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2012 DIGILAW 161 (RAJ)

Arjun Lal v. State of Rajasthan

2012-01-13

SANGEET LODHA

body2012
Hon'ble LODHA, J.—These two writ petitions involving identical questions of law were heard together finally at the admission stge with the consent of the learned counsels appearing for the parties and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. By way of writ petition No.9121/2011, the petitioner-Arjun Lal who is Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) representing Bilara Assembly Constituency, District Jodhpur has assailed the validity of notifications dated 19.9.2011 issued by the State Government nominating the respondent No.5-Om Joshi, MLA representing Phalodi Assembly Constituency, as member of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti (KUMS) (Fruit & Vegetable) Mandore Road, Jodhpur and KUMS, Bilara. Similarly, by way of writ petition No.9122/2011, the petitioner-Kamsa Meghwal, MLA representing Bhopalgarh Assembly Constituency has assailed validity of notification dated 19.9.2011 issued by the State Government nominating Malkhana Singh Bishnoi, MLA representing Luni Legislative Constituency as member of KUMS, Pipar City, District Jodhpur. 3. To provide a better regulation of buying and selling f agriculture produce and the establishment of market for agricultural produce in the State of Rajasthan, the State Legislature enacted the Act namely Rajasthan Agriculture Produce Market Act, 1961 (in short "the Act"). The need of said enactment was felt for the reason that agriculturists being generally illiterate and ignorant about the prevailing prices of their produce in the market were being exploited by the middle men and profiteers. 4. The procedure for Constitution of the Markets, Declaration of Market area and Division of the Market into yards is governed by the provisions contained in Chapter II of the Act. Chapter III of the Act deals with classification of Market area, Establishment and Constitution of the Market Committees so also the Function and Duties of a Market committee. 5. As per Section 6 of the Act, the State Government may classify the market areas into Super class, A class, B class, C class and D class market areas on the basis of the criteria as may be prescribed and shall establish a market committee for every such market area. 6. The State Government vide various notifications issued while declaring the market areas throughout the State of Rajasthan in conformity with he provisions of Section 3 and 4 of the Act classified them in different categories. 7. 6. The State Government vide various notifications issued while declaring the market areas throughout the State of Rajasthan in conformity with he provisions of Section 3 and 4 of the Act classified them in different categories. 7. Pursuant to the various notifications issued by the State Government, the market areas with which we are concerned in the present writ petitions namely, the KUMS (Anaj), Jodhpur, KUMS (Fruit & Vegetable), Jodhpur, KUMS, Bilara and KUMS, Pipar City were declared as Super class, A class, C class and D class market areas respectively. 8. As per provisions of Section 7 of the Act, the market committees of every Super class and A class market area to be constituted shall consist of 17 members and every B, C & D class market committees shall consist of 11 members. The members constituting the market committee includes elected as well as nominated members. As per Section 7(1)(a)(iv) and Section 7(1)(b)(vi) of the Act out of 17 members in case of Super class and A class market committee and out of 11 members in case of B, C & D class market committee, one shall be the member of the Legislative Assembly as nominated by the State Government. 9. In exercise of the power conferred u/Sec. 7(1)(a)(iv) and 7(1)(d)(vi) of he Act, the State Government while constituting the market committees of KUMS (Food & Vegetable), Jodhpur and KUMS, Bilara vide separate notification dated 19.9.2011 (annexed with he Writ Petition No.9121/2011 and collectively marked as Annexure 8) nominated Shri Om Joshi, MLA representing Phalodi Assembly Constituency as member of the said market committees. Similarly, vide notifications dated 19.9.2011 (Annex.8) issued con-stituting the market committees of KUMS, Pipar City, Shri Malkhan Singh, MLA representing Luni Assembly Constituency has been nominated as Member. 10. The petitioners are aggrieved by the nominations made as aforesaid by the State Government inasmuch as, according to them as per Rule 4(i) of the Agriculture Produce Market Rules, 1963 (in short "the Rules"), a person whose name is not included in any part of the electoral rolls of the legislative constituency/constituencies which comprise the market area of the KUSM concerned shall be disqualified for being chosen as member of the Market Committee. According to the petitioner-Arjun Lal, Shri Om Joshi, MLA representing Phalodi Assembly constituency is disqualified for being nominated as member in the capacity of MLA in the market committee of KUMS, Bilara inasmuch as, his name is included neither in the electoral rolls of Bilara Assembly Constituency nor in any other Assembly constituency which comprise the market areas of KUMS (Food and Vegetable), Jodhpur and KUMS, Bilara. Similarly, petitioner-Kamsa Meghwal has questioned the nomination of Shri Malkhan Singh, MLA representing Luni Assembly Constituency as member of market committee of KUMS, Pipar City inasmuch as his name does not appear in the electoral rolls of Bhopalgarh Assembly Constituency or in any other Assembly Constituency which comprise the market area of he aforesaid Market Committee. The petitioner-Arjun Lal claims his nominationas member of the market committee of KUMS, Bilara being MLA from Bilara Legislative Constituency which comprise the market area of the said Market Committee. Similarly, Kamsa Meghwal claims her nomination in Market Committee of KUMS, Pipar City being MLA representing Bhopalgarh Assembly Constituency which comprise the market area of KUMS, Pipar City. 11. Mr. J.R. Patel, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that Section 7 of The Act which deals with constitution of market committees envisaged three categories of the members in various classes of market committee elected in terms of the provisions of Sec. 7(1)(a)(i)(ii)(iii) or Section 7(1)(b)(i)(ii)(iii), (iv) as the case may be, the representatives of the Cooperative Marketing Societies and Central Cooperative Financing Agency in the market area for which it is established in terms of Section 7(1)(a)(v)(vi) or 7(b)(1)(iii) read with Rule 6A and 6B of the Rules and the nominated members to be nominated by the State Government in terms of Section 7(1)(a)(iv)(viii) or 7(1)(b)(v)(vi) of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that as per Section 7(1(a) and 7(1)(b), the market committees shall be constituted as may be prescribed. Learned counsel submitted that the word "prescribed" stands defined by Section 2(i)(xii) to mean "prescribed by rules under Section 36". Section 36 empowers the State Government to make rules either generally or specially for any market area or market areas for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that the word "prescribed" stands defined by Section 2(i)(xii) to mean "prescribed by rules under Section 36". Section 36 empowers the State Government to make rules either generally or specially for any market area or market areas for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. Relying upon he provisions of Section 36(2)(aa), learned counsel submitted that the State Government is empowered to make rules inter alia to provide for or regulate the election and nomination of members of market committee, the manner of election, the preparation and revision of lists of voters from time to time and the qualification and disqualification of the voters and candidates. Learned counsel submitted that an MLA nominated as member of the market committee in terms of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) or 7(1)(b)(vi), as the case may be, is a voter in the election of Chairman of the market committees and may also be a candidate for election to the post of Vice Chairman of the market committee by virtue of Section 7(8) read with Rule 5-B of the Rules and therefore, the State Government is empowered to make rules providing for qualification or disqualification of the nominated members as well. Drawing the attention of this Court to Rule 4 of the Rules which provides for "Disqualification for memberships", learned counsel submitted that as per Rule 4(1), a person shall be disqualified to be chosen as member of the market committee if his name is not included in any of the divisions or the parts of the electoral rolls of Assembly constituency/constituencies which comprise the area of the market committee concerned and therefore, an MLA who is not an elector of any of the Assembly constituency/constituencies which comprise the market area of the market committee is disqualified to be nominated as member of the market committee concerned. To strengthen the contention raised as aforesaid, learned counsel relied upon Rule 28 of the rules which provides that a member of the committee may be removed by the government if at any time after his nomination or election, as the case may be, he becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Rule 4 and his seat shall thereupon become vacant. Learned counsel submitted that a conjoing reading of provisions of Rule 4 and Rule 28 makes it abundantly clear that the disqualifications prescribed under Rule 4 apply to the elected as well as nominated members. Learned counsel urged that it is not in dispute that the names of the respondents who have been nominated as members of the respective market committees are not included in the electoral rolls of the Assembly constituencies which comprise the market areas of the respective market committees and therefore, they are disqualified to be nominated as member to the said market committees. Learned counsel submitted that any other interpretation of the rule referred to above shall make it redundant. Learned counsel urged that it is settled law that a plain grammatical and literal meaning should be given to the words used by the Statute but if that material word is capable of two construction then, one which furthers the object of the Statute should be adopted and no such interpretation should be made of the words used which may stifle the very object of the Statute or which may result in absurdity or mischief. In this regard, learned counsel has relied upon a Bench decision of this court in the matter of Municipal Council, Bhilwara vs. State of Raj., AIR 1994 Raj. 142 = RLW 1993(1) Raj. 629 and decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of "Smt. Rasila S. Mehta vs. Custodian, Nariman Bhavan, Mumbai", AIR 2011 SC 2122 , "Phool Patti & Anr. vs. Ram Singh (Dead) through LRs. & Anr.", 2009 DNJ (SC) 660 and "Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust & Ors. vs. A.G. Syed Mohideen & Ors.", AIR 2010 SC 671 . 12. Learned counsel next contended that in exercise of its Rules making power, the State Government has prescribed the disqualification as aforesaid apparently with a view that only the persons who are voters of the Assembly constituencies which comprise the market area of the Market Committee wholly or partly should be permitted to inter meddle in the statutory functions to be discharged by the concerned market committee. Learned counsel submitted that the State is under an obligation to act fairly without ill will or malice and therefore, there is absolutely no reason when the petitioners who are MLAs representing the Assembly constituencies which comprise the market areas of the market committees in question are available, hat any other MLA representing an Assembly constituency which does not comprise the market area of the market committees concerned should be nominated as member. Learned counsel submitted that nothing has been brought on record by the respondent-State to justify the nomination of the respondents Om Joshi and Malkhan Singh as members of the market committees in preference to the petitioners who are admittedly, representing the Assembly constituencies which comprise the market area of the respective market committees. Learned counsel submitted that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the action of the State in nominating the respondent No.5 herein in both the petitions, as members of the market committees in question amounts to colourable exercise of the power and therefore, the impugned notifications so far as they relate to their nomination as members of the market committees concerned deserves to be set aside on this count alone. 14. Mr. Anand Purohit, Additional Advocate General submitted that from the plain reading of the provisions of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) and 7(1)(b)(vi) of the Act, it is manifestly clear that any of the member of legislative assembly may be nominated by the State Government as member of any of the Market Committees constituted under the Act. Learned counsel submitted that the words used by the legislature while incorporating the aforesaid provisions are clear and plain and therefore, the court is bound to accept the expressed intention of the legislature. Learned counsel submitted that the provision incorporated does not suggest more than one interpretation and therefore, no different interpretation is permitted to be made of the provision by reading something in the provision which is not there. Learned counsel submitted that in terms of provisions of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) and 7(1)(b)(vi), it is the prerogative of the State Government to nominate any of the members of the Legislative assembly as the member of any of the market committees and the petitioners have no right to question the nominations made. Learned counsel submitted that in terms of provisions of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) and 7(1)(b)(vi), it is the prerogative of the State Government to nominate any of the members of the Legislative assembly as the member of any of the market committees and the petitioners have no right to question the nominations made. Learned counsel submitted that Rule 4 of the Rules do not apply to the nominated members and in any case to the members of the Legislative Assembly to be nominated by the State Government in terms of provisions of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) and 7(1)(b)(vi) of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that if the provisions providing for disqualification to be chosen as member of the market committee as set out by Rule 4 of the Rules is applied to the nominations to be made by the State Government from amongst the members of the legislative assembly then, it may make the provision non-workable and redundant inasmuch as, as per the provisions of Section 5(c) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951, a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly unless he is an elector from any Assembly Constituencies in the State and thus, for contesting election as member of the Legislative Assembly, the requirement is that the person should be elector of any of the Assembly constituencies in the State and not an elector of the particular constituency from which he is contesting the election. Accordingly, learned AAG submitted that if the interpretation as suggested by the petitioners is accepted then a situation may arise when there will be non-availability of the MLAs who could be nominated a member of the market committees in terms of provisions of Sec. 7(1)(a)(iv) or 7(1)(b)(vi) of the Act, as the case may be. Accordingly, it is submitted that the interpretation of the provisions suggested by the petitioners which may frustrate the very purpose behind the incorporation of the provision cannot be accepted by this Court. 15 . Learned AAG further submitted that there is no foundation of facts in the petitions to establish that the action of the State in nominating the respon-dent No.5 herein as members of he market committees concerned amounts to a colourable exercise of the power and therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard is devoid of any merit. 16. Mr. 16. Mr. M.S. Singhvi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the intervenor submitted that the nomination of the members in terms of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) or 7(1)(b)(vii) is a policy matter of the government and he same is not justiciable. Learned counsel submitted that Section 36 of the Act in no manner empowers the State Government to prescribe any further qualification or disqualification for the nominated members and therefore, Rule 4 of the Rules which prescribes disqualification for being chosen as member of the market committee has no application in respect of the nominations in question. Learned counsel submitted had this been the intention of the legislature that only the person representing he constituency which comprise wholly or partly the market area of the Market Committee concerned should be nominated as member of the market committee then nothing prevented the State Legislature to incorporate the provisions in such terms as provided under Article 243-R of the Constitution of India, which empowers the state legislature to make law for representation in the municipality of the members of House of the People and the members of the State Assembly representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the Municipal area. Accordingly, it is submitted by the learned counsel that the provisions of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) and 7(1)(b)(vi) of the Act which are not suggestive of more than one interpretation does not warrant any contextual construction by this Court. Learned counsel submitted that the nominations made by the State Government exercising the power conferred upon it do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality and cannot be said to be ultra vires so as to warrant interference by this Court. 17. I have considered the rival submissions and given my thoughtful consideration to the various provisions of the Act and the Rules so also the decisions cited at the bar. 18. The factual position set out in the petitions that Shri Om Joshi, MLA representing Phalodi Legislative Constituency is not an elector of the Legislative Constituency/Constituencies which comprise the market area of KUMS (Fruit & Vegetable), Jodhpur or KUMS, Bilara and Shri Malkhan Singh, MLA from Luni Legislative Constituency is not an elector of Legislative Constituency/Constituencies which comprise market area of KUMS, Pipar City is not in dispute. Thus, there being no factual dispute, the controversy involved in the present writ petitions revolves around the interpretation of the provisions of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) and 7(1)(b)(vi) of the Act and the provisions of Rule 4(1) of the Rules and other ancillary provisions referred to by the counsel appearing for the parties which may be beneficially quoted as under: "Section 7. Constitution of Market Committee.—(1)(a) Every super class and A class market committee shall be constituted as prescribed and shall consist of the following seventeen members, namely:- (i) Eight shall be agriculturists elected in the prescribed manner by such agriculturists or institutions of the market area as the State Government may prescribe; (ii) Two shall be traders or brokers elected in the prescribed manner by traders and brokers licensed by the market committee; (iii) One shall be the person elected in the prescribed manner by weighmen, measures, surveyors, warehousemen and other persons licensed by the market committee; (iv) One shall be the member of Legislative Assembly, as nominated by the State Government; (v) One shall be the representative of Co-operative Marketing Societies in the market area for which it is established as the State Government may prescribe; (vi) One shall be the representatives of Central Co-operative Financing Agency in the market area for which it is established as the State government may prescribe; (vii) Two shall be the persons nominated by the State Government. (b) Every B, C & D class market committee shall be constituted as prescribed and shall consist of the following eleven members, namely: (i) Six shall be agriculturists elected in the prescribed manner by such agriculturists or institutions of the market area as the State Government may prescribe; (ii) One shall be trader or broker elected in the prescribed manner by traders and brokers licensed by the market committee; (iii) One shall be the representative of Co-operative Marketing Societies in the market area for which it is established as the State Government may prescribe; (iv) One shall be the person elected from amongst its own members by the Municipal Board or Municipal Council or Municipal Corporation or Gram Panchayat in which the principal Market yard is situated; (v) One shall be the person nominated by the State Government; (vi) One shall be the member of Legislative Assembly as nominated by the State Government: Provided that a person to whom a license has been granted under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 4 or under Sec. 14 shall not be eligible to become a member of the market committee under sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (v) or sub-clause (vi) or sub-clause (vii) of clause (a) and sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (iii) or sub-clause (iv) of clause (b): Provided further that the State Government may, at any time, reduce the number of nominated members for any market committee and in their place may increase the number of members to be elected under sub-clause (i) and sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) or, as the case may be, under sub-clause (i) and (iv) of clause (b) as it thinks fit." xxx "Section 2(1)(xii)-"prescribed" means prescribed by rules under Sec.36." xxx "Section 36. Rules.—(1) The State Government may, either generally or specially for any market area or market areas make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generally of the foregoing provision, such rules may provide for or regulate- (a) xxx .... xxxx (aa) the election and nomination of members of the market committee, the manner of election, the preparation and revision of lists of voters from time to time, the qualifications and disqualifications of voters and candidates and the payment of all expenditure in connection with or incidental to such election; xxx "Rule 4. Disqualifications for membership.—A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as a member of market committee:- ¼1½ ;fn mldk uke fo/kku lHkk fuokZpj {ks=/fuokZpu {ks=ksa ds ,sls fdUgha Hkh [k.Mksa@Hkkxksa dh ernkrk lwph esa lfEefyr ugha gS] tks e.Mh {ks= esa vkrs gS( (2) if he has not attained the age of 21 years; (3) if he has been adjudged by a competent Court to be of unsound mind; (4) if he is an undischarged insolvent; (5) if he has been convicted and sentenced by a Court to imprisonment for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding six months unless such disqualification has been removed by an order passed by the Government. (6) If he has made a default in payment of any fees or cesses due to market committee; ¼7½ ;fn og e.Mh lfefr dk dksbZ lsod gS;k ,slh lfefr esa QqVdj foØsrk ds :i esa dksbZ vuqKfIr /kkj.k djrk gS( (8) If he has directly or indirectly any share or interest in any contract or employment with or on behalf of or under the market committee; ¼9½ —"kd fuokZpu {ks=ksa ls] ;fn mlds ikl vius Lo;a ds uke ls e.Mh lfefr ds {ks= esa vkus okys fdlh Hkh jktLo xkao ds jktLo vfHkys[k ¼tekcUnh½ esa lfEefyr] —f"k Hkwfe ugha gSA Provided that- ¼i½ fdlh O;fä dks] O;kikfj;ksa ;k nykyksa ds fuokZpu {ks= ;k] ;FkkfLFkfr] rqykbZdkjksa] ekidksa] losZ{kdksa] Hkk.Mkxkjikyksa vkSj vU; O;fä;ksa ds fuokZpu {ks= ls fHkUu fuokZpj {ks=ksa dk izfrfuf/kRo djus ds fy, lnL; ds :i esa ugha pquk tk;sxk ;fn og] fu;e 69 ;k fu;e 72 ds lkFk ifBr] vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 4 dh mi/kkjk ¼2½ ds v/khu;k /kkjk 14 ds v/khu vuqKfIr /kkj.k djrk gS ;k ;fn og ,slh vuqKfIr /kkj.k djus okyh fdlh Qez dk Hkkxhnkj ;k deZpkjh gS( ¼ii½ fdlh O;fä dks] O;kikfj;ksa ;k nykyksa ds fuokZpu {ks= ;k ;FkkfLFkfr] rqykbZdkjksa] ekidksa] losZ{kdksa] Hkk.Mkxkjikyksa vkSj vU; O;fä;ksa ds fuokZpu {ks= dk izfrfuf/kRo djus ds fy, lnL; ds :i esa ugha pquk tk;sxk ;fn og e.Mh {ks= esa fuokl ugha djrk gS vkSj tks fuokZpu ds o"kZ dh igyh tuojh dks vuqKfIr/kkjd ugha gS] ;k ftls fdlh U;k;ky; }kjk Qhl dk lank; ugha djus ds fy, ;k mlds fuca/kuksa vkSj 'krksZa dk Hkax djus ds fy, nks"kfl) Bgjk;k x;k gS % Li"Vhdj.k ,d ls vf/kd e.Mh {ks=ksa esa vuqKfIr j[kus okyh dksbZ QeZ ;k dksbZ dEiuh ;k dksbZ fuxe ,d ls vf/kd e.Mh lfefr dk lnL; gksus ds fy, vfgZr ugha gksxkA** xxx "Rule 28. Person disqualified to cease to be a member.—(1) A member of the Committee may be removed by the Government if at any time after his nomination or election as the case may be, he becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Rule 4 and his seat shall thereupon become vacant: Provided that before the Government notify the removal of the members under this rule, the reasons for his proposed removal shall be communicated to the member concerned and he will be given an opportunity of tendering an explanation in writing : (2) A member of the market committee shall cease to hold offence as such if he ceases to be the member of the electorate by which, or one of the persons by whom, he was elected. Such member shall automatically cease to attend the meetings of the market committee in future. 19. It is well settled principle, which is often said the golden rule of interpretation, that the language of the statute must prima facie be given grammatically and terminologically, the ordinary meaning which it bears in its context without an addition or omission. The words of the statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and the phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. (Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edition, 2010, page 85). If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. (vide Kanti Lal vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907 ) 20. In Jugal Kishore Saraf vs. M/s Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 376 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the court may adopt the same. But, if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation." 21. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the court may adopt the same. But, if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation." 21. In Harbhajan Singh vs. Press Council of India, (2002) 3 SCC 722 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed : "The legislature does not waste its words. Ordinarily, grammatical and full meaning is to be assigned to the words used while interpreting a provision to honour the rule- the legislature chooses appropriate words to express what is intends the therefore, must be attributed with such intention as is conveyed by the words employed so long as this does not result in absurdity of anomaly or unless material-intrinsic or external - is available to departure from the rule." 22. In Smt. Rasila S. Mehta's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "12. It is settled law that the objects and reasons of the Act are to be taken into consideration in interpreting the provisions of the statute. It is incumbent on the Court to strive and interpret the statute as to protect and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. Any narrow or technical interpretation of the provisions would defeat the legislative policy. The Court must, therefore, keep the legislative policy in mind while applying the provisions of the Act to the facts of the case. It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute or the statutory rule that efforts should be made in construing the different provisions, so that each provision may have effective meaning and implementation and in the event of any conflict a harmonious construction should be given. It is also settled law that literal meaning of the statute must be adhered to when there is no absurdity in ascertaining the legislative intendment and for that purpose the broad features of the Act can be looked into. The main function of the court is to merely interpret the section and in doing so it cannot re-write or re-design the section.-----" (emphasis added) 23. In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed : "6. The main function of the court is to merely interpret the section and in doing so it cannot re-write or re-design the section.-----" (emphasis added) 23. In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed : "6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation took kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the authority of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the judge think it should be, put to make it what the legislature intended it to be." (emphasis supplied) 24. In Phool Patti's case (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that "It is well settled principle of interpretation that court cannot add words to the statute or change it language, particularly, when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear." 25. In Raghunath Rai Bareja vs. Punjab National Bank, (2007) 2 SCC 230, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no interpretation. In other words we should read the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language." 26. In Raghunath Rai Bareja vs. Punjab National Bank, (2007) 2 SCC 230, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no interpretation. In other words we should read the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language." 26. In Kishenlal vs. Sohanlal, 1954 RLW 398, a Full Bench of this Court observed that "The law is well settled hat in interpreting a statute, we must know that anything which is not in the statute itself nor subtract something which is to be found therein and we must place due meaning upon every words thereof without straining the language in any way. To be able to depart from this rule which has some time being characterized as golden rule of interpretation, we can only do so in rare and exceptional cases where the plain meaning of the words used would lead to absurd conclusions or would be destructive of very purpose for which the legislation sought to be interpreted happens to be enacted." 27. In the backdrop of the fundamental principles of interpretations of statutes noticed above, the first question comes for consideration of this Court is whether the language of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) and 7(1)(b)(vi) of the Act is plain, clear and unambiguous and admits only one meaning and therefore, the question of construction thereof does not arise? 28. A plain reading of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) reveals that every super class and A class Market Committee shall consist of 17 members and out of them, one shall be the member of Legislative Assembly, as nominated by the State Government. Suffice it to say that in terms of provisions of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) the State Government is empowered to nominate any MLA as member of any Market Committee. There is nothing in the provision incorporated as aforesaid to suggest that the MLA to be nominated as member of Market Committee must be one amongst the MLAs representing the Assembly Constituency which comprise wholly or partly the market area of the Market Committee concerned. Similar is the position in respect of the provisions of Section 7(1)(b)(vi) which makes provision for nomination of MLA as member of B, C & D Class Market Committee. 29. Similar is the position in respect of the provisions of Section 7(1)(b)(vi) which makes provision for nomination of MLA as member of B, C & D Class Market Committee. 29. It is to be noticed that Section 7(1)(a) provides that the Market Committee shall be consist of 17 members out of which 8 shall be agriculturists elected in prescribed manner by such agriculturists or institution of the market area as the State Government may prescribe. Similarly, in respect of 2 members representing traders and brokers are required to be elected in the prescribed manner by the traders and brokers licensed by the Market Committee. It is further provides that one shall be the representative of Cooperative Marketing Society in the market area for which it is established, as the State Government may prescribe. Besides, one shall be the person elected from amongst its own members by the Municipal Board or Municipal Council or Municipal Corporation or Gram Panchayat in which the principal market yard is situated. Thus, apparently while incorporating the provisions for the elected or nominated members, wherever it is considered appropriate that the representative from a particular category or the class should be from within the market area or the market yard of the Market Committee concerned, the specific provision has been incorporated by the legislature in this regard. As a matter of fact, the petitioners wan the provision to be read in the terms suggested on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. But then, if the contention of the petitioners is accepted that the member of the Legislative Assembly to be nominated by the State Government must be the MLA from the Legislative Constituency which comprise wholly or partly the market area then it will amount to reading something in the provision which is not there. 30. There is yet another aspect of the matter. It is to be noticed that by way of Constitution (Seventy Third) Amendment Act, 1992, Chapter IX & IX A were incorporated in the Constitution of India. 30. There is yet another aspect of the matter. It is to be noticed that by way of Constitution (Seventy Third) Amendment Act, 1992, Chapter IX & IX A were incorporated in the Constitution of India. By way of Article 243C(3)(b), it is provided that the legislature of the Sate may, by law provide for representation of the members of the house of the people and members of the Legislative Assembly of the State representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly, a Panchayat area at a level other than village level in the Panchayat. Similarly, by way of Article 243(2)(a)(iii) provides that the legislature of the State may by law provide for the representation to municipality of the members of house of the people and members of the Legislative Assembly of the state representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the municipal area. Suffice it to say that had the intention of the legislature being to provide for the nomination of only the members of the Legislative Assembly representing the Constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the market area of the Market Committee then obviously it would have couched the provision in the like manner. 31. As noticed above, it is well settled that in interpreting the statue, the Court cannot add anything which is not in the statute itself or substract something which is to be found therein and the every word used must be given natural meaning without straining the language used and therefore, this Court cannot add the words to the provisions of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) and 7(1)(b)(vi) to put a rider on the power conferred upon the State Government by the statute and restrict it so as to permit only the nomination of MLAs representing the Legislative Constituency which comprise wholly or partly the market area of the Market Committee, as the member the Market Committee concerned. In considered opinion of this Court, the language used by the legislature while incorporating provisions of Section 7(1)(iv)(a) and 7(1)(b)(vi) is clear, plain and unambiguous and this court is bound to give effect to its literal meaning irrespective of the consequences. In other words, the provisions incorporated as aforesaid admits only one meaning and therefore, the same needs to be read as it is and the question of interpretation thereof does not arise. 32. In other words, the provisions incorporated as aforesaid admits only one meaning and therefore, the same needs to be read as it is and the question of interpretation thereof does not arise. 32. This takes the court to consideration of the contention of the learned counsel in respect of Rules making power of the State by virtue of provisions of Section 36(2)(aa) and the ambit and scope of rule 4(1) of the Rules. It is true that by virtue of provisions of Section 36(2)(aa), the State Government is empowered to make rules to provide for regulate inter alia the election and nomination of members of the Market Committee, the manner of election and the qualification and disqualification of the voters and candidates. Indisputably, in terms of provisions of Section 36(2)(aa), the State Government is empowered to provide for and regulate the nomination of members of the Market Committee as well. Further, as per the provisions of Section 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(b) of the Act, the Market Committees shall be constituted as prescribed and in terms of Section 2(1)(xii), the prescribed means "prescribed by Rules u/Sec. 36" and therefore, the constitution of the Market Committee which includes nomination of the members shall be regulated by the Rules framed in this regard by the State Government in exercise of its Rules making power. But then, the power to make delegated/subordinate legislation is derived from enabling act and delegate on whom such power is conferred has to act within the limit of authority conferred by the Act. The Rules cannot be made to supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but to supplement it. (vide: St. Johns Teachers Training Institute vs. Regional Director, National Council for Teachers Education, (2003) 3 SCC 321 ). Suffice it to say that the delegate cannot override the Act either by exceeding the authority vested or by making provision inconsistent with the provision incorporated in the Act. It is well settled that subordinate legislation shall always remain subservient to the Act and in case of conflict, latter shall prevail. 33. There cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that Rule 4 of the Rules which deals with "Disqualification for Membership", and starts with the words "A member shall be disqualified for being chosen as member of the Market Committee" includes the disqualification for membership of nominated as well as elected members. 33. There cannot be any quarrel with the proposition that Rule 4 of the Rules which deals with "Disqualification for Membership", and starts with the words "A member shall be disqualified for being chosen as member of the Market Committee" includes the disqualification for membership of nominated as well as elected members. Learned counsel is justified in relying upon the provisions of Rule 28 of the Rules in support of his contention raised in this regard as aforesaid, which provides for the removal of nominated as well as elected member by the State Government, if at any time, he becomes subject to any of the disqualification mentioned in Rule 4. Undoubtedly, as per provisions of Rule 4(1) of the Rules, a person shall be disqualified for being chose as member of the Market Committee if his name does not appear in any division/part of the electoral rolls of the Assembly Constituency/Constituencies which comprise the market area of the Market Committee concerned. But then, in view of the provisions of Section 7(1)(iv)(a) and 7(1)(iv)(b) of the Act which as discussed above empowers the State Government to nominate any of the MLAs as member of any of the Market Committees, under the rules making power, the State Government cannot restrict its ambit and scope and therefore, the provisions of Rule 4(1) of the Rules cannot be made applicable in respect of the nomination to be made in terms of provisions of Section 7(1)(a)(iv) or 7(1)(b)(vi), as the case may be and has to be treated redundant to that extent. 34. There is yet another important aspect of the matter which requires to be dealt with. As per the provisions of Section 5 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, a person is not qualified to be chosen to fill up a seat in the State Assembly unless he is elector for any Assembly constituency in that State. Suffice it to say that for being chosen as member of the Legislative Assembly, the person is not required to be an elector of the Assembly Constituency from which he intends to contest the election, it will suffice if he is an elector of any of the Assembly Constituencies of the State. Suffice it to say that for being chosen as member of the Legislative Assembly, the person is not required to be an elector of the Assembly Constituency from which he intends to contest the election, it will suffice if he is an elector of any of the Assembly Constituencies of the State. In this view of the matter, if the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is accepted then it is quire possible that no MLA shall be available for being nominated as member of a particular Market Committee inasmuch as, the MLA/MLAs representing the Assembly Constituency/Constituencies which comprise the market area of the Market Committee concerned may not be the elector of that Assembly Constituency. In considered opinion of this Court, this cannot be the intention of legislature to create a situation where the seat to be filled in the Market Committee by nomination of MLAs should remain vacant. 35. Thus, viewed from any angle, in considered opinion of this Court, the impugned notification issued by the State Government nominating the respondents Arjun Lal and Malkhan Singh representing Phalodi and Bhopalgarh Legislative Constituencies respectively as members of the Market Committees concerned cannot be said to be beyond the scope of the power conferred on the State Government by the relevant statute. 36. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the action of the State Government in nominating the respondents Om Joshi and Malkhan Singh as the members of the respondents Market Committees and ignoring the candidature of the petitioners who are better entitled is bad for mala fide, unreasonableness or colourable exercise of the power is also devoid of any merit. Since, the action of the State Government nominating the respondents Om Joshi and Malkhan Singh, MLAs as member of the Market Committees concerned constituted under the provisions of the act is found intra vires and therefore, in absence of foundation of facts and adequate proof suggesting that the State Government while nominating the members has acted arbitrarily, unreasonably and in colourable exercise of power, no case for interference by this Court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is made out. 37. For the aforementioned reasons, the writ petitions fail, the same are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.