ORDER 1. This application has been filed for quashing of the order dated 20.12.2011 passed in Cr. Rev.No.139 of 2006 whereby 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh affirmed the order dated 21.8.2006 whereby and whereunder Executive Magistrate, Hazaribagh in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Proceeding declared the possession of opposite parties no.2 to 4 (1st party) over the land in question and also passed an order for restoration of the possession of the opposite parties as they had been dispossessed from the land during proceeding of the case. 2. A proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated with respect to a piece of land appertaining to Plot No.289, under Municipal Ward No.15 including tiled house situated at Hazaribagh. Subsequently, that proceeding was converted into a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. The case of the first party (opposite parties 2 to 4) is that a piece of land bearing Plot No.289 under Municipal Ward no.15 (old word no.8), Hazaribagh including tiled house was purchased by Smt.Mundrika Devi by registered deed in the year 1952. Mundrika Devi died in the year 1974 leaving behind her husband Jagdish Mishra and two daughters, Chanchala Devi and Purnima Devi as her legal heirs. When Jagdish Mishra died, both the daughters partitioned the properties orally whereby land in question came to the share of Chanchala Devi who started paying rent and holding tax etc. When Chanchala Devi started construction over the said land, Brij Kishore Mishra, uncle of the second party created disturbance which resulted into a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, an order was passed in favour of Chanchala Devi. When Chanchala Devi died, her husband Binod Bihari Mishra and her two daughters and two sons came in possession over the land but the members of 2nd party started creating disturbances in the peaceful possession of the 1st party and therefore proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure got initiated. 4. The case of the second party is that they had jointly purchased the property in the name of Mundrika Devi (maternal grand-mother of the first party). Mundrika Devi had sold the land to one Tetari Devi who allowed the first party to reside in the dwelling house. 5. 4. The case of the second party is that they had jointly purchased the property in the name of Mundrika Devi (maternal grand-mother of the first party). Mundrika Devi had sold the land to one Tetari Devi who allowed the first party to reside in the dwelling house. 5. It is also the case of the 1st party that during proceeding the members of 2nd party forcibly entered in to the land under proceeding. 6. The parties adduced their respective oral evidences. The first party also adduced documentary evidences whereas second party did not adduce any documentary evidences. The court having taken into account the evidences adduced on behalf of the parties did come to the finding that the 1st party has proved his case by possession and hence, declared the possession of the first party over the land in question and also passed an order for restoration of possession of the first party as first party during proceeding had been dispossessed from the land. 7. That order was challenged before the revisional court who did not find any illegality with the order and hence, affirmed the order passed by the Executive Magistrate. 8. The question which was raised by Mr. Bharti, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that whether the Magistrate did commit illegality by passing order for restoration of the possession of the land to the first party as it was never the case of the first party that they had been wrongfully dispossessed with within two months before the submission of the report of the police officer or information being given to the Magistrate or the date when the order was passed in terms of Section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure? 9. Learned counsel by referring to proviso to sub-section(4) of Section 145 submits that only in a case of dispossession within two months before either from the date of receipt of the information by the Magistrate or from the date when order was passed under Section 145(1), the Magistrate does have power to pass an order for restoration of the possession, if any of the party is dispossessed during that period. 10. 10. But in the instant case, according to the first party, they had been dispossessed with from the land in question during proceeding of the case and as such, the court did commit wrong in passing order for restoration of the first party over the land in question. 11. As against this, Mr. Deepak Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the first party submits that under the provision of the Code when the Magistrate finds that within two months either from the date of receipt of the information or from the date of initiation of the proceeding, one has been dispossessed with, the party dispossessed would be deemed to be in possession and thereby the Magistrate can pass an order for restoration of the possession. Therefore, even before initiation of the proceeding if one is dispossessed, his possession is restored , then in the event, when during proceeding one is dispossessed, the Magistrate will have every power to pass order for restoration and therefore, when the Magistrate did find that during proceeding the 1st party had been dispossessed from the land, he passed order for restoration of possession and thereby no illegality has been committed. In view of the submissions, one needs to take notice of the provision as contained in Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads as follows: Section 145: Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace – (1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (2) For the purposes of this section, the expression “land or water” includes buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of land, and the rents or profits of any such property. (2) For the purposes of this section, the expression “land or water” includes buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of land, and the rents or profits of any such property. (3) A copy of the order shall be served in the manner provided by this Code for the service of a summons upon such person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. (4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under sub-section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under subsection (1). (5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) shall be final. (6) (a) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was, or should under the proviso to sub-section (4) be treated as being, in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction; and when he proceeds under the proviso to sub-section (4), he may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed (b) the order made under this sub-section shall be served and published in the manner laid down in sub-section (3). 12. Under Chapter X of the Code which deals with maintenance of public order and tranquility. Section 145 has been incorporated whereunder if on account of bona fide land dispute parties are likely to cause breach of peace, the Magistrate has been empowered to initiate a proceeding under Section 145 to decide question of actual possession of the parties over the land in question. Further proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 145 does stipulate that if a person is dispossessed with from the land within two months before the date when information of bona fide dispute resulting into breach of peace is received by the Magistrate or within two months prior to the date of initiation of the proceeding under Section 145(1), he would be deemed to be in possession. In that event, the Magistrate does have power under sub-section (6) of Section 145 to restore the possession of the person who had wrongfully been dispossessed with. 13. The question which has been is raised that whether the Magistrate does have power to pass an order for restoration where one party has been dispossessed during proceeding of the case. 14. Submission advanced on behalf of the parties seems to be wholly misconceived and is against the spirit of the provisions of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which relates to the maintenance of public order and tranquility. 15. Under proviso to sub-section(4) of Section 145, the Magistrate is empowered to pass an order for restoration in case one is dispossessed from the land within two months before the date of receipt of the information or from the date of order of initiation of the proceeding. 16. 15. Under proviso to sub-section(4) of Section 145, the Magistrate is empowered to pass an order for restoration in case one is dispossessed from the land within two months before the date of receipt of the information or from the date of order of initiation of the proceeding. 16. Thus, the Magistrate when can pass order for restoration even in a case of dispossession before initiation of the proceeding, why there should be restriction the power of the Magistrate to pass an order for restoration if one party is dispossessed from the land during proceeding. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted that possession cannot be restored to one who has been dispossessed during proceeding, the entire provision of Section 145 shall be rendered as meaningless as in that event, unscrupulous person not being in possession if takes forcible possession during proceeding, he would be allowed to be in possession until he is dispossessed by the order of the competent civil court. Certainly this would never be the intention of the legislature while making provision as contained in Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which relates to maintenance of public order and tranquility. 17. Looking to the matter from another angle, it be stated that if a person is dispossessed within two months before the date of getting information by the Magistrate or from the date of initiation of the proceeding, the party dispossessed would be deemed to have been in possession and on this premise, the order is being passed for restoration of the possession of the person who has been dispossessed. In such eventuality, even before initiation of the proceeding if one is dispossessed, his possession can be restored then why a person who during proceeding has been dispossessed can be denied restoration. Thus, it can be said that this power of the Magistrate is implicit in the provision itself. 18. Under the circumstances, I do not find merit in the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. Accordingly, this application being devoid of any merit is dismissed. Application dismissed.