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2012 DIGILAW 16 (JK)

Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Bhat v. State & Ors.

2012-01-31

HASNAIN MASSODI

body2012
1. Challenge in this Criminal Revision Petition, is to the order of Learned Sessions Judge, Kulgam, dated 25th July, 2011, in case titled "State v. Abdul Razak Parray and ors." FIR No. 246/2009, Police Station, Kulgam, under Section 302,102-B RFC, whereby the Trial Court has granted bail to Shri Bashir Ahmad Bhat S/o Habib-Ullah Bhat R/o Kelam, Tehsil Kulgam — respondent no. 3 herein, one of the accused facing trial on the afore-stated charge. 2. First, a closer look at the background facts. 3. On 19th September, 2009, a written report was lodged by Ghulam Mohi-Din Bhat S/o Habib- Ullah Bhat R/o Kelam, Kulgam — petitioner herein, with Police Station, Kulgam, alleging therein that in the evening on the said date, Shri Abdul Razak Parray S/o Gula Ahmad alias Amma Parray, with 36 other accused all residents of Kelam, Kulgam, formed an unlawful assembly in the premises of local Jamia Masjid, and in furtherance of common object of the assembly, armed with lathies and stones attacked amongst others one Nawaz Ahmad Bhat, and in execution of the criminal conspiracy hatched prior to the occurrence, severely thrashed Shri Nawaz Ahmad Bhat with the intention to kill him and that the victim was injured due to murderous assault and breathed his last in the local hospital. 4. The receipt of the report prompted Police Station, Kulgam registered case FIR No. 246/2009 under Section 148,149,323,325,336,341,427,447,302,102-B RPC. After usual investigation, the charge sheet was presented before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kulgam, who in turn after fulfilling the requirement of Section 205 (d) Code of Criminal Procedure committed the case to the Learned Sessions Court, Kulgam. Learned Sessions Court, Kulgam, on going through the charge sheet and the material submitted therewith and on hearing the prosecution and the accused found all the accused in the charge sheet to have prima facie committed offences alleged against them. The accused were formally charged of the offence alleged against them in the charge sheet. The accused pleaded not guilty, making it necessary for the prosecution to adduce evidence in support of the charges. Shri Bashir Ahmad Bhat — respondent no. 3, is one of the accused facing trial on the charge of having committed offences punishable under Section 302,102-B RPC. 5. The respondent no. 2, after the charge was framed, filed an application for grant of bail on the grounds pleaded therein. Shri Bashir Ahmad Bhat — respondent no. 3, is one of the accused facing trial on the charge of having committed offences punishable under Section 302,102-B RPC. 5. The respondent no. 2, after the charge was framed, filed an application for grant of bail on the grounds pleaded therein. The application was dismissed by learned Sessions Judge vide order dated 2nd February, 2011, on the grounds that most of the eye witnesses had yet to step in the witness box on the date the bail application was dismissed. 6. The respondent no. 3 after an interval of about four months made a fresh bid for bail, the application was allowed vide order dated 25th July 2011, and the respondent no. 3 admitted to bail and directed to be let off subject to the conditions laid down in the order. 7. The Trial Court order dated 25th July, 2011, whereby respondent no. 3 / accused has been enlarged on bail is questioned by father of the deceased in the present Criminal Revision Petition, requested in alternative to be treated as a petition under Section 561-A CrPC on the grounds that nothing extra ordinary had happened between 2nd February, 2011, and 25th July, 2011, to persuade the trial Court to take a view different from one taken on 2nd February, 2011, when the first bail application was dismissed. It is pointed out that the prosecution witnesses who appeared in the witness box during the intervening period had as a matter of fact, reinforced the prosecution case that the respondent no. 3 was part of a criminal conspiracy to eliminate the deceased (Late Nawaz Ahmad Bhat) and in execution of the criminal conspiracy hatched by the respondent no. 3 with his co-conspirators the deceased was killed as per the plan. It is next urged that the learned trial Court granted bail to the respondent no. 3, without recording satisfaction that there were no reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent no. 3 had committed the offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Learned trial Judge is said to have failed to record reasons in support of the view that "a prima facie case for bail" was made out "in favour of the accused". The petitioner suspects a foul play as according to the petitioner the respondent no. 3 had committed the offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Learned trial Judge is said to have failed to record reasons in support of the view that "a prima facie case for bail" was made out "in favour of the accused". The petitioner suspects a foul play as according to the petitioner the respondent no. 3 instead of joining other accused who filed an application for grant of bail in April, 2011, before the High Court registered as Bail Application No. 24/2011, filed a separate application before the trial Court on 10th June, 2011, later allowed on 25th July, 2011. The petitioner insists that learned Sessions Judge while allowing the bail application has committed grave irregularity and that the order also amounts to abuse of process of the Court. 8. I have gone through the petition as also the trial Court record. I have heard counsel for the parties at length and given my thoughtful consideration to the argument advanced at bar. 9. Mr. Z. A. Shah, Senior Advocate apart from justifying the impugned order on facts, questions maintainability of the petition on hand, on following two grounds:- (i) That the trial Court order dated 25th July, 2011, is interlocutory in nature and cannot be subject matter of the Criminal Revision in view of express bar created under Section 435 (4-a) of the Code, (ii) That the petition cannot be treated as one under Section 561-A CrPC inasmuch as inherent powers can be invoked only in absence of a provision under Code to deal with the matter and as Sections 497 (5) and 498 (2) CrPC provide a remedy to the petitioner, Section 561-A CrPC cannot be pressed into service. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3, to butters the argument seeks to draw support from "Abdul Rashid and ors. v. State and anr." 2007 (II) SLJ 544 : 2007 (2) JKJ HC-550, wherein revision against the order of the trial Court rejecting the bail application has been held not maintainable in view of bar created under Sub Section (4-a) of Section 435 CrPC. 3, to butters the argument seeks to draw support from "Abdul Rashid and ors. v. State and anr." 2007 (II) SLJ 544 : 2007 (2) JKJ HC-550, wherein revision against the order of the trial Court rejecting the bail application has been held not maintainable in view of bar created under Sub Section (4-a) of Section 435 CrPC. Learned counsel insists that right course for a person aggrieved with the order whereby bail is granted to an accused is to make an application for cancellation of bail before the Sessions Court or the High Court as the case may be and not to assail the order through a revision petition under Section 435 CrPC. Learned counsel making a pointed reference to Sub Section 5, Section 497 and Sub Section 2, Section 498 argues that the High Court or Court of Sessions can be approached by a person aggrieved with the order granting bail to an accused for cancellation of the bail and that such powers can be even exercised by a Court other than High Court or Sessions Court where bail has been granted by such Court. Elaborating upon his argument, learned counsel states that the petitioner is competent to approach the trial Court with an application for cancellation of the trial Court order dated 25th July, 2011, and the bail granted to respondent no. 3, or even the High Court but cannot question the order in revision because of its interlocutory character. 11. Mr. Lone learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand places reliance on "State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Khaliq Ahanger and anr." to canvass that the revision against an order granting bail is maintainable. Mr. Lone in particular invites attention to paras 6 and 7 of the reported judgment which reads as under:- "6. The powers to revision conferred on the High Court, in relation to orders passed by inferior criminal courts situated within local limits of its jurisdiction, is of widest range and amplitude. The very amplitude of the powers would include any order passed under the criminal procedure code. The High Court can call for and examine the records of any proceedings before any criminal Court within its local jurisdictional limits with a view to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or proprietary of any finding, sentence or orders passed and to judge the irregularity of any proceedings of such court. The High Court can call for and examine the records of any proceedings before any criminal Court within its local jurisdictional limits with a view to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or proprietary of any finding, sentence or orders passed and to judge the irregularity of any proceedings of such court. The orders recorded or passed and irregularity of the proceedings of the subordinate criminal courts is by now well understood in the legal parlance. Order would cover the commands and directions for something to be done, discontinued or suffered and the proceedings are wide enough to cover every thing done and recorded by any inferior criminal court. 7. Viewed thus, granting of bail in the facts and circumstances of the case, when the order is arbitrary, incorrect and illegal for the reasons to follow, the impugned order of bail cannot fall within the sweep of bar created by Section 4 (a) of Section 435 of the Code. The High Court has powers in revision to interfere with the orders and proceedings of the lower court at any stage by exercising the powers in terms and on conditions of Section 435 of the code. The High Court has powers in revision to interfere with the orders and proceedings of the lower court at any stage. The powers in terms of conditions of Section 435 CrPC by their very range, tenor and nature, are but to be exercised." 12. Mr. Lone laying emphasis on distinction between the right to get the bail cancelled and to question an unjustified or illegal bail order, insist that Sections 497 (5) and 498 (2) can be pressed into service, where an accused admitted to bail after availing the concession attempts to obstruct or impede trial or influence and intimidate the prosecution witnesses and not where the bail order is assailed on the grounds of illegality or perversity. Learned counsel to reinforce his argument proposes to draw support from law laid down in "Puran v. Rambilas and anr." AIR 2001, Supreme Court 2023. Learned counsel in particular lays stress on the following observation made by the Court:- "10. Learned counsel to reinforce his argument proposes to draw support from law laid down in "Puran v. Rambilas and anr." AIR 2001, Supreme Court 2023. Learned counsel in particular lays stress on the following observation made by the Court:- "10. Further, it is to be kept in mind that the concept of setting aside the unjustified, illegal or perverse order is totally different from the concept of cancelling the bail on the ground that accused has misconduct himself or because of some new facts requiring such cancellation. This position is made clear by this Court in Gurucharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), reported in AIR 1978 SC 179 : (1978 CriLJ 129). In that case the Court observed as under (Para 16): If, however, a Court of Session had admitted an accused person to bail, the State has two options. It may move the Sessions Judge if certain new circumstances have arise which were not earlier known to the State and necessarily, therefore, to that Court. The State may as well approach the High Court being the superior Court under S. 439 (2) to commit the accused to custody. When, however, the State is aggrieved by the order of the Sessions Judge granting bail and there are no new circumstances that have cropped up except those already existed, it is futile for the State to move the Sessions Judge again and it is competent in law to move the High Court of cancellation of the bail. This position follows from the subordinate position of the Court of Session vis-a-vis the High Court." 13. It is important to note that in Rambilas's case (Supra) one of the arguments advanced to assail the High Court order directing cancellation of bail granted by the Sessions Court was that the order granting bail was an "interlocutory order" and the High Court was debarred from exercising its inherent powers. The case set up in other words was that as revisional powers in terms of Section 397 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Central Code) were expressly restricted in case of "interlocutory orders", the High Court was not competent to exercise inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code (Central code), as it would amount to negating and nullifying Section 397 (2). It was in this background that, reliance was placed inter alia on "Amarnath v. State of Harayna" AIR 1977 SC 2185 where it was held that: "where a revision to the High Court against the order of the Subordinate Judge is expressly barred under sub-s. (2) of S. 397 of the 1973 Code the inherent powers contained in s. 482 would not be available to defeat the bar contained in s. 397(2). Section 482 of the 1973 Code contains the inherent powers of the Court and does not confer any new powers but preserves the powers which the High Court already possessed. A harmonious construction of ss. 397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under s. 397(2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of s. 482 would not apply. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the, Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject-matter. Where there is an express provision, barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers." 14. The Supreme Court did not repel or reject the argument that the order granting bail was an "interlocutory order" not amenable to revisional jurisdiction. The case law relied upon by Mr. Lone, thus, extends support to the stand taken by Mr. Shah that the order granting or refusing bail is an "interlocutory order" and revision is not maintainable being expressly barred by Section 435 (4-a) of the Code. However, this does not end the matter inasmuch as the petitioner though styling the petition as Criminal Revision has made a specific prayer in the body, of that the petition that it, in alternative may be treated as one under Section 561-A CrPC. 15. The objection from learned counsel for the petitioner to maintainability of the petition as one under Section 561-A CrPC is two folds. In the first place, it is argued that once law makers have in their wisdom curtailed or restricted the revisional powers of the High Court, the petitioner cannot be permitted to avoid and circumvent the express bar, by invoking inherent powers under Section 561- A CrPC. In the first place, it is argued that once law makers have in their wisdom curtailed or restricted the revisional powers of the High Court, the petitioner cannot be permitted to avoid and circumvent the express bar, by invoking inherent powers under Section 561- A CrPC. Secondly, it is contended that as Sections 497 (5) and 498 (2) of the Code provide the remedy, the petitioner cannot fall back upon inherent powers, that are to be exercised only in absence of a specific provision in the Code. 16. Both the arguments are destined to fail. The answer to the first ground urged is found in Rambilas's case (Supra), wherein the Supreme Court repelling the argument that inherent powers could not be invoked to question an order interlocutory in character observed: "16. Further, even if it is an interlocutory order, the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 is not affected by the provisions of Section 397 (3) of the code of Criminal Procedure. That the High Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 on the basis of self-imposed restriction is a different aspect. It cannot be denied that for securing the ends of justice, the High Court can interfere with the order which causes miscarriage of justice or is palpably illegal or is unjustified." 17. The second argument also does not sound convincing. Cancellation of bail and setting aside an unjustified or perverse order granting or denying bail are two different concepts. It is pertinent to point out that S.s 497 (5) and 498 (2) of the Code empower the High Court or a Court of Sessions or any other Court "to cause any person" who has been released/admitted to bail to be arrested and to commit him to custody. The power under Section 497 (5) of the Code may be exercised by (i) the High Court where a person has been released on bail or without bail (as under Section 497 (4) CrPC) under Section 497 by a Sessions Court or Magisterial Court (ii) the Sessions Court where a person has been so released under Section 497 by the Sessions Court, Magisterial Court and (iii) Judicial Magistrate 1st Class where a person has been so released by the said Magistrate. The power under Section 498 (2) can be exercised by the High Court where a person who have been admitted to bail under Sub Section (1) by the High Court or by the Court of Sessions. The power under both the provisions viz 497 (5) and 498 (2) CrPC has the focus on post bail developments. Both the provisions are more concerned with committing person released/ admitted to bail to custody. The two provisions, thus, primarily visualize a situation where a person released/admitted to bail has not come up to the expectations of the Court granting the bail as regard his conduct while out on bail, has not abided by the conditions subject to which bail was granted or some new facts have surfaced not earlier known to the Court while granting bail and it is bound to be lethal to the course of trial to allow him to be out on bail because of said facts. It is in such cases the High Court or the Court of Sessions or the Court that granted the bail may direct arrest of the person out on bail, and to be committed to custody. The law makers have taken the "post bail developments" so seriously that they have conferred concurrent jurisdiction on all the three Courts, High Court, Sessions Court, Magisterial Court to direct the person released/admitted to bail to be arrested and committed to custody. Section 498 (2) and Section 497 (5) ordinarily do no encompass a case where there are no "post bail developments" but the order granting/ refusing bail is illegal, perverse or unjustified. 18. In case the person released/admitted to bail is strictly abiding by all the conditions subject to which he was released on /admitted to bail, does not influence or intimidate the prosecution witnesses, attends trial on each and every date of hearing, does not obstruct or impede trial and no new facts have come to light after the bail order, as would warrant his arrest but the bail order is perverse, illegal and unjustified, the question arises whether the person aggrieved can press into service Sections 497 (5) and 498 (2) to question the bail order on the ground of perversely, illegality etc. The aggrieved in such case may make use of aforestated provisions but move a superior court as it would be of no use to question the bail order on the ground of perversity before the court that granted the bail. Sections 497 (5) and 498 (2) CrPC are primarily concerned with a case of misconduct by the person released / admitted to bail or appearance of new facts warranting arrest and custody of such person. Where the bail order is assailed on the ground of illegality, perversity or un-justifiability one of the courses open to the aggrieved person is to invoke inherent powers of the Court under Section 561-A CrPC that are there to be exercised to prevent abuse of process of Court or to secure the ends of justice. 19. From the above discussion, following principles of law emerge: i) That an order granting/refusing bail is an "interlocutory order" and not revisable in view of bar created under Section 435 (4-a) CrPC. ii) That the power to direct arrest of the person released/admitted to bail and to commit him to custody is to be exercised at the instance of the aggrieved party or even suo motto — by the Court itself or an application of someone reminding the Court of need to exercise such power, where post bail conduct of such person or the facts surfacing after the order warrant cancellation of bail. iii) That inherent powers of the High Court under Section 561-A to entertain and deal with the petition questioning the order grating/refusing bail on the ground of perversity, illegality and such other grounds are not barred or restricted by Section 435 (4-a) CrPC. 20. Let us now shift focus to the case in hand. The petitioner's case as may be clear by now is not that there have been any "post bail development" that warrant cancellation of bail and arrest of respondent no. 3, and his custody. It is not petitioner's case that the respondent no. 3, after he was granted bail has done anything to hamper trial, tamper with the evidence or prevent the witnesses from appearing in the witness box. The petitioner's case on the other hand is that the trial Court has rushed to the conclusion that "a prima facie case for bail" was made out without detailing any reasons. 3, after he was granted bail has done anything to hamper trial, tamper with the evidence or prevent the witnesses from appearing in the witness box. The petitioner's case on the other hand is that the trial Court has rushed to the conclusion that "a prima facie case for bail" was made out without detailing any reasons. It is insisted that the evidence brought on the file does not justify such conclusion and that the trial Court order dated 27th July, 2011, amounts to abuse of process of the Court and has resulted in failure of justice. Emphasizing that respondent no. 3, has been formally charged of an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment and in terms of Section 497 CrPC, the bail was to be granted only in case the trial Court was satisfied that there were "not reasonable grounds for believing that" the respondent no. 3, had committed the alleged offence, no such satisfaction was recorded in the present case. It is insisted that the trial Court order dated 25th July, 2011, is un-justified and perverse. 21. To counter the argument, learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 insist that the trial Court while dealing with an application for grant of bail is neither expected nor required to make a threadbare discussion of the material on the file or to deal with the merits of the case. It is argued that learned trial Judge after making such examination of the evidence as permissible under law has justifiably drawn the conclusion that the respondent no. 3 had made out a case for grant of bail. 22. Section 497 CrPC as regards grant of bail to the accused, divides non-bailable offences into two groups — the offences punishable with punishment other than death or imprisonment for life and the offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In case of first group of offences discretion is given to the Court to grant bail to the accused. However, such discretion is to be exercised in a judicious manner, not arbitrarily or as a matter of course. In case of second group of non bailable offences i.e. offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life, grant of bail is prohibited unless the accused is under age of 16 years, is a woman or sick or infirm. However, such discretion is to be exercised in a judicious manner, not arbitrarily or as a matter of course. In case of second group of non bailable offences i.e. offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life, grant of bail is prohibited unless the accused is under age of 16 years, is a woman or sick or infirm. In such cases, discretion is given to the Court as given in case of non-bailable offences of the first group to admit the accused to bail. There may be a case, where a person is alleged to have committed offence punishable with death or imprisonment and thus not entitled to bail, but as the trial proceeds and the evidence is recorded, it may appear to the trial Court that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed the offence punishable with death or life imprisonment. What is the course to be followed in such a case. Should accused be kept behind bars till the trial concludes, because of prohibition against bail embodied in Section 497 (1) CrPC ? The answer lies in Section 497 (2) of the Code. It reads: 497 (1)... "(2) If it appears to such officer or Court at any stage of the investigation inquiry or trial, as the case may be, that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt the accused shall, pending such inquiry be released on bail, or, at the discretion of such officer or Court, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided." 23. It follows that while in case of bail in a non-bailable offence other than offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the Court is expected to detail reasons though briefly to conclude that a case for bail is made out. In case of bail in an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the Court is required to record its satisfaction that "there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed" the offence punishable with death or life imprisonment. In case of bail in an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the Court is required to record its satisfaction that "there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed" the offence punishable with death or life imprisonment. The Court obviously cannot rush to the conclusions in vacuum and has to make an objective over view of the evidence brought on the file and have regard to the evidence yet to be brought on the file, to satisfy itself that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed the offence and spell out the reasons for the conclusion so drawn. The Supreme Court in Rambilas's case (Supra) where the offence alleged were not punishable with death or life imprisonment and there was no bar to grant of bail to the accused emphasizing the requirement of recording reasons while granting bail observed: "At the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case has not to be undertaken. What the Additional Sessions Judge had done, in the Order dated 11th September, 2000, was to discuss the merits and demerits of the evidence. That was what was depreciated. That did not mean that whilst granting bail some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be indicated." The principle of law has been reiterated in "Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav and anr." (2004) 7 SCC 528 . There is thus an added requirement of recording reasons when the trial court accords consideration to grant of bail to an accused taking trial on the charge of having committed offence punishable with or life imprisonment. 24. In the present case, learned trial Judge while granting bail to respondent no. 3, alleged to have committed an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment, oblivious to the mandate of Section 497 (2) has not recorded satisfaction that "there are no reasonable grounds for believing" that the resplendent no. 3 has committed the offence of which he was charged and that he thus, deserves to be enlarged on bail. Learned trial Judge has not even recorded reasons in support of the prima facie view taken that respondent no. 3 had made out a case for bail. 3 has committed the offence of which he was charged and that he thus, deserves to be enlarged on bail. Learned trial Judge has not even recorded reasons in support of the prima facie view taken that respondent no. 3 had made out a case for bail. Learned trial Judge has made a brief reference to statements of three witnesses PW-6 (Sabzar Ahamd Bhat), -PW-7 (Nazir Ahmad Bhat), PW- 25 (Mohd. Shafi Bhat) pointing out that, though in their statements under section 164-A CrPC, the witnesses have stated that the conspiracy was hatched in the meeting held by the accused in the house of Mohd. Bhat S/o Habib Ullah Bhat, before the occurrence, the three witnesses had not in their statement before the Court made a specific mention of "hatching of conspiracy". The trial Court also disbelieved the statement of the said three witnesses that they were asked by the accused present in the meeting to ask the deceased Nawaz Ahmad Bhat and his father to stay away from the Auqaf dispute or, otherwise, they would be eliminated/assassinated, on the ground that such a threat was bound to disclose the plans of the accused and they would have ordinarily desisted from disclosing their mind by extending such threats. It appears that the trial Court scanned the statements of the three prosecution witnesses as if it was called upon to see whether the prosecution case was established against the respondent no. 3 beyond reasonable doubt or he was entitled to benefit of doubt. Surprisingly, learned trial Judge a month after respondent no. 3 was let off on bail vide order dated 25th August, 2011, declined bail to other accused observing that "to refuse bail, it is not necessary that there should be evidence, which would practically justify a conviction". It is pertinent to point out that the conclusions rushed to by learned trial Judge while granting bail to respondent no. 3 do not find support from the testimony of said prosecution witnesses. The three prosecution witnesses insisted on presence of respondent no. 3 in the meeting held by the accused a day before the occurrence in the house of Mohd. 3 do not find support from the testimony of said prosecution witnesses. The three prosecution witnesses insisted on presence of respondent no. 3 in the meeting held by the accused a day before the occurrence in the house of Mohd. Bhat S/o Habib-Ullah Bhat where the three witnesses (PWs 6, 7, and 25) as per their statements were summoned, persuaded to side with the accused party, offered Rs.20,000/- each and on their refusal asked to communicate the threat to the deceased Nawaz Ahmad Bhat and his father. The trial Court, thus, while allowing bail application of respondent no. 3, did not refer to requirement of absence of "reasonable grounds" for believing that the respondent no. 3, had not committed the offences of which he was charged, did not record satisfaction that there were no reasonable grounds for such a belief, and obviously did not record reasons for such satisfaction. Against the said backdrop, the order impugned is perverse, unjustified, illegal, amounts to abuse of process of the Court and is liable to be set aside to secure ends of justice. 25. For the reasons discussed above, the petition is allowed and the order of learned Sessions Judge dated 25th July, 2011, whereby the respondent no. 3 has been enlarged on bail in case FIR No. FIR No. 246/2009, Police Station, Kulgam, is in exercise of inherent powers under section 561-A Cr.PC quashed. 26. The respondent no. 3 has been already taken into custody. However, respondent no. 3 would be at liberty to make a fresh bid for bail as the trial proceeds and in the event, such an application is filed, it shall be decided on its own merits, unmindful of observations made while disposing of the present petition.