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2012 DIGILAW 1614 (MAD)

Ponnusamy v. Sathyapriya

2012-03-29

R.S.RAMANATHAN

body2012
JUDGMENT ( 1. ) THE second defendant in O.S.No.29 of 2001, on the file of the Sub Court, Arni, is the appellant herein. ( 2. ) THE respondents 1 to 3 herein, filed the above suit for partition of 3/4th share in the suit property against the fourth respondent. ( 3. ) THE case of the respondents 1 to 3 herein was that the suit properties are the joint family properties of the respondents 1 to 3 and 4 and the fourth respondent is their father and the suit property was allotted to the share of the fourth respondent in a partition deed, dated 4.6.1973, entered into between the fourth respondent and his brothers and father. After coming into force of the Tamil Nadu amended Act 1 of 1990, the respondents 1 to 3, who are the daughters of the fourth respondent are entitled to a equal share, along with their father, viz., the fourth respondent and therefore, they are entitled to 3/4 share and the fourth respondent has no right to sell the properties to the appellant, who was the second defendant in the suit and the sale is not for family necessity and the sale is not binding on the respondents 1 to 3 and hence, there are entitled to the relief of partition. ( 4. ) THE appellant contested the suit, stating that the respondents are not members of joint Hindu family and the suit is bad for partial partition and possession and the fourth respondent is not a mentally deranged person, as projected by the respondents 1 to 3 and the fourth respondent is working as a part time Clerk in the Panchayat and the sale is for family necessity to discharge the loan and the wife of the fourth respondent and the second plaintiff attested the sale deed and the husband of the second plaintiff also identified the fourth respondent before the Sub Registrar, along with his wife, viz., the second respondent herein and therefore, the respondents are fully aware of the sale transaction and hence, it is not open to them to say that the sale is not binding on them and the fourth respondent has no right to sell the property. ( 5. ( 5. ) THE Trial Court held that the fourth respondent is a Kartha of the joint Hindu family, consisting of the respondents 1 to 4, and the sale deed in favour of the appellant was executed by the fourth respondent, while he was in a sound and disposing state of mind and he was not having any mental problem, as alleged by the respondents 1 to 3 and the sale was also for legal necessity and the fourth respondent, being the Kartha of the joint family, is entitled to sell the property for legal necessity, without seeking permission from the Court and the legal necessities are proved by the appellant, beyond reasonable doubt. THErefore, the sale in favour of the appellant is binding on the respondents 1 to 3 and they are not entitled to the relief of partition and dismissed the suit. ( 6. ) THE Lower Appellate Court reversed the findings of the Trial Court and held that the sale in favour of the appellant was not for legal necessity and the appellant failed to prove that the sale consideration was utilized for discharge of the loans and admittedly, loan payable to the Society was not paid and therefore, the sale is not binding on the respondents 1 to 3. ( 7. ) THE Lower Appellate Court further held that the second respondent was a minor at the time of execution of the sale in favour of the appellant and in the sale, it was not mentioned that the fourth respondent was selling the property for himself and on behalf of the minor children and without getting permission from the Court, the sale was effected and therefore, that is not binding on the minors and the suit is not bad for partition and allowed the Appeal. Aggrieved by the same, the present Second Appeal has been filed by the appellant. ( 8. ) THE following Substantial Questions of Law were framed at the time of admission of this Appeal:- i) Whether the Lower Appellate Court was right in decreeing the suit, especially, when the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989, Chapter II-A Section 29-A (V) clearly mandates that nothing would apply to partitions done before the commencement of the Act. ) THE following Substantial Questions of Law were framed at the time of admission of this Appeal:- i) Whether the Lower Appellate Court was right in decreeing the suit, especially, when the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989, Chapter II-A Section 29-A (V) clearly mandates that nothing would apply to partitions done before the commencement of the Act. ii) Whether the Lower Appellate Court was right in decreeing the suit, when the plaintiffs have not proved that the suit property is either a joint family property or an ancestral property. iii) Whether the Lower Appellate Court was right in decreeing the suit, especially, when the plaintiffs themselves come with the case that they seek only partial partition. ( 9. ) THE learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr.P.Seshadri, submitted that in addition to the above Substantial Questions of Law, one more Substantial Question of Law, arises for consideration, and agreeing with him, the following Substantial Question of Law, was framed with consent of both the learned counsel and the fourth Substantial Question of Law is as follows:- "iv) Whether the sale executed by the fourth respondent in favour of the appellant is for legal necessity and is binding on the respondents 1 to 3" ( 10. ) THE relationship between the parties is admitted. THE fourth respondent is the father of the respondents 1 to 3. THE fourth respondent sold the property to the appellant, under a registered sale deed- Ex.B.1. THE suit was filed by the respondents 1 to 3, on the ground that the fourth respondent got the properties from his brothers and father, under the registered partition deed, dated 4.6.1973-Ex.A.1. THErefore, it is a joint family property of the fourth respondent, and therefore, after coming into force of Tamil Nadu amended Act 1 of 1990 to the Hindu Succession Act and by virtue of Section 29-A of the Hindu Succession Act, the respondents 1 to 3, got right over the suit property from the date of coming into force of the Tamil Nadu amended Act 1 of 1990 and they are co-parceners, having 1/4 share each in the suit property and hence, they are entitled to 3/4 share in the property ( 11. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Lower Appellate Court, without properly appreciating the provisions of Section 29-A (v) of the Act and also the fact that the partition had taken place between the fourth respondent and his brothers and father even in the year 1973, prior to the coming into force of the Act, the property ceased to be the joint family property and the respondents 1 to 3, cannot claim any right over the same and they got right over the property by virtue of the Tamil Nadu amended Act 1 of 1990 to the Hindu Succession Act and even prior to the passing of the said Act, the property became the absolute property of the fourth respondent, the father of the respondents 1 to 3 and therefore, they cannot claim any share in that property and the sale by the fourth respondent in favour of the appellant is valid and that cannot be challenged. ( 12. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the provisions of Section 29-A (v) of the Act and as per the above sub-section, amended Act was not applicable to the partition, which had been effected prior to the date of commencement of the Hindu Succession Act and Tamil Nadu, amendment Act, 1989 and in this case, admittedly, partition took place in the year 1973, as evidenced by Ex.A.1, and therefore, prior to the coming into force of the Tamil Nadu amended Act 1 of 1990, partition had taken place and hence, the respondents 1 to 3, cannot claim the status of co-parceners along with the fourth respondent and the property was the separate property of the fourth respondent and therefore, he was competent to sell the same and that cannot be questioned by the respondents 1 to 3. ( 13. ( 13. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that even assuming that the property is a joint family property of respondents 1 to 3 and 4, admittedly, the fourth respondent is the father of the respondents 1 to 3 and therefore, as the Kartha of the joint family, he is entitled to sell the property for legal necessity and he sold the property for legal necessity to discharge the loan incurred by him and the sale was attested by his wife, son -in-law and the second respondent herein and therefore, it cannot be impeached that the sale is not for legal necessity and being the Kartha of the joint family, he is competent enough to sell the property for legal necessity, without getting consent from the Court and the sale is binding on the respondents 1 to 3 and hence, they are not entitled to any partition. ( 14. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that, though, it was alleged in the plaint that the fourth respondent is mentally deranged person and not looking after the family and he is living a wayward life, no evidence, worthy the name was adduced, except, the oral evidence of P.W.s 1 and 2 and therefore, the allegation that the fourth respondent is a mentally deranged person, incapable of taking care of himself was not proved. THE learned counsel further submitted that admittedly, the fourth respondent mortgaged the properties in favour of the appellant, as evidenced by Ex.B.2 and to discharge the said mortgage, to discharge the co-operative loan and to discharge other sundry loans, the property was sold for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- and no evidence was adduced by the respondents 1 to 3, that the property was worth more than Rs.1,00,000/- at the time of sale. ( 15. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that, when a person purchased a property from the Kartha of the joint family, he is not bound to see the application of money and he has to satisfy that the sale is for legal necessity and once the legal necessity is proved, the sale is binding on the family members. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the following reported judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:- I) A.I.R. 1951 Madras 643 in the case of[ Muthu Nadar Vs. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the following reported judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:- I) A.I.R. 1951 Madras 643 in the case of[ Muthu Nadar Vs. Chinnadorai Nadar and others ] ii) 1963 1 S.C.R. 648 in the case of[ Radhakrishnadas and another Vs. Kaluram ( dead) and Lrs. and others ] iii) 1980 2 S.C.C. 387 : A.I.R.1980 S.C.645 in the case of[ Arvind @ Abasaheb Ganesh Kulkarni and others Vs. Anna @ Dhanpal Parisa Chougule and others ] iv) 1996 9 S.C.C. 53in the case of[ GangadharanVs. Janardhana Mallan and others ]. ( 16. ) PER contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents 1 to 3, Mr.S.V.Jayaraman, submitted that the respondents 1 to 3, after coming into force of Tamil Nadu Amendment Act to the Hindu Succession Act, introduced by the Tamil Nadu Government Act 1 of 1990, the daughters, who were not married on the date of coming into force of the amendment Act, became entitled to a share in the joint family property, as if, they get a share by birth like the son and admittedly, the respondents 1 to 3, were unmarried on the date of coming into force of the amendment Act and having regard to Ex.A.1, the partition deed between the brothers of the fourth respondent, the fourth respondent and his father, the properties allotted to the share of the fourth respondent par-takes the character of ancestral properties in his hands and therefore, after passing of the said Act, the respondents 1 to 3 became entitled to a share along with the fourth respondent and each one is entitled to 1/4 share and therefore, the suit is maintainable. ( 17. ) THE learned Senior counsel for the respondents further contended that partition referred to under Section 29- A (v) is the partition that had taken place between the father and sons, prior to the coming into force of the Act, and on the date of coming into force of the Act, the fourth respondent was keeping the property with him not as a separate property, but as a joint family property and therefore, after coming into force of the Act, the daughters automatically became entitled to equal share along with the father. THE learned counsel, therefore, submitted that, as per Clause V of Section 29- A of the Hindu Succession Act, the suit property is the ancestral property in the hands of the fourth respondent. ( 18. ) THE learned Senior Counsel for the respondents further submitted that the fourth respondent sold the property, without getting permission from the Court and as per Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the natural guardian shall not, without the permission of the Court, sell any properties, belonging to the minors and any sale by the natural guardian, without getting permission of the Court is voidable at the instance of the minors and therefore, the minors have avoided transaction by filing a suit for partition and hence, the alienation is not binding the minor daughters, viz., the respondents 1 to 3 herein. ( 19. ) THE learned Senior Counsel for the respondents further submitted that admittedly the loan payable to the co-operative society, for which the property was sold to the appellant, by the fourth respondent was not discharged and Exs.A.11 to A.14, proves the said fact and when the loans are not discharged, it can be presumed that the recitals in the sale deed to the effect that the properties are sold to discharge the loan are only imaginary and the sale was not for legal necessity and hence, it is not binding the respondents 1 to 3. THE learned Senior Counsel, therefore, submitted that the Lower Appellate Court, after carefully appreciating all these factors, set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and held that the sale in favour of the appellant was not for legal necessity and the sale, without getting permission of the Court, was not valid and binding on the respondents 1 to 3, and hence, the Second Appeal is liable to be dismissed. ( 20. ) THE learned Senior Counsel for the respondents also submitted that the suit was also not bad for partial partition and admittedly, in addition to the properties sold under Ex.B.1, house sites were allotted to the fourth respondent in the partition and that was not included and hence, the suit was not bad for partial partition and on that ground also, the Second Appeal has to be dismissed. ( 21. ) HEARD both sides. ( 22. ( 21. ) HEARD both sides. ( 22. ) TO appreciate the contention of the learned counsel appearing on either side and to answer the Substantial Questions of Law 1 and 2, we will have to see whether the respondents 1 to 3, became co-parceners, along with the fourth respondent, after coming into force of Tamil Nadu amended Act 1 of 1990 to the Hindu Succession Act Whether the fourth respondent was Kartha of the joint family, consisting of himself and the respondents 1 to 3 and Whether the properties sold to the appellant was held by the fourth respondent, as a separate properties? ( 23. ) ADMITTEDLY, in a partition under Ex.A.1, which is of the year 1973, the fourth respondent got the suit property and other properties. Therefore, it was the ancestral properties in his hands, he, having got the same from his brothers and father, under a registered partition deed. ADMITTEDLY, when the fourth respondent got the properties, under Ex.A.1, the fourth respondent has got only three daughters, viz., the respondents 1 to 3 herein and no son was born to the fourth respondent later. Therefore, we will have to see the character of the properties in the hands of the fourth respondent, when he got the properties in the said partition. ( 24. ) IN the judgment reported in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 343 in the case of [Sitabai Vs. Ramachandra ] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "Under the Hindu System of law, a joint family may consist of a single male member and widows of deceased male members and the property of a joint family does not cease to belong to a joint family, merely because, the family is represented by a single coparcener, who possesses rights which an absolute owner of property, may possess. The property, which was the joint family property of the Hindu undivided family does not cease to be so, because of the 'temporary reduction of the coparcenary unit to a single individual'. The character of the property, viz. that it was joint property of a Hindu undivided family remains the same. The property, which was the joint family property of the Hindu undivided family does not cease to be so, because of the 'temporary reduction of the coparcenary unit to a single individual'. The character of the property, viz. that it was joint property of a Hindu undivided family remains the same. It is only by analyzing the nature of the rights of the members of the undivided family, both those in being and those yet to be born, that it can be determined whether the family property can properly be described as joint property of the undivided family" ( 25. ) FURTHER the same view was confirmed in the judgment reported in A.I.R. (1972) S.C. 1369 in the matter of[ Manoharlal Vs. Bhuri Bai] wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "the property held by a sole surviving co-parcener of joint Hindu family, is not his separate property, if there is a woman in the family, who can bring into existence a new co-parcener by adoption" ( 26. ) THEREFORE, eventhough, the fourth respondent was not having any son at the time of getting the properties in the partition from his brothers and father, in the year 1973, and he was a sole surviving co-parcener of a joint Hindu Family, the character of the property will not change into a separate property and it remains as the joint family property, as the wife of the fourth respondent was alive at that time. Hence, when the property held by the fourth respondent retains the character of the joint family property, after coming into force of Tamil Nadu amended Act 1 of 1990 to the Hindu Succession Act, the respondents 1 to 3, automatically became co-parceners and are entitled to claim a share equally with their father. This has been dealt with in a detailed manner, by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in (2004) 3M.L.J. 620 in the case of [Alamelu Ammal and others Vs. Tamizh Chelvo and Others]. ( 27. ) FURTHER, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in (2008) 1 M.L.J. 610 in the case of[ Amudha Rani and two others Vs. Tamizh Chelvo and Others]. ( 27. ) FURTHER, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in (2008) 1 M.L.J. 610 in the case of[ Amudha Rani and two others Vs. K.Veeraraghavan@K.V.Raghavan and four others] held that the unmarried daughters become co-parceners in the joint family property in her own right in the same manner as a son and have the same rights, as she had been a son on the coming into force of the ( Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989, to the Hindu Succession Act. ( 28. ) THEREFORE, in the light of the judgments referred supra, I have no hesitation to hold that the property in the hands of the fourth respondent was the joint family property and it was not a separate property and on the coming into force of Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment Act) 1989, (1 of 1990), the respondents 1 to 3, who were unmarried at that time, became entitled to claim a share equally along with the father and therefore, they are entitled to 1/4 share each to the suit property. Further, the partition referred to in Section 29 - A (v) will not have the effect of changing the character of the property and Section 29-A (v) can be invoked by the appellant, only, if there had been a partition between the fourth respondent and his children and the partition between the fourth respondent with his brothers and father, was not a partition, envisaged in Section 29 - A (v) of the Hindu Succession Act. ( 29. ) THEREFORE, the substantial questions of law 1 and 2 are answered against the appellant and I hold that the property in the hands of the fourth respondent was the joint family property and after coming into force of the Tamil Nadu amended Act 1 of 1990, to the Hindu Succession Act, the respondents 1 to 3 became entitled to claim right along with the father, viz., the fourth respondent herein and therefore, they are entitled to 1/ 4 share each in the suit property. ( 30. ) IT is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the sale is for legal necessity and therefore, it is binding on the respondents 1 to 3. ( 30. ) IT is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the sale is for legal necessity and therefore, it is binding on the respondents 1 to 3. To appreciate this contention, we will have to see the recitals in Ex.B.1, viz., the sale deed executed in favour of the appellant and the evidence adduced by the parties. ( 31. ) THOUGH, an attempt was made by the respondents 1 to 3, that the fourth respondent was not having full mental faculty and he was leading a wayward life, not taking care of the family, no proof was adduced by the respondents 1 to 3, to substantiate the said allegation. Admittedly, the wife of the fourth respondent and mother of the respondents 1 to 3, was alive at the time of execution of Ex.B.1, the sale deed in favour of the appellant and she also attested the sale deed. She was also alive during the trial and she did not enter the box to speak about the mental condition of her husband and the life he lead. Therefore, in the absence of any material or proof filed by the respondents 1 to 3, regarding the mental condition of the fourth respondent and non examination of the wife of the fourth respondent, it cannot be stated that the respondents 1 to 3 have proved that the fourth respondent is a mentally deranged person and he is leading wayward life and is not taking care of the family. ( 32. ) THEREFORE, we will have see whether the sale was for legal necessity. It is stated in the sale deed that to discharge the mortgage in favour of the appellant, to discharge the society loan and to discharge the sundry debts, the properties were sold at Rs.1,00,000/- ( 33. ) AS stated supra, the wife of the fourth respondent, viz., mother of the respondents 1 to 3, and the second respondent attested the documents and the second respondent also identified her father before the Sub Registrar. The husband of the second respondent also identified the fourth respondent, before the Sub Registrar, along with his wife, the second respondent. ) AS stated supra, the wife of the fourth respondent, viz., mother of the respondents 1 to 3, and the second respondent attested the documents and the second respondent also identified her father before the Sub Registrar. The husband of the second respondent also identified the fourth respondent, before the Sub Registrar, along with his wife, the second respondent. It was contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents 1 to 3, that the second respondent was a minor at that time and that was proved by Exs.A.15and A.16, and therefore, the attestation by the second respondent will not bind the second respondent and that would also prove that by practising fraud, the sale was effected. ( 34. ) IT is not the case of the respondents 1 to 3 that the appellant practiced fraud on their father and get the properties for a lesser price. No evidence was let in to prove the market value of the properties at the relevant time. Further, the husband of the second respondent-P.W.1, was one of the identifying witnesses before the Sub-Registrar and therefore, it is not the appellant, who practiced fraud and it is the respondents 1 to 3 with connivance of P.W.1, practiced fraud on the appellant and sold the property and the appellant cannot be expected to know whether the second respondent was minor or major at the time of execution of Ex.B.1. ( 35. ) ADMITTEDLY, the second respondent got married at the time of execution of sale deed in favour of the appellant and her husband was one of the identifying witnesses before the Sub Registrar. The wife of the fourth respondent was the first attesting witness to the sale deed and the second respondent attested the document and also identified her father. Therefore, there is no reason to doubt the capacity of the second respondent, by the appellant, when he got the sale deed executed in his favour. Thus, the fact that the sale deed was executed by the fourth respondent, with the knowledge of his wife, daughter and son in law would prove that the sale transaction was genuine one and it was for family necessity. ( 36. Thus, the fact that the sale deed was executed by the fourth respondent, with the knowledge of his wife, daughter and son in law would prove that the sale transaction was genuine one and it was for family necessity. ( 36. ) FURTHER, as rightly pointed out by the learned for the appellant, as per the judgment of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1951 Madras 643 (supra) when the father sells the property for family necessity, eventhough, he has not described himself as Manager or Kartha, the sale is binding on the co-parceners, once the legal necessity is proved. ( 37. ) FURTHER, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (1963) 1 S.C.R. 648 : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 574 : in the case of [Radhakrishnadas and another Vs. Kaluram (dead) and lrs. And others ] the alienee is required to establish only the legal necessity for the transaction and it is not necessary for him to show that every bit of the consideration, which he advanced was actually applied for meeting family necessity. ( 38. ) FURTHER, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 1980 2 S.C.C. 387 (supra) held that where bulk of sale proceeds is accounted for by necessity, the fact that a small portion of the consideration is not accounted for will not invalidate the sale and when the mortgagee himself was the purchaser and greater portion of consideration went in discharge of mortgage, it cannot be stated that the sale is not for legal necessity. ( 39. ) IN this case, admittedly, the appellant was a mortgagee, as evidenced by Ex.P.2 and the mortgage amount was of Rs.50,000/- and the sale was to discharge the mortgage loan. Eventhough, it was stated that the sale was also for discharging the society loan, the society loan was not discharged, as evidenced by Exs.A.11 to A.14. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is not the duty of the alienee to see the application of consideration and once the major portion of the consideration was used to discharge the earlier mortgage, the sale can be valid. Further, the sale was also for discharge of sundry debts and it cannot be excepted of a purchaser to see that the sundry debts are discharged. Further, the sale was also for discharge of sundry debts and it cannot be excepted of a purchaser to see that the sundry debts are discharged. Therefore, having regard to the fact that the sale was for discharge of mortgage in favour of the appellant and in the absence of any proof that the family was affluent and therefore, no necessity to incur loan and when the sale was made with the knowledge of the wife and children, and the wife attested the document, it can be presumed that the sale is for legal necessity. Further, Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, will not be applicable to the facts of this case and in respect of joint family property, the Kartha of the family has got every right to sell the property for family necessities and therefore, there is no need for him to get permission of the Court and this has been held so in the judgment reported in (1996) 9 S.C.C. 53 (supra) Further, in the judgment reported in (1996) 8 S.C.C. 54 , in the case of[ Sri Narayan Bal and others Vs. Sridhar Sutar and others ],the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Kartha or adult members of a joint Hindu family can sell or dispose of the joint family property, involving undivided interest of minor and the provisions of Section 8 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, will not be attracted to such a sale. ( 40. ) THE Trial Court also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. (1967) S.C. 574 (cited supra)and A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 645 (cited supra), wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when a mortgagee himself is the purchaser and greater portion of the consideration went in discharge of the mortgage, the question of enquiry regarding legal necessity does not arise. ( 41. ) THEREFORE, I hold that the sale by the fourth respondent in favour of the appellant under Ex.B.1 was for legal necessity and the respondents 1 to 3 were aware of the sale and the sale is binding on them and the substantial questions of law No. 4 is answered in favour of the appellant. ( 42. ( 41. ) THEREFORE, I hold that the sale by the fourth respondent in favour of the appellant under Ex.B.1 was for legal necessity and the respondents 1 to 3 were aware of the sale and the sale is binding on them and the substantial questions of law No. 4 is answered in favour of the appellant. ( 42. ) ADMITTEDLY, under Ex.A.1, the fourth respondent got the suit property and other properties and in the present suit, the respondents 1 to 3, did not include those properties and despite the same being brought to their notice, no attempt was made by them to include those properties. Hence, the suit is also bad for partial partition and the substantial question of law No. 3 is answered in favour of the appellant. ( 43. ) IN the result, having regard to the fact that answers are given in respect of the substantial questions of law Nos.3 and 4, in favour of the appellant, eventhough the respondents 1to 3 became co-parceners along with the fourth respondent and got equal share along with the fourth respondent in the properties, as the properties were sold for legal necessity by Kartha of the joint family, the same is binding on the respondents 1 to 3 and therefore, respondents are not entitled to the relief of partition. Hence, the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court is restored, the suit is dismissed and the Second Appeal is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected M.P. is closed.