JUDGMENT [Hon’ble B.S.Verma, J.] 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 2.6.1976, passed by IV Additional District & Sessions Judge Saharanpur in Civil Appeal No. 152 of 1975 and the judgment and decree dated 31.3.1975, passed by Munsif Roorkee in Suit No. 264 of 1969. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case giving rise to this second appeal are that plaintiff-respondent Pandit Sriniwas, since deceased and represented by Legal Representatives respondents 1/1 to 1/4 his sons and respondents 1/5 to 1/8 his daughters, has filed suit for specific performance of contract as well as for possession of the property detailed in the plaint. The original owner of the disputed properties was Pir Onkar Nath, the disciple of Pir Ganesh Nath, who belonged to Darshni Ascetic Nath Panth. The disputed property is said to be the property of Gaddi and thus being the Mahant of that Gaddi Onkar Nath was the owner of the same. The said Onkar Nath excuted a sale-deed in favour of defendant No.1, Raghunath Bail in respect of the disputed property for a consideration of Rs. 1,500/-. The same day an agreement of reconveyance was executed by defendant No.1 in favour of Onkar Nath conferring on the executant of sale deed a right to repurchase the transferred property within ten years from the date of the execution of the sale deed i.e. 7.9.1959 after return of the sale consideration. By a deed dated 13.3.1961 Onkar Nath transferred his right of repurchase in favour of plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 500/-. Thus the plaintiff claims to have become entitled to reconveyance of the property in his favour on payment of sale consideration of Rs. 1,500/- from defendant No.1. After getting the said deed in his favour plaintiff claims to have served a number of notices on defendant No.1, intimating him the fact that the rights of reconveyance were purchased by the plaintiff from Onkar Nath and he was prepared to pay sale consideration and to fulfill all the terms of the contract of reconveyance and thus called upon defendant No.1 to execute the sale deed in his favour. A notice is also alleged to have been served on behalf of Onkar Nath on defendant no.1 intimating that the rights of reconveyance were transferred by him in favour of the plaintiff. A notice is also alleged to have been served on behalf of Onkar Nath on defendant no.1 intimating that the rights of reconveyance were transferred by him in favour of the plaintiff. Inspite of service of these notices defendant No.1 did not execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff and later transferred the disputed properties in favour of defendant No.2 just to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. 3. The defendants filed separate written statements in the suit. Defendant No.1 denied plaint allegations and asserted that Onkar Nath was not competent to transfer his right of reconveyance in favour of the plaintiff and the right of reconveyance had virtually extinguished. He claims to have transferred the disputed property in favour of defendant No.2 through registered sale deed dated 30.4.1969 in good faith. Plea of limitation had also been raised in defence. It was further asserted by defendant No.1 that he was originally tenant of disputed property from 1940 on behalf of Pir Ganesh Nath and he continued as such till the date of the suit. Pir Ganesh Nath is said to have died in the month of May 1957 and after that he claims to be paying rent of the disputed property to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and other sons of Pir Ganesh Nath. He claims to have purchased the said property from Onkar Nath under misconception that Onkar Nath was the full owner of the property in dispute but later on it was intimated to him by defendants 2 and 3 that Onkar Nath had only 1/5th share in the disputed property and was not the owner of the whole property in suit. 4. The defendant No.2 in her written statement also denied plaint allegations and had raised almost the same pleas. It was stated by her that Pir Ganesh Nath was the owner of the disputed property who died on 30.5.1957 leaving behind herself and other sons and daughters including Onkar Nath. She also asserted that Onkar Nath’s share in the disputed property was only one-fifth. She claims to have purchased the disputed property from defendant No.1 bonafide for consideration without any knowledge of earlier agreement of reconveyance in favour of the plaintiff. 5. The defendant No.3 was impleaded as a party under the orders of the court but she did not contest the suit. 6. She claims to have purchased the disputed property from defendant No.1 bonafide for consideration without any knowledge of earlier agreement of reconveyance in favour of the plaintiff. 5. The defendant No.3 was impleaded as a party under the orders of the court but she did not contest the suit. 6. On the basis of pleadings of parties, the trial court framed necessary issues to ascertain whether plaintiff had purchased the right of reconveyance from Sri Onkar Nath and further whether those rights were transferable rights. Issues were also framed on the point whether the defendant No.2 was bonafide purchaser for value without notice of the earlier agreement of reconveyance and which party was defaulter in the fulfillment of the agreement. Issues were also framed on the points whether Onkar Nath was the owner of the full property or was having 1/5th share. In order to ascertain the devolution of property after the death of Pir Ganesh Nath issues were also framed about the effect whether defendant No.2 was wife of Pir Ganesh Nath and defendant No.3 was daughter of Pir Ganesh Nath. 7. After due consideration of the entire evidence documentary and oral available on record and looking to the circumstances of the case, the learned Munsif was of the view that Pir Onkar Nath was the absolute owner of the property in suit as disciple of Pir Ganesh Nath and he had executed the deed transferring the rights of reconveyance in favour of plaintiff. It was further held that defendants 1 and 2 had full notice of the transfer of reconveyance rights, but inspite of that defendant No.1 transferred and defendant No.2 obtained the sale deed in respect of the disputed property which he declared to be malafide. The learned Munsif decreed the suit of the plaintiff. 8. Against the above judgment and decree passed by Munsif, the defendants preferred appeal before the District Court and the IV Additional District & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur vide impugned judgment and decree dated 2.6.1976 has dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif. The learned Munsif decreed the suit of the plaintiff. 8. Against the above judgment and decree passed by Munsif, the defendants preferred appeal before the District Court and the IV Additional District & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur vide impugned judgment and decree dated 2.6.1976 has dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif. The Appellate Court has observed that the disputed property belonged to Gaddi, which was owned and managed by Pir Ganesh Nath as disciple of Mauj Nath and then by Onkar Nath as disciple of Pir Ganesh Nath and the defendants 2 and 3 have nothing to do with that property and Onkar Nath was fully competent to transfer that property in favour of plaintiff. On the point of reconveyance it was observed that the plaintiff had offered to comply with the terms of agreement while defendant No.1 defaulted in reconveying the property deliberately. It was further observed that defendant No.2 was clearly in collusion with defendant No.1 and had wrongly executed sale-deed in her favour, and no reliance can be placed on this agreement, alleging to be creating tenancy in favour of defendant No.1. So far as the limitation part is concerned, the appellate court has held that since the period fixed for reconveyance was ten years and the suit was filed after expiry of ten years within a reasonable period. The court observed the limitation would start after expiry of ten years, i.e. three years thereafter as prescribed in Article 54 of Limitation Act. 9. Now feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decrees passed by courts below the defendant No.1 Raghunath Bail has filed this second appeal. 10. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. The learned counsel for defendant No.1/appellant, substituted by Kamal Agnihotri, has contended that this appeal has been filed prior to amendment in C.P.C. in the year 1977 which came in force from 1.1.1977 by Amending Act No. 57 of 1976, therefore, this appeal shall be considered on the grounds mentioned in Section 100 C.P.C. prior to amendment and not on the basis of substantial question of Law. This legal proposition is not disputed. 11. Learned counsel for appellant also contended that the suit was time barred. This legal proposition is not disputed. 11. Learned counsel for appellant also contended that the suit was time barred. As per plaint averment the defendant No.1 denied to execute the sale deed on 28-3-1962 when the notice was served upon the defendant and the suit was filed in the year 1969 whereas in Article 54 of Limitation Act the limitation is three years from the date of refusal of notice. 12. Learned counsel for appellant has relied on the following case laws 1. Babu Ram @ Durga Prasad Vs. Indra Pal Singh (dead) by L.Rs. reported in AIR 1998 Supreme Court 3021. 2. Sultan Latif Shamshuddin Ahmed Vs. Shaik Alia Baksh Jani, reported in [2002] 4 ALD 779/[2003]1 ALT 24. 3. Ahmmadsahab Abdul Mulla (deceased by L.Rs.) vs. Bibijan & Ors. reported in AIR 2009 Supreme Court 2193. 4. Abdul Sami Qureshi and others vs. Sardar Kuldeep Singh and others, reported in [2008 (1) RC 394]. I have gone through the rulings cited by counsel for the appellant on the point limitation. 13. In the case of Babu Ram @ Durga Prasad Vs. Indra Pal Singh (dead) by L.Rs. reported in AIR 1998 Supreme Court 3021, it has been held that under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is stated in the third column that the suit for specific performance had to be filed within three years from the date stipulated in the contract or from the date of refusal to perform the contract in the present case, even though a period of 5 years is fixed for exercising the option to purchase, it is not specified in the agreement that the vendee shall execute the deed of repurchase within a particular period from the date of exercise of option. Hence the first part of the third column of Article 54 does not apply. The second part applies. Time therefore starts to run only from the 22.7.1968, the date when the defendant refused to execute the deed of re conveyance. 14. In the case of Sultan L atif Shamshuddin Ahmed Vs. Hence the first part of the third column of Article 54 does not apply. The second part applies. Time therefore starts to run only from the 22.7.1968, the date when the defendant refused to execute the deed of re conveyance. 14. In the case of Sultan L atif Shamshuddin Ahmed Vs. Shaik Alia Baksh Jani, reported in [2002] 4 ALD 779/[2003]1 ALT 24, it has been held that the period of limitation begins from the date of refusal by the vendee or the defendant and applying the said principles the period of three years mentioned under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, shall be reckoned from the date of refusal to execute the deed of reconveyance. 15. In the case of Ahmmadsahab Abdul Mulla (deceased by L.Rs.) vs. Bibijan & Ors. reported in AIR 2009 Supreme Court 2193, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under: “The inevitable conclusion is that the expression ‘date fixed for the performance’ is a crystallized notion. This is clear from the fact that the second part “time from which period begins to run” refers to a case where no such date is fixed. To put it diferently, when date is fixed it means that there is a definite date fixed for doing a particular act. Even in the second part the stress is on ‘when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. Here again, there is a definite point of time, when the plaintiff notices the refusal. In that sense both the parts refer to definite dates. So, there is no question of finding out an intention from other circumstances. Whether the date was fixed or not the plaint if had notice that performance is refused and the date thereof are to be established with reference to materials and evidence to be brought on record. The expression ‘date’ used in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act definitely is suggestive of a specified date in the calendar.” 16. So far as the ratio of judgments is concerned that cannot be disputed, but in the case at hand the agreement of reconveyance was for 10 years from 7.9.1959 when the agreement was executed. Thus there was time upto 4.9.1969 and the suit was filed on 22.8.1969. So far as the ratio of judgments is concerned that cannot be disputed, but in the case at hand the agreement of reconveyance was for 10 years from 7.9.1959 when the agreement was executed. Thus there was time upto 4.9.1969 and the suit was filed on 22.8.1969. Thus the limitation would start to run from the date of refusal to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff as provided in fourth column of Article 54 of Indian Limitation Act, which provides that the date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. I do not find any illegality in the finding recorded by courts below on the point of limitation and the courts below have rightly arrived at a conclusion that the suit was filed within reasonable time of limitation since it was specifically pleaded in the para of cause of action of the plaint that lastly the defendant refused to execute the sale-deed in the year 1969. It is pertinent to mention here that it has been admitted in written statement by defendant No.1 that he alienated the property in question by a sale deed on 30.04.1969 to Mangla Devi in good faith, therefore, now the sale deed was to be executed in favour of the plaintiff and it has been stated that it was lastly refused by the defendants in the year 1969. No notice was given to defendant No.2 Mangla Devi in the year 1962. On the notice the defendant No.1 never turned up to execute the sale deed, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was rightly held by the trial court as well as First Appellate Court that the suit is not time barred. 17. Secondly it was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that compliance of Section 16 of Specific Relief Act is mandatory and specific performance of contract cannot be enforced in favour of the person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him according to the true construction of the agreement. He further contended that Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 makes its discretionary upon the court to grant or not to grant a decree for specific performance but the said discretion is exercisable on sound and reasonable judicial principles. 18. In reply to the question that no issue was framed pertaining to ready and willingness, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the issue No.3 was framed whether the plaintiff is entitled to the specific performance of agreement dated 7.9.59 and issue No.4 was framed, which of the parties if any committed the breach of the agreement. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents further submitted that the court on issue Nos. 3 and 4 after discussion has given the finding that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Issue No.6 was also framed on limitation and that was also dealt with in detail and the limitation was reckoned by the court from the last date mentioned in the deed of reconveyance. 19. In Second Appeal No. 20 of 1996 Indal Kumar Kushwaha & another vs. Rajesh Kumar Gupta & others, rendered by Allahabad High Court, (supra), it is has been held that legal position that emerges from the provision is well settled, first there has to be an averment and proof of continuous readiness and willingness on part of plaintiff to perform his agreement. Secondly, the court is not bound to decree every suit for specific performance even if there is an agreement and it is lawful to do so and the court is vested with the power to exercise its discretion on equitable consideration for which conduct of the parties play an important role. Thirdly, the limitation for initiating a suit for specific performance is three years from the date fixed for the performance or where no such date is fixed from the date the performance was refused and exercising the discretionary power U/S 20 of the Act, the conduct of the parties is relevant and of utmost important. 20. Thirdly, the limitation for initiating a suit for specific performance is three years from the date fixed for the performance or where no such date is fixed from the date the performance was refused and exercising the discretionary power U/S 20 of the Act, the conduct of the parties is relevant and of utmost important. 20. In the instant case it has come in evidence that plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part agreement to get the sale deed executed on the basis of deed of reconveyance and notices were also served by him upon the defendant No.1 to execute sale deed, therefore the courts below have rightly exercised the discretionary powers U/S 20 of the Act in favour of the plaintiff. 21. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents has relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in Shyam Singh vs. Daryao Sigh (dead) by Lrs. & Ors., reported in JT 2003(9) SC 151, wherein in para- 16 it has been held that the right of repurchase has to be held to be assignable or transferable and cannot be treated as personal to the contracting parties. Therefore so far as the question whether he was entitled to decree for specific performance on the basis of the right repurchase in his favour was entitled to file a suit. 22. Learned counsel further contended that the predecessor of the appellant had purchased the property in dispute by way of sale-deed from Pir Onkar Nath, and as soon as he purchased the property the tenancy rights if any were ceased. Thereafter when the sale deed was executed by the predecessor of the appellant in favour of Mangla Devi they alleged to have been again become tenant of Mangla Devi and Mangla Devi has also executed rent deed during the pendency of the suit. Therefore learned Munsif did not place reliance on the document and the transaction was not held to be bonafide therefore the suit was decreed. 23. Learned counsel for respondents also raised the plea that the appellant has no locus to file the appeal after the execution of the sale deed in favour of Mangla Devi and Mangla Devi had also filed appeal that was abated and no substitution was made in that appeal. 24. 23. Learned counsel for respondents also raised the plea that the appellant has no locus to file the appeal after the execution of the sale deed in favour of Mangla Devi and Mangla Devi had also filed appeal that was abated and no substitution was made in that appeal. 24. On the point of personal rights on the disputed property and no transfer could be made of the said property, it was plaint case that Pir Onkar Nath was the owner of the property in suit and he transferred the property to defendant No.1 through registered sale deed dated 7.9.1959 for a consideration of Rs. 1500/- with an agreement to reconvey the property within ten years to Pir Onkar Nath from the date of execution of agreement in consideration of Rs. 1500/- and afterwards Pir Onkar Nath vide deed dated 13.3.61 transferred his rights to the plaintiff and thus plaintiff was having a right to repurchase the property in question of Pir Onkar Nath under the agreement of reconveyance dated 7.9.1959. After purchasing the rights plaintiff informed the defendant No.1 for the transfer, the defendant asserted that the rights under agreement were personal of Pir Onkar Nath and the same were not transferred and no information was given to him of the transfer. The courts below have recorded categorical finding that the burden was on defendants and they utterly failed to discharge the burden and on the basis of deed executed by Pir Onkar Nath in favour of plaintiff dated 13.3.1961 and agreement dated 7.9.59 it was concluded that the rights to get the property reconveyed is a valuable and alienable right. 25. In the case of Shyam Singh vs. Daryao Sigh (dead) by Lrs. & Ors., reported in JT 2003(9) SC 151, cited by learned counsel for respondents it has been held that unless the contents of the document in question and evidence in relation thereto are so clear to infer a prohibition against assignment or transfer, the right of repurchase has to be held to be assignable or transferable and cannot be treated as personal of the contracting parties. 26. The appellant/defendant have failed to adduce evidence to show that the contents of document in question was having prohibition against assignment or transfer and the right of repurchase cannot be treated as personal. 27. 26. The appellant/defendant have failed to adduce evidence to show that the contents of document in question was having prohibition against assignment or transfer and the right of repurchase cannot be treated as personal. 27. I do not find any illegality and perversity in the judgment and decrees passed by courts below and the second appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed. 28. The appeal is dismissed. The judgment and decrees passed by both the courts below are affirmed. 29. The interim order dated 21.7.1976 passed by the court is vacated.