JUDGMENT 1. This is defendant's second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the C.P.C.') against the judgment and decree dated 16.02.1996 passed by the 2nd Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Appeal No.1-A/1994 reversing the judgment and decree dated 22.11.1993 passed by the 5th Civil Judge Class-II, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 46-A/90. 2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are as under : (i) The appellant/defendant No. 1 is brother-in-law (Jija) of Rameshwar Prasad. The suit land i.e. agricultural land, area 10.80 acres situated in Bhimpuri, P. H. No.52 was ancestral property of deceased Rameshwar Prasad. Present respondents No. 1 to 4 are his legal representatives, who have been substituted during pendency of the suit, on his death. (ii) Rameshwar Prasad, the original plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. In substance, the case of the plaintiff is that the alleged transaction of sale dated 13.05.1971 (Ex.D.1) was not that of sale but the sale deed has been executed by the plaintiff in favour of the appellant as a collateral security of loan of Rs. 1,000/- taken by him from the appellant on interest at the rate of 2% per month. It was agreed between the parties that on repayment of loan with interest the sale deed would be cancelled/returned to the plaintiff by the appellant; it was nominal and fictitious transaction; the possession of the suit property was never handed over to the appellant; valuation of the suit property at the time of alleged sale deed was Rs. 20,000/-; the plaintiff has repaid the loan amount taken by him; it is only in 1980-81 when the appellant illegally got mutated his name over the suit land with the help of revenue inspector, therefore, the plaintiff was forced to file the instant suit. (iii) The claim was denied by the appellant. The trial Court framed issues. Parties led evidence. (iv) During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant also died and his legal representatives were brought on record. (v) The trial Court dismissed the suit The first appeal preferred by the respondents (plaintiffs) was allowed and the plaintiffs' suit was decreed. Hence, this second appeal. 3. The trial Court framed issues. Parties led evidence. (iv) During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant also died and his legal representatives were brought on record. (v) The trial Court dismissed the suit The first appeal preferred by the respondents (plaintiffs) was allowed and the plaintiffs' suit was decreed. Hence, this second appeal. 3. This Court, vide order dated 17.09.1996, admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law: "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the first appellate court was justified in holding that the sale deed was sham and bogus, was not to be acted upon and was executed as a collateral security?" 4. Shri H.B. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate with Smt. Meera Jaiswal for the appellant in substance submit: once admittedly the sale deed has been executed by the plaintiff, the relief available to the plaintiff was asking for reconveyance by filing a suit for redemption of mortgage by pleading and proving that there was a specific amount of loan, which was paid with interest agreed on and there was refusal on the part of the defendants to making re-conveyance as agreed. But he cannot ask for relief of declaration of sale deed as void and not binding upon him. It was further contended that in the absence of agreement to re-sale, oral evidence under Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act is barred and suit itself was not maintainable. 5. Per contra, Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal with Shri Sourabh Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents supported the judgment and decree impugned and submitted the plaintiffs' case is not to the effect that the transaction was a mortgage or that it was a sale with a condition of repurchase. The plaintiffs' case is that the transaction is fictitious and nominal and the sale deed was executed as a collateral security of loan amount taken by the original plaintiff. Therefore, the oral evidence is admissible to show the nature and character of the transaction. The first appellate Court, on proper re-appreciation of the entire material placed on record, has rightly decreed the plaintiffs' suit and the instant appeal is devoid of merit 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of both the Courts below including judgment and decree impugned. 7. The first appellate Court, on proper re-appreciation of the entire material placed on record, has rightly decreed the plaintiffs' suit and the instant appeal is devoid of merit 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of both the Courts below including judgment and decree impugned. 7. The plea of the plaintiffs is not to the effect that the transaction was a mortgage or that it was a sale with a condition of re-purchase, when the amount of Rs. 1,000/- along with interest was paid back by the plaintiff. In substance, the plea advanced by the plaintiffs is simply to the effect that the sale was merely fictitious and nominal and was not intended to be acted upon and so the plea advanced by the plaintiffs is neither barred under Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act nor by Section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. 8. Section 92 of the Evidence Act excludes the oral evidence to vary the terms of a written contract but has no reference to the question whether the parties agreed to contract on the terms set forth in the document. If the validity of a document is impeached, the Court is not bound by what has been described as the paper expression of the parties and is not precluded from entering into the real nature of the transaction between the parties. Section 92 of the Evidence Act does not preclude a party from showing that the writing is not really a contract between the parties but was only a fictitious or colourable device which cloaked something else. Oral evidence has been held to be admissible to show that an agreement was only a sham or nominal transaction and was not intended to be acted upon. 9. When the true character of a document is questioned, extrinsic evidence by way of oral evidence is admissible. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, in the case of Kashiram Vs. Abdul Jabbar, 1961 MPLJ Note 127 has held : "The plaintiffs had not alleged that the transaction was a mortgage or that it was a sale with a condition of repurchase. Had he set up such a case, oral evidence might have been admissible as that would amount to variation of the terms. Abdul Jabbar, 1961 MPLJ Note 127 has held : "The plaintiffs had not alleged that the transaction was a mortgage or that it was a sale with a condition of repurchase. Had he set up such a case, oral evidence might have been admissible as that would amount to variation of the terms. Further under proviso to section 58 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act, the plaintiff could not prove an agreement to recovery if it was not incorporated in the same document. However, that aspect did not arise as all that the plaintiff said was that there was no agreement to sell at any time and the document did not incorporate the contract between the parties. Evidence to prove that fact was admissible." 10. The Supreme Court, in the case of R. Jankiraman Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, CBI, SPE, Madras, (2006) 1 SCC 697 , has held: the bar under Section 92 would apply when a party to the instrument, relying on the instrument, seeks to prove that the terms of the transaction covered by the instrument are different from what is contained in the instrument It will not apply where anyone, including a party to the instrument seeks to establish that the transaction itself is different from what it purports to be. To put it differently, the bar is to oral evidence to disprove the terms of a contract, and not to disprove the contract itself, or to prove that the document is not intended to be acted upon and that intention was totally different. The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain and others Vs. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, (2009) 5 SCC 713 , wherein it has been held: when the true character of a document is questioned, extrinsic evidence by way of oral evidence is admissible. 11. The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain and others Vs. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, (2009) 5 SCC 713 , wherein it has been held: when the true character of a document is questioned, extrinsic evidence by way of oral evidence is admissible. 11. In view of above, the plea advanced by the plaintiff is simply to the effect that the sale was merely fictitious and was nominal and was not intended to be acted upon and so the plaintiffs' suit is neither barred under Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act nor the Article 58 of the Limitation Act has any application in the facts and circumstances of the present case nor oral evidence under section 92 of the Evidence Act is barred to show the real nature of the transaction. 12. Now reverting to the facts of the present case, it is pertinent to note that 10.80 acres of land has been sold under the sale deed for a meager amount of Rs.2000/- only whereas ample evidence is available on record showing the suit land is much valuer than the amount shown in the sale deed. It is also pertinent to mention that the defendant till 1980-81 did not take steps to get his name mutated in the revenue records. It is established by the evidence recorded in the case that the original plaintiff and after his death the present respondents are in continuous and peaceful possession of the suit property. Ex. P. 13 along with the statement of the appellant/ defendant shows, the appellant is a money lender and used to lend money to the plaintiff by charging interest thereupon. 13. Admittedly, the revenue inspector passed the order of mutation in favour of the original appellant/defendant. After a period of about 9 - 10 years of the execution of the sale deed, the revenue inspector was empowered under notification dated 28.07.1975 published in the M.P. Rajpatra on 08.08.1975 to deal with only undisputed cases of mutation. He was not authorised to mutate the land without noticing the seller and without his consent. The original plaintiff never consented for mutation. He was not authorised to mutate the land without noticing the seller and without his consent. The original plaintiff never consented for mutation. The original appellant himself stated in para 14 of his evidence that ^^lu~ 71 ls ysdj 80 esa ukekarj.k fd;k x;k bruh yach vo/kh es ukekarj.k bl dkj.k gqvk D;ksadh ckn esa oknh iVokjh ds ikl tkus ls badkj dj fn;k FkkA^^ 14. Therefore, on the face, the original appellant got his name mutated over the suit land behind back of the original plaintiff and in violation of statutory rules and as such the above , mutation is of no consequence. Thus, the first appellate Court, on proper re-appreciation of the evidence available on record, has held, the transaction as sham and bogus, was not to be acted upon and was executed as a collateral security, and has rightly decreed the plaintiffs' suit and the substantial question of law is answered accordingly in favour of the plaintiffs. 15. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 16. A decree be drawn accordingly. Appeal Dismissed.