Judgment : The petitioners, whose eviction from the petition schedule property, was ordered by the learned I Additional Rent Controller-cum-XIII Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad (for short “the Rent Controller”), by order dated 26-7-2010 in R.C.No.43/2007, which was confirmed by Judgment dated 21-11-2011 in R.A.No.296/2010 by the learned Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, filed this Civil Revision Petition under Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act 1960 (for short "the Act"). 2. The respondent, who filed the eviction petition, pleaded that she is the absolute and exclusive owner of portions of the petition schedule property bearing municipal No.5-9-88 and 5-9-101/3, admeasuring 127 sq. yards out of 218.66 sq. yards, situated at Public Garden Road, Nampally, Hyderabad, having purchased the same under registered sale deed dated 20-2-2004 from one Mohd. Mehdi Hussain Khan, who was the original owner of the same and that the first floor portion of the petition schedule property was purchased by her husband Nawab Behboob Ali Khan under registered sale deed dated 8-5-2003 from the same owner. That at the time of purchase of the properties, the possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule property was in occupation of the petitioners as tenants on a monthly rent of Rs.3500/-; that the factum of purchase of the properties was intimated to the petitioners with a request to pay rents to the respondent from 1-3-2004 and that the vendor has attorned the tenancy in favour of the respondent and authorized her to receive rent from 1-3-2004 as the absolute owner of the property. Even though the respondent has demanded rent from 1-3-2004 onwards, the petitioners failed to pay the same and committed default in payment of the rent. The respondent also pleaded that apart from the petitioners committing willful default, she requires the petition schedule property for her personal occupation; that she has terminated the tenancy with effect from 30-11-2006 by issuing legal notice dated 6-11-2006 and that the vendor of the respondent sent notice on 10-11-2006 to the petitioners wherein he has stated that he sold the petition schedule property to the respondent under registered sale deed dated 20-2-2004 and directed the petitioners to pay rent to the respondent. It was further averred that the petitioners sent a belated reply on 28-11-2006 with false allegations and had set up false claim of title in respect of one part of the petition schedule property i.e., 5-9-88, without disclosing the source of title by taking a vague stand that the same was purchased by them in the years 1982 and 1984; that the petitioners have disowned the other part of the petition schedule property bearing municipal door No.5-9-101/3 and that therefore the plea of the petitioners amounts to denial of title of the respondent over the petition schedule property. 3. The petitioners filed a counter-affidavit, the substance of which, is as under: 4. That the respondent, in collusion with her vendor, filed the eviction petition with a mala fide intention to grab the property; that the petitioners are the owners and possessors of house bearing No.5-9-88 (part), measuring 131.06 sq. yards and that from the years 1982 and 1984, they have been enjoying the same with full rights; that the petitioners have nothing to do with the property bearing municipal door No.5-9-101/3 and they are concerned only with house bearing municipal No.5-9-88, which was purchased by them about 25 years back; that there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenants between the parties and that the petitioners have already sent a suitable reply to the respondent and hence the question of payment of rent does not arise. 5. Having regard to the respective pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller framed the following points: 1. Whether there is jural relationship between the petitioner and the respondents ? 2. Whether the denial of the title of the petitioner by the respondents is bonafide or malafide ? 3. Whether the respondents have committed willful default in payment of rent from 1-3-2003 as alleged by the petitioner ? 4. Whether the petitioner requires the schedule premises for her personal occupation as additional accommodation ? 5. To what relief ? 6. On behalf of the respondent, she has examined PW-1 and PW-2 and marked Exs.P-1 to P-10. On the petitioners’ side, RW-1 and RW-2 were examined and Ex.R-1 was marked. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Rent Controller held all the Points in favour of the respondent. 5. To what relief ? 6. On behalf of the respondent, she has examined PW-1 and PW-2 and marked Exs.P-1 to P-10. On the petitioners’ side, RW-1 and RW-2 were examined and Ex.R-1 was marked. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Rent Controller held all the Points in favour of the respondent. She has held under Point No.1 that Exs.P-1 and P-2 and the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 have clinchingly established that the properties in question were purchased by the respondent and her husband under registered sale deeds dated 20-2-2004 and 8-5-2003 and that Ex.P-4 notice issued by their vendor established attornment of tenancy in favour of the respondent. While dealing with Point No.2, the learned Rent Controller has marshalled the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, RW-1 and RW-2, exchange of notices between the parties marked as Exs.P-3, P-4, P-6, P-8 and P-9 and Ex.R-1 sale deed dated 12-4-1978 and held that the petitioners have failed to show that they are in any way connected with the petition schedule property bearing No.5-9-88 and that therefore their denial of title of the respondent is not bona fide. Having regard to the admitted facts that the petitioners who have set up title over the petition schedule property in themselves, have not paid the rents, the learned Rent Controller held on Point No.3 that the petitioners have committed willful default in payment of rent from 1-3-2004. On Point No.4, the learned Rent Controller held that the respondent bona fide requires the schedule premises for her personal occupation as additional accommodation. As noted above, on appeal, the learned Additional Chief Judge, on a reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, fully concurred with the findings of the learned Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal. 7. At the hearing, Sri N. Subba Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners, assailed the findings of the Courts below. The learned counsel submitted that both the Courts below have committed a serious error in embarking upon the aspect of title of the parties over the premises in question, which is in serious dispute. 7. At the hearing, Sri N. Subba Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners, assailed the findings of the Courts below. The learned counsel submitted that both the Courts below have committed a serious error in embarking upon the aspect of title of the parties over the premises in question, which is in serious dispute. The learned counsel further submitted that in the face of the registered sale deed marked as Ex.R-1 in favour of the petitioners, there is a title dispute between the parties and hence the Courts below ought to have relegated them to the Civil Court for getting their title adjudicated before entertaining the petition for eviction. 8. Opposing the above contentions, Sri P. Shiv Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent, has drawn the attention of this Court to various portions of the Judgments of the Courts below and the evidence on record and submitted that the petitioners have come out with inconsistent stands. The learned counsel submitted that while the case of the petitioners in Ex.P-6 reply notice dated 28-11-2006 and the counter-affidavit shows that the property was purchased by them in the years 1982 and 1984, for the first time, they have come out in their evidence that they have purchased the property under Ex.R-1 registered sale deed dated 12-4-1978. The learned counsel further submitted that as held by both the Courts below, Ex.R-1 does not contain the premises number and that the boundaries therein do not tally with the boundaries under Exs.P-1 and P-2. Therefore, contends the learned counsel, the petitioners miserably failed to even establish their prima facie title and there was no need at all for the lower Courts to direct the respondent to get her title adjudicated. The learned counsel also submitted that respondent No.2, who was examined as RW-2, has comprehensively admitted that the whole stand taken by them in Ex.P-6 reply notice and the counter-affidavit, is incorrect and that on this admission alone, the lack of bona fides on their part in setting up title over the schedule premises, stood established and the Courts below are completely justified in ordering the petitioners’ eviction. 9. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. The main issue revolves around whether denial of title of the respondent over the petition schedule property, by the petitioners, is bona fide. 9. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. The main issue revolves around whether denial of title of the respondent over the petition schedule property, by the petitioners, is bona fide. The finding on this issue determines the jurisdiction of the learned Rent Controller, for if he finds that such a claim is bona fide, he loses jurisdiction to order eviction of the petitioners and it is only the Civil Court which has the jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction. This issue also assumes relevance because lack of bona fides in denial of title of the landlord or setting up of a right of permanent tenancy constitutes one of the grounds for eviction of the tenant under Section 10(2)(vi) of the Act. In view of this aspect, let me now analyse the evidence in this regard. 11. To recapitulate, the respondent has claimed her title in herself and her husband under Exs.P-1 and P-2, the two registered sale deeds dated 20-2-2004 and 8-5-2003 respectively. The vendor under these two documents was examined as PW-2. In his affidavit filed in lieu of chief examination, PW-2 has admitted that the ground floor portions of the properties bearing Nos.5-9-88 and 5-9-101/3, admeasuring 127.5 sq. yards out of 218.66 sq. yards situated at Public Garden Road, Nampally, Hyderabad, were sold to the respondent under registered sale deed dated 20-2-2004 under Ex.P-1 and that he sold the first floor portion of the said premises to the husband of the respondent (PW-1) under registered sale deed dated 8-5-2003. PW-2 also testified that the petitioners were in occupation of these properties as tenants on a monthly rent of Rs.3500/- and that he informed the petitioners that he sold the petition schedule property to the respondent and requested them to pay rents to the respondent from 1-3-2004 and thus there was attornment of tenancy in favour of the respondent and in pursuance thereof the respondent is entitled to receive rents from 1-3-2004. PW-2 also deposed that on receipt of the legal notice from the respondent, he sent letter dated 10-11-2006 to the petitioners through registered post, marked as Ex.P-4, wherein he has informed the petitioners about the sale of the schedule properties to the respondent and that they agreed to pay the rent to the respondent. PW-2 also deposed that on receipt of the legal notice from the respondent, he sent letter dated 10-11-2006 to the petitioners through registered post, marked as Ex.P-4, wherein he has informed the petitioners about the sale of the schedule properties to the respondent and that they agreed to pay the rent to the respondent. In his cross-examination, the witness admitted that the petitioners are the tenants of the petition schedule property since 1970’s and that a part of the premises bearing No.5-9-88 was sold to the petitioners but he has not sold the petition schedule property to the petitioners and that he does not remember the exact portion of the land that was sold to the petitioners in premises bearing No.5-9-88. PW-2 further testified that he has sold the ground floor portion to the extent of 100 sq. yards in premises No.5-9-88 to the respondent and that the said property is clearly described in Ex.P-1. He specifically denied the suggestion that he has sold the property admeasuring 131.06 sq. yards in premises bearing No.5-9-88 (Part) to the petitioners in the years 1982 and 1984. He also denied the suggestion that the property covered by Ex.P-1 was earlier sold to the petitioners. 12. The evidence of RW-2 assumes great importance. He is the managing partner of the petitioner No.1-firm. In his cross-examination, RW-2 stated that he is not aware whether they have purchased the petition schedule property under Ex.R-1 sale deed in the year 1978 as stated in Ex.P-6 reply notice. He termed the stand taken in Ex.R-6 reply notice that they have purchased the petition schedule property in 1982 and 1984 and also the same stand taken in the counter-affidavit, as incorrect. He admitted that the counter-affidavit bears his signature and that he has read the contents of the counter-affidavit before signing the same. RW-2 also admitted that he is aware of the contents of Ex.P-6 reply notice before it was sent to the respondent. He also conceded that his statement in the affidavit filed in lieu of chief-examination that they have purchased the petition schedule property through registered sale deed, marked as Ex.R-1, is contrary to their averments in the counter-affidavit and the stand taken by them in Ex.P-6 reply notice. He also conceded that his statement in the affidavit filed in lieu of chief-examination that they have purchased the petition schedule property through registered sale deed, marked as Ex.R-1, is contrary to their averments in the counter-affidavit and the stand taken by them in Ex.P-6 reply notice. RW-2 also stated that he cannot make out from the plan annexed to Ex.P-1 sale deed whether the same is the petition schedule property and whether the petitioners are in occupation of the same, or not. He added that the plan annexed to Ex.P-1 is different from the plan annexed to Ex.R-1 sale deed. He further deposed that the petitioners have purchased three portions of the property bearing municipal No.5-9-88/C, Public Garden Road, Hyderabad by three registered sale deeds and two portions through agreement of sale with possession before 1983 and that despite their demands, PW-2 had not executed registered sale deeds in respect of the two portions covered by the said agreement of sale. 13. While the petitioners have come out with an unequivocal stand that the premises bearing No.5-9-88 (Part) admeasuring 131.06 sq. yards was purchased in the years 1982 and 1984, both in Ex.P-6 reply notice and the counter-affidavit, no documents executed during those years have been filed by them to substantiate the same. It is for the first time after the rent control case was filed that the petitioners have set up a completely new case in their notice dated 25-6-2007, marked as Ex.P-8, wherein they have introduced Ex.R-1 and the same stand was pursued by RW-1 and RW-2 in their evidence. Interestingly, PW-2, who is the vendor under Ex.R-1, was not confronted with the said document during his cross-examination. A perusal of Annexure to Ex.R-1, which contains the description of the property conveyed thereunder, would show that it was “a small lobby having three doors and one passage to the entrance hall, one door projecting to the press situated in the north, and the other two doors having entrance to east and west sides and a small hall adjoining to the said rooms”. The said property was further described as having “three rooms stretching straight to south to the said entrance hall, having lime plastering roofs, totaling in all 83.6 sq.m. or 100.2 sq.yards.” The eastern boundary of the said property was described as existing portion of premises bearing No.5-9-88, Fateh Maidan, belonging to the vendor and leased to petitioner No.1; western boundary as property belonging to the “purchaser”; southern boundary as belonging to one Abbas Hussain and the northern boundary as Dalton Press. The fact that the petitioners shielded Ex.R-1 from PW-2-their vendor, would give rise to a reasonable presumption that they did not want their vendor to explain the exact property that was sold to them. Lack bonafides on the part of the petitioners is thus clearly evident from this conduct and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Rent Controller in this regard is totally justified. Even though RW-2 in his cross-examination has stated that the petitioners have purchased three portions of the property bearing Nos.5-9-88/C under three registered sale deeds and two portions through agreement of sale in the year 1983, they have not filed any of these documents. They have also not explained why they have not filed those documents. Their withholding of these documents also leads to a reasonable inference that the petitioners are not coming out with true and correct facts and they are hiding material facts before the Courts. This conduct also proves lack of bona fides on their part in not only denying title of the respondent but also setting up title to the petition scheduled property in themselves. 14. While considering the provisions of Section 10(2)(vi) of the Act, the Supreme Court in J. Pandu Vs. R. Narsubai ( (1987) 1 SCC 573 )held that either denial of title or claim of permanent tenancy, without bona fides, will itself be enough to attract the said provision and that the order of eviction made on that ground has therefore to be sustained. R. Narsubai ( (1987) 1 SCC 573 )held that either denial of title or claim of permanent tenancy, without bona fides, will itself be enough to attract the said provision and that the order of eviction made on that ground has therefore to be sustained. As the petitioners miserably failed to satisfy the learned Rent Controller that their disputing the respondent’s title is bona fide, it leads to two inevitable consequences, namely, (i) that the case falls outside the category of one, where the dispute over title is involved as envisaged under Section 10(1) of the Act and (ii) that the case squarely falls under Section 10(2)(vi) of the Act, which ordains that the Rent Controller shall make an order directing the tenant’s eviction, if denial of title of the landlord is not bona fide. In the light of the material available on record, the learned Rent Controller has rightly held that denial of title of the respondent by the petitioners was not bona fide and that there was jural relationship between the petitioners and the respondent. 15. As the findings on these two aspects were enough to justify the eviction order, the other two grounds, i.e., willful default in payment of rents and bonafide requirement of the landlord, are rendered inconsequential. At any rate, once the petitioners fail to establish that there is no jural relationship between them and the respondent, in the face of the admitted position that they have not paid any rents to the respondent from 1-3-2004, it necessarily follows that the petitioners have committed willful default in payment of rents. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioners has not contested the finding of the Courts below on the aspect of bona fide requirement of the petition schedule property by the respondent and therefore it is not necessary for this Court to deal with the said aspect. 17. For the above mentioned reasons, I do not find any ground to interfere with the orders of the Courts below. The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed. 18. As a sequel, C.R.P.M.P.No.377/2012 is disposed of as infructuous.