JUDGMENT 1. - These two appeals have been filed challenging the order dated 15.5.2012 passed by the Additional District Judge, Raisinghnagar, whereby the learned Judge has partly allowed the temporary injunction application filed by the plaintiffs, Poona Devi, and Chawli Devi. While the plaintiffs, Poona Devi and Chawli Devi have filed S.B.Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1021/2012, Vinod Kumar, the defendant in the civil suit has filed S.B.Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1035/2012. Since both these appeals relate to the same impugned order, they are being decided by this common order. 2. The facts are being taken from S.B.Civil Misc. Appeal No.1021/12. The appellants had filed a suit for presumption against Vinod Kumar, and one Rakesh Kumar. However, an application for temporary injunction was filed only against Vinod Kumar. According to the appellants, their father-in-law, Ballu Ram, had bought a shop, namely shop No.53 from one Sohan Lal Trilok Chand. This shop was purchased in the names of his wife, Patasi Devi and daughter, Tulsi Devi. While he had bought the eastern side of the shop in the name of his wife, Patasi Devi, the western side of the shop was bought in the name of his daughter, Tulsi Devi. In order to fulfill the needs of his family, he constructed a residential area above the shops in the form of first and second floor. Subsequently, they have inherited the shops and the residential area through a Will. After the death of Tulsi Devi, half the part of the shop No.53 i.e. on the western side was surrendered to Rakesh Kumar. The said shop was mutated in the name of Rakesh Kumar in the records kept by the Municipal Council. They further claimed that there is only one staircase on the eastern side, and even to reach the western part of the building one has to go through the staircase, which is situated in the eastern side. In the back of the shop, one Vijay Kumar has set up a business of water-filter. They further claimed that the plaintiffs were willing to buy the portion which went to Rakesh Kumar. Despite the sharing of a common staircase, without informing, Rakesh Kumar has sold part of his property to Vinod Kumar. Therefore, on the basis of sharing of common staircase, the plaintiff claimed right to presumption. They further claimed that the plaintiffs were willing to buy the portion which went to Rakesh Kumar. Despite the sharing of a common staircase, without informing, Rakesh Kumar has sold part of his property to Vinod Kumar. Therefore, on the basis of sharing of common staircase, the plaintiff claimed right to presumption. Along with the suit, the appellants also filed an application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 for temporary injunction. 3. After hearing both the sides, by order dated 15.5.2012, the learned Judge directed as under:- " fygktk izkFkZuk i= izkFkhZx.k fo:) vizkFkhZ vUrxZr vkns'k&39 fu;e 1 o 2 rFkk lifBr /kkjk&151 flfoy izfdz;k lafgrk bl 'krZ ds lkFk Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn izkFkhZx.k 15 fnu ds Hkhrj&Hkhrj ;g vaMjVsafdx izLrqr djsa fd oknh dk okn&i= [kkfjt gks tkus ij ,d ekg ds Hkhrj&Hkhrj izFke o f}rh; eafty ds if'peh [kjhn'kqnk fgLlk o xksnke dk if'peh [kjhn'kqnk fgLlk dk dCtk vizkFkhZ dks lqiqnZ dj nsaxs rks vizkFkhZ dks tfj;s vLFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk rk&QSlyk nkok ikcUn fd;k tkrk gS fd vizkFkhZ fooknxzLr fgLlk ij ihNs dh vksj xksnke ds fgLls o izFke o f}rh; eafty ij fLFkr fookfnr fgLls dk mi;ksx miHkksx djus ls izkFkhZx.k dks oafpr u djs vkSj izkFkhZx.k dks csn[ky u djs vkSj bl fgLlk dks izkFkhZx.k ds vykok vU; fdlh O;fDr gks jgu] cS; ;k nhxj rjhds ls eaqrfdy ugha djsA fookfnr fgLlk esa tks nqdku dk fgLlk gS] ml gn rd izkFkZuk&i= izkFkhZx.k [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA [kpkZ i{kdkj Lo;a ogu djsaxsA " 4. Mr. Ranjeet Joshi, the learned counsel for the appellants, Poona Devi, and Chawli Devi, has contended that while partly granting the temporary injunction in favour of the appellants, the learned Judge could not have imposed a condition upon the appellants that they should give an undertaking within a period of fifteen days to the trial court, that in case of rejection of the civil suit, they will hand over the possession of the first and the second storey of the building as well as the godown in the western side, to the defendant. According to him, since the defendant has not filed any counter-claim, even if, the appellants were to lose the suit, a decree for granting the possession of the property in favour of the defendant cannot be passed. In fact, in order to seek the possession, the defendant would be required to file a separate civil suit. According to him, since the defendant has not filed any counter-claim, even if, the appellants were to lose the suit, a decree for granting the possession of the property in favour of the defendant cannot be passed. In fact, in order to seek the possession, the defendant would be required to file a separate civil suit. Since, such a relief cannot be given to the defendant, even as a final order, obviously, such a condition cannot be imposed while granting the temporary injunction partly in favour of the appellants. 5. Mr. C.S. Kotwani, the learned counsel for the respondent has opposed the stand taken by the learned counsel for the appellants. 6. It is, indeed, a settled position of law that a relief is limited by the prayer clause. The Court cannot travel beyond the relief clause. Undoubtedly, the appellants have filed a suit for pre-emption wherein they have claimed that due to the common staircase, they have the right of preemption, which could not be defeated by Rakesh Kumar by selling part of the property to the defendant, Vinod Kumar. Even if, the plaintiffs were to lose this suit, it would not entitle Vinod Kumar to seek the possession of the property which is allegedly sold to him. In order to get the possession, naturally, he would have to file a separate suit. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellants is justified in claiming that a prayer which could not be granted by way of final relief, cannot be imposed as a condition while partly allowing the temporary injunction in favour of the appellants. Thus, obviously this condition imposed by the learned Judge needs to be interfered with. Thus, this Court allows the Civil Misc. Appeal no. 1021/2012, and deletes the said condition imposed by the order dated 15.5.2012. 7. As far as the appeal of Vinod Kumar is concerned, namely Appeal No. 1035/2012, Mr. C.S.Kotwani has contended that the learned Judge has correctly held that the right of pre-emption could not be sought on a commercial complex. Therefore, he has rejected the application for temporary injunction as far as the two shops, namely shop Nos. 53A and 53B are concerned. However, while granting the temporary injunction in favour of Poona Devi and Chawli Devi, he has erred in granting the temporary injunction, vis-a-vis the godown, which is attached to the two shops on the ground floor. Therefore, he has rejected the application for temporary injunction as far as the two shops, namely shop Nos. 53A and 53B are concerned. However, while granting the temporary injunction in favour of Poona Devi and Chawli Devi, he has erred in granting the temporary injunction, vis-a-vis the godown, which is attached to the two shops on the ground floor. According to the learned counsel, even the space occupied by godown is part of the commercial complex for the said space is attached to the two shops. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Ranjeet Joshi, has contended that the shops continue to be in possession of the appellant-plaintiffs. According to him, the possession needs to be protected. Hence, he has supported part of the impugned order. 9. In the case of Ram Prakash Agarwal through LRs. v. Smt. Pushpa Agarwal and Ors. [2008 (4) WLC, 751] , this Court was of the opinion that the shop would be included in the bar contained in Section 5 (1)(a) of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act, 1966. Therefore, according to this Court a suit for pre-emption would not lie vis-a-vis a shop. Since the godown is attached to a shop and commercial is used for commercial purpose, therefore, a suit for pre-emption would not lie for an area which is used for commercial purposes. i.e. for the godown. 10. A bare perusal of the map attached with the Commissioner's Report, in the present case, clearly shows that the godown in question is attached to the shops in question. Moreover, such a godown is being used for commercial purposes for certainly it cannot be used for residential purposes. Therefore, what has been held vis-avis shop would obviously apply to a godown. Therefore, as far as the godown is concerned, the learned Judge was certainly not justified in passing the temporary injunction in favour of Poona Devi and Chawli Devi, the plaintiffs, with relation to this godown. Therefore, this part of the order whereby the temporary injunction has been given in favour of the plaintiffs, vis-a-vis a godown, needs to be modified. 11. However, as there is a dispute, as to which party is in possession of the said portion-a dispute which is subject matter of evidence, it is directed that both the parties shall maintain status quo as of today i.e. as of 25.7.2012, with regard to the godown portion of the building. 12. 11. However, as there is a dispute, as to which party is in possession of the said portion-a dispute which is subject matter of evidence, it is directed that both the parties shall maintain status quo as of today i.e. as of 25.7.2012, with regard to the godown portion of the building. 12. The learned trial court is directed to decide the civil suit as expeditiously as possible. Since this Court has directed the learned trial court to decide the case as expeditiously as possible, the Registry is directed to send the record to the learned trial court.Appeal disposed of. *******