JUDGMENT 1. - These two revision petitions, filed by the petitioner-contractor against the similar nature orders dated 28.09.2004 as passed by the Additional District Judge, Neem-Ka-Thana ('the Executing Court'), have been considered together for having their genesis in similar nature arbitral awards dated 10.01.1996 and involving common questions, regarding interest payable, between the same parties; and are taken up for disposal by this common order. 2. The basic and the relevant facts and the background aspects in these matters are more or less similar in nature; and could be taken into comprehension as under:S.B. CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 34/2005 3. The parties herein appear to have entered into a contract for supply of stone ballast that contained an arbitration clause for resolution of disputes; and pursuant thereto, the petitioner-contractor filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 ('the Act of 1940') for appointment of an arbitrator that was registered as Arbitration Case No. 44/1995 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Neem-ka-Thana, District Sikar. The learned Additional District Judge, by his order dated 05.08.1995, accepted the application so moved and appointed Shri Bhagwan Das Meena, Retired Senior Divisional Engineer, Western Railway as the sole arbitrator to resolve the dispute between the parties and to make the award within four months from the date of submission of the claim. Eventually, the arbitrator proceeded to make the award on 10.01.1996, a photostat whereof has been placed for perusal by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In this award dated 10.01.1996, the arbitrator awarded a sum of Rs. 84,025/- in favour of the petitioner in the following:- "I award the following sums of money item-wise:- Claim No : Amount awarded in Rupees. Item No : 1 Rs. 8,750/- Item No : 2 Rs. 9,450/- Item No : 3 Rs. 10,050/- Item No : 4 & 5 Claims deleted by the claimant. Item No : 6 Rs. 7,000/- Item No : 7 : Interest on Item Nos : 1,2,3 & 6 @ 12% Per Annum with effect from 1.11.86 to 31.12.95 Rs. 38,775/- Item No: 8 Rs. 10,000/- Total Rs. 84,025 RUPEES EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE ONLY." 4. Thereafter, the learned arbitrator made certain observations about rejection of the counter-claim sought to be taken by the respondents that are not relevant for the present purpose. 38,775/- Item No: 8 Rs. 10,000/- Total Rs. 84,025 RUPEES EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE ONLY." 4. Thereafter, the learned arbitrator made certain observations about rejection of the counter-claim sought to be taken by the respondents that are not relevant for the present purpose. The arbitrator ultimately directed as under:- "(1) That the respondent do pay the claimant a sum of Rs. 84,025/- (Rupees eighty four thousand and twenty five only) as detailed above against each item of claim. (2) That on payment of the said amount mentioned in (1) above, ( Rs. 84,025/-), all demands in respect of the said contract by the claimant against the Respondent and the Respondent against the claimant are finally and fully satisfied. (3) That the respondent do pay the claimant a sum of Rs. 84,025/- (Rupees eighty-four thousand and twenty-five only) within one month of the declaration of award, failing which the respondent do pay to the claim interest on the full amount @ 12% per annum from the expiry of one month till the date of payment. (4) That the respondent Railway shall bear the expenses incurred, if any, in arbitration matters." 5. The aforesaid award dated 10.01.1996 was filed in the Court; the non-petitioners submitted their objections under Section 30 of the Act of 1940; and the petitioner put the objections to contention. By the order dated 10.05.1999, the learned Additional District Judge, Neem-ka-Thana accepted the objections filed by the non-petitioners and set aside the award essentially on the consideration that the arbitrator had not given any reason on the basis of calculation of the award amount. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 10.05.1999, the petitioner preferred an appeal, being S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1038/1999 in this Court. This appeal and the cognate matters involving akin issues were taken up together for consideration by the learned Single Judge of this Court; and the appeals were decided by the common judgment and order dated 07.05.2001. This judgment has since been reported as AIR 2001 Rajasthan 389. 7. Shorn of unnecessary details, suffice is to notice for the present purpose that in the aforementioned judgment and order dated 07.05.2001, so far the present matters are concerned, the learned Single Judge found that the subordinate Court was not justified in setting aside the award dated 10.01.1996. The learned Single Judge also found the arbitrator justified in awarding interest for pre-reference period. The learned Single Judge also found the arbitrator justified in awarding interest for pre-reference period. The learned Single Judge, inter alia, observed as under:- "14. In view of the ratio indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforequoted pronouncements, it can safely be observed that under the provisions of 1940 Act it was open to the arbitrator to give an award without giving reasons unless the parties had stipulated that the arbitrator should give a reasoned award. An error of law or fact committed by the arbitrator in making the award by itself does not constitute misconduct warranting interference with the award. The court below thus committed illegality in setting aside the awards in claim cases No. 44/95, 46/95 and 47/95 on the ground that arbitrator had not given any reasons as to on what basis he calculated the amounts under awards.........." 15. I am also of the view that under section 30 of 1940 Act the appointment of arbitrator cannot be questioned. In the instant cases the arbitrator was appointed under Section 8 of the 1940 Act by the Court and the order had attained finality. In so far as the question of interest is concerned the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Executive Engineer v. N.C. Budharaj, AIR 2001 SC 626 held thus- The arbitrator appointed with or without the intervention of the court, has jurisdiction to award interest, on the sums found due and payable for pre-reference period." 8. After disapproving the impugned order dated 10.05.1999 and while setting aside the same, the learned Single Judge proceeded to allow the appeals, insofar relating to these matters, with the observations and directions that are the bone of contention herein. The relevant observations and directions read as under:- "17. In view of discussions made herein above I allow the appeals No.1038/99, 1039/99 and 1040/99 and set aside the impugned judgments of the learned Additional District Judge Neem Ka Thana. The awards dated January 10, 1996 (Case No.44/95) January 10, 1996 (Case No.46/96) and July 29, 1996 (Case No.47/95) are ordered to be made rule of court. There will, therefore, be a decree in each claim case in terms of the award. The respondents shall also pay to the appellants further interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum from the date of the decree till payment and costs. (emphasis supplied) 9. There will, therefore, be a decree in each claim case in terms of the award. The respondents shall also pay to the appellants further interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum from the date of the decree till payment and costs. (emphasis supplied) 9. It appears that pursuant to the aforesaid judgment and order dated 07.05.2001, the learned Additional District Judge, Neem-ka-Thana took up the proceedings in arbitration case again; and on 19.09.2001, proceeded to draw the decree that reads as under:- " vr% vkfcZVs~Vj }kjk izLrqr vokMZ 10 tuojh] 1996 Lohdkj l'kZr fd;k tkrk gS :i vkWQ dksVZ cuk;k tkrk gSA rFkk izkFkhZ fcgkjh yky vizkFkhZ ;qfu;u vkWQ bf.M;k o vU; ls 84]025@& :i;s e; [kpkZ izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS rFkk fu.kZ; o fMdzh dh rkjh[k ls ekuuh; jkt0 mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkns'k dh jks'kuh esa 9 izfr'kr okf"kZd C;kt dh nj jkf'k olwyh rd] vfrfjDr C;kt dh jkf'k lk/kkj.k nj ls] izkFkhZ fcgkjhyky vizkFkhZx.k ls ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA " 10. The petitioner felt dissatisfied with the decree so drawn by the learned Additional District Judge, Neem-ka-Thana on 19.09.2001, particularly in relation to the component of interest during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings and until the date of decree; and filed a review petition that was rejected by the learned Additional District Judge on 16.04.2002 while observing that the decree had been drawn in terms of the award and in terms of the order passed by the High Court. Having regards to the questions posed in these matters, it appears appropriate to reproduce the relevant part of the order dated 16.04.2002 as under:- " 10- tgka rd izdj.k ij miyC/k nLrkosth lk{; ds vuq:i iqujh{k.k ;kfpdk dks Lohdkj fd;s tkus dk iz'u gSa] eq[; :i ls ;kfpdk esa ;g rF; vafdr fd;k x;k gS fd vfcZV~sVj ds ;gka izdj.k dh dk;Zokgh vkjaHk gksus ls ysdj vokMZ dh rkjh[k rd C;kt dh jkf'k bl U;k;ky; }kjk ugha fnykbZ xbZ gS tks fd fnyk;k tkuk vfuok;Z gSA bl dze esa tgka rd vfcZVs~Vj }kjk izLrqr vokMZ dh 'krksZa dk iz'u gS] ge bl LVst ij vfcZVs~Vj }kjk ikfjr vokMZ o C;kt dh jkf'k ds xq.kkoxq.k ij fdlh izdkj dh fVIi.kh djuk U;k;ksfpr ugha le>rs gSa D;ksafd mDr vokMZ ds dze esa ekuuh; jkt0 mPp U;k;ky; }kjk i{kksa dks foLr`r :i ls lquus ds i'pkr~ fu.kZ; ikfjr fd;k tk pqdk gS rFkk vfcZV~sVj }kjk izLrqr vokMZ dh 'krksZa dh D;k O;k[;k gS] ;g fcUnq Hkh bl izdze dk ugha gS ysfdu eku0 jkt0 mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; fnukad 7-5-2001 esa eq[; :i ls iSjk la0 17 esa ;g rF; izdV fd;k x;k gS fd dsl ua0 44@95] 46@96] 47@95 ds dze esa ikfjr vokMZ dks :i vkWQ dksVZ cuk;k tkrk gS rFkk lHkh izdj.kksa esa vokMZ dh 'krksZa ds vuqlkj fMdzh cukbZ tk;sxh lkFk esa izR;FkhZ ( Hkkjr la?k ) 9 izfr'kr okf"kZd C;kt dh nj ls fMdzh dh jkf'k ls Hkqxrku dh vof/k rd dh jkf'k dk vfrfjDr Hkqxrku Hkh djsxkA mijksDr fu.kZ; dh jks'kuh esa gekjh jk; esa vfcZVs~Vj }kjk ikfjr vokMZ dks ;Fkkor Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS rFkk fMdzh dh rkjh[k ls Hkqxrku dh rkjh[k rd 9 izfr'kr okf"kZd nj ls vfrfjDr C;kt jkf'k izkFkhZ dks fnyk;s tkus dk vkns'k fn;k x;k gSA bl dze esa tgka rd bl U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 19-9-2001 dk iz'u gS] tks fuEu izdkj gS & " vr% vkfcZV~sVj }kjk izLrqr vokMZ 10 tuojh] 1996 Lohdkj l'krZ fd;k tkrk gS rFkk :i vkWQ dksVZ cuk;k tkrk gSA izkFkhZ fcgkjh yky vizkFkhZ ;wfu;u vkWQ bf.M;k o vU; ls 84]025@& :0 e; [kpkZ izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS rFkk fu.kZ; o fMdzh dh rkjh[k ls ekuuh; jkt0 mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkns'k dh jks'kuh esa 9 izfr'kr okf"kZd C;kt dh nj ls jkf'k olwyh rd vfrfjDr C;kt dh jkf'k lk/kkj.k nj ls izkFkhZ fcgkjhyky vizkFkhZx.k ls ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA " mijksDr vkns'k ls ;g Li"V gS vkfcZVs~Vj }kjk izLrqr vokMZ iw.kZr;k e; [kpkZ Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS rFkk fu.kZ; o fMdzh dh rkjh[k ls olwyh dh vof/k rd dk 9 izfr'kr okf"kZd nj ls C;kt dh jkf'k Hkh izkFkhZ dks fnykbZ xbZ gSA ,slh lwjr esa gekjh jk; esa eku0 jkt0 mPp U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; dh jks'kuh esa vokMZ bl U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fd;k x;k gS mlesa fdlh izdkj dh dksbZ =qfV gksus izdV ugha gksrh gS rFkk vizkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr m)j.k 1999 Mh0,u0ts0 jkt0 ist 370 jkt0 jkT; cuke eS0 Hkkjrh dUlV~D'ku da0 esaa izfrikfnr fl)kUrksa dh jks'kuh esa iqufoZyksdu ls lacaf/kr U;k;ky; dks iqujh{k.k vihy ds vuqlkj lquus dk dksbZ vf/kdkj ugha gSA blds vfrfjDr fopkjk/khu vokMZ izfdz;k dh le; vof/k dk C;kt dk iz'u gS] gekjh jk; esa vokMZ ls gVdj fdlh izdkj dk dksbZ vkns'k izdj.k esa ikfjr fd;k tkuk izdV ugha gksrk gS] ,slh fLFkfr esa bl fcUnq ij bl izdze ij vyx ls fo'ys"k.k dh vko';drk ugha gS D;ksafd vokMZ dks mUgh 'krksZa ds vuq:i :y vkWQ dksVZ cuk;k x;k gS tks fd vokMZ esa vafdr gSA mijksDr foospu ds vk/kkj ij izkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr iqujh{k.k ;kfpdk Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; ugha ikbZ tkrh gSA " (emphasis supplied) 11. After rejection of the review application, the petitioner filed an execution application that was registered as Execution Case No. 38/2002. In this execution case, the petitioner claimed interest on the award amount for the period from 10.01.1996 (the date of the award) until the date of decree @ 12% per annum. The non-petitioners, on the other hand, submitted that they had already paid the amount as due to the decree-holder in terms of the decree. In its impugned order dated 28.09.2004, the learned Executing Court was of opinion that as per the decree, interest had been allowed @ 9% per annum from the date of decree and the position was clarified in the order dated 16.04.2002 while rejecting the review application. The learned Executing Court held that the judgment-debtor had already made the payment as per the decree dated 19.09.2001; and nothing further was payable while observing as under:- " U;k;ky; }kjk fnukad 19-9-01 dks ikfjr fu.kZ; o fMdzh dk voyksdu djus ij Li"V gS fd C;kt ckcr U;k;ky; }kjk ;gh vkns'k fn;k x;k gS fd fu.kZ; o fMdzh dh rkjh[k ls 9 izfr'kr okf"kZd nj ls olwyh rd vfrfjDr C;kt izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA ;g Hkh mYys[kuh; gS fd U;k;ky; }kjk fnukad 19-9-01 dks ikfjr fu.kZ; o fMdzh ckcr oknh@fMdzhnkj }kjk /kkjk 151 lifBr vkns'k 47 fu;e&1 lh0ih0lh0 ds rgr utjlkuh izLrqr dh xbZ Fkh tks fnukad 16-4-02 ds vkns'k ds vuqlkj [kkfjt dj ;g Li"V fd;k x;k Fkk fd fu.kZ; o fMdzh dh rkjh[k ls Hkqxrku dh rkjh[k rd 9 izrh'kr okf"kZd nj ls gh vfrfjDr C;kt jkf'k izkFkhZ dks fnyk;s tkus dk vkns'k fn;k x;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa fMdzhnkj }kjk vc iqu% vkosnu izLrqr dj vokMZ dh 'krZ la0 4 vuqlkj fnukad 10-1-96 ls 12 izfr'kr okf"kZd dh nj ls C;kt fnyk;s tkus dk rdZ dksbZ egRo ugha j[krk gSA i=koyh ds voyksdu ij Li"V gS fd U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fMdzh fnukad 19-9-01 dh vuqikyuk esa leLr fMdzhd`r jkf'k] fMdzh [kpkZ o U;k;ky; ds vkns'kkuqlkj C;kt dh x.kuk djrs gq, C;kt jkf'k feykdj 85]852-64 :0 dk Hkqxrku xSj fMdzhnkj dksbZ vU; jkf'k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gSA U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; o fMdzh fnukad 19-9-01 dh iw.kZ ikyuk gks pqdh gS] ,slh fLFkfr esa bl i=koyh esa dksbZ dk;Zokgh fd;k tkuk 'ks"k ugha jgrh gSA " 12. Being aggrieved of the aforesaid order dated 28.09.2004 whereby the learned Executing Court has held the decree satisfied and has dismissed the execution application, the petitioner has preferred this revision petition.S. B. CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 35/2005 13. The basic facts of this case are essentially similar to the foregoing except on the quantum of amount awarded by the same arbitrator. The photostat of the award dated 10.01.1996 in this matter (Arbitration Case No. 46/1995) has been placed for perusal by the learned counsel and the relavant operative portion thereof is reproduced as under:- I award the following sums of money itemwise:- Claim No: Amount awarded in Rupees Item No :1 Rejected Item No :2 Claim deleted. Item No :3 Rs. 27,826/- Item No :4 Rs. 75,000/- Item No :5: Rs. 10,000/- Item No : 6-Interest @ 12% Rs. 78,558/- On Item No. 3 with effect from 1.4.86 to Dec. 95 Rs. 33,558/- Item No. 4 : w.e.f. 1991 to 1995 Rs. 45,000/- Rs. 78,558 Total Rs. 1,91,384/- RUPEES ONE LAKH NINETY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTYFOUR ONLY. 14. Herein too, the learned arbitrator made the observations about rejection of the counter-claim that are not relevant for the present purpose. The arbitrator ultimately directed in this case as under:- (2) That the respondent do pay the claimant a sum of Rs. 1,91,384/- (Rupees One lakh Ninetyone thousand three hundred eighty-four only) as detailed above against each item of claim. (3) That on payment of the said amount mentioned in (1) above (i.e. Rs. 1,91,384/-) all demands in respect of the said contract by the claimant against the Respondent and the respondent against the claimant are finally and fully satisfied. (4) That the respondent do pay to claimant a sum of Rs. 1,91,384/- (Rupees One lakh ninetyone thousand three hundred eighty-four only) within one month of the declaration of award failing which the respondent do pay to claimant interest on the full amount @ 12% per annum from the expiry of one month till the date of payment. (5) That the respondent Railway shall bear the expenses incurred, if any, in arbitration matters. 15. This award was also set aside by the similar nature order dated 10.05.1999 in Case No. 46/1995 by the Additional District Judge, Neem-ka-Thana. The appeal in this Court against the order relating to this case had been S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1039/1999. (5) That the respondent Railway shall bear the expenses incurred, if any, in arbitration matters. 15. This award was also set aside by the similar nature order dated 10.05.1999 in Case No. 46/1995 by the Additional District Judge, Neem-ka-Thana. The appeal in this Court against the order relating to this case had been S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1039/1999. This Court passed the judgment and order dated 07.05.2001 common to both these cases alongwith other cognate matters, as noticed hereinabove. The similar nature decree dated 19.09.2001 was drawn in this matter also by the learned Additional District Judge, Neem-ka-Thana; and the similar nature review application as filed by the petitioner-claimant was dismissed by the similar nature order dated 16.04.2002 in this matter too. The petitioner filed separate execution application, being Execution Case No. 37/2002, in this case; and the same was also disallowed by the similar nature order of the even date, i.e., 28.09.2004.The Submissions: 16. Assailing the aforesaid orders dated 28.09.2004, the learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that the learned Execution Court has committed serious illegality and material irregularity in failing to consider the meaning and purport of the award dated 10.01.1996 that was made the rule of the Court pursuant to the directions of this Court as contained in the judgment and order dated 07.05.2001. The learned counsel submitted that the arbitrator had clearly awarded interest to the petitioner @ 12% per annum from the date of the award until the date of realisation in case payment of the award amount was not made within one month of the award. The learned counsel submitted that the said essential stipulation in the award regarding interest is fully operative and the petitioner is entitled to interest accordingly. The learned counsel submitted that as per the settled position of law, interest could be awarded at all the four stages of arbitration case, i.e., pre-reference period, from reference until the date of award, from the date of award until the date of decree/payment, and from the date of decree until payment. The learned counsel submitted that as per the settled position of law, interest could be awarded at all the four stages of arbitration case, i.e., pre-reference period, from reference until the date of award, from the date of award until the date of decree/payment, and from the date of decree until payment. The learned counsel submitted that when the arbitrator had awarded interest @ 12% per annum until payment; and this Court directed making the award rule of the Court; and decree was drawn in terms of the award, mere omission of a stipulation in the decree regarding payment of interest for the intervening period between the date of award and the date of decree would not operate against the rights of the petitioner to get the interest as per the terms of the award. It is submitted that the relevant position of law being clear, mere rejection of the review application or receiving of the part payment would not be decisive over the rights of the petitioner. The learned counsel has referred to and relied upon the decisions in Secretary, Government of Orissa & Ors. v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508 ; T.P. George v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2001) 2 SCC 758 ; and Indian Hume Pipe Company Limited v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 10 SCC 187 : 2009 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 766 . 17. While countering the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, the learned counsel for the non-petitioners has duly supported the order impugned and submitted that the order as passed by this Court on 07.05.2001, the respective decrees as passed on 19.09.2001 by the learned subordinate Court, and the orders dated 16.04.2002 in rejection of the respective review applications, all have attained finality, as the same were, admittedly, never challenged. The learned counsel vehemently contended that as per paragraph 17 of the order dated 07.05.2001, this Court specifically directed that the interest was to be paid @ 9% per annum from the date of decree until the date of actual payment; and the decree dated 19.09.2001 in each case was passed in accordance with the aforesaid directions of this Court; and, admittedly, the decreetal amount comprising of the principal that included interest until the month of December 1995 and then, interest from 19.09.2001 to 10.12.2001 had been paid by the non-petitioners and received by the petitioner. The learned counsel submitted that no other amount being payable to the petitioner, the Executing Court was perfectly justified in rejecting the execution applications. The learned counsel has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gulam Mohammad Dar v. State of J & K & Ors., (2008) 1 SCC 422 and submitted that therein, on the dispute as to the date from which interest was payable, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it shall be from the date of decree. The learned counsel contended that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are of no assistance because they relate only to the principles regarding award of interest by the arbitrator but herein, the rights of the parties regarding interest would be governed by the orders that have attained finality. The learned counsel has also referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Union of India v. Ravi Construction Company, Bangalore, 2003 (2) Arb.LR 208 , that of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the case of Union of India v. S.M. Construction Co., 2009 (1) Arb.LR 271 , and that of this Court in the case of Banwari Lal v. Om Prakash & Ors., 1986 RLR 982 on the principles governing grant of interest by the Court. 18. The learned counsel for the non-petitioners has further referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Limited v. Poddar Projects Limited & Anr., (2007) 2 SCC 431 and submitted that the order as passed by this Court on 07.05.2001 having attained finality, no order contrary to the same could now be made. The learned counsel yet further referred to the decision of this Court in Gopal Lal v. Smt. Amba Bai & Ors., AIR 1998 Rajasthan 301 to submit that the award and the order of the Additional District Judge merged into the order of the High Court and only the final decree was executable. The learned counsel also submitted that the petitioner, having accepted without protest the decreetal amount paid to him, had no right to make a claim for interest thereafter; and hence, the execution application was not even maintainable. The learned counsel also submitted that the petitioner, having accepted without protest the decreetal amount paid to him, had no right to make a claim for interest thereafter; and hence, the execution application was not even maintainable. In this regard, the learned counsel has referred to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Bhagwati Prasad Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 311 : 2006 (2) WLR (SC) Civil 538 ; and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nipha Exports (P) Ltd., (2006) 8 SCC 156 : 2006 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 738 .The impugned orders cannot be sustained 19. After having given a thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and having perused the material placed by the contesting parties, this Court is clearly of opinion that the impugned orders cannot be sustained and the respective execution cases deserve re-consideration by the learned Executing Court. 20. Before taking up the core issue regarding the rate and the period of interest as claimed by the petitioner, appropriate it shall be to consider the objections taken on behalf of the non-petitioners regarding finality of the orders and regarding waiver. 21. So far the question of waiver or acquiescence by acceptance of the payment is concerned, it had not been a case where any particular claim was a matter of live dispute between the parties on their respective rights wherefor acceptance of the payment could have operated as waiver. It had been a matter regarding the amount payable under the arbitral awards, which had been made the rule of the Court and whereupon the decrees had been passed. Any payment, if made by the respondents in discharge of their liability under the decrees in question and received by the petitioner, would remain subject to the final orders of the Executing Court regarding discharge and satisfaction; and mere acceptance of the payment by the petitioner cannot operate in foreclosure of all his rights, if the decree or any part thereof remained to be satisfied. Moreover, it has not been shown if the non-petitioner (judgment-debtor) took recourse to the relevant modes of making payment under the decree per Rules 1 and 2 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure and took any step to get the payment certified and recorded as full satisfaction of the decree. Moreover, it has not been shown if the non-petitioner (judgment-debtor) took recourse to the relevant modes of making payment under the decree per Rules 1 and 2 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure and took any step to get the payment certified and recorded as full satisfaction of the decree. Thus, payment of any amount, even if made by the judgment-debtor and accepted by the decree-holder, could not be taken as conclusive of the matter nor the decree-holder is precluded from asserting his claim that decree has not been fully satisfied. 22. In the case of Nipha Exports (supra), in regard to an insurance claim after settlement of the disputes, the claimant gave a clean discharge upon receiving the settled amount. The claim of interest, thereafter, on the insurance amount was held untenable. In Bhagwati Prasad (supra), in respect of the claim made by the appellant, the respondent had sent a cheque for the lower amount with the condition that if such offer was not acceptable, the cheque should be returned, failing which, it would be deemed that the appellant had accepted the offer in full and final satisfaction of the claim. The appellant proceeded to encash the cheque without protest. Such a conduct was held amounting to acceptance and the protests after encashment were held to be of no avail. The cases aforesaid, for essential difference of fact situation, have no application to the present case. In the passing, it may also be observed that waiver by way of acceptance of any amount by the decree-holder had not been the reason of passing of the order impugned by the Executing Court for declining his prayer for execution. The contentions on waiver, as urged by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner, carry no substance and stand rejected. 23. So far the aspect of the relevant orders having attained finality is concerned, there is no and there cannot be any dispute that the common judgment and order passed by this Court on 07.05.2001 has attained finality and so also the orders dated 16.04.2002 as passed by the learned subordinate Court in rejection of the review applications. 23. So far the aspect of the relevant orders having attained finality is concerned, there is no and there cannot be any dispute that the common judgment and order passed by this Court on 07.05.2001 has attained finality and so also the orders dated 16.04.2002 as passed by the learned subordinate Court in rejection of the review applications. The question, however, would be of true import and effect of the respective awards dated 10.01.1996 read with this Court's order dated 07.05.2001; and of the decrees drawn by the learned subordinate Court on 19.09.2001 read with the orders dated 16.04.2002 as passed in rejection of the respective review applications. The decision in Peerless General Finance (supra), thus, has no bearing on the issue at hand. Similarly, the decision of this Court in Gopal Lal (supra) about merger does not make out any ground for the non-petitioner to stand on. As would be seen hereafter, the final order of this Court has resulted in a decree and that would require proper satisfaction. 24. Coming to the core question as to what had been awarded to the petitioner towards interest and what amount the petitioner is entitled towards interest, this Court is clearly of the opinion that on a purposive reading of all the orders aforesaid, the petitioner is entitled to interest on the principal sum adjudged in the award @ 12% per annum for the period to be counted from one month after the date of award, i.e., from 10.02.1996 and upto a day before the decree, which would be 06.05.2001; and the petitioner is further entitled to interest @ 9% per annum from the date of decree i.e., 07.05.2001 until the date of payment 25. There remains nothing of doubt on the position of law regarding entitlement of a claimant to receive interest on the sum adjudged in the award and on the authority and competence of the arbitrator to make directions regarding interest for pre-reference period as also until the date of award and until the date of decree. The decisions of the High Courts in Ravi Construction, S.M.Construction and Banwari Lal (supra) as referred by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner on the principles governing grant of interest by the Courts do not admit of any quarrel or dispute. The decisions of the High Courts in Ravi Construction, S.M.Construction and Banwari Lal (supra) as referred by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner on the principles governing grant of interest by the Courts do not admit of any quarrel or dispute. Apparent it is that the Courts' jurisdiction to award interest is referable to Section 29 of the Act of 1940 and therein, the Court is empowered to award interest from the date of decree. However, the component of interest for the period prior to the date of decree essentially rests within the jurisdiction and authority of the arbitrator. In the ordinary course, the interest for all the relevant stages ought to be awarded; and deprivation of any claimant of any component of interest has to be on sound and strong reasons. The law in this respect stands settled with a series of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court including those cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. A reference to the decision in Indian Hume Pipe Company Limited (supra) shall suffice wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has summed up the position of law as under:- 7.By a long catena of cases decided by this Court from time to time, it is too well settled that arbitrators have the competence, jurisdiction and power to award interest for the period from the date of award to the date of payment as also for pre-reference, pendente lite and post-award. The only caveat is that the amount of interest so awarded should be reasonable and agreement between the parties should not prohibit grant of such interest. (emphasis supplied) 26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that in the absence of any embargo or legal hurdle, there cannot be any justifiable reason to deny interest for all the relevant stages. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 13. The learned Single Judge also committed a grave error in coming to the conclusion that even though the arbitrator was competent to award interest but it was not mandatory on his part to do so. The said reasoning does not appeal to be legally tenable and convincing, for the simple reason, if the amount has been withheld wrongly and without any justification then of course the aggrieved party would be fully justified in claiming interest. The said reasoning does not appeal to be legally tenable and convincing, for the simple reason, if the amount has been withheld wrongly and without any justification then of course the aggrieved party would be fully justified in claiming interest. This is the mandate of the Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure as also Section 29 of the Act. Both the aforesaid provisions make it abundantly clear that the power to award interest at all stages vests with the arbitrators. The arbitrators are bound to make the award in accordance with law and if there is no embargo or legal hurdle in awarding interest for the aforesaid three stages mentioned hereinabove then there cannot be any justifiable reason to deny the same. (emphasis supplied) 27. Before proceeding further and at this juncture, an aspect regarding date of decree deserves to be dealt with. As noticed, the awards were made on 10.01.1996. The learned Additional District Judge proceeded to set aside the award in each case by the order dated 10.05.1999. In each of the present matters, the order as passed on 10.05.1999 was not approved by this Court in its judgment dated 07.05.2001; and while setting aside the impugned orders, this Court ordained,- The awards dated January 10, 1996.... are ordered to be made rule of the court. This Court further ordered,- There will, therefore, be a decree in each claim case in terms of the award. 28. This Court was dealing with the appeals filed under Section 39 of the Act of 1940 against the orders passed by the subordinate Court. With setting aside the impugned orders in the appeal, the aforesaid directions of this Court were essentially those as envisaged by Section 17 of the Act of 1940 that reads as under:- 17. Judgment in terms of award.- Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award. (emphasis supplied) 29. Thus, the judgment dated 07.05.2001, though passed by this Court in appeal but, for all practical purposes, had been a judgment in terms of Section 17 ibid. On 07.05.2011, this Court pronounced judgment according to the award; and upon the judgment so pronounced, a decree automatically followed. It hardly matters if a formal decree pursuant to the aforesaid paragraph 17 of the judgment dated 07.05.2011 was not drawn. In the true operation of Section 17 of the Act of 1940, the decree came into existence on 07.05.2001 itself with this Court passing the judgment in terms of the award. 30. In the aforesaid position, it had been rather superfluous for the learned subordinate Court to have drawn a decree on 19.09.2001 in terms of the judgment of this Court. The decree had come into existence at once with allowing of respective appeals by this Court and with the judgment dated 07.05.2001. Hence, the proceedings for drawing the decree dated 19.09.2001 and so also the review thereof all appear to be superfluous and unnecessary. Of course, the rights of the parties would be governed by the terms of the award as made rule of the Court; and by the decree as passed by this Court. 31. Now, the question is about construction of the judgment and order leading to the decree dated 07.05.2001. In the opinion of this Court there remains little doubt about the meaning, purport and legal implication thereof. Therein, the awards dated 10.01.1996 were accepted as they were. Even the question of interest was a little bit gone into (vide paragraph 15 of the order dated 07.05.2001) and this Court found the arbitrator justified in awarding interest for pre-reference period. The learned Single Judge was conscious of the directions required to be given in such a decree in terms of the award and, therefore, 'also' made the provision for 'further interest' in the following terms:- There will, therefore, be a decree in each claim case in terms of the award. The respondents shall also pay to the appellants further interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum from the date of the decree till payment and costs. 32. The respondents shall also pay to the appellants further interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum from the date of the decree till payment and costs. 32. Paragraph 17 of the judgment and order dated 07.05.2001 leaves nothing to doubt that the award was made the rule of the Court and what this Court directed towards interest was its component of post-decree period; and the respondents were directed to pay such component of interest from the date of decree until payment @ 9% per annum. This period would obviously be from 07.05.2001 until the date of payment, which is shown to be 10.11.2001. 33. This Court is not at all impressed with the submissions made on behalf of the non-petitioners that as per the decree, interest is payable only from the date of decree until payment. If the submissions of non-petitioners are accepted, it would mean that the entire component of interest for the period between the date of award and the date of decree got wiped out or eclipsed because of the aforesaid stipulation in the decree regarding interest from the date of decree until payment. As noticed, this Court never disturbed the award and rather pronounced the judgment in terms of the award. The terms of the awards dated 10.01.1996, as noticed, are clear that while allowing the claim in regard to some of the items, the arbitrator awarded interest on such items for pre-reference and pendente lite period; and then, in relation to the entire amount so adjudged, the arbitrator ordered that the same be paid within a month and else, it shall carry interest @ 12% per annum until the date of payment. Of course, the stipulation 'until the date of payment' shall stand overshadowed by the intervening decree of the Court before the date of payment. In fact, the arbitrator ought to have ordered interest until the date of decree or until the date of payment, if that be earlier than the date of decree because interest from the date of decree is within the jurisdiction of Court per Section 29 of the Act of 1940. In any case, the terms of the decree make it absolutely clear that the award as made by the arbitrator was accepted by the Court and was made the rule of the Court. In any case, the terms of the decree make it absolutely clear that the award as made by the arbitrator was accepted by the Court and was made the rule of the Court. It would be rather a travesty of justice that despite such unequivocal and emphatic ruling of the Court, an integral part of the award regarding period and rate of interest would be considered as nullified with reference to the other stipulation in the decree about 'future' interest from the date of decree. 34. Thus, on a purposive reading of the award with the decree, the inescapable conclusion is that on the amount adjudged by the arbitrator, from the date beyond a month from the date of award (i.e., from 10.02.1996) and to a date before the date of decree (i.e., upto 06.05.2001), the petitioner would be entitled to interest @ 12% per annum as per the terms of the award that has been accepted in toto and made the rule of Court. Thereafter, i.e, from 07.05.2001, the petitioner would be entitled to interest @ 9% per annum until the date of payment. 35. The decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Gulam Mohammad Dar (supra) as relied upon by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner has no application to the facts of the present cases. Therein, the terms of award were themselves not very clear where award was made on 05.09.1995 and the arbitrator awarded interest @ 10% per annum beyond 10.11.1995 till payment but then, directed that in case of default, the award amount would carry interest at 18% per annum from 01.02.1994. The High Court making the award rule of the Court directed that the amounts found due alongwith interest awarded by the arbitrator be paid from the date of decree with interest at 18% per annum till final realisation. In the given set of facts and circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified the position that the claimant would be entitled to interest @ 18% per annum for the award amount from the date of decree till realisation. In the present cases, the terms of awards do not carry any ambiguity and the stipulations in the decree are also explicit as dilated hereinbefore. In the present cases, the terms of awards do not carry any ambiguity and the stipulations in the decree are also explicit as dilated hereinbefore. As noticed, with the series of consistent decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the law remains settled that ordinarily, and if there be no legal hurdle, arbitrators ought to award interest for all the relevant stages (vide above-quoted paragraph 13 in Indian Hume Pipe's case). In the present case, there appears no indication that the arbitrator ever intended to deprive the petitioner of interest for any of the relevant stages. This Court, too, accepted the award in toto and there had never been any modification of any term of the award. Thus, the non-petitioners cannot avoid their liability to pay interest in terms of award; and the decision in Ghulam Mohammad Dar does not make out a case in their favour. 36. It may, in the passing, be observed that the discussion aforesaid has essentially been with reference to paragraph 17 of the order dated 07.05.2001 as passed by this Court in appeal that has resulted in the decree in terms of award. As observed hereinbefore, the proceedings for decree dated 19.09.2001 by the subordinate Court were superfluous. As a necessary consequence, the proceedings in review were also of little avail. However, when it has been suggested on behalf of the non-petitioners that the order passed in review has also attained finality, it may be noticed that while rejecting the review application, the learned subordinate Court definitely took into comprehension the meaning, effect and import of the order passed by this Court on 07.05.2001; and consciously made the observations that this Court has awarded additional interest from the date of decree. Obvious it is that 'additional' interest from the date of decree would never operate in nullifying the already available interest in the award. 37. The upshot of the discussion aforesaid is that the Executing Court has neither considered the record of the case nor the true import of the award and the decree. The orders impugned, therefore, cannot be sustained and are required to be set aside. The Executing Court is required to proceed with the execution proceedings afresh keeping in view the observations and findings in this order. 38. Accordingly, these revision petitions are allowed. The impugned orders dated 28.09.2004 are set aside; and each of the execution applications (Execution Case Nos. The orders impugned, therefore, cannot be sustained and are required to be set aside. The Executing Court is required to proceed with the execution proceedings afresh keeping in view the observations and findings in this order. 38. Accordingly, these revision petitions are allowed. The impugned orders dated 28.09.2004 are set aside; and each of the execution applications (Execution Case Nos. 37/2002 and 38/2002) shall stand restored to its number for consideration afresh by the learned Executing Court who shall proceed to determine the same in accordance with law keeping in view the observations and findings herein. The parties through their counsel shall stand at notice to appear before the Executing Court on 29.02.2012. 39. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs of these revision petitions.Revision allowed. *******