Judgment :- 1. The Criminal Appeal arises out of the judgment of acquittal, dated 30.04.2002, made in Spl. C.C.No.5 of 1984, on the file of the learned Special Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuddalore, whereby the accused was acquitted of the offences under Sections 120B IPC and 5(2) r/w 5(1)(e) of P.C. Act and 420 IPC and 5 (2) r/w 5(1)(e) and 5(3A) of P.C. Act and 5(2) r/w 5(1)(e) of P.C. Act and 420 & 109(12 counts) IPC and 5(3A) of P.C. Act and 420 IPC and 116 (5 counts) IPC. 2. The appellant herein has filed a charge sheet stating that A2/Respondent/Dr.Ramalingam was working as a Medical Officer at Nallur Primary Health Centre as a public servant and A1 was working as Medical Officer at Mangalampettai Primary Health Centre as a public servant and the accused 3, 4, 17 were working as workers in Dasal Stores Ware pipes and the accused 5 to 7 and 18 to 20 were working in Tannel Ceramics, Virudhachalam and A8 to A16 and A21 and A22 were working in Tannel Art Battery, Virudhachalam and these two Companies come under Tamil Nadu Ceramics Limited and A1 and A2 between November 1977 and January 1978 were conspiring together with the Approvers N.V.Devanathan and B.Ramasamy, abused their positions and issued medical prescriptions to A3 to A22 and their family members to obtain unlawful pecuniary gain as if that the Approvers had sold the medicines and prepared vouchers and the accused 3 to 22 had got the reimbursement amount and thereby committed the offences punishable under Sections 120B IPC and 5(2) r/w 5(1)(e) of P.C. Act and 420 IPC. 3. On the basis of the evidence let in by the prosecution, the case is as follows: (i) P.W.1-Krishnamoorthy, who was working in Krishna Pharmacy at Kurinjipadi under one Devanathan, who was the owner of the shop, deposed that he had issued medical bills without parting the money and medicines after receipt of 10% commission as per the instruction of his owner viz., Mr.N.V.Devanathan. On the basis of the prescriptions given by A2/the respondent herein (i.e.) Ex.P2, likewise, he had issued receipts for Manimozhi, Thulukambi, Anjalai, Suppurayan and for several persons and the bills were marked as Exs.P2 to P47. (ii) P.W.2-Rajamanickam, who was working as Pharmacist in Mangalampettai Primary Health Centre, deposed about the availability of medicines and the Medicines Stock Register was marked as Ex.P48. (ii) P.W.2-Rajamanickam, who was working as Pharmacist in Mangalampettai Primary Health Centre, deposed about the availability of medicines and the Medicines Stock Register was marked as Ex.P48. (iii) P.W.3-Ramasamy would depose that he is running Deivanai Medical Shop in the name of his wife at Vadalur and the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Inspector received the bill book, Stock register upto 31.03.1978 and further deposed that on the basis of the prescriptions given by A2/respondent herein without parting money and medicines after receipt of 10% of bill amount as commission, he issued medical bills from 30.11.1977 to January 1978 and those medical bills and prescriptions were marked as Exs.P49 to P206. The medicines purchase bills and the related file were marked as Exs.P207 to P212. (iv) P.W.4-Shunmugasundaram, who was working as Pharmacist in Nallur Primary Health Centre, deposed that during the investigation, he handed over Ex.P214-Medicines Stock Register and the Entries under Exs.P215 to P221 to the Officers of V and AC. (v) P.W.5-Dr.Vishwakedhu deposed that A2/Ramalingam prescribed two medicines in excess dosage and the component of the medicines are one and the same, but that has been manufactured by different Companies and through him Exs.P222 to P259Prescriptions were marked. (vi) P.W.6-Navaneethan, who is the Pharmacist in Cuddalore Government Hospital, deposed that he inspected the documents relating to Deivanai Medical shop as well as Krishna Medical shop for the purchase and sale of medicines between the period 10.11.1977 and 31.03.1978 and purchase bills of Krishna Medical Shop was marked as Ex.P260 and Stock Register was marked as Ex.P261 and the sale bills, counter foils were marked as Exs.P262 to P273. (vii) P.W.7-A.M.K.Samy, who is the General Manager of the Head Office of Tamil Nadu Ceramic Industry, deposed that 700 to 800 employees are working in the Tamil Nadu Ceramic Industry at Virudhachalam and they are entitled all the benefits as par with the Government Servants and they are also entitled medical reimbursement facility. (viii) P.W.8-Ananthanarayanan, who is the Time Keeper-1 of Vadalur Ceramic Industry Unit, deposed that they are enjoying the benefits of medical reimbursement as par with the Government servants after obtaining certificates from the Competent Doctor. He further deposed that since the workers are not having sufficient educational qualification, he used to fill up their medical leave applications and other relevant forms. He further deposed that since the workers are not having sufficient educational qualification, he used to fill up their medical leave applications and other relevant forms. Accordingly, he filled up the Form given by one Kittu and as per Ex.P240, he filled up the Form given by one Ramachandran and the nature of disease was filled up by A2/Ramalingam. P.W.9-Kubendran was also working as one of the time keepers along with P.W.8. P.W.10-Gokuldas deposed that he filled up the medical reimbursement form for one Kaliaperumal and his essentiality certificate was filled up by the Doctor. (ix) P.W.11-Menon, who was working as General Manager of Tamil Nadu Ceramic Industry, Virudhachalam, deposed that in December 1977, the medical reimbursement has been suddenlyincreased comparing with the other months and hence, he gave Ex.P274-Complaint before the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department. (x) P.W.12-Dr.Muthuperumal deposed that when he was working as District Health Officer of Cuddalore, the Nallur and Mangalampettai Primary Health Centres were under his jurisdiction, at the time A2 was working as Medical Officer and A2 has every right to practice as Medical Officer independently and he can practice at the outside of his jurisdiction after obtaining permission from his higher officials. He further deposed that Virudhachalam is beyond his jurisdiction. But A2 had not obtained any permission to practice at Virudhachalam. Then he also identified the signatures and writings of A2 (i.e.) Exs.P49, P50 and P53 and Medical Certificate under Ex.P275. (xi) P.W.13-Samikalai, who was working as Assistant Section Officer at various Health Centres, deposed that he was working under the Head of the Officer-JagmohanSingh Khan, who is a competent authority to appoint or dismiss A2 and P.W.13 is well acquaintance with the signature of JagmohanSingh Khan and the document under Ex.P348 contains the signature of JagmohanSingh Khan. (xii) P.W.14-Jagadeesan deposed that from 1977 to 1981, he was working as Inspector in Vigilance and Anti-corruption Department, Cuddalore and after receipt of letter from P.W.11-Menon, he registered a case in Cr.No.8/AC/1978 under Sections 120B, 409, 467 and 471 IPC and 5(2) r/w 5(1)(c)(e) of P.C. Act, 1947 and prepared a printed F.I.R. under Ex.P349. Then he took up the matter for investigation and examined the witnesses and recorded their statements and seized the documents and also gave Ex.P350-requisition to record Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements of the accused. Then he took up the matter for investigation and examined the witnesses and recorded their statements and seized the documents and also gave Ex.P350-requisition to record Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements of the accused. Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement of Approver P.W.3-Ramasamy has been recorded under Ex.P213 and Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement of Approver Devanathan has been recorded under Ex.P351. Exs.P352 and P353 are requisitions given to the concerned Magistrate for giving tender of pardon to the accused Devanathan & P.W.3 and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after following the procedure pardoned them. Then P.W.14 examined the other witnesses and concluded his investigation and filed a charge sheet against the accused under Sections 120B, 116, 420, 467, 471 r/w 511 and Sections 5(2) r/w 5(1)(c) and 5(3A) of P.C. Act and 109 IPC. 4. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after following the procedure framed necessary charges. A2 pleaded not guilty. After completion of the prosecution evidence, the Special Court placed the incriminating evidence (i.e.) P.W.1 to P.W.15, Exs.P1 to P359 against the accused. On the side of the defence, the accused marked Exs.D1 and D2. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after considering the oral and documentary evidence, acquitted A2 stating that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, against which, the State preferred an appeal. 5. Challenging the judgment of acquittal, Mr.R.Prathap Kumar, the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) filed written arguments and submitted that the Special Court acquitted A2 stating that there is no direct evidence for conspiracy between the employees of TACEL, shop owners and the Medical Officer/A2. He further submitted that the witnesses P.W.2 and P.W.4 have deposed about the availability of storing medicines in the hospital and that factum has not been considered. As per the evidence of P.W.5, the medicines prescribed were in excess and some of the medicines were having same component and that factum has not been considered by the Special Court. It is further submitted that conspiracy can be inferred by the circumstantial evidence. The evidence of P.W.3 has proved that the accused had agreed to give essentiality certificates for drugs mentioned in the prescriptions, if the bills for the drugs were obtained from the medical shops and an amount of 10% commission for the net amount will be paid and on receipt of 10% commission from them, he issued the bills. The evidence of P.W.3 has proved that the accused had agreed to give essentiality certificates for drugs mentioned in the prescriptions, if the bills for the drugs were obtained from the medical shops and an amount of 10% commission for the net amount will be paid and on receipt of 10% commission from them, he issued the bills. It is further submitted that without obtaining due permission, A2/respondent practicing outside his jurisdiction and prescribed medicines, which are available in the hospital and also prescribed four or five times for a single patient the same medicine of different companies and that factum has clearly proved the conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. He further submitted that the prescribed medicines available in the hospital are deposed by P.W.2 and P.W.4 and Stock Registers. He further submitted that P.W.5 is a qualified Assistant Professor of Medicine in Tanjore Medical College and he deposed that the medicines prescribed by A2 in the prescriptions are same component manufacturing in different Companies. He further submitted that P.W.7 and P.W.11 stated that the employees have obtained medical reimbursement from the TACEL on the basis of the prescriptions issued by A2, who received commission from the employees and issued certificates, which caused loss to the TACEL. Hence, he prayed for setting aside the judgment of acquittal and prayed for conviction. To substantiate his arguments, he relied upon the following decisions: (i) 1993 Cri.L.J.558 (M.Srinivasulu Reddy v. State Inspector of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Nellore Range, Nellore) (ii) AIR 1962 SC 1821 (R.K.Dalmia and others v. The Delhi Administration) (iii) 1978 Cri.L.J.189(1) (Yash pal Mital v. The State of Punjab) (iv) 1988 SCC (Cri) 711 (Kehar Singh and others v. State (Delhi Administration) (v) 2007 AIR SC 3106 (Girja Prasad (dead) by Lrs. v. State of M.P.) 6. Resisting the same, Mrs.Vedavallikumar, learned counsel appearing for A2/respondent submitted that there is no iota of evidence to show that A2 received 10% commission or illegal gratification by the employees. Only P.W.3 alone received 10% commission. There is no nexus for Section 120B r/w Section 5(1)(e) of P.C. Act r/w 420 IPC. She further submitted that the evidence of P.W.3 and P.W.5 is vague and not specific as to who came and approach the medical shop owners and told him that A2 had agreed to give essentiality certificates for drugs mentioned in their prescriptions. There is no nexus for Section 120B r/w Section 5(1)(e) of P.C. Act r/w 420 IPC. She further submitted that the evidence of P.W.3 and P.W.5 is vague and not specific as to who came and approach the medical shop owners and told him that A2 had agreed to give essentiality certificates for drugs mentioned in their prescriptions. P.W.3 has fairly conceded that the respondent herein never approached him at any point of time. P.W.1 also deposed that as per the instructions of his employer, who died during the pendency of the case, he issued false bills actually without selling the medicines. So the conspiracy has not been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that even though P.W.2 and P.W.4, who are the pharmacists from the Primary Health Centres at Nallur and Mangalampettai, were examined, they have not pin pointed the medicines which are prescribed by the Doctors available in the hospital. P.W.5 has not seen the patients. Without examining the patients, it is not possible for a Doctor to depose before the Court that the medicines prescribed by the respondent is excessive. Without going through the medical history of the patients, P.W.5 cannot depose that based on the prescriptions that the combination of the medicines would cause serious effect. There is no documentary proof to show that the employees had obtained medical reimbursement from TACEL. Since A3 to A22, who are employees of TACEL admitted the offence and paid the fine, it cannot be a basis to convict A2 for the charge framed against him. There is no material to show or no witness spoke that the A2/respondent had received commission for issuing prescriptions. She further submitted that an Assistant Section Officer in Health and Public Welfare Department, Secretariat alone has been examined and the sanctioning authority was not examined before the Court. Since the case has been ended in acquittal, the burden is heavily upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. Since it is a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse and erroneous, it is not called for any interference. She also relied upon the decisions and submits that if two views are possible, the view favouring the accused alone has to be taken into consideration. Hence, she prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 7. Since it is a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse and erroneous, it is not called for any interference. She also relied upon the decisions and submits that if two views are possible, the view favouring the accused alone has to be taken into consideration. Hence, she prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 7. Considered the rival submissions made on both sides and the materials available on record. 8. The respondent/A2 is a Medical Practitioner and working as Medical Officer at Nallur Primary Health Centre. The case of the prosecution is that A2 misused and abused his power as Medical Officer, even though medicines are available at Primary Health Centre, he prescribed medicines in excess dosage one and the same component medicines manufactured in different Companies enabling the employees A3 to A22, who were working in Tamil Nadu Ceramics Limited, to get medical reimbursement without purchasing the medicines, but the case was ended in acquittal. Since A1, A3 and A22 were died, the charges levelled against them are abated. 9. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the following decision relied upon by the learned Government Advocate (crl. Side) reported in AIR 2007 SC 3106 (Girja Prasad (dead) by Lrs. v. State of M.P.) and submitted that an appeal against acquittal is also an appeal under the Code and an appellate Court has every power to re-appreciate, review and reconsider the evidence as whole before it. In para-27, it is held as follows: "27. Regarding setting aside acquittal by the High Court, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Kunju Muhammed v. State of Kerala, (2004) 9 SCC 193 : JT (2003) 7 SC 114, KashiRam v. State of M.P., (2002) 1 SCC 71 : JT (2001) 8 SC 650 and Meena v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 5 SCC 21 : JT 2000 (4) SC 521. In our opinion, the law is well settled. An appeal against acquittal is also an appeal under the Code and an Appellate Court has every power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence as a whole before it. It is, no doubt, true that there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and that presumption is reinforced by an order of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. But that is not the end of the matter. It is, no doubt, true that there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and that presumption is reinforced by an order of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. But that is not the end of the matter. It is for the Appellate Court to keep in view the relevant principles of law, to reappreciate and reweigh the evidence as a whole and to come to its own conclusion on such evidence in consonance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence." 10. Learned counsel for A2/respondent herein would take me through various judgments and submitted that while challenging the judgment of acquittal, under what circumstance, the appellate Court can interfere with the judgment of acquittal. (i) AIR 1981 SC 113 (Sirajudeen v. State of Karnataka) and submitted that if the view of the evidence taken by the trial Court is reasonably possible, the High Court in appeal from acquittal should not, as a rule of prudence, disturb the acquittal. (ii) In (1983) 2 SCC 21 (Babu and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh), it was held that if the trial Court's order of acquittal is based on plausible reasons, the High Court not justified in reversing it merely because another view is possible. (iii) In 2009 (15) SCC 200 (State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede), it was held that where it is possible to have two views, one in favour of the prosecution and the other in favour of accused, the view in favour of the accused would prevail. (iv) In AIR 1976 SC 832 (Dharamdeo Singh and others v. The State of Bihar), it was held that in an appeal against an order of acquittal, if two conclusions can be based upon the evidence on record, the High Court should not disturb the findings of the acquittal recorded by the trial Court. It follows as a corollary from that if the view taken by the trial Court in acquitting the accused is not unreasonable, the occasion for reversal of that view would not arise. (v) In AIR 1979 SC 1782 (Dhan Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi), it was held that if two views of the evidence are reasonably possible, one favouring acquittal and the other conviction, the High Court should not reverse the order of acquittal. (v) In AIR 1979 SC 1782 (Dhan Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi), it was held that if two views of the evidence are reasonably possible, one favouring acquittal and the other conviction, the High Court should not reverse the order of acquittal. Considering the above decisions and the dictum of the principles laid down by the Apex Court, this Court perused the materials and contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant. 11. Now this Court has to decide that whether the respondent herein gave false prescriptions or essentiality certificates to A3 to A22 for availing medical reimbursement benefits?. But admittedly, P.W.1 and P.W.3 were examined to prove that they issued medical bills without parted with medicines, after receipt of 10% value of the medical bills as commission. But Admittedly Devanathan, who was turned as Approver, died. There is no evidence to show that A2/respondent herein has given instructions to P.W.1 to P.W.3 to issue medical bills without selling the medicines, after receipt of 10% commission by theemployees. Exs.P2, P4, P6, P10, P12, P14, P16, P18, P20, P22, P24, P42, P44, P50, P52, P54, P56, P58, P60, P62, P64, P68, P70, P72, P80, P82, P84, P93, P95, P99 P103, P107, P109, P128, P130, P132, P134, P136, P142, P144, P151, P153, P155, P159, P161, P200 and P222 to P259 are the prescriptions alleged to be given by A2/respondent on the basis of the medical bills issued by P.W.1 and P.W.3. 12. P.W.1 stated in his chief-examination that N.V.Devanathan, who was the Owner of Krishna Medical Shop, told him that he can get 10% commission by issuing medical bills to the employees of TACEL without parted with medicines. But he never stated that 10% commission has been given to A2/respondent. In his cross-examination, he fairly stated that either his Owner Devanathan or himself issued bills. He further stated that in Ex.P47-Ledger, each and every date, sale has been shown and it contains the amount mentioned in the bill issued to the purchasers that too to the accused 3 and 4. He further stated that whenever he prepared a bill, a carbon copy has been maintained by him and they have to assess sales tax. He further stated that in Ex.P47-Ledger, each and every date, sale has been shown and it contains the amount mentioned in the bill issued to the purchasers that too to the accused 3 and 4. He further stated that whenever he prepared a bill, a carbon copy has been maintained by him and they have to assess sales tax. In such circumstances, the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.3 has not been proved that the A2/respondent has directed them to issue medical bills without giving medicines and receiving the amount for the same and with a direction to receive only 10% commission. But they never stated that 10% commission has been paid to the accused. P.W.3 also not deposed that they have paid 10% commission amount to A2. In such circumstances, I am of the view, the prosecution has not proved that on the instructions given by A2/respondent, P.W.1 and P.W.3 issued bills without giving medicines after receipt of 10% commission. Furthermore, A2 and A4 who are the Pharmacists, through them, the documents under Exs.P48 and P214 have been marked, but there is no evidence to show the date of issuance of prescriptions and the medicines prescribed are available in the stock register under Exs.P48 and P214. 13. P.W.5-Dr.Viswakedhu's evidence is not reliable, because without seeing the patients and without verifying the medical history of the patients, he simply deposed that the medicines prescribed by the Doctor are excess in dosage and the medicines are replica and the components are one and the same and made by two different Companies. In such circumstances, I am of the view, the evidence of P.W.5 is not reliable. 14. The Stock Register has been marked through P.W.6, who was working as Pharmacist, but there is no evidence to show that on the date of prescription, the medicines mentioned in the prescriptions are available in the Primary Health Centre. In his cross-examination, he fairly conceded that the Stock of medicines between 30.11.1977 and 31.12.1977 will be known only on 31.03.1978, so he is not in a position to depose that what are the medicines available in the Hospital in between 30.11.1977 and 30.12.1977. He further stated that he is unable to depose the medicines mentioned in the medical bills under Exs.P51 to P160 whether they are sold or not. He further stated that he is unable to depose the medicines mentioned in the medical bills under Exs.P51 to P160 whether they are sold or not. He further stated that he is not in a position to depose that whether the medicines are available in between 30.11.1977 to 3.1.1978 in the medical shops. So his evidence is not sufficient to hold that the medicines are available at the Primary Health Centre. It is true that A4 to A21 were convicted on the basis that they pleaded guilty. Merely because they are pleaded guilty, it will not fasten the criminal liability against A2/respondent. 15. P.W.11, who was working as Managing Director of TACEL, deposed that during the relevant period (i.e.) in December 1977, the medical reimbursement amount has been disproportionately high and hence, he gave Ex.P274-complaint to the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department. But to prove the same, no document has been filed regarding the relevant period that the medical reimbursement amount has been suddenly increased to 1500%. Without the document, it is not possible that the medical reimbursement has been increased. 16. Now this Court has to consider whether the prosecution has proved the conspiracy between the accused? At this juncture, the learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) relied upon the following decisions and submitted that conspiracy can be inferred from the circumstances giving rise to a conclusion or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit the offence. He further submitted that it is not necessary that each member of a conspiracy must know each other or all the details of the conspiracy. (i) 1993 Cri.L.J.558 (M.Srinivasulu Reddy v. State Inspector of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Nellore Range, Nellore), in which, it is held as follows: "It is true that in most cases it will be difficult to get direct evidence of an agreement of minds to conspire but a conspiracy can be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. " (ii) AIR 1962 SC 1821 (R.K.Dalmia and others v. The Delhi Administration) in para-317, it is held as follows: "317.Gurha, among the accused, must have been chosen for the purpose of the conspiracy because he had connection both with the Union Agencies and with Asia Udyog Ltd. He had been in the employ of a Dalmia concern from long before. He was the Accountant of the Dalmia Cement and Paper Marketing Company from 1948 till its liquidation in 1953. Gurha, as Director of the Union Agencies, knew that it had suffered losses as a result of share-speculation business in 1954-55 and that the Delhi Office was short of liquid funds to meet those losses. He must have known how the funds to meet the losses were being secured from the funds of the Insurance Company through Bhagwati Trading Company. He must have also known that this was wrong. It is only with such knowledge that he could have been a party to the making of false advices and vouchers. There could be no other reason. It could not have been possible for the prosecution to lead direct evidence about Gurha's knowledge with respect to the full working of the scheme to provide for the losses of the Union Agencies from the funds of the Insurance Company. It is further not necessary that each member of a conspiracy must know all the details of the conspiracy." (emphasis added) (iii) 1978 Cri.L.J.189(1) (Yash pal Mital v. The State of Punjab), in which, it is held as follows: "The offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A is a distinct offence. The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient of the offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co-participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and there may be division of performances in the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end of which every collaborator must be aware and in which each one of them must be interested. There must be unity of object or purpose but there may foe plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another; amongst the conspirators. There must be unity of object or purpose but there may foe plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another; amongst the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences may be committed by some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only relevant fact is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported to be in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though there may be sometimes misfire or over-shooting by some of the conspirators. Even if some steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the knowledge of the others it will not affect the culpability of those others when they are associated with the object of the conspiracy. " (iv) In 1988 SCC (Cri.) 711 (Kehar Singh and others v. State (Delhi Administration) and submitted that generally, a conspiracy is hatched and it may be difficult to adduce direct evidence of the same. The offence of conspiracy requires some kind of physical manifestation of agreement. The express agreement, however, need not be proved. Nor actual meeting of two persons is necessary. Nor is it necessary to prove the actual words of communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design may be sufficient. Considering the above decisions, even though fifteen witnesses were examined, there is no evidence or circumstance to infer there was a conspiracy between A2/respondent herein ad other accused for committing such offence. Furthermore, the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.3 were examined, but they have not deposed about the conspiracy. As per the above decisions, it is not necessary that each member of the conspiracy must know each other and all the details of the conspiracy and the conspiracy can be inferred from the circumstances giving rise to the conclusion or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit the offence. But no one deposed that on the basis of the conspiracy, A2/respondent issued prescriptions and essentiality certificates and on that basis, P.W.1 and P.W.3 issued the medical bills without giving medicines after receipt of 10% commission. P.W.11/Complainant has not deposed about that they had reimbursed the medical expenses only on the basis of the essentiality certificates issued by A2/respondent herein. But no one deposed that on the basis of the conspiracy, A2/respondent issued prescriptions and essentiality certificates and on that basis, P.W.1 and P.W.3 issued the medical bills without giving medicines after receipt of 10% commission. P.W.11/Complainant has not deposed about that they had reimbursed the medical expenses only on the basis of the essentiality certificates issued by A2/respondent herein. It is a settled principle that the prosecution cannot take advantage of weakness of defence and cannot take advantage of the inconsistent stand taken by the accused from time to time. The prosecution must stand on its own legs basing on the evidence that has been let in by it. But here, the prosecution has miserably failed to do the same and that factum has been considered by the learned Special Judge. 17. Now this Court has to consider whether A2/respondent is guilty of the offence under Section 420 IPC. It is appropriate to consider the ingredients of Section 420 IPC, which are as follows: Ingredients: (1)Accused cheated the complainant. (2)Accused did so dishonestly. (3)Thereby induced the complainant: (i) to deliver some property to accused or to some other person. (ii) to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of the valuable security or anything which was signed, sealed, and which was capable of being converted into valuable security. But admittedly, there is no iota of evidence to show that A2/respondent cheated P.W.11/complainant dishonestly to reimburse the medical expenses to the employees of TACEL. In such circumstances, I am of the view, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove A2 is guilty of the offence under Section 420 IPC and the Special Court is correct in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the same. Hence, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the findings of the Special Court in respect of an offence under Section 420 IPC. 18. Sanction: The learned counsel for A2/respondent would submit that the sanctioning authority was not examined before the Court to prove that the sanction was accorded by the competent authority after applying his mind and no reason has also been assigned. But already this Court has held that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of A2/respondent beyond reasonable doubt. 18. Sanction: The learned counsel for A2/respondent would submit that the sanctioning authority was not examined before the Court to prove that the sanction was accorded by the competent authority after applying his mind and no reason has also been assigned. But already this Court has held that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of A2/respondent beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, I do not want to give any opinion in respect of non-application of mind by the competent authority, while according sanction, since sanctioning authority was not examined before the Special Court. 19. Considering the above decisions, as already discussed above, the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Special Judge considered the same in a proper perspective and came to the correct conclusion and acquitted the accused. Hence, the judgment of acquittal does not suffer any illegality or infirmity and therefore, it is hereby confirmed. 20. In fine, The Criminal Appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment of acquittal dated 30.04.2002 made in Spl. C.C.No.5 of 1984 on the file of the learned Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuddalore. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.