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2012 DIGILAW 1552 (PAT)

Ratna Kumari v. Sushila Devi

2012-11-08

JYOTI SARAN

body2012
ORDER This civil revision application is directed against the order dated 31.10.2006 passed by learned Civil Judge, Junior Division I, Samastipur in Title Suit No. 9 of 2006 whereby the learned Court below has been pleased to reject the objection raised by the defendant-petitioner in his application dated 31.8.2006 questioning the valuation set up by the plaintiffs-opposite parties which according to the petitioner, was grossly undervalued and was set up only for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction. 2. The suit in question has been filed by the plaintiffs-opposite parties seeking a declaration of his title over the suit property mentioned in Schedule III of the plaint, confirmation of possession and for restoration thereof in case the plaintiff were found dispossessed during the pendency of the suit proceedings. A prayer for permanent injunction restraining defendant-petitioner from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs-opposite parties over the suit property, was also made. 3. The suit was valued at Rs. 29,900/- and Court fee was paid thereon together with the separate fee in relation to the relief for injunction. 4. The defendant-petitioner appeared upon service of summons and raised objections on the issue of suit valuation as also on the issue of jurisdiction. 5. The suit property is a land admeasuring 1 katha and 3 dhurs consisting of a house and shop. According to the defendant-petitioner, the Government valuation of the land in the area where the suit property is situated, is Rs. 3,75,000/- per katha. The defendant-petitioner had also enclosed a sale deed dated 4.3.2005 in respect of a piece of land admeasuring 6 dhurs, which was sold for a consideration of Rs. 1,55,000/- to support his contention that the suit was undervalued. 6. It is the contention of the defendant-petitioner that the suit property admeasuring 1 katha 3 dhurs having a double storied house, is worth more than Rs. 20 lacs and yet a valuation of Rs. 29,900/- has been given by the plaintiffs-opposite parties by way of suit valuation. The defendant-petitioner contended that in view of the documentary evidence, the matter in issue was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court. The objection having been contested and rejected hence the present application. 7. Mr. 20 lacs and yet a valuation of Rs. 29,900/- has been given by the plaintiffs-opposite parties by way of suit valuation. The defendant-petitioner contended that in view of the documentary evidence, the matter in issue was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court. The objection having been contested and rejected hence the present application. 7. Mr. Madhuresh Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the plaintiffs-opposite parties have deliberately and consciously undervalued his suit for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction in a Court which otherwise the Court did not possess. It was submitted that after the enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts under the amendment introduced in the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge, Junior Division has been enhanced from Rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 30,000/- whereas the Subordinate Judge has been conferred with unlimited jurisdiction to try the suits of all valuation. It is submitted that merely to avoid the Court of Subordinate Judge, the valuation has been set up at Rs. 29,900/- which is without any basis. It is contended that the documentary evidence in the form of Government Notification as well as the sale deeds which were produced by the defendant-petitioner in support of his objection, amply proved that the suit had been grossly undervalued. It was contended that the order passed by the learned Court below suffers from material irregularity inasmuch as the issue raised by the defendant-petitioner has neither been considered nor rejected by a reasoned order. It is stated that as the valuation set up by the plaintiffs-opposite parties goes to the very root of jurisdiction, hence it has material relevance and ought to have been considered in the backdrop of the documentary evidence. Learned counsel while admitting that the issue of Court fee is an issue between the plaintiffs and the State, submits that even in such circumstance a plaintiff has not been given an absolute right to place any valuation whatsoever and if he does so and undervalues his suit, the Court should intervene in such matters particularly where it goes to the root of the jurisdiction. In continuation, it was contended that there was no basis for the valuation set up by the plaintiffs-opposite parties inasmuch as there is no nexus between the valuation of his relief and the valuation of the property. In continuation, it was contended that there was no basis for the valuation set up by the plaintiffs-opposite parties inasmuch as there is no nexus between the valuation of his relief and the valuation of the property. It was contended that even when the ad valorem Court fee has been paid yet the basis for valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction, is completely absent in the present case. It is contended that in any view of the matter, the trial Court ought to have tested the objection raised by the defendant-petitioner in the course of trial as a preliminary issue. It was lastly contended that in absence of finding on the objections raised by the defendant-petitioner on the jurisdictional issue, the order suffers from material irregularity and cannot be sustained. 8. Learned counsel in support of his submission has referred to the Full Bench judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Md. Alam Vs. Gopal Singh reported in 1987 PLJR 370 to submit that no absolute right vests in a plaintiff to place any valuation on his relief and that the Court concerned has complete jurisdiction to intervene where the plaintiff deliberately undervalues the relief. Learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1992) 1 SCC 731 (Sujir Keshav Nayak Vs. Sujir Ganesh Nayak). With reference to paragraph 3 of the said judgment it was submitted that the plaintiff has to take every care to disclose a valuation which should not be arbitrary. It was submitted that the Supreme Court has held that where the question of Court fee is linked with the jurisdiction, the defendant has a right to raise an objection which should be decided as a preliminary issue. Learned counsel with reference to a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2002(1) PLJR 268 (SC) (Kamaleshwar Kishore Singh Vs. Paras Nath Singh) submits that the Supreme Court has held that an arbitrary valuation of the suit having no basis for such valuation and made for evading payment of Court fee or for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on a Court which it does not have or for depriving a Court of jurisdiction which it would otherwise have, can be interfered by the Court. 9. 9. An attempt was made by learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner to bring the suit within the purview of Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 in view of the relief for recovery of possession prayed by the plaintiffs-opposite parties. 10. The contentions advanced by Mr. Prasad learned appearing for the petitioner has been strongly contested by Mr. K.K. Mishra learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs-opposite parties 1st set. 11. While supporting the order impugned it was submitted that the order neither suffered from any jurisdictional error nor any material irregularity so as to invite any interference therewith. It was submitted that the plaintiff is a master of the suit and has liberty to value his relief. It was submitted that issue of Court fee being a concern of the State, in absence of any objection from the State and in view of the acceptance of the valuation by the trial Court, this Court may not sit in appeal over the satisfaction recorded by the trial Court on the valuation of the relief. It was submitted that the nature of the suit being that of a declaratory suit with consequential reliefs, neither the valuation of the suit is arbitrary nor the ad valorem Court fee paid thereon is incorrect. It was submitted that the value of a property, in a declaratory suit is not material rather it is to be seen whether the relief prayed has been properly valued. 12. Learned counsel in the said background submits that since the plaintiff had prayed for a declaration of a title over the suit property with consequential reliefs as per the eventualities occurring, there was no arbitrariness in the valuation of the suit property or in the Court fee paid. It was thus submitted that the defendant has raised a bogey of Court fee merely to delay the proceedings even when she has no locus to raise such objections. Learned counsel has relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions:– (1) 1987 PLJR 370, Full Bench (Md. Alam Vs. Gopal Singh) (2) AIR 1938 Patna 22, Full Bench (Ramkhelawan Sahu Vs. Bir Surendra Sahi and Others) (3) AIR 1958 SC 245 (S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar) (4) 2002(1) PLJR 268 (Kamaleshwar Kishore Singh Vs. Paras Nath Singh) (5) 2001(3) PLJR 444 (Krishna Nandan Jha Vs. Alam Vs. Gopal Singh) (2) AIR 1938 Patna 22, Full Bench (Ramkhelawan Sahu Vs. Bir Surendra Sahi and Others) (3) AIR 1958 SC 245 (S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar) (4) 2002(1) PLJR 268 (Kamaleshwar Kishore Singh Vs. Paras Nath Singh) (5) 2001(3) PLJR 444 (Krishna Nandan Jha Vs. Basudeo Prasad Maskara & Anr.) (6) (1994) 4 SCC 349 (Ram Narain Prasad and Another Vs. Atul Chander Mitra and Others) (7) AIR 1979 SC 989 (A. K.A. CT. V. CT. Meenakhisundaram Chettiar Vs. A. K.A. CT. V. CT. Venkatachalam Chettiar) (8) AIR 1961 SC 1299 (Sri Rathnavarmaraja Vs. Smt. Vimla) 13. With reference to the judicial pronouncement(s) noted above, it was submitted that the defendant-petitioner has no locus to raise objection on the issue of suit valuation or Court fee paid and that unless the valuation is found arbitrary, the Courts have refrained from interfering in the arena. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials on record. 15. The only issue which falls for consideration is whether there has been any material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Court below while passing the order impugned rendering the same illegal, in the teeth of the statutory provisions as also the judicial pronouncements on the issue. 16. As noted at the outset, the suit is in the nature of a declaratory suit seeking a declaration of title over the suit property, confirmation of possession and in the eventuality of dispossession, the recovery thereof. The valuation of a suit has to be tested in the backdrop of the relief prayed. The suit as framed primarily seeks a declaration of title with the other reliefs flowing in consequence there from. The suit definitely is not a suit for possession though it may follow as a consequence of such declaration. It is in this background that the Supreme Court in the case of Kamaleshwar Kishore Singh (supra) has held as follows:– “8. The suit as framed primarily seeks a declaration of title with the other reliefs flowing in consequence there from. The suit definitely is not a suit for possession though it may follow as a consequence of such declaration. It is in this background that the Supreme Court in the case of Kamaleshwar Kishore Singh (supra) has held as follows:– “8. It is well settled that the Court fee has to be paid on the plaint as framed and not on the plaint as it ought to have been framed unless by astuteness employed in drafting the plaint the plaintiff has attempted at evading payment of court fee or unless there be a provision of law requiring the plaintiff to value the suit and pay the court fee in a manner other than the one adopted by the plaintiff……” 17. It is while observing as such that it was held that the valuation given by the plaintiffs would normally be taken to be correct but an arbitrary valuation for the purpose of evasion of Court fee or for conferring jurisdiction on a Court which it would otherwise not have, or to deprive a Court of jurisdiction which it would otherwise have, could be grounds for interference. 18. The judgments relied upon by the contesting parties broadly lay down the same principle i.e even where the plaintiff has jurisdiction to value his suit, the same cannot be arbitrary nor could be done with the object to avoid a Court or to confer jurisdiction on a Court or to evade payment of Court fee. 19. To appreciate whether or not the suit valuation as placed by the plaintiffs is arbitrary, would require the consideration of the provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 which provides for payment of Court fee on a suit filed for obtaining a declaratory decree with consequential relief, according to the amount at which the relief is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. 20. It is more than clear that the suit in question primarily seeks a declaration as to the title of the plaintiffs over the suit property with consequential reliefs and thus the suit valuation has to be tested in the backdrop of the relief prayed. The provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) nowhere refers to the valuation of a property. 21. 20. It is more than clear that the suit in question primarily seeks a declaration as to the title of the plaintiffs over the suit property with consequential reliefs and thus the suit valuation has to be tested in the backdrop of the relief prayed. The provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) nowhere refers to the valuation of a property. 21. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Sathappa Chettiar (supra) have held as follows:– “14.……….Section 7 further provides that in all suits falling under S.7(iv) the plaintiff shall state the amount at which the value of relief is sought. If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covered by several sub-sections of S.7 is considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling under sub-s.(iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of Court fees.” “……What the plaintiff purports to do by making a claim for partition is to ask the court to give him certain specified properties separately and absolutely on his own account for his share in lieu of his undivided share in the whole property. Now it would be clear that the conversion of the plaintiff's alleged undivided share in the joint family property into his separate share cannot be easily valued in terms of rupees with any precision or definiteness. That is why legislature has left it to the option of the plaintiff to value his claim for payment of court-fees……” 22. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Md. Alam (supra) even while holding that no absolute right vests in a plaintiff to place any valuation nor would a Court be a silent spectator thereto has made reference to paragraph 2 of the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Sri Rathnavarmaraja Vs. Smt. Vimla reported in AIR 1961 SC 1299 which runs as follows:– ………. “We fail to appreciate what grievance the defendant can make by seeking to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court on the question whether the plaintiff has paid adequate court-fee on his plaint. Whether proper court-fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State. “We fail to appreciate what grievance the defendant can make by seeking to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court on the question whether the plaintiff has paid adequate court-fee on his plaint. Whether proper court-fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State. How by an order relating to the adequacy of the court-fee paid by the plaintiff, the defendant may feel aggrieved, it is difficult to appreciate. Again the jurisdiction in revision exercised by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly conditioned by cls. (a) to (c) thereof and may be invoked on the ground of refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Subordinate Court or assumption of jurisdiction which the court does not possess or on the ground that the court has acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The defendant who may believe and even honestly that proper court-fee has not been paid by the plaintiff has still no right to move the superior courts by appeal or in revision against the order adjudging payment of court-fee payable on the plaint.” ……. 23. Perusal of the order impugned in the present case manifests that the objection of the petitioner in the backdrop of the circular of the State Government as to the value of the land and the sale deed was considered by the learned trial Court before rejecting the objection inter alia on grounds that a valuation of land had no connection with the valuation of a relief prayed in a declaratory suit. There is a conscious application of mind by the learned trial Court. The issues raised has been considered and rejected by the trial Court recording satisfaction on the valuation made instead of rejecting the plaint in exercise of the powers vested under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’). 24. The order being reasoned, prima-facie there appears no ground warranting interference with the same. Even on merits the objection raised by the petitioner as to the valuation on grounds of jurisdiction does not hold much value for no prejudice apparently seems to be caused to the petitioner by the trial of the proceedings in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division. 25. Even on merits the objection raised by the petitioner as to the valuation on grounds of jurisdiction does not hold much value for no prejudice apparently seems to be caused to the petitioner by the trial of the proceedings in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division. 25. Section 15 of the Code provides for institution of the suit in the Court of the lowest grade, competent to try the same. The suit being primarily in the nature of a declaratory suit the consequential relief prayed by the plaintiff would not alter its nature, as being endeavoured by the defendant-petitioner to establish. 26. As mentioned earlier, no prejudice can be complained of by the defendant by the trial of the suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division as the appeal would still lie in the Court of District Judge and thus more than two forums up to the High Court would still be available to the parties. This Court in the case of Dumraon Properties & Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. Bihari Lal Gupta & Ors., 2004 (3) PLJR 805 , in identical facts, has held as follows:– “……….The fact that the trial Court would be the Munsif or the Sub-Judge, and the first appellate court would be the District Judge or the High Court has not at all in law been taken to cause any prejudice to the parties..…..” 27. Section 8 of the Suit valuation Act, 1887 provides that for suits other than those falling in the category of Section 7 (v),(vi),(ix) and (x)(d), where Court fee is paid ad valorem, the value determinable for computation of Court fee and the value for the purpose of jurisdiction, shall be the same. It is thus manifest from plain reading of the provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act read with Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act that the determination of the value of the relief by the plaintiff for the purpose of jurisdiction and Court Fee is the same and left at the discretion of the plaintiff and which is ordinarily to be accepted unless found by the Court to be arbitrary and which is not the finding of the trial Court in the present case. 28. The word ‘ad valorem’ is not synonymous to ‘market value‘ rather it means ‘in proportion to the value’. 28. The word ‘ad valorem’ is not synonymous to ‘market value‘ rather it means ‘in proportion to the value’. Had the word “Ad valorem” carried the same meaning as ‘market value’ there would be no necessity of having a separate provision of Section 7(v) in the Court Fee Act requiring Court fee to be paid as per the Market Value. In the present case the relief prayed in the suit, as reflected from the plaint placed at Annexure-1, shows that the plaintiffs have claimed their right, title and interest over the suit property on the basis of pleadings made thereunder and seeks a seal of approval from the trial Court, meaning thereby a declaration of the competent Court is being sought by the plaintiff over the property which is subject matter of the suit and upon which they claim derivative title. The mere inclusion of a consequential relief of recovery of possession in eventuality of dispossession, certainly would not transfer the suit from the provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) to that of Section 7 (v)(e) of the Court Fee Act. 29. For the reasons aforesaid, no infirmity nor any jurisdictional error can be found in the order passed by the learned trial Court and this application is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs. 30. As the matter has been lingering adjudication since long, hence the trial Court would be well advised to expedite the trial.