Judgment : The appellant/accused-officer a Public Servant, was tried on two charges under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity “the Act”) in C.C.No.11 of 1994 on the file of the Additional Special Judge for S.P.E. and A.C.B. Cases, City Civil Courts, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”). The first charge is under Section 7 of the Act and the second charge, which is connected with the first one, is under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, both based on the allegations of bribery and trap. 2. The trial Court by its judgment dated 9.3.2005 convicted the appellant of both the charges and sentenced him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for one year and also to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-and, in default, to undergo Simple Imprisonment for three months for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act; and further imposed a similar sentence for the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act. Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. Questioning the said judgment, this criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant, who hereinafter will be referred to as “the Accused Officer”. 3. At the relevant point of time, the Accused Officer was working as Child Development Project Officer, I.C.D.S. Project, Kodomuru, Kurnool District. 4. P.W.1, defacto-complainant, was a Transport Contractor. He transported office furniture and records of I.C.D.S. Project Office from its rented building to the newly constructed Government building on 2.10.1993. In that connection, he met the Accused Officer in the month of December, 1993 and asked for payment of the bill. At that time, the Accused Officer asked him to prepare and submit fresh bill. After P.W.1 submitted fresh bill, the Accused Officer demanded Rs.600/-as bribe for passing the said bill. He later reduced the demand to Rs.400/-on the pleading of P.W.1. Again when he met the Accused Officer on 7.2.1994, he reiterated the earlier demand and insisted that he would pass the bill only on payment of the demanded amount. Unwilling to comply the said demand, P.W.1 lodged Ex.P-1 complaint with P.W.4, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kurnool Range, on 7.2.1994 at 1-00 p.m. After registering the said complaint, P.W.4 made arrangements for laying trap against the Accused Officer. Unwilling to comply the said demand, P.W.1 lodged Ex.P-1 complaint with P.W.4, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kurnool Range, on 7.2.1994 at 1-00 p.m. After registering the said complaint, P.W.4 made arrangements for laying trap against the Accused Officer. Accordingly, pre-trap proceedings were conducted on 9.2.1994 by securing the presence of two independent witnesses i.e., R.V. Krishna Reddy, who was examined as P.W.2, and another by name G. Bakkaiah. The said proceedings were recorded under Ex.P-2 mediators report. 5. The trap party then proceeded to the office of the Accused Officer. P.W.1 found the Accused Officer sitting in the Clerks’ room along with other staff members, namely P.W.6-Samuel, Bhagyalakshmi and Ramanakrishna. The Accused, after enquiring whether P.W.1 brought the amount, took him to his room and received the tainted amount from P.W.1 and kept it in the right side pocket of his trouser. Thereupon the trap party entered the office and recovered the tainted amount from the Accused Officer. The chemical test conducted on the hand fingers and trouser pocket of the Accused Officer yielded positive result. Thus, according to the prosecution, the Accused Officer demanded and accepted the illegal gratification for doing official favour of passing the bills of P.W.1; and thereby committed the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 (2) of the Act. 6. The trial Court framed two charges, which are as follows: “Firstly: That you being a public servant employed as Child Development Project Officer, ICDS Project, Kodumur, Kurnool Dist. on or about the 9th day of February, 1994 at about 3.50 p.m. at your office accepted an amount of Rs.400/-from one B. Lakshmi Reddy, Transport Contractor of Julekal Vg. for yourself as gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for doing an official favour viz. for passing the transport bill; in pursuance of your earlier demand for Rs.600/-initially and reduced it to Rs.400/-on pleading in Dec.93 and also on 7.2.94 when he approached you for the above said purpose and thereby you committed an offence punishable u/S. 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and within my cognizance. Secondly: That you being a public servant employed as Child Development Project Officer, ICDS Project, Kodumur, Kurnool Dist. Secondly: That you being a public servant employed as Child Development Project Officer, ICDS Project, Kodumur, Kurnool Dist. on or about the day, date, time and place as mentioned in Charge No.1 by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abusing your position as public servant obtained for yourself a pecuniary advantage to the extent of Rs.400/-from B. Lakshmi Reddy in pursuance of your earlier demands and thereby you committed the offence of criminal misconduct specified in Sec. 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) of the said Act within my cognizance.” 7. In order to bring home the guilt of the Accused Officer, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 6 and got marked Exs.P-1 to P-7, besides marking material objects MOs-1 to 8. In defence, the Accused Officer examined D.W.1 and got marked Exs.D-1 to D-4. 8. The Accused Officer denied demand and acceptance of the bribe amount. He took the plea that P.W.1 used to take hand loans from him and used to repay the same after the bills were passed. P.W.1 was due an amount of Rs.600/-and on the date of trap, he repaid Rs.400/-towards part payment of the loan amount. Thus, the amount received by him was towards repayment of the loan and not bribe. He also took the plea that he was falsely implicated at the instance of Smt. Rajyalakshmi, Anganwadi Supervisor, who bore a grudge against him because she was transferred from Nagalapuram area to Cherubelgal against her will. 9. The trial Court did not accept the pleas of the Accused Officer and, upheld both the charges and accordingly convicted him. 10. Heard Sri T. Bali Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri R. Balakrishna Rao, learned counsel appearing for the Accused Officer; and Sri Ghani A. Musa, learned Special Public Prosecutor for Anti-Corruption Bureau appearing for the respondent-State. 11. The learned Senior Counsel, while reiterating the pleas of the Accused Officer as were canvassed before the trial Court, would contend that the Accused Officer was falsely implicated in the case. He would contend that though the Accused Officer is alleged to have made demands in the month of December, 1993 and on 7.2.1994, there is no evidence supporting the said allegation. Similarly, there is no worthwhile evidence to support the allegation that what was paid by P.W.1 was towards bribe. He would contend that though the Accused Officer is alleged to have made demands in the month of December, 1993 and on 7.2.1994, there is no evidence supporting the said allegation. Similarly, there is no worthwhile evidence to support the allegation that what was paid by P.W.1 was towards bribe. On the other hand, the evidence on record would support the plea of the Accused Officer that amount was repayment of the loan. The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the trial Court mis-directed itself in appreciating the evidence. He would therefore, contend that the conviction and sentence recorded against the Accused Officer is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. 12. On the other hand, Sri Ghani A. Musa, learned Special Public Prosecutor would refute the said contentions, and contend that the evidence of PWs.1, 2, 4 and 6 is clinching against the Accused Officer and his conviction does not warrant any interference. 13. I have considered the aforesaid contentions, examined the evidence available on record and the judgment of the trial Court as well. 14. According to the prosecution, the first demand was made in the month of December, 1993 and the second demand was made on 7.2.1994, and that the alleged bribe amount was paid to the Accused Officer on the date of trap i.e., on 9.2.1994. 15. To prove demand in December 1993 and on 7.02.1994, the prosecution examined PW.1-defacto complainant. Except the evidence of PW.1, there is no other evidence, either direct or corroborative, on this aspect. Though he vaguely stated that there was a demand in December, 1993, he admitted in his cross-examination that he did not mention the date either in Ex.P-1 complaint or in his statement made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate. On the other hand, he admitted that he met him for the first time, only on 7.2.1994. Therefore, it can safely be said that there was no demand by the Accused Officer in the month of December, 1993. 16. It is next to be seen whether there was any demand on 7.2.1994 on which date the Accused Officer is said to have reiterated his demand. 17. On this aspect, on the one hand there is evidence of PW.1 and on the other, there is evidence of PW.6. According to P.W.1, he met the Accused Officer at 7.00 am., on 7.2.1994 at his office. 17. On this aspect, on the one hand there is evidence of PW.1 and on the other, there is evidence of PW.6. According to P.W.1, he met the Accused Officer at 7.00 am., on 7.2.1994 at his office. However in his cross-examination, he admitted that he did not mention the time, but merely stated the date in his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. 18. P.W.6, who was working as Senior Assistant, was examined by the prosecution to speak with regard to the procedure for sanctioning transport charges and about his presence in the office on the date of trap and his witnessing P.W.1 coming into the office. In his cross-examination, he stated that there was a Budget Review Meeting at Kurnool on 7.2.1994. He came to the office at 6-30 a.m., and by that time the Accused Officer was present in the office and attending the files. Both of them proceeded to Kurnool by bus at 8-00 a.m. During 6-30 a.m. to 8-00 a.m., nobody came to the office and met the Accused Officer. He reiterated in his re-examination stating that he did not see P.W.1 meeting the Accused Officer in the office at 7-00 a.m. He denied the suggestion that he did not attend the office on that day from 6-30 a.m. to 7-00 a.m. Thus according to his evidence PW.1 did not meet the Accused Officer on 7.02.1994. 19. Basing on Ex.P-4 attendance register, in which it was not shown that the Accused Officer was on other duty (OD) on 7.02.1994, an effort is made to show that the Accused Officer did not go to Kurnool, but was present in the office through out, on the basis of which an inference was drawn by the trial Court. The said controversy really does not matter much, because according to PW.1, he met the Accused Officer at 7-00 am., and not later. On the other hand, Ex.D-3 and D-4, which are T.A and D.A bills on 7.02.1994 support the evidence of P.W.6 that he and the Accused Officer went to Kurnool on official duty. 20. The trial Court was not inclined to rely on the evidence of P.W.6 because he is a subordinate to the Accused Officer, which in my view is unsustainable. Firstly, Ex.D-3 and D-4 T.A and D.A bills drawn by the Accused Officer and P.W.6 would show that they went on O.D. to Kurnool. 20. The trial Court was not inclined to rely on the evidence of P.W.6 because he is a subordinate to the Accused Officer, which in my view is unsustainable. Firstly, Ex.D-3 and D-4 T.A and D.A bills drawn by the Accused Officer and P.W.6 would show that they went on O.D. to Kurnool. There cannot be a presumption that the bills were falsely drawn because it is an official record subjected to audit. Secondly, P.W.6 is a Government servant, who has no stakes in the matter unlike P.W.1. Nextly, it is natural for P.W.1 to support his own case being the complainant. Therefore, in my considered view, there is no reason why the evidence of P.W.6 cannot be accepted vis-à-vis the evidence of P.W.1. 21. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the only possible conclusion that can be drawn is that there was no demand by the Accused Officer on 7.2.1994. 22. It is then contended by the learned Special Public Prosecutor that though there is no evidence regarding the earlier demands, in the fact situation where the amount was found and recovered from the possession of the Accused Officer and his own admission that he received the amount, it is sufficient to hold him guilty of the charged offences. 23. There is no dispute that the amount was found in the possession of the Accused Officer as per the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2 and 4 and also Ex.P-5 mediator report. 24. Now, it is to be seen whether mere recovery of the amount is sufficient to hold him guilty. 25. Before considering the said question, it is necessary to examine the legal requirements under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act. 26. The essential ingredients of Section 7 of the Act are that the person accepting the gratification should be a public servant and that he should have accepted the gratification for himself or others and the gratification should be as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act in the discharge of his official duties. 27. Likewise, under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, a public servant should have used corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abused his position as such public servant and that he should have obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person. 28. 27. Likewise, under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, a public servant should have used corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abused his position as such public servant and that he should have obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person. 28. Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, the initial burden is upon the prosecution to establish that the Accused Officer received illegal gratification to show an official favour and received or agreed to receive the same. When once the said burden is discharged by the prosecution, the presumption under Section 20(1) of the Act would arise. But, insofar as the offence falling under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, no presumption would arise, but the prosecution has to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt by adducing relevant evidence. 29. In SURAJ MAL v. STATE (DELHI ADMN.) (1979) 4 SCC 725 ), the Apex Court held the view that mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. 30. In C.M. GIRISH BABU v. CBI (2009) 3 SCC 779 ), the Apex Court held that the presumption to be drawn under Section 20 is not an inviolable one. The accused charged with the offence could rebut it either through the cross-examination of the witnesses cited against him or by adducing reliable evidence. If the accused fails to disprove the presumption the same would stick and then it can be held by the Court that the prosecution has proved that the accused received the amount towards gratification. 31. It was further held that the burden of proof placed upon the accused person against whom the presumption is made under Section 20 of the Act is not akin to that of burden placed on the prosecution to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. 32. 31. It was further held that the burden of proof placed upon the accused person against whom the presumption is made under Section 20 of the Act is not akin to that of burden placed on the prosecution to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. 32. Thus, from the ingredients of Section 7, the principles stated in the aforesaid judgments is that, in order to sustain conviction under Section 7 of the Act, the prosecution should establish that the Accused Officer accepted the amount of bribe. If once the said burden is discharged, the burden lies on the Accused Officer to rebut it. 33. In the instant case, as noticed earlier, the prosecution could establish that the Accused Officer received the amount and to that extent presumption can be drawn against the Accused officer. 34. As held by the Apex Court in C.M. GIRISH BABU’s case (2-supra), the Accused Officer can rebut the presumption either by adducing independent evidence or through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. 35. To decide whether the Accused Officer has discharged his burden of rebutting the presumption, it is necessary to examine the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 6. 36. It is already noticed that the defence of the Accused Officer was that he received the amount, not towards the bribe, but it was towards repayment of loan amount. He took this plea in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 37. It is true, as contended by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, that this defence was not taken at the earliest point of time during the trap proceedings or at the time of framing charges by the trial Court. It is to be noted that in the case A. ABDUL KAFFAR V. STATE OF KERALA (2004) 9 SCC 333 ), cited by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, the Apex Court observed that the defence taken by the accused therein was not genuine, since he failed to mention to the Investigating Officer at the first available opportunity. The said observation was in the facts and circumstances of that case. 38. I am of the view that mere failure to offer the spot explanation will not render invalid the explanation given under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 39. The said observation was in the facts and circumstances of that case. 38. I am of the view that mere failure to offer the spot explanation will not render invalid the explanation given under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 39. In PUNJABRAO v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (2004 SCC (Cri) 1130), which arose under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (old Act), the Apex Court held that failure to offer explanation when the investigation officer seized the amount should not be sufficient to throw out the explanation offered by the accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and such explanation could be held reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 40. Thus, it has to be examined whether the defence taken by the Accused Officer was established by preponderance of probabilities of the case. 41. P.W.1, defacto-complainant, was confronted with the suggestion that he used to borrow amount from the Accused Officer and repay the same after the bills were passed. He was also suggested that he gave the amount towards the clearance of the loan and made it appear as bribe amount. He was confronted with Exs.D-1 and D-2, which are cover and a letter, respectively. Though he denied the suggestions, he admitted that Exs.D-1 and D-2 were written by him and Ex.D-2 letter bears his signature. In Ex.D-2 letter dated 31.1.1994 it was mentioned that he borrowed Rs.600/-from the accused; (Rs.300/-on 15.10.1993, Rs.100/-on 10.11.1993 and Rs.100/-on 5.12.1993) and he could not repay the same soon and that he would repay the same within a week. Thus, there is an admission by P.W.1 that he owed some amount to the Accused Officer. 42. P.W.6 in his evidence clearly stated that P.W.1 used to take hand loans from the Accused Officer now and then. The said evidence was not contradicted by the prosecution. 43. In view of the aforesaid admission of P.W.1 coupled with the evidence of P.W.6, the probability of the defence that the amount was received by the Accused Officer was towards the loan and not as bribe, cannot be ruled out. 44. The trial Court did not accept Exs.D-1 cover and D-2 letter on the ground that there is no mention about the loan in Ex.P-5 trap proceedings and there was no suggestion to P.Ws.2 and 4 about the availability of these documents at that time. 44. The trial Court did not accept Exs.D-1 cover and D-2 letter on the ground that there is no mention about the loan in Ex.P-5 trap proceedings and there was no suggestion to P.Ws.2 and 4 about the availability of these documents at that time. In my considered view, the said reasons are not tenable in view of the clear admission by P.W.1 himself. 45. On a careful consideration of the matter as above, in my view, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused Officer beyond reasonable doubt and the Accused Officer could rebut the presumption raised against him. The conclusions drawn and the reasons assigned by the trial Court in convicting the Accused Officer in my considered vieware not tenable and accordingly the conviction recorded against the Accused Officer is not sustainable. 46. In the result, the judgment dated 9.3.2005 in C.C.No.11 of 1994 passed by the Additional Special Judge for S.P.E. and A.C.B. Cases, City Civil Courts, Hyderabad,is set aside. The Accused Officer is accordingly stands acquitted. 47. Consequently, the bail bonds executed by the appellant-Accused Officer shall stand discharged and the amount of fine paid, if any, shall be refunded to him. 48. The Criminal Appeal is accordingly allowed.