A.K. Goel, CJ.;- The matter has been placed before this Bench in view of the order dated 12.05.2009 passed by a Division Bench referring the ques­tion of scope of Section 54 CPC in relation to executability of a Civil Court decree for partition of undivided estate by Collector to larger Bench. One of the issues referred is whether the term 'estates' includes any piece of land in which case there may be conflict between Order 21 and Section 54 CPC. The reference order is as follows: "...Apart from the individual rights of the parties, i.e., the decree-holders and the judg­ment debtors, in our view, the question arises for determination is whether a decree for parti­tion of properties passed by a competent Civil Court can be executed by the revenue authori­ties acting under the provisions of Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886. Reliance is placed on Section 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Chapter VI of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886. Section 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the partition of revenue paying es­tate, which read as follows: "54. Partition of estate or separation of share.- where the decree is for the parti­tion of an undivided estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government, or for the separate possession of a share of such an estate the partition of the estate or the separation of the share shall be made by the Collector or any gazetted sub-ordinate of the Collector deputed by him in this be­half, in accordance with law (if any) for the time being in force relating to the partition, or the separate possession of shares, of such estates." Neither the expression "estate" or "rev­enue" paying estate" is defined under the Code of Civil Procedure. Chapter VI of the Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 deals with partition relating to revenue paying estate. The expres­sion "estate" itself is defined in Section 3 (v) (b) of the abovementioned Regulation. The expression "estate" occuring in Sec­tion 54 came up for consideration in various High Courts. The earliest decision in this re­gard appears to be that of the Madras High Court reported in (1884) ILR 7 Mad 3 82 (Muttu Chidambara Vs. Karuppa). The expres­sion "estate" itself is defined in Section 3 (v) (b) of the abovementioned Regulation. The expression "estate" occuring in Sec­tion 54 came up for consideration in various High Courts. The earliest decision in this re­gard appears to be that of the Madras High Court reported in (1884) ILR 7 Mad 3 82 (Muttu Chidambara Vs. Karuppa). A Full Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of five Judges hold that the expression "estate" occurring in Section 265 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not include ryotwari holdings and therefore, not amenable to the power under Section 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Similar views were ex­pressed in AIR 1953 Pun250: Rameshwar Nath Vs. Jogeshwar Nath & Ors., AIR (39) 1952 Allahabad 191: Ram Khelawan Vs. Sri. Ram & Ors. and also in another judgment reported in AIR (32) 1945 Calcutta 28 : Priyanath Roy Vs. Sreedhar Chandra Roy & Ors. Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure pre­scribes a procedure for execution of decree re­lating to movable and immovable properties. If the term "estate" occurring in Section 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure includes any piece of land, in our view, the provision of the Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure would become redundant. In the circumstances, in our view, the question now arises is as to what is the meaning to be given to the word to the expres­sion "estate" occurring in Section 54 of the Code of Civil procedure, requires an authoritative pro­nouncement. We are conscious of the fact that the Code of Civil Procedure is that subject confers with the concurrent of the Legislatures, both Parlia­mentary as well as State Legislature. The State Legislature adopts the Code of Civil Procedure by following pre-constitutional procedure and due weightage be given to the procedure pre­scribed therein. The Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 is a pre-Constitutional Law whereas, the Code of Civil Procedure though is a pre-Constitutional law, it has got past Consti­tutional amendment. Undoubtedly, the prescrip­tion provided in the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 relating to partition is a long established practice in the State of Assam. Therefore, we deem it appropriate that the mat­ter requires an authoritative pronouncement as to what would be the right procedure to be fol­lowed in such a case. Undoubtedly, the prescrip­tion provided in the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 relating to partition is a long established practice in the State of Assam. Therefore, we deem it appropriate that the mat­ter requires an authoritative pronouncement as to what would be the right procedure to be fol­lowed in such a case. We, therefore, direct the Registry to place the matter before a larger Bench consisting of five Judges on 16.06.2009." 2. The respondent-plaintiff filed suit for partition of the scheduled property between the parties which included land assessed to payment of revenue to the Government. The suit was filed in the year 1975. The suit was decreed in the year 1988. The decree holder filed proceedings for execution before the Revenue Court under Section 54 CPC. The Assistant Settlement Officer, acting as Rev­enue Court, decided the application on 27.05.1993, against which an appeal was preferred by the decree holders before the Assam Board of Revenue under Section 151 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations, 1886 with a grievance that the order of the executing authority was not in terms of the decree. The said Board vide order dated 08.04.2008 set aside the order of the Assist­ant Settlement Officer and remanded the matter for a fresh decision. The appellant, aggrieved by the order of the Board, filed a writ petition in this Court which has been dis­missed giving rise to this appeal. Lerned Sin­gle Judge rejected the contention of the ap­pellant that preliminary decree of Civil Court was not executable in view of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hasham Abbas Sayyad Vs. Usman Abbas Sayyad, (2007) 2 SCC 355 , it was followed: " 18. In the instant case, unlike the aforesaid case before the Apex Court, the preliminary de­cree drawn by the learned District Judge was in the form of final decree. The suit was instituted by the predecessor-in-interest of the respond­ents, inter alia, for partition of her share in re­spect of the land in question. While answering the issue framed in the suit, the learned District Judge held that the plaintiff had the right, title and interest to the extent of 2 kathas of land. The suit was instituted by the predecessor-in-interest of the respond­ents, inter alia, for partition of her share in re­spect of the land in question. While answering the issue framed in the suit, the learned District Judge held that the plaintiff had the right, title and interest to the extent of 2 kathas of land. As regards the claim for partition of her share of the land, repelling the contention of the con­testing defendants that the suit for partition did not lie as per the provision of the Assam Land & Revenue Regulation, the learned District Judge, upon a reference to the judgment of this Court in aforesaid FA No. 88/1979 in which it was held that the jurisdiction was entitled to a decree of partition in respect of her share of land forming subject matter of the present dis­pute. It is in this context, the judgment and de­cree dated 14.11.1988 passed in Title Suit No. 10/75 will have to be understood." Aggrieved by order of learned Single Judge, this appeal has been filed. 3. When the appeal came up for hearing, one of the questions raised by the appellant, was that the Revenue authorities could not execute the decree passed by the Civil Court as the Revenue Court could only execute the decree passed by the Revenue Court under Chapter VI of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulations, 1886. Reliance was placed on judgments cited in the reference order, ex­cluding applicability of Section 54 to ryotwary holdings. It was also submitted that Order 21 CPC laid down procedure for execution of decree passed by the Civil Court which will become redundant if Section 54 was read as permitting Revenue Court to execute a Civil Court decree. The Division Bench referred the mater to larger Bench, as above. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant sub­mitted that the Revenue Court could not ex­ecute the decree passed by the Civil Court and Section 54 CPC should be read as re­ferring to a decree of Revenue Court. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent-decree holder, on the other hand, submitted that the plain language of Section 54 with Order 20 Rule 18 clearly indicates that a Civil Court decree of the nature specified therein can be executed by Revenue Court. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent-decree holder, on the other hand, submitted that the plain language of Section 54 with Order 20 Rule 18 clearly indicates that a Civil Court decree of the nature specified therein can be executed by Revenue Court. In sup­port of this submission reliance has also been placed on judgment of Bombay High Court in Ramabai Govind Vs. Anant Daji, AIR 1945 Bombay SC 338 and judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bikoba Deora Gaidwa & Ors. Vs. Hirabhai Marutirao Ghorgare & Ors., (2008) 8 SCC 198 [para 11 to 13] indicating the scope of Section 54 read with Order 20 Rule 18 to include ex­ecution of Civil Court decree. Same view has been taken in a Single Bench judgment of this Court in Sri. Hem Kanta Saikia Vs. Smti. Prabhati Bala Deka (1992) 1 GHC 6. 7. After due consideration of rival sub­missions and in view of statutory provisions and judgments relied upon, we are of the view that Section 54 CPC applies to decree passed by the Civil Court and the revenue paying estate can be partitioned by the Col­lector or officer deputed by him in accord­ance with the Civil Court decree. Order 21 CPC cannot be read as excluding Section 54 nor can be read as being in conflict there­with. We are not concerned with the ques­tion whether the expression "estate" in Sec­tion 54 excludes ryotwari holdings. 8. We may now refer to the decisions cited at the Bar. 9. In Ramabhai Govind (supra), Full Bench of Bombay High Court was concerned with the question of applicability of provisions of the Limitation law for executability of a de­cree covered by Section 54 CPC. It was held that effecting partition by the Collector in pursuane of Civil Court was merely a minis­terial act and not execution governed by Limi­tation Law. It was also observed that proce­dure of passing of final decree was not re­quired in such cases in view of special provi­sion of Section 54 CPC. It was held that effecting partition by the Collector in pursuane of Civil Court was merely a minis­terial act and not execution governed by Limi­tation Law. It was also observed that proce­dure of passing of final decree was not re­quired in such cases in view of special provi­sion of Section 54 CPC. Relevant observa­tions are: "...The decree contemplated in sub-rule (1) is very much more of the nature of a preliminary than of a final decree, though further proceed­ings are left to the Collector under Section 54 the obvious reason being revenue authorties are considered more conversant and better qualified to deal with such matters and are ex­pected to be able better to safeguard the inter­ests of Government with regard to the revenue assessed on the lands to be partitioned. An­other consideration is furnished by the lan­guage of Order 26, Rule 13, which says: "Where a preliminary decree far parti­tion has been passed, the Court may, in any case not provided for by Section 54 issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit to make the partition or separation accord­ing to the rights as declared in such decree." In other words, in the case of a preliminary decree for partition, which is provided for by Section 54, no Commissioner can be appointed for effecting a partition, since under that sec­tion the partition is to be effected by the Collec­tor. Had such a decree not been regarded as preliminary, the words "in any case not pro­vided for by Section 54" in the above rule would be superfluous. The Legislative probably used these words in the view that a decree passed under Order 20, Rule 18(1), is in its nature pre­liminary. In a partition suit what the plaintiff claims is not a mere declaration of his share in the joint property, but its actual division and recovery of possession of the share allotted to him. Until such division is effected, recovery of possession is not possible, and till then the decree merely declaring the shares and direct­ing a division by the Collector may well be taken to be only preliminary. A final decree, unless it is merely declaratory, ought to be capable of execution, and for that purpose it must direct the judgment-debtor to do or not to do some act. Execution follows only upon the judgment-debtor's failure to comply with such direction. A final decree, unless it is merely declaratory, ought to be capable of execution, and for that purpose it must direct the judgment-debtor to do or not to do some act. Execution follows only upon the judgment-debtor's failure to comply with such direction. In the absence of such a direction to the judg­ment-debtor, it is difficult to look upon the de­cree as final. He must be given an opportunity to obey the decree without its being executed against him. This opportunity he will not get so long as the decree is not preliminary. A de­cree under Order 20, Rule 18(1), does not direct the judgment-debtor to obey it. It declares the shares of the different shares and directs the partition to be made by the Collector. It is only after such partition is made by the Collector that the judgment-debtor can be called upon to put the decree-holder in possession of the share allotted to him. It is only at that stage that the decree can be regarded as having become final and capable of execution: (compare the final decrees in suits on mortgages or suits for ac­counts or suit for mense profits). According to the prevailing practice, pointed out in 11 Bom. 662, the Collector, without waiting for the final decree being formally drawn up, delivers to the different sharers possession of the shares re­spectively allotted to them. It may be in this view that Order 26, Rule 13 has taken such a decree to be preliminary decree, and specially mentioned it as an exception to those prelimi­nary decrees in which Court given power to appoint a Commissioner to make the partition." "...If for these various reasons such a de­cree be regarded as preliminary, it would follow that an application made by a party to a decree under Order 20 Rule 18(1), asking that the pa­pers should be sent to the Collector for effect­ing a partition as directed in it is of the nature of a mere proceeding in the suit rather than an application to execute the decree, and that there is no period of limitation for making it. On the other hand, it must be said that such a decree does not fall within the definition of a prelimi­nary decree as given in the explanation to Sec­tion 2 sub-section (1), Civil PC. On the other hand, it must be said that such a decree does not fall within the definition of a prelimi­nary decree as given in the explanation to Sec­tion 2 sub-section (1), Civil PC. It says: "A decree is preliminary when further proceedings, have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is fi­nal when such adjudication completely dis­poses of the suit." "...The effecting of partition by the Collec­tor carrying out an order already passed by the Court is not "execution of the decree" as con­templated by that expression in Col. 1 of Article 182 of Sch. 1, Limitation Act. Even if the decree be regarded as final, this article will not avail the appellant, and there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the view taken in 41 Bom., L.R. 921 that an application to send the decree to the Collector for effecting a partition, being only a request to the Court to do a ministerial act, is not governed by the said Article 182." 10. In Hem Kanta Saikia, it was observed: " 18. Sri C.K. Sarma Baruah, learned counsel for the respondent, has referred to the provi­sions of Section 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 to contend that the final decree for partition could be made by the civil Court. In view of the clear provision in the later law as in Section 54 of the Code obviously made for proper revenue administration, it shall not be proper for the Civil Court even with the assistance of some revenue functionary to un­dertake the task of actual partition of revenue paying estate and to make a final decree. The proper course for the civil Court in such a mat­ter is to declare the share and then transmit the same to the Collector to effect partition and make the final decree. The preliminary decree made by the learned trial Court to that effect requires to be corrected." 11. Some view has been taken, inter alia, in Ramakrlshnacharya & Ors, Vs. Sreeni-vasacharya & Ors., AIR 1989 Karnataka 30 [para 4]; Smt. Ramrathibhai Vs. Surajpal, AIR 1995 Bombay 445; Prakash Nathyaba Bhosale Vs. Laxman Ganaba Bhosale, AIR 2003 Bombay 41 and Ravatsinh Ranubha Vs. V. S. Sinha or his successor & Ors. (2001) 2 GLR 679. 12. In Bikoba Deora Gaikwad, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "13. Sreeni-vasacharya & Ors., AIR 1989 Karnataka 30 [para 4]; Smt. Ramrathibhai Vs. Surajpal, AIR 1995 Bombay 445; Prakash Nathyaba Bhosale Vs. Laxman Ganaba Bhosale, AIR 2003 Bombay 41 and Ravatsinh Ranubha Vs. V. S. Sinha or his successor & Ors. (2001) 2 GLR 679. 12. In Bikoba Deora Gaikwad, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "13. A bare perusal of Section 54 read with Order 20 Rule 18 of the Code leaves no manner of doubt that the application filed before the Court to send decree and papers to the Collec­tor to carry out partition was not and could not have been an application in execution. If it was not application for execution, the question of the application of the provisions of the Limita­tion Act would not apply." 13. Aplain reading of Section 54 read with Order 20 Rule 18 leaves no scope for doubt that it refers to decree of the Civil Court of the nature specified therein. This viewhas been consistently taken in precedents referred to above. No contrary view has been brought to our notice. We are not concerned with the ryotwary holdings dealt with by the Madras High Court in Muttu Chidambara Vs. Karuppa: 1884 ILR 7 Mad 382 and other judgments referred to in the order of refer­ence. We are only concerned with partition decree covered by scope of Section 54 CPC. 14. We accordingly decide the question referred against the appellant and in favour of the respondent by holding that Section 54 CPC contemplates Civil Court decree in re­spect of nature of properly described therein and in respect thereof partition is to be effected by the Collector or office deputed by him in accordance with decree of the Court. Order 21 CPC has to be read harmoniously with Section 54 CPC. 15. The matter may now be placed be­fore the Division Bench for decision of the appeal on merits. 16. The reference stands disposed of ac­cordingly.