Judgment :- Ghulam Mohammed, J. This writ appeal is preferred by the respondent – Indian Bank in the writ petition challenging the correctness of the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge who allowed the writ petition filed by the 1st respondent – employee of the said bank. During the currency of the writ petition, the 1st respondent – employee/officer of the bank died. His legal representatives have been permitted to prosecute the writ petition. The 1st respondent – writ petitioner has been retired from service of the appellant – bank on 8.6.1979 as a measure of punishment. By then, he has already put in 34 years of service to the bank. However, he was not granted gratuity. Ultimately, his representations for payment of gratuity have been turned down on 28.1.1981 on the premise that he was compulsorily retired from service for acts, which amounted to offence involving in moral turpitude and hence he is not eligible to receive gratuity. The case of the 1st respondent – writ petitioner was that as per regulations of the respondent-appellant/Indian Bank, payment of gratuity can be denied only to such employees who are either removed or dismissed from service and not for those who have been retired from service. The case of the appellant – bank is that the 1st respondent – employee/officer has admitted his misdemeanor unconditionally. Hence, he was awarded the punishment of compulsory retirement in accordance with the Indian Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. Therefore, this is not one such case where the employee officer has retired from the service on attaining the age of superannuation. Learned single Judge has noticed that gratuity payable to an officer can be wholly forfeited if only the service of such officer has been terminated for his riotous or disorderely conduct or any other act of violence on his part or if the officer is dismissed for misconduct or his services have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment. It is therefore, held by the learned single Judge that excepting in the above contingent situations, payment of gratuity cannot be forfeited in any other case. In the instant case, the officer – employee has been handed down major punishment of compulsory retirement from service. It is therefore, held by the learned single Judge that excepting in the above contingent situations, payment of gratuity cannot be forfeited in any other case. In the instant case, the officer – employee has been handed down major punishment of compulsory retirement from service. It is not the same as dismissal from service. Hence, the writ petition has been allowed. We have heard Sri Ambadipudi Satyanarayana, learned counsel for the appellant – bank and Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for the respondents. Sri Satyanarayana would strenuously contend that the respondent – employee has admitted his guilt and hence misconduct attributed to him has been established. Consequently major punishment of compulsory retirement has been imposed on him. When once an officer – employee is guilty of conduct which is otherwise grave and heinous in nature, he is not entitled for payment of gratuity. Though, learned counsel for the appellant referred to us Regulation 46 of the Indian Bank Officers Service Regulations, 1979, in support of his contention that gratuity need not be paid to an officer – employee whose services have been terminated by way of punishment, but, however, when his attention was drawn to the fact that the aforementioned regulations have been brought into force with effect from 1.7.1979 and the appointed date also defines the said date viz., 1st April, 1979 in Regulation 3(a) of the Indian Bank Officers Service Regulations, 1979 and consequently they will not have any applicability to the case on hand inasmuch as the officer employee in the instant case has been retired compulsorily from service on 8.6.1979 which is a date anterior to 1.7.1979, the learned counsel for the appellant did not press the contention raised by him in this regard any further. Even otherwise, since the employee officer concerned in the instant case has been retired compulsorily on 8.6.1979, which is prior to the Indian Bank Officers’ Service Regulations 1979, coming into force, the said regulations will not be applicable to the case on hand. In the absence of any such regulations made by the Indian Bank, the Indian Bank Employees Gratuity Fund, which has been approved in accordance with the provisions of Rule 2(1) of Part C of Fourth Schedule to the Income-tax Act, 1961 alone will have to be taken into account and consideration. Paragraph (31) of the Gratuity Fund Scheme mentioned supra, dealt with gratuity payable to officer employees. Paragraph (31) of the Gratuity Fund Scheme mentioned supra, dealt with gratuity payable to officer employees. It is made clear that upon an officer employee seizing to be an employee and in case of his death, his nominee or heirs, as the case may be, shall be paid gratuity in accordance with the provisions of the rules contained in Annexure 2 thereto. Annexure 2 contained the detailed procedure for regulating the payment of gratuity. Rules 1, 2 and 3 thereof, are important for our consideration. They read as under: “1. Gratuity shall be paid : (i) on the death of an Officer whilst in the service of the Bank, the amount of gratuity being payable to the heirs, executors, administrators or assigns of the Officer or in case he has executed a nomination paper in the manner as hereinafter provided, to the nominee of the officer; (ii) on an Officer becoming physically or mentally incapable of further service or on termination of his service by the Bank otherwise than by dismissal; (iii) on voluntary retirement or resignation on completion of continuous service of ten years or more. 2. Notwithstanding anything contained in these presents : (a) The gratuity of an Officer whose services have been terminated for any act, willful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss or destruction of property belong to the Bank shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so caused. (b) The gratuity payable to an officer shall be wholly forfeited: (i) if the services of such Officer have been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part (ii) if the Officer is dismissed for misconduct or his services have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment. 3. The amount of gratuity payable shall be equal to one month’s basis salary for each completed year of service subject to a maximum of fifteen months’ salary. Where an Officer has put in a service of over thirty years, an extra amount by way of gratuity shall become payable at the rate of additional half month’s salary for each completed year of service beyond thirty years. To that extent the maximum provided under this clause shall stand increased. Where an Officer has put in a service of over thirty years, an extra amount by way of gratuity shall become payable at the rate of additional half month’s salary for each completed year of service beyond thirty years. To that extent the maximum provided under this clause shall stand increased. A perusal of the above scheme makes it clear and plain that even in case of termination of service of an employee of the bank otherwise than by dismissal or upon voluntary retirement or resignation upon completion of continuous service of 10 years or more, such an employee becomes entitled to be paid gratuity. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the officer employee has not been dismissed from service. His services have been brought to an end by imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement on him as a measure of punishment. Rule 2 supra enabled forfeiture of gratuity in case the service of an officer employee has been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part. Even this clause is not attracted to the case on hand as the service of the officer employee has not been terminated for any riotous or disorderly conduct or for any act of violence on his part. However, Sri Ambadapudi Satyanarayana, learned counsel would place strong reliance upon clause (2) contained in Rule 2(b) of the aforesaid Annexure 2 of the Fund, which authorized forfeiture of gratuity if the services of an officer have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude provided that such an offence is committed by him during the course of his employment. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the conduct of the respondent officer employee is wholly blameworthy. He has admitted of his misdemeanor. Bank has taken a lenient view and imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement instead of dismissing him from service. The conduct behind the charges levelled against the officer employee are grave and serious and they involve moral turpitude. We are not at all impressed by the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. He has admitted of his misdemeanor. Bank has taken a lenient view and imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement instead of dismissing him from service. The conduct behind the charges levelled against the officer employee are grave and serious and they involve moral turpitude. We are not at all impressed by the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. One of us (NRR,J) had an occasion to consider in the case of Lakdev Ashok v. Government of A.P. and another 2009(6) ALD 641 : 2009(6) ALT 677 , the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1996) 4 SCC 17 which dealt with the issue as to in what classes of offenses, moral turpitude can be constituted. The matter has been considered in the following manner: “……..The question relating to what class of offences constitute moral turpitude and which others do not attract the elements of moral turpitude has been considered and appropriately dealt with by the Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana : (1996) 4 SCC 17 : 1996 (3) ALT 2 (D.N.). In the said judgment, the Supreme Court held as under: ...Thereafter the opinion of the District Attorney, Bhiwani was sought. He opined that the offence punishable under Section 294 IPC was not a serious offence which could involve moral turpitude and the sentence of fine of Rs. 20 imposed on the appellant was not likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties and therefore there was no legal bar for his retention in service. A reference was also made to the Legal Remembrancer to the Government of Haryana, soliciting his opinion. This officer opined that it would not be desirable to appoint the appellant in government service since he had been convicted under Section 294 IPC, involving an offence of moral turpitude, as otherwise the very purpose of verification of character/antecedents would be frustrated. On the collection of such material, decision was taken and the services of the appellant were terminated vide order dated 30.9.1984, as no longer required. 6. Challenging this order the appellant went in suit for declaration before the Civil Court, describing the order terminating his services as against law, equity, good conscience, and violative of principles of natural justice, claiming that he continued to be in service entitled to all benefits of service including salary etc. 6. Challenging this order the appellant went in suit for declaration before the Civil Court, describing the order terminating his services as against law, equity, good conscience, and violative of principles of natural justice, claiming that he continued to be in service entitled to all benefits of service including salary etc. The State and the Chief Medical Officer resisted the suit. The only contentious issue which sprung up from the pleadings of the parties was: Whether the order dated 30.9.1984 about the termination of service of the plaintiff is wrong, illegal and liable to be set aside as alleged? 7. The trial court decided the said issue against the appellant. The lower appellate court on appeal affirmed the same. The High Court too in second appeal concurred with the decision of the courts below, basically on two grounds, namely, (i) that the conviction of the appellant under Section 294 IPC revealed an act which per se constituted moral turpitude; and (ii) the order of termination of service, bare facedly, on its plain language was not stigmatic. All the same it was never disputed by the defendants-respondents that since the character and antecedent verification had revealed the conviction of the appellant under Section 294 IPC, that was the reason why the services of the appellant were dispensed with and not regularised. Hence this appeal. 12. "Moral turpitude" is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity. The government of Haryana while considering the question of rehabilitation of ex-convicts took a policy decision on February 2, 1973 (Annexure E in the Paper Book), accepting the recommendations of the Government of India, that ex-convicts who were convicted for offences involving moral turpitude should not however be taken in government service. A list of offences which were considered involving moral turpitude was prepared for information and guidance in that connection. Significantly Section 294 IPC is not found enlisted in the list of offences constituting moral turpitude. Later, on further consideration, the government of Haryana on 17/26th March, 1975 explained the policy decision of February 2,1973 and decided to modify the earlier decision by streamlining determination of moral turpitude as follows: ... Significantly Section 294 IPC is not found enlisted in the list of offences constituting moral turpitude. Later, on further consideration, the government of Haryana on 17/26th March, 1975 explained the policy decision of February 2,1973 and decided to modify the earlier decision by streamlining determination of moral turpitude as follows: ... The following terms should ordinarily be applied in judging whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not: (1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general. (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one. (3) whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society. Decision in each case will, however, depend on the circumstances of the case and the competent authority has to exercise its discretion while taking a decision in accordance with the above mentioned principles. A list of offences which involve moral turpitude is enclosed for your information and guidance. This list, however, cannot be said to be exhaustive and there might be offence which are not included in it but which in certain situations and circumstances may involve moral turpitude. Section 294 IPC still remains out of the list. Thus the conviction of the appellant under Section 294 IPC on its own would not involve moral turpitude depriving him the opportunity to serve the State unless the facts and circumstances, which led to the conviction, met the requirements of the policy decision above-quoted. 14. Before concluding this judgment we hereby draw attention of the Parliament to step in and perceive the large many cases which per law and public policy are tried summarily, involving thousands and thousands of people throughout the country appearing before summary courts and paying small amounts of fine, more often than not, as a measure of plea-bargaining. Foremost among them being traffic, municipal and other petty offences under the Indian Penal Code, mostly committed by the young and/or the inexperienced. The cruel result of a conviction of that kind and a fine of payment of a paltry sum on plea-bargaining is the end of the career, future or present, as the case may be, of that young and/or inexperienced person, putting a blast to his life and his dreams. The cruel result of a conviction of that kind and a fine of payment of a paltry sum on plea-bargaining is the end of the career, future or present, as the case may be, of that young and/or inexperienced person, putting a blast to his life and his dreams. Life is too precious to be staked over a petty incident like this. Immediate remedial measures are therefore necessary in raising the toleration limits with regard to petty offences especially when tried summarily. Provision need be made that punishment of fine upto a certain limit, say upto Rs. 2000 or so, on a summary/ordinary conviction shall not be treated as conviction at all for any purpose and all the more for entry into and retention in government service. This can brook no delay, whatsoever. 6. Let us note how The Living Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary' of the English Language described the following expressions: depraved: Corrupted; Perverted; immoral base : of illegitimate birth; morally low; without dignity of sentiment; mean -spirited; befitting or characteristic of an inferior person or thing; Unworthy; menial; not classical or refined; of little comparative value. vile : Wretchedly bad; highly offensive or objectionable; repulsive or disgusting, as to the senses or feelings; morally base, depraved or despicable. Therefore, the elements of moral turpitude are attached to only certain classes of offences, which are considered to be incompatible with a decent social order. Civilised society is not expected to bear the rough of the presence of such individuals amongst themselves. The conduct which led to the conviction of an offence which involves moral turpitude has therefore come to be recognised as offering a reasonable basis for the State to initiate action against such civil servant in terms of Article 311 of our Constitution……. It is clear that not all offences ipso facto attract the expression `moral turpitude’ to them. Only a few of them would involve `moral turpitude’. There is any amount of distinction between a civil wrong and an offence. Unless a statute is made by a competent legislature, no particular human conduct or an omission can be considered or treated as an offence. “Offence” as was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Maqbool Hussain’s case (1953) SCR 730, where Article 20(2) of the Constitution came up for consideration, has not been defined in the Constitution. Unless a statute is made by a competent legislature, no particular human conduct or an omission can be considered or treated as an offence. “Offence” as was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Maqbool Hussain’s case (1953) SCR 730, where Article 20(2) of the Constitution came up for consideration, has not been defined in the Constitution. So under Article 367, which provides that the General Clauses Act, 1987, shall apply for the interpretation of the Constitution, the word “offence” in the several clauses of Article 20 must be understood to convey the meaning given to it in Section 3(37) of the General ClausesAct. Thatsection defines an `offence’ to mean an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. See also Judgement of the Supreme Court in Jawala Ram v. State of Pepsu (1962) 2 SCR 503 : AIR 1962 SC 1246 also Venkataraman v. Union of India AIR 1954 SC 375 . This is the essential distinction between a civil wrong and a wrong involving criminal culpability. Only acts or omissions involving criminal culpability can be characterized as offences. Such offences are required to be codified well in advance so that one can regulate his own conduct carefully enough not to attract the penal consequences therefrom. What clause (2) of Rule 2 of the Second Schedule of the Gratuity Fund of the Bank dealt with was with regard to offences an officer employee has been convicted of, involving moral turpitude and as a consequence thereof, the bank removes him or terminates his services, in such cases the gratuity can be forfeited as a whole. The bank itself cannot unilaterally assume the conduct of its officer employee as an offence involving moral turpitude. It has no such power or jurisdiction. It would have been an entirely different matter, if the officer employee of the Bank has been tried by a competent Criminal Court and was punished for an offence involving moral turpitude and based upon such conviction the services of such an employee have been dismissed or otherwise terminated. It is, therefore, not proper for the appellant bank to have withheld the payment of gratuity as the respondent – officer employee has been retired from service compulsorily as a measure of punishment. It is, therefore, not proper for the appellant bank to have withheld the payment of gratuity as the respondent – officer employee has been retired from service compulsorily as a measure of punishment. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of The Management of Tournamulla Estate v. Workmen 1973(2) SCC 502 . In paragraph (3) of the said judgment, the Supreme Court had approvingly referred to its earlier judgment in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (1969) 2 SCR 307 : AIR 1970 SC 919 wherein the following principle has been laid: “……. However, this Court has had occasion to consider in detail the various circumstances in which gratuity would be liable to forfeiture for misconduct of a particular nature. It was laid down in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co., Ltd., v. Workmen and others : (1969)IILLJ755SC that the object of Having a gratuity scheme is to provide a retiring benefit to workmen who have rendered long and unblemished service to the employer and thereby contributed to the prosperity of the employer, and it is, therefore, not correct to say that no misconduct however grave, may not be visited with forfeiture of gratuity. Misconduct could be of three kinds, (1) technical misconduct which leaves no trail of indiscipline, (2) misconduct resulting in damage to the employer's property which might be compensated by forfeiture of gratuity or part thereof, and (3) serious misconduct such as acts of violence against the management or other employees or riotous or disorderly behavior in or near the place of employment, which, though not directly causing damage, is conducive to grave indiscipline. The first should involve no forfeiture, the second may involve forfeiture of the amount equal to the loss directly suffered by the employer in consequence of the misconduct and the third will entail forfeiture of gratuity due to the workman. In other words, according to this decision, if a workman is guilty of a serious misconduct of the third category, then, his gratuity can be forfeited in its entirety. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in P.Rajan Sandhi v. Union of India and another (2010) 10 SCC 338 . In paragraph (10), the principle has been laid therein as under: “10. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in P.Rajan Sandhi v. Union of India and another (2010) 10 SCC 338 . In paragraph (10), the principle has been laid therein as under: “10. It may be seen that there is a difference between the provisions for denial of gratuity in the Payment of Gratuity Act and in the Working Journalists Act. Under the Working Journalists Act gratuity can be denied if the service is terminated as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary act, as has been done in the instant case. We are of the opinion that Section 5 of the Working Journalists Act being a special law will prevail over Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act which is a general law. Section 5 of the Working Journalists Act is only for working journalists, whereas the Payment of Gratuity Act is available to all employees who are covered by that Act and is not limited to working journalists. Hence, the Working Journalists Act is a special law, whereas the Payment of Gratuity Act is a general law. It is well settled that special law will prevail over the general law, vide G.P. Singh's 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation', Ninth Edition, 2004 pp. 133, 134.” In the instant case, the service of the 1st respondent employee officer having been brought to an end only by way of compulsory retirement, but not due to his conviction of an offence involving any moral turpitude, the respondent – appellant – bank has no justification whatsoever for either withholding or forfeiting the amount of gratuity payable to such an officer employee. Since there is no justification whatsoever for withholding the gratuity payable, it would be appropriate that the same shall be paid within a maximum period of three months together with interest calculated at 6% per annum. The writ appeal is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.1,000/-(Rupees One thousand only). The amount of costs shall also be paid along with the gratuity amount.