JUDGMENT 1. - The present second appeal has been filed by the appellant-plaintiff Rishabhwadi Jain Shwetamber Murti Pujak Trust through its trustee Shri Jugraj and others against the defendant-tenant Mahaveer s/o Balu Singh being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the court below of the learned Civil Judge-cum-Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sojat allowing the defendant-tenant's appeal No.63/90 (11/90)-Mahaveer v. Rishabhwadi Jain Shwetamber Murti Pujak Trust dated 26.11.1993 reversing the judgment and decree of the learned trial court of Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, I Class, Sojat, Pali decreeing the suit No.75/84-Rishabhwadi Jain Shwetamber Murti Pujak Trust v. Mahaveer Singh, dated 18.01.1990. 2. The two suit shops in question situated at village Chandawal, Sojat, district Pali were given on rent Rs. 20/- per month for each shops to the defendant-respondent under the rent note dated 01.04.1979. The defendant paid rent only up to 31.5.1984 and, thereafter did not pay any rent. The plaintiff, therefore, served a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the lease and also claimed the bonafide need of the suit premises for the purpose of Trust. The suit was decreed by the learned trial court, however, the learned appellate court reversed the said finding on issue No.4 on the ground that the plaintiff-Trust failed to prove that the notice under Section 106 of the Act of 15 days was served upon the defendant-tenant. The notice Ex.2 has been placed on record and the same said to have been sent by registered AD post. 3. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, Mr. Arpit Bhoot submitted that in view of the amended provisions of Section 106(3) of the Act and Section 3 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, providing for Transitory provisions, since the receipt of the notice was admitted by the defendant lessee, it could not be said to be invalid in view of the said provision of Section 3 of the Amending Act and consequently, the appellate court has erred in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court on this ground alone. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-defendant, Mr. Rajesh Panwar urged that in the notice, the plaintiffs had claimed that 7 months rent was due, whereas in the plaint, they said that only two months rent was due and, therefore, the notice could not be said to be valid. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-defendant, Mr. Rajesh Panwar urged that in the notice, the plaintiffs had claimed that 7 months rent was due, whereas in the plaint, they said that only two months rent was due and, therefore, the notice could not be said to be valid. He, however, is unable to dispute the legal position as pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, Mr. Arpit Bhoot. 5. At the time of admission of the present second appeal, vide order dated 18.08.1994, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court framed the following substantial question of law for consideration by this Court: "Whether the onus of proving the issue framed by the trial court that the notice is not valid, is discharged by the respondent ?" 6. The provision of Section 3 as substituted w.e.f. 31.12.2002 reads as under: "S.3 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002 (3 of 2003) reads as under:- "3. Transitory provision.- The provisions of section 106 of the principal Act, as amended by section 2, shall apply to - (a) all notices in pursuance of which any suit or proceeding is pending at the commencement of this Act; and (b) all notices which have been issued before the commencement of this Act but where no suit or proceeding has been filed before such commencement." Sub-Section (3) of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Amendment Act 2002 is also quoted below for ready reference: (3) "A notice under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section." 7. In view of the aforesaid quoted provisions and in view of the findings of both the courts below that the receipt of Notice Ex.3 was admitted by the defendant-tenant, the same cannot be held to be invalid for the reasons of it being sent for a shorter period or the notice containing stipulation for rent due for a shorter period. In view of the aforesaid quoted provisions and in view of the findings of both the courts below that the receipt of Notice Ex.3 was admitted by the defendant-tenant, the same cannot be held to be invalid for the reasons of it being sent for a shorter period or the notice containing stipulation for rent due for a shorter period. All notices which have been issued in pursuance of which any suit or proceedings is pending at the commencement of the said Act, which in present case was so pending, have to be governed by the Amended provision as per Section 3 of the Transitory provision contained in the Amending Act No.3 of 2002. In para 20 of the impugned judgment, the learend appellate court itself has noticed that the defendant had admitted having received the said notice, terminating the lease under Section 106(3) of the Act. 8. In view of the said admission, the question of burden and the discharge thereof by the plaintiff, becomes irrelevant and in view of the admitted receipt of the notice, the lease stood terminated and thereafter the status of the lessee becomes that of a trespasser. 9. In view of this, the learned appellate court has erred in reversing the finding of the learned trial court and allowing the appeal of the defendant-lesee. 10. Consequently, the present second appeal of plaintiff is allowed and the substantial question of law framed above is answered in favour of the appellant-plaintiff and against the defendant-tenant (lesee). 11. The appellant-defendant-tenant shall hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit property viz. Both the shops to the respondent-plaintiffs within a period of one year from today i.e. on or before 31st July, 2013 and shall pay mesne profit Rs. 1,000/- per month commencing from August, 2012 and will further continue to pay the mesne profit each month by 15th day of the next succeeding month or in advance to the respondent also and in case there is any default in payment of mesne profit, the period of one year for eviction shall stand reduced and the decree of eviction would become executable forthwith. The tenant shall also not sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit premises or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period and the same would be treated as void. The appellant-defendant shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within one month and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. It is made clear that if the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit shop is not handed over to the respondent-landlord within a period of one year from today, besides execution of the decree in normal course, the respondent-plaintiff shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. A copy of this judgment be sent to learned courts below and both the parties forthwith.Appeal allowed. *******