 (III) CTC 346 , one: of the contentions raised therein, challenging the award, was that a married son, who was living separately and not a dependant, is not entitled to claim compensation. The 'short question framed by this Court, at Paragraph 6 of the judgment, was whether the claimants, who were married sons and married daughters, entitled for compensation ? While addressing the abovesaid question, a learned Judge has considered two decisions relied on by the appellant-Insurance Company therein in Revanben v. Kantibhai Narottamehai Gohil, reported in 1995 ACJ 548 and U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Tara Devi, reported in 1995 ACJ 1220 and also the decisions of the Apex Court in Bhagwatidin v. Gheesalal, reported in 1980 ACJ 116, Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1690 and Pushpam v. Nirmala, reported in 1991 TLNJ 101, and at Paragraphs 15, 16 and 17, held as follows : "15. As pointed out earlier, the compensation amount is being paid to the legal representatives on account of untimely death of their ancestor. The dependency of the legal representatives is a question to be considered and does not mean only the dependents can claim compensation. The compensation being the amount for the loss to the estate of the deceased, it has to be considered as to whether the legal representatives had been put to loss because of the death of the deceased. The dependency of the legal representatives is a question to be considered and does not mean only the dependents can claim compensation. The compensation being the amount for the loss to the estate of the deceased, it has to be considered as to whether the legal representatives had been put to loss because of the death of the deceased. Wherever the deceased is an earning member, naturally his savings is an accumulation for the estate which can be divided by the legal representatives after the death of the deceased. As the legal representatives had been put to loss of the earning of the deceased, the legal representatives are also entitled for the compensation. 16. Further in this case there is absolutely no evidence to show that the married sons are living separately. When they are residing with the mother, naturally the married sons had lost not only the assistance of the deceased mother but also lost her valuable advice in family matters. The deceased, being a widow, naturally she could have lived with any one of the sons. When the legal representatives, the married sons of the deceased are entitled for compensation even though they are residing separately, the claimants herein will be entitled for compensation; especially when they are residing with the deceased. Moreover, the aged parents in many a house are the watch dogs for the entire house, servants and the grand children except a few exceptional cases. When the claimants had lost such valuable services of their mother they are entitled for compensation. The loss cannot be substituted by any other confident or responsible person either in the family or by appointing a servant. If the contention of the counsel for the appellant is accepted, I am not surprised that in future the appellant may plead that generally the aged ones are only a liability in the family and since due to the accident the aged one died, the family has got rid of the same and the driver should be suitably rewarded by the legal representatives instead of claiming any compensation for the death of the deceased. 17. 17. Further if the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the claimants are entitled only for the no fault amount is accepted, then a person who sustained some grievous injuries will be paid more than the amount that would be paid to the legal representatives i.e. married sons and daughters of the deceased and in that case it would be cheaper to kill than maim. If the claimants are to be paid the no fault amount, that may mean that the claimants are being paid some ex gratia payment out of sympathy and not for the loss of life of their ancestor. Hence, the contention of the counsel for the appellant cannot be countenanced and there is absolutely no merit in the appeal and is dismissed." 33. It is worthwhile to reproduce the judgments in Pushpam's case (cited supra) and Bhagwatidin's case, which are as follows:- "10. In fact in judgment reported in Pushpam v. Nirmala reported in 1991 TLNJ 101, the question considered is whether in a petition claiming compensation for injuries sustained by the claimant, after his death whether the sister can come on record as the legal representative. Venkataswami, J. has held, that the sister of the deceased claimant can be brought on record as the legal representative, in the following terms :- "In more or less identical circumstances, v. Ramaswami, J. as he then was, in 1981 ACJ 185 (supra), after noticing a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in C.P. Kandaswamy v. Mariappa Stores, 1974 ACJ 3 held that by introducing Section 110-A in the Motor Vehicles Act, Parliament intended not to restrict the statutory right to claim damages to the injured alone. In the case of claims 'arising out of motor accidents, Clause (b) provides that the cause of action would survive to the legal representative where death has resulted from the accident. This was an exception to the general principle action personalise moritor cum persona. It is true there is a distinction between case of death resulting from the accident and a case of other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, i.e., the party dying subsequently during the pendency of the proceedings not due to the accident. But the Motor Vehicles Act does not, in my opinion, make any distinction so far as the right to claim damages. The claims in all these cases are not statutory rights. But the Motor Vehicles Act does not, in my opinion, make any distinction so far as the right to claim damages. The claims in all these cases are not statutory rights. Therefore, there appears to be no reason to restrict the right to the injured alone." The learned Judge further distinguished the Division Bench case 1974 ACJ 362 on facts. The learned Judge ultimately held as reasonable question of recovering the actual expenses incurred by the deceased, I have no doubt that the claim will survive since that amount if had not been spent might have been available as the estate of the deceased to be succeeded by his legal representatives." In 1987 (II) ACJ 561 (supra) the Supreme Court has elaborately considered the expression 'legal representative' in Section 110-A of the Act. After noticing the divergent views of the various High Courts, the Supreme Court has held as follows:- "In the light of the principles laid down in the above two judgments, I am of the view that the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent, namely reported in Videowala v. Union of India, 1986 (II) MLJ 345 : AIR 1987 Mad 52 and reported in Kandaswamy v. Mariappa Stores, 86 LW 667, cannot be pressed into service. I am further of the view that the question of bringing on record or coming on record as legal representatives and the further question whether they are entitled to compensation on the facts and circumstances of the case are two different issues. Merely because they are brought on record, that does not automatically entitle them to get compensation. In the light of the wider meaning given to the expression 'legal representative' by the Supreme Court, though in a case of death in a motor accident, the order of the Court below cannot be sustained. Therefore, I hold that the petitioner is entitled to continue the proceedings and it is for the Court below to decide whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation at all, and if so, how much in the light of the principles laid down in 1981 ACJ 185 (supra) and other cases." 34. Limiting the payment of compensation to some of the legal representatives, as per Section 140 of the Act, to the exclusion of others, would amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Limiting the payment of compensation to some of the legal representatives, as per Section 140 of the Act, to the exclusion of others, would amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the light of the above, the contention that the married daughters are entitled to only compensation under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, under No Fault Liability claim of Rs. 50,000/- alone cannot be countenanced. If the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company are to be accepted, then it would be introducing a bar or prohibition against a married daughter to prefer a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which apparently is not the intention of the legislature. Monetary dependency is not the only factor to award compensation to the legal representatives. 35. In view of the above discussion, the award of the tribunal is sustained both on negligence and quantum. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. The appellant Insurance Company, is directed to deposit the entire award amount with proportionate accrued interest and costs, less the amount already deposited, to the credit of MCOP No. 333 of 2010 on the file of Motor Accidents -Claims Tribunal (District Judge), Nagapattinam, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; if not deposited earlier. On such deposit being made, the respondents/claimants are permitted to withdraw their share, as apportioned by the tribunal, by making necessary applications. No costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.