Judgment : COMMON ORDER: V.V.S.Rao, J. These four writ petitions are filed against common order dated 09.9.2010 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Hyderabad (the State Commission) in CD Nos.46, 49, 55, 56 of 2004 and FA No.179 of 2006 (against the FA there is no writ petition). Hence all the four matters are being disposed of by this order. 2. The background fact of the matter common to all the four writ petitions may be noticed, referring to W.P.No.24164 of 2011, which is filed against the order in CD No.56 of 2004. M/s. Patel Engineering Limited, the petitioner herein, is a company engaged in the business of executing civil works. It was given the contract work of APGENCO for the construction of Srisailam Left Bank Hydroelectric Project in 1991. In that connection, the petitioner took workmen’s compensation policy (WC policy) from the New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (hereafter, the insurer) covering skilled, semiskilled and unskilled workers against the accidents. The WC policy initially valid from 22.09.1999 to 21.09.2000 was periodically extended. The petitioner also obtained three other similar policies paying the premium separately. 3. During the policy period, the workmen met with fatal accidents resulting in death. There were nonfatal accidents as well resulting in injuries. It is the case of the petitioner that the insurer allegedly deposited compensation in the case of fatal accidents as determined by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation – the Assistant Commissioner of Labour – (hereafter the Commissioner) in the claim filed by the legal heirs of the deceased workmen. In the case of non-fatal accidents the petitioner settled the claims in the presence of the officials of the APGENCO based on the final medical report and paid the amount directly to the injured workmen. This was done according to the terms of the memorandum of the agreement arrived at and registered with the Commissioner. During the period of four years from 1997 to 2001, the petitioner paid compensation to all the injured workmen. In January, 2002 the petitioner wrote to the insurer about the settlement of the claims and requested for release of payments under the WC policy. The correspondence continued between the petitioner and the insurer till August, 2004, without any response from the latter. 4. In January, 2002 the petitioner wrote to the insurer about the settlement of the claims and requested for release of payments under the WC policy. The correspondence continued between the petitioner and the insurer till August, 2004, without any response from the latter. 4. The petitioner then filed four complaints before the State Commission with reference to each of the WC policies, seeking directions to the insurer to pay the insurance claims with interest at 12% per annum. The State Commission dismissed the cases on 16.07.2007 inter alia on the ground that they are barred by limitation and that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief as the insurer was not made party in the proceedings before the Commissioner. The petitioner then moved the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (the National Commission) by filing FA Nos.535, 536, 537 and 538 of 2007. By order dated 14.01.2010, the National Commission remanded the matters to the State Commission. On such remand the State Commission by order dated 09.09.2010 again dismissed the CDs. Be it also noted that the petitioner had filed CD No.109 of 2004 before the District Forum, Ranga Reddy. The same was dismissed. The petitioner filed FA No.179 of 2006 before the State Commission and the same was dismissed against which the petitioner filed RP No.4265 of 2009 before the National Commission which was also dismissed by common order dated 14.1.2010. 5. The insurer filed counter affidavit opposing these writ petitions. It is stated that the State Commission passed a common order in four CDs and one FA, but the writ petitions are filed only against four CDs, and no appeal is filed against the order in FA. Further, the respondent submits that in view of the effective alternative remedy available to the petitioner, the writ petition is barred; and when the State Commission considered as many as 241 documents and adverted to all the points exhaustively, a writ petition would not lie. Under the Employees Compensation Act (the Compensation Act, for brevity), the petitioner has to work out the remedies elsewhere and approaching the State Commission itself is improper. On the merits of the case, the insurer would submit that the order in FA having become final, the writ petitions are not maintainable. As per the policy terms, the petitioner has to inform the insurer in case of any claim. On the merits of the case, the insurer would submit that the order in FA having become final, the writ petitions are not maintainable. As per the policy terms, the petitioner has to inform the insurer in case of any claim. But, payments were made without prior consent of the insurer. Therefore, the insurer is not liable to pay the amount. 6. The Counsel for the petitioner submits that under the Compensation Act the remedy to claim compensation is provided to the workmen and no remedy is provided for the insured employer to move the Commissioner. The insured has a remedy either to move the civil Court claiming the insurance amount or the Consumer Forum Act by way of consumer complaint. In support of this submission, he relies on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in G.Sreedharan v Hindustan Ideal Insurance Corporation 1976 Lab IC 732 . He would submit that the State Commission committed grave error apparent on the face of the record in denying itself the jurisdiction to adjudicate the consumer complaint in which the claim was made against the insurer. Nextly he would urge that though a large number of documents were filed, the State Commission committed error in holding that there is no evidence of payment of compensation to workmen. Lastly he would submit that the availability of alternative remedy is not a bar to move the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of this contention, the Counsel would point out the following: a) the impugned order of the State Commission is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record and therefore the judicial review is not precluded; b) the State Commission denied the relief on an erroneous view that they had no jurisdiction; c) the question whether there was any deficiency of service or not is to be decided by the State Commission alone and such a question cannot be decided by any other adjudicative body; d) the claims made by the petitioner were never repudiated by the insurer; and e) on the question whether the insurer should be made a party to the claims made before the Commissioner, there is divergence of opinion among the High Courts, and therefore, so as to settle the law the writ petition can be entertained ignoring alternative remedy. 7. 7. The Standing Counsel for the insurer would submit that the writ petitions are not maintainable because the petitioner has an effective alternative remedy by way of an appeal under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act. Under Section 21(b) of the said Act, the National Commission has revisional jurisdiction, over all the orders of the State Commission; the petitioner in the first instance filed the appeals which were remanded to the State Commission, and therefore, there cannot be any valid and justifiable ground for the petitioner to ignore the alternative remedy in the second round of litigation. The insurer would further submit the contractual obligations under the insurance policy cannot be enforced in writ petition. On merits, it is contended that the claims made by the petitioner are illegal; the petitioner did not inform the insurer while making payments in fatal accident cases as well as non-fatal cases; and therefore, there is no obligation on the part of the insurer to pay the amounts under the policy. Lastly, the counsel would submit that when the record is voluminous, the consumer forum can always decline to exercise jurisdiction and relegate the complainant to a civil Court. He placed reliance on Life Insurance Corporation of India v Kiran Sinha (1986) 2 SCC 553 : AIR 1986 SC 1265 : 1985 ACJ 657, Food Corporation of India v Jagannath Dutta AIR 1993 SC 1494 , Synco Industries v State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur (2002) 2 SCC 1 : AIR 2002 SC 568 , New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v Harshadbhai Amrutbhai (2006) 5 SCC 192 : AIR 2006 SC 1926 : 2006 (2) MAC 1014 (SC) , P.J.Narayan v Union of India (2006) 5 SCC 200 : 2004 ACJ 452, Surya Prasad Shukla v M.P. State Consumer Dispute Redresssal Commission AIR 2006 MP 81 , Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju v National Insurance Co. Ltd (2007) 13 SCC 446 : 2007 ACJ 1025., Ch.Narasimhulu v United India Insurance Co., Cuddapah 2008 (6) ALD 350 and M/s. Air Canada v M/s. Arpee Garments AIR 2010 Madras 201. 8. Ltd (2007) 13 SCC 446 : 2007 ACJ 1025., Ch.Narasimhulu v United India Insurance Co., Cuddapah 2008 (6) ALD 350 and M/s. Air Canada v M/s. Arpee Garments AIR 2010 Madras 201. 8. In his rejoinder the Counsel for the petitioner submits that the dispute regarding insurance claim is one to be decided by the State Commission alone as the petitioner did not raise any dispute under the Compensation Act and is only claiming the amounts assured under the WC policy; and that when the issue of improper non-exercise of jurisdiction by the authority crops up, judicial review can correct it. 9. As both the Counsel devoted considerable time on the maintainability question, it is proper to consider it as the first point before dealing with the other points that may arise, if necessary. 10. There is no dispute that the petitioner took five WC policies commencing from September 1997 valid till September 2000. There is, however, dispute with regard to legality in paying compensation to workers/their legal heirs in fatal and non-fatal accidents without prior intimation to the insurer. There is also no dispute that when the insurer declined to honour the claims, consumer dispute cases were filed unsuccessfully before the State Commission under Section 17(1)(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed four first appeals and one revision petition before the National Commission. By order dated 14.1.2010 the National Commission remanded the matters giving liberty to the parties to file additional pleadings and evidence. After remand the State Commission again rejected the original cases as well as the appeals which is the subject matter of this writ petition. When in the first instance alternative remedy was availed, what are the extraordinary circumstances to bypass the effective alternative remedy available under the Consumer Protection Act? 11. Judicial review is ordinarily barred when there is effective and efficacious alternative remedy. If a statue creates hierarchy of tribunal with ouster clause, the reviewing Court would be slow in exercise of the jurisdiction until statutory remedy is exhausted. This judicially evolved principle of caution can be ignored when the statue/rule is challenged; the order impugned is in violation of natural justice or violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution; and the order is ex facie without jurisdiction (Whirlpool Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1 : AIR 1999 SC 22 ). This judicially evolved principle of caution can be ignored when the statue/rule is challenged; the order impugned is in violation of natural justice or violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution; and the order is ex facie without jurisdiction (Whirlpool Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1 : AIR 1999 SC 22 ). But even when the inherent lack of jurisdiction is alleged in a challenge to order, the Court can decline judicial review and relegate the parties to the designated statutory fora or functionaries (Special Director v Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (2004) 3 SCC 440 : AIR 2004 SC 1467 ). Similarly if there are serious disputed questions of fact or question of title to immovable property is involved or voluminous evidence to be marshalled, the Court may deny prerogative writs (State of Rajasthan v Bhawani Singh AIR 1992 SC 1018 , Parvatibai Subhanrao Nalawada v Anwarali Hasanali Makani (1992) 1 SCC 414 : AIR 1992 1780, Mohan Pandey v Usha Rani Rajgaria (1992) 4 SCC 61 : AIR 1993 SC 1225 andDwarka Prasad Agarwal v B.D.Agarwal (2003) 6 SCC 230 = AIR 2003 SC 2686 ). 12. The judicial review Courts in all the jurisdictions spiritually apply the caution more frequently in cases involving taxes, cess, fee, recovery of money by the Banks and generally in the disputes arising out of fiscal, monetary and securities laws. In Union of India v Satyawati Tondon (2010) 8 SCC 110 : AIR 2010 SC 3413 the Supreme Court considered these aspects as follows. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. … While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. … It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. (emphasis supplied) 13. In Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan (2001) 6 SCC 569 , in the context of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, a question arose whether rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy would bar petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, the apex court held that even though an Act of Parliament cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the Court ought to refrain from exercising extraordinary jurisdiction. The relevant observations are as follows. The relevant observations are as follows. In our opinion, the order which was passed by the Tribunal directing sale of mortgaged property was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short ‘the Act’). The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act. We do not propose to go into the correctness of the decision of the High Court and whether the order passed by the Tribunal was correct or not has to be decided before an appropriate forum. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act. 14. In City and Industrial Development Corporation v Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala (19) 2008 (8) SCJ 920 = (2009) 1 SCC 168 , the Supreme Court indicated the following parameters required to be kept in mind in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. 14. In City and Industrial Development Corporation v Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala (19) 2008 (8) SCJ 920 = (2009) 1 SCC 168 , the Supreme Court indicated the following parameters required to be kept in mind in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether: (a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; (b) the petition reveals all material facts; (c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches; (e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors. 15. Even in a situation where the statute confers the appellate power on the High Court, a person cannot invoke judicial review and file a writ petition ignoring the remedy of appeal. This was considered in Raj Kumar Shivhare v Directorate of Enforcement (2010) 4 SCC 772 . Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) provided for an appeal to the High Court. The appellant and another received unauthorised payments worth Rs.4 crores from persons living outside India. The competent authority passed orders under Section 13(2) of FEMA confiscating the money and levying penalty. The appellant preferred an appeal under Section 19(2). The Foreign Exchange Appellate Tribunal dispensed with the requirement of pre-deposit of penalty but was directed to deposit full amount of penalty within thirty days in default of which, the appeal stood dismissed. The appellant filed writ petition in Delhi High Court. The same was dismissed because of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The issue before the apex Court was the maintainability of the writ petition against appellate tribunal’s order having regard to Section 35 of the FEMA. It was held as follows. When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. In this case the High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should not be abdicated and given a go-by by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. In this case the High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should not be abdicated and given a go-by by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating this aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. ... ... No reason could be assigned by the appellant's counsel to demonstrate why the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 35 of FEMA does not provide an efficacious remedy. In fact there could hardly be any reason since the High Court itself is the appellate forum. (emphasis supplied) 16. Om Prakash Saini v DCM Limited (2010) 11 SCC 622 : AIR 2010 SC 2608 is a case which arose under the Consumer Protection Act. The appellant, a retired Railway employee, invested certain amount in fully secured redeemable non-convertible debentures due for payment on 14.08.1998. He was informed that due to financial difficulties, it will not be possible to pay the amount of maturity as scheduled. A revised payment scheme was informed but amounts were not paid. A complaint was moved before the Delhi State Commission. The State Commission directed DCM to pay maturity amount in terms of the contract along with interest, who was challenged before the National Commission. However, after withdrawing the appeal, DCM approached the High Court under Article 227 and a learned single Judge allowed it ex parte. The application to recall the order was dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the order was challenged inter alia on the ground that there is jurisdictional error in entertaining the petition under Article 227 ignoring the alternative remedy already availed, and that there was no extraordinary reasons for entertaining the petition. Noticing the scheme of the Act, the Supreme Court faulted the High Court for entertaining the petition under Article 227 ignoring the effective alternative remedy. The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted directing the High Court to take note that the respondent had an effective alternative remedy against the order of the State Commission, and that it had availed the remedy of appeal. The following are the relevant observations. The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted directing the High Court to take note that the respondent had an effective alternative remedy against the order of the State Commission, and that it had availed the remedy of appeal. The following are the relevant observations. Admittedly, Respondent 1 had availed the alternative remedy available to it under Section 21 by filing an appeal against the order of the State Commission. During the pendency of the appeal, Respondent 1 chose to challenge the order of the State Commission by filing a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, which was entertained by the learned Single Judge on the basis of the assurance given by the learned counsel that the appeal filed before the National Commission will be withdrawn. The order passed by the learned Single Judge on 21-3-2007 or the one by which the petition filed by Respondent 1 was finally disposed of does not contain any indication as to why the learned Single Judge thought it proper to make a departure from the rule that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person. ... ... In our view, during the pendency of the appeal filed by Respondent 1 under Section 21 of the 1986 Act, the learned Single Judge was not at all justified in entertaining the petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution merely because he thought that the State Commission did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in view of the scheme sanctioned by the Company Judge under Section 391 read with Sections 392 and 394 of the Companies Act. 17. The petitioner in the first instance availed the alternative remedy of appeal under Section 23. They also filed revision under Section 21(b) of the Act against the order of the State Commission in FA. The counsel submits that when the orders of statutory authority or tribunal are vitiated by an error apparent on the face of record, the writ petition is not barred. We are afraid the submission is misconceived. 18. It is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. We are afraid the submission is misconceived. 18. It is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. If the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or some times in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is on expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of Certiorari. Every error of law is not a ground to issue a writ. It is only such an error which is apparent on the face of record that can be corrected by a writ jurisdiction. If an elaborate argument to discover an error is required, it is certainly cannot be an error apparent on the face of record and a writ Court cannot entertain a petition ignoring an effective alternative remedy (Syed Yakoob v Radhakrishnan AIR 1964 SC 477 ). It is a misconceived notion that an error of law or an error apparent on the face of record cannot be corrected by an appellate Court. There is also no hard and fast rule that all the errors apparent on the face of record can be corrected only in judicial review. The power of appellate Court is wider and broader. The judicial review is more concerned with the decision making process than the merits of the decision. The appellate Court, on the contrary, can deal with all errors in the finding of facts, the finding applicable principle of law and application of the principles to the facts. The appellate authority or court can reconsider the lis and correct all errors committed within the jurisdiction and/ or outside the jurisdiction. 19. As distinguished from original jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction is exercised to review judgment of lower Court. The source of appellate jurisdiction, however, is always statutory and no person, who has a remedy in original jurisdiction, can claim right of appeal as a matter of course. The appeal, therefore, is a proceeding which is brought before competent appellate authority and ordinarily in continuation of original proceedings. The source of appellate jurisdiction, however, is always statutory and no person, who has a remedy in original jurisdiction, can claim right of appeal as a matter of course. The appeal, therefore, is a proceeding which is brought before competent appellate authority and ordinarily in continuation of original proceedings. Subject to certain statutory limitations, appellate authority has a duty to review and appreciate entire record before upholding or reversing original authority (see Sections 1 to 7, Volume 2, American Jurisprudence - 'Appeal and error', pp.843, 848). In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition Volume 3A, p.281), "appeal" is explained as under. An "appeal" is a process of civil law origin and removes a cause entirely, subjecting the fact as well as the law to a review and retrial, and is, in fact, the granting of a new trial on the same issue in a higher court. ... ... ... ... Generally, a 'hearing de novo" means a new hearing or a hearing for the second time, contemplating an entire trial in same manner in which matter was originally heard and a review of previous hearing, differing from ordinary appeal wherein proceedings in lower court are reviewed and their validity determined by the reviewing court. ... ... ... ... since on hearing "de novo" court hears matter as court of original and not appellate jurisdiction wherein determination binds parties and nullifies former determination. (emphasis supplied) 20. In Evans v Bartlam (1937) AC 473 (HL), a question arose as to whether an appellate Court should not interfere with exercise of judicial discretion by the Court exercising original jurisdiction. The House of Lords ruled. Appellate jurisdiction is always statutory: there is in the statute no restriction upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal: and while the appellate Court in the exercise of its appellate power is no doubt entirely justified in saying that normally it will not interfere with the exercise of the judge's discretion except on grounds of law, yet if it sees that on other grounds the decision will result in injustice being done it has both the power and the duty to remedy it. (emphasis supplied) 21. (emphasis supplied) 21. In Lachmeshwar v Keshwar Lal AIR 1941 FC 5, it was held that, “on the theory of an appeal being in the nature of a re-hearing that the Courts in this country have in numerous cases recognized that in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the Court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against”. This view was affirmed in M.M.Quasim v Manohar Lal Sharma (1981) 3 SCC 36 = AIR 1981 SC 1113 . In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v Rangaswamy Chettiar (1980) 4 SCC 259 : AIR 1980 SC 1253, apex Court explained distinction between 'appeal' and 'revision' in the following manner. "Appeal" and "revision" are expressions of common usage in Indian statute and the distinction between "appellate jurisdiction" and "revisional jurisdiction" is well known though not well defined. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has been done in the case of second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, and under some Rent Acts in some States. Ordinarily, again, revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may sometimes be exercised even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction. The conferment of revisional jurisdiction is generally for the purpose of keeping tribunals subordinate to the revising Tribunal within the bounds of their authority to make them act according to law, according to the procedure established by law and according to well defined principles of justice. Revisional jurisdiction as ordinarily understood with reference to our statutes is always included in appellate jurisdiction but not vice versa. (emphasis supplied) 22. In Lachhman Dass v Santokh Singh (1995) 4 SCC 201 , the apex Court observed as under. This Court in the case of Hari Shankar v Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 198,had an occasion to consider the question of distinction between an appeal and a revision and Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed at p. 939 of the report as follows: (SCR p.939) "The distinction between an appeal and revision is a real one. A right of appeal carries with it a right of rehearing on law as well as fact, unless the statute conferring the right to appeal limits the rehearing in some way as, we find, has been done in second appeals arising under the Code of Civil Procedure. The power to hear a revision is generally given to a superior court so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided according to law." In the case of State of Kerala v K.M.Charia Abdullah & Co., AIR 1965 SC 1585 , this Court expressed the view that when the Legislature confers a right to appeal in one case and a discretionary remedy of revision in another, it may be deemed to have created two jurisdictions different in scope and content. Again in the case of Neta Ram v Jiwan Lal, AIR 1963 SC 499 , Hidayatullah,J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court do not include the power to reverse concurrent findings, without showing how those findings are erroneous. 23. Therefore, we are not able to accept the submission of the counsel for the petitioners. The other plea that so as to lay down the law and clarify inconsistency in precedents, the judicial review power can be exercised is a misconception. The High Court, as recognised by Article 214, is a Court of record as ordained by Article 215. The decisions of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh are therefore binding on all the Courts, Tribunals and other authorities subordinate to it or over whom it exercises supervisory jurisdiction. The law laid down by this Court is also binding on the authorities in the State of Andhra Pradesh alone. It may have persuasive value but it is not binding on the Courts, Tribunals and other authorities in other States. Conversely, the same is the case insofar as the law decided by various Courts in the State of Andhra Pradesh though they may have persuasive value. 24. In that view of the matter, on the question whether the insurer should be made a party to a claim arising out of fatal or non-fatal accidents, before the Commissioner, different High Courts may have taken different views. The law decided by this Court on this question would alone be binding on the authorities. 24. In that view of the matter, on the question whether the insurer should be made a party to a claim arising out of fatal or non-fatal accidents, before the Commissioner, different High Courts may have taken different views. The law decided by this Court on this question would alone be binding on the authorities. Merely because the view taken by this Court is at variance with the view taken by High Courts, the same cannot be a ground for ignoring the alternative remedy. Further, it is well accepted limitation on the exercise of certiorari power that, “if a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari” (Syed Yacoob). Therefore, we are convinced that there are no extraordinary reasons to entertain these writ petitions. Prima facie, the State Commission appears to have considered not only the question of jurisdiction but other issues as well. The petitioners’ remedy is to approach the National Commission by way of appeals as was done earlier. In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary to go into other points that may fall for consideration. 25. These writ petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs.