JUDGMENT : Deepak Gupta, J. This appeal by the appellant is directed against the judgment dated 6.5.2009, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby he rejected the petition. 2. Admitted facts of the case are that the petitioner is a sportsman. He at the relevant time was employed as a Clerk in the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (HPSEB). The State of Himachal Pradesh issued an advertisement inviting applications for the post of District Sports Officer. A number of persons including the petitioner applied for the said post. The application of the petitioner was not considered since it had not been sponsored by the Employment Exchange. The stand of the State was that so far as the applications sent by the employees of the departments are concerned, they could be sent through the competent authority/Heads of the Departments, but in so far as the employees of the autonomous bodies like the HPSEB are concerned, only those candidates were to be considered whose names were sponsored by the Employment Exchange. 3. The petitioner challenged this action by filing Original Application No. 1883/1996 before the erstwhile H.P. State Administrative Tribunal. In the meanwhile, a question was raised before the H.P. Public Service Commission whether the private respondents fulfills the essential qualifications to be considered for appointment to this post. The Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission took the view that the private respondent was eligible. The private respondent was thereafter selected. The petitioner not only challenged the non-consideration of his name but also challenged the appointment of the private respondent on the ground that he did not fulfill the essential qualifications. 4. We are first considering the second contention of the petitioner. The Recruitment & Promotion Rules framed by the State are identical in respect of Sports Coach/District Sports Officer. The essential qualifications are as under:- Essential: (I) Degree course from the recognized University/ Institution or its equivalent. (II) Diploma/certificate course in the concerned game for the duration not less than one year. OR Diploma in Physical Education/Graduate in Physical Education with at least 6 months coaching certificate/Diploma (condensed course) from a recognized University/Institution. 5. The learned Single Judge held that the word "coaching" should be read as "teaching" since in the original Hindi Rules, the word "Shikshan" has been used. Be that as it may, this in our opinion does not affect the merits of the case.
5. The learned Single Judge held that the word "coaching" should be read as "teaching" since in the original Hindi Rules, the word "Shikshan" has been used. Be that as it may, this in our opinion does not affect the merits of the case. The first essential qualification was that the candidate should have a degree course from a recognized University/Institution, which admittedly the private respondent had. The second essential qualification was divided into two parts. Any candidate having one of the two qualifications would be deemed to be fulfilling the eligibility criteria. He should have a diploma/certificate course in the concerned game for the duration not less than one year. In the absence of such diploma/certificate of one year, the candidate should have had a Diploma in Physical Education/Graduate in Physical Education with at least six months coaching certificate/teaching certificate from a recognized University/ Institution. The respondent did not have this certificate, but was a postgraduate in Physical Education. When the question was raised before the Public Service Commission as to whether the private respondent fulfills the eligibility criteria, it was of the view that since the post which was advertised, was that of District Sports Officer and not of Sports Coach of a specific game, then the postgraduate degree of two years should meet the second eligibility criteria inasmuch as it was higher than a diploma or certificate course of one year. 6. The main contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the diploma or the certificate should have been in a specific game and the postgraduate course in Physical Education would not meet the requirement of the rule. At first blush, this argument does appear to be attractive, but what would be the specific concerned game/specific game in the case of District Sports Officer? The duties of a District Sports Officer are more or less administrative in nature, unlike a Sports Coach who has to excel in a particular field and coach the sportsmen in a particular game or field. There may be a Coach in athletics, there may be a Coach of Table Tennis, a Coach of Cricket etc., but this qualification has to be read in the context of the post advertised. If the post was that of a Coach in a particular game or field, then that the qualifications required i.e. diploma/certificate course/coaching/teaching certificate would be in that specific game of field.
If the post was that of a Coach in a particular game or field, then that the qualifications required i.e. diploma/certificate course/coaching/teaching certificate would be in that specific game of field. However, when the post of District Sports Officer was to be filled up, then the interpretation given by the Public Service Commission that the wider field of Physical Education would suffice the requirement of the rules, does not appear to be incorrect. The duties of District Sports Officer are more administrative in nature and as rightly held by the Commission, it is not necessary that he should be expert in one field. At the same time, his qualifications should be in the field of Physical Education and since the respondent was a postgraduate in Physical Education, he was rightly held to be eligible. 7. As far as the first contention raised by the petitioner is concerned, we are of the view that since the post was advertised in 1996 and the private respondent has been working since 1998 and we have held that he is duly qualified to hold the post, the learned Single Judge was right in rejecting the plea of the petitioner especially when his name has not been sponsored by the Employment Exchange. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal filed by the appellant, which is dismissed.